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Abstract 
The rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) are facing increasing criticism from some contracting states. At the 
heart of these concerns is the perception that the ECtHR is, in some cases, acting outside its 
legitimate mandate, by expanding its use of authority beyond the object and purpose of the 
agreement. While significant work has been published concerning the approach taken by the 
ECtHR in protecting rights, there is little that addresses the legitimacy of the existing judicial 
model in terms of the authority initially and subsequently conferred upon the Court by ECHR 
signatories.  
This work provides a critical review and analysis of the authority initially conferred upon the 
ECtHR by the first signatories and by the subsequent operation and evolution of the ECHR 
legal system. Findings from the review and analysis of the nature of the ECtHR’s authority are 
used as the basis for development of an analytical framework for the purpose of assessing 
the legitimacy of its procedures. The framework is designed to appraise the validity of the 
criticisms by states and to support the development of a proposed improved judicial model 
for decision-making. The analytical framework and the corrective model represent the major 
challenge and originality in the work and the major contribution to knowledge. 
Application of the analytical framework and the corrective model to relevant and 
controversial decisions of the ECtHR demonstrates their value and indicates that in some 
cases the criticisms made by states appear valid. This evaluation of the corrective model 
suggests that it is, at the least, of value in support of practical and academic analysis of ECtHR 
decisions, but also that it may be a useful element in the development of improvements in 
the processes and operation of the Court, to enhance legitimacy, consistency and authority 
in its rulings.  
Discussion relating to the potential for wider development of the ECtHR’s processes, beyond 
the proposed corrective model, is provided under the heading of further work.  
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1.1 Introduction 
Chapter One presents the background to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and sets out challenges made by different groups in relation to its interpretation and 
application via the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The purpose of this chapter is 
not to evaluate the validity of such challenges but rather to identify the specific and underlying 
concerns associated with them and their potential impact on the future effectiveness of the 
ECHR. The following discussion will introduce the areas and issues addressed in this work and 
hence the scope of the overall PhD project. 
The difficulties in practice caused by any significant questioning of the ECtHR's use of its 
authority are evidenced by worrying and measurable trends, explored in this chapter. Trends 
include significant non-compliance with rulings, duplication of cases and troubling public 
statements. Such incidents have the potential to undermine confidence in, and respect for, a 
system dependent upon member state and popular support.1  While concerns have been 
                                                                
1 Without judgment compliance, the legality of an adjudicatory system is in question. See A. Huneeus, 
“Compliance with International Court Judgments and Decisions”, in K. Alter, C. Romano and Y. Shany 
(eds), Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press: 2013) 437.   
The ECtHR itself has held that without domestic delivery of its judgments, the right of access to a court 
under Article 6 become illusory.  See Hornsby v Greece, Application No. 18357/91, Judgment of 19 
March 1997. 
It is also recognised by the Council of Europe Steering Committee for Human Rights in its report on the 
future of the ECHR system: 
Of course, our Convention – first established in the aftermath of the Second World War – is 
only ever as strong as the political will behind it. Member States are primarily responsible for 
its implementation and for executing the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. 
The system hinges on their willingness and ability to do so. The decision of Europe’s 
governments to reiterate their commitment to it, through the adoption of the Brussels 
Declaration on “the implementation of the Convention, our shared responsibility” (March 
2015), was therefore extremely welcome [emphasis added]. 
Council of Europe, ‘The Longer-Term Future of the System of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (adopted December 2015, published June 2016) report of the Steering Committee for Human 
Rights, page 7, available at <https://rm.coe.int/the-longer-term-future-of-the-system-of-the-
european-convention-on-hum/1680695ad4> accessed 9 May 2018. 
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voiced most robustly in the UK by both political representative and prominent judges2, this 
work posits that such concerns are now more widespread and represent a growing perception 
that the ECtHR can be said to be overstepping its authority under the ECHR mandate. Notably, 
the membership of the ECHR, as a collective body of 47 states, agreed in the Brighton 
Declaration that the safeguards recognising a divide between national choices and legitimate 
centralised protection require reinforcement.3 
This work submits that where the text of the ECHR appears open to more than one 
interpretation in relation to the rights or to different approaches for their application, a 
detailed analysis of the shared government object and purpose of its member states could 
distil what this implies for a legitimate approach to the interpretative and enforcement 
                                                                
2 In reference to the judiciary, the concerns about some aspects of the operation of the ECtHR as raised 
by Lord Hoffmann, Lord Sumption and Lady Hale are explored later in this work.  
In reference to political bodies, controversy the ECtHR’s ruling on the right of convicted prisoners to 
vote, caused some members of parliament to call for the UK to break its treaty obligations. For 
example, David Davis MP stated: 
However, there are those who argue that there is nothing more we can do, that we have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court and must forever obediently obey its 
decisions. But this is not the case. Britain cannot be forced to give prisoners the vote or to pay 
compensation to prisoners who sue the government. The Strasbourg Court has no power to 
fine Britain for non-compliance with its judgments. 
The Council of Europe has failed to expel Bulgaria for police brutality, Moldova for torture and 
Russia for atrocities committed in Chechnya, so it is hardly likely to expel a country for 
standing up for its proper constitutional rights. If Parliament rejects the proposal to give 
prisoners the vote, the matter will simply remain on the long list of unenforced judgments 
reviewed by the Committee of Ministers. 
D. Davis MP, ‘Today's Vote on Prisoners' Rights is an Historic Opportunity to Draw a Line in the Sand 
on European Power’, Conservative Home (blog from 10 February 2011) available at 
<http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2011/02/david-davis-todays-vote-on-prisoners-
rights-is-an-historic-opportunity-to-draw-a-line-in-the-sand-on.html> accessed 6 September 2018. 
Some MPs have accused the ECtHR of ‘judicial activism’. For example, Jack Straw, MP stated: 
[T]he problem has arisen because of the judicial activism of the Court in Strasbourg, which is 
widening its role not only beyond anything anticipated in the founding treaties but beyond 
anything anticipated by the subsequent active consent of all the state parties, including the 
UK. 
J. Straw MP, Hansard, HC Vol. 523, Col. 502, 10 February 2011 available at 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110210/debtext/110210-
0002.htm> accessed 6 September 2018. 
3 As well as in the declarations adopted at the conferences held in Interlaken on 18 and 19 February 
2010, İzmir on 26 and 27 April 2011 and Brussels on 26 and 27 March 2015. 
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authority of the ECtHR. These implications could form the basis for the identification of a 
framework of principles underpinning and justifying the limits of the ECtHR when exercising 
its autonomy. This orientation might then guide an analysis of the ECtHR’s case law to help 
evaluate the accuracy or otherwise of claims that the current judicial model operates outside 
the legitimate boundaries of a reasonably mandated framework.   
The agreement between the ECtHR (as the agent) and ECHR contracting states (as the principals4) 
does give the Court a wide discretion in the choice of means adopted to accomplish the 
Convention aims.5  Under Article 32, the ECtHR has jurisdiction to decide all matters concerning 
the interpretation and application of the ECHR and its Protocols. However, the government 
object and purpose of the agreement must still guide the ECtHR in its actions, given that its 
agency authorizes it only as the enabler and guardian of the principals’ agreed goals for 
cooperation in ceding to it power. The authority of the ECtHR is thereby subject to inferred limits 
if it is not to exceed what is reasonably necessary for the task conferred.6  
Ultimately, either a lack of reflective awareness by the ECtHR of its own place, or the absence of 
an established and transparent judicial model guiding its rulings, may lead to complaints and 
actions representing more than mere discontent by the member states. An erosion of the sense 
                                                                
4 This is ultimately the voters but for practical purposes it is the state(s) which gives/represents their 
agreement. 
5 As Hawkins et al explain: 
‘Discretion entails a grant of authority that specifies the principal’s goals but not the specific 
actions the agent must take to accomplish those objectives.’  
D. Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielson and M. Tierney, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations 
(2006: Cambridge University Press) 8. 
6 An inferred control over the ECtHR’s powers is possible, in spite of the wording under Article 32 
ECHR, which gives the Court the wide-reaching jurisdiction of deciding, ‘all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto’ and expressly authorises 
the ECtHR to determine for itself the limits of this jurisdiction.  
As an agent, the ECtHR’s powers are subject implicitly to the limits of the authority vested in it by the 
principals to the agreement. To explain: 
The relations between a principal and an agent are always governed by a contract, even if this 
agreement is implicit (never formally acknowledged) or informal (based on an unwritten 
agreement). 
ibid 7. 
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of legitimacy brings with it the risk of “demise or reform”.7  For a legal system such as the ECHR, 
extra vigilance is perhaps called for, to ensure that there is not an unrealistic reliance upon 
textualism by the ECtHR in using its jurisdiction under Article 32. The area of human rights is 
never far from controversy, and has far-reaching consequences that could not have been 
predicted fully by the original drafters.  
Judge-made tools used in reviewing national choices, such as subsidiarity, the margin of 
appreciation and consensus, show that the ECtHR is aware of the need to show a degree of 
judicial restraint. This is not the same as suggesting the ECtHR must do what the member states 
want, but only that its process of reasoning must take account the conditions of the grant of 
authority i.e. the purpose desired by the states and the implications for continued state influence 
limiting the pace of development.8  The ECtHR recognises the danger of moving beyond the 
conditional grant of authority from the member states and accepts that its autonomy is limited 
in its range by the need for such mechanisms of control. There is then no attempt to deny the 
central role of the states in the human rights process. It is apparent from the Brighton 
Declaration, however, that reform is being called for.  
Since the Brighton Declaration, the challenge regarding the authority of ECtHR case law has been 
considered by the Council of Europe.9 There is also evidence of a possible shift in attitude within 
                                                                
7 P. Popelier and C. Van de Heyning, “Subsidiarity Post-Brighton: Procedural Rationality as Answer?” 
(2017) Leiden Journal of International Law 5,7. 
8 The following explanation is helpful on this point: 
Agents receive conditional grants of authority from a principal, but this defining characteristic 
does not imply that agents always do what principals want. Agency slack is independent action 
by an agent that is undesired by the principal. Slack occurs in two primary forms: shirking […] 
and slippage, when an agent shifts policy away from its principal’s preferred outcome and 
towards its own preferences. Autonomy is the range of potential independent action available 
to an agent after the principal has established mechanisms of control […] [emphasis added] 
D. Hawkins (n 5) 8. 
9 See the Council of Europe report of the Steering Committee for Human Rights on the future of the 
Convention system: 
The authority of the Court is vital for its effectiveness and for the viability of the Convention 
system as a whole. These are contingent on the quality, cogency and consistency of the Court’s 
judgments, and the ensuing acceptance thereof by all actors of the Convention system, 
including governments, parliaments, domestic courts, applicants and the general public as a 
whole. The interpretation of states’ obligations under the Convention, especially by reference 
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the ECtHR, which recognises the force and potential danger to the ECHR system of these 
concerns. Dean Spielmann, while President of the European Court of Human Rights, commented 
that: 
The future imagined at Brighton is one where the centre of gravity of the Convention 
system should be lower than it is today, closer temporally and spatially to all 
Europeans, and to all those under the protection of the Convention.10 
Similarly, Judge Spano of the ECtHR has suggested that:  
The next phase in the life of the Strasbourg Court might be defined as the age of 
subsidiarity, a phase that will be manifested by the Court’s engagement with 
empowering member States to truly “bring rights home”.11     
There is evidence that suggests there been a demonstrable growth in the role of the margin of 
appreciation in ECtHR rulings post the Brighton Declaration. Figure 1.1 is an extract from a 
working paper produced by iCourts12, which analyses datasets from the iCourts database on 
decisions by international courts. By comparing the number of references to the margin of 
appreciation in ECtHR case law against the quantitative development of case law, the relative 
development in references to the margin of appreciation is shown as a percentage of total cases. 
                                                                
to the “European consensus”, has at times led to criticisms by some of these actors. This 
reflects a wider debate about the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity and, in 
particular, the extent of the margin of appreciation that states should be afforded. 
Council of Europe, ‘The Longer-Term Future of the System of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (adopted December 2015, published June 2016) report of the Steering Committee for Human 
Rights, page 56, available at <https://rm.coe.int/the-longer-term-future-of-the-system-of-the-
european-convention-on-hum/1680695ad4> accessed 9 May 2018. 
10 D. Spielmann, “Whither the Margin of Appreciation” (2014) 67 CLP 49, 65. 
11 R. Spano, “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity” (2014) 
14 Human Right Law Review 487, 491. 
12 The Danish National Research Foundation's Centre of Excellence for International Courts (iCourts), 
is a research centre dedicated to the study of international courts, their role in a globalising legal order 
and their impact on politics and society. More information is available at 
<https://jura.ku.dk/icourts/about/> accessed 6 September 2018. 
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Fig 1.1 Development of Case Law v. Margin of Appreciation13 
The chart shows a statistically significant growth in the percentage of cases referring to margin 
of appreciation over the entire period since the Brighton Declaration. However, it is notable that 
the peak is still only around 10% of cases.  
It is clear that any problem in the balance that is reached between the member states and the 
ECHR institutions is thus a matter of degree and a result of the difficult tightrope the ECtHR must 
tread between interference and inconsequence. The author most certainly does not seek to 
undermine the work of the ECtHR to date, or to suggest that the Court has been anything other 
than a positive overall influence.14 The work proposes, only, possible ways in which the ECtHR 
process may be strengthened, to avoid any missteps as it continues to maintain its fine balance 
moving towards an ever more comprehensive system and responding to newly emergent societal 
trends and concerns. The author notes also that the ECtHR has been proactive in its responses to 
                                                                
13 M. Madsen, ‘Rebalancing European Human Rights: Has the Brighton Declaration Engendered a New 
Deal on Human Rights in Europe?’ (June 27, 2017) iCourts working paper series no. 100, page 17, 
available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2993222_code2133408.pdf?abstractid=299322
2&mirid=1&type=2> accessed 26 January 2018 
14 For an analysis of the benefits of the ECtHR at the individual, national and global level see M. Amos, 
"The Value of the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom" (2017) 28(3) European 
Journal of International Law 763. 
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the concerns since Brighton, both in word and deed. However, should there be any continuing 
validity in the claims being made by the member states then they must be taken seriously. If 
there is no validity, demonstrating the point remains important to the future of the ECHR. 
In light of the UK decision to withdraw from the European Union (EU), the potential impact of a 
lack of public understanding and support for an international system is more apparent than ever. 
These “voluntary” arrangements are vulnerable to damaging perceptions, and can be fatally 
undermined by them. This is despite their longevity and, with the EU in particular, substantial 
integration with national systems and evidence of beneficial aspects for individuals which may 
appear to offset the negative elements. There is real evidence of some shift in attitude towards 
how the decisions of the ECtHR should take effect in UK law. Government proposals openly 
question whether the UK should be bound to follow ECtHR rulings.15 Such an eventuality on the 
part of an important ECHR participant would surely impact on the effectiveness of the 
Convention as a system in securing rights.16  
                                                                
15 Note the proposals for a British Bill of Rights and to negotiate a status for the UK where the ECtHR’s 
rulings would be merely advisory or, alternatively, to altogether leave the ECHR. 
The proposals for reform set out in the UK Government review of the operation of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and of the ECHR will be explored in depth later in this work, when the project considers how 
the operation of the ECtHR could be brought more in line with the findings of the work, on basis of 
the Court’s authority.   
For now, it is worth noting that despite the Government paper’s support, at p. 2, of purpose of the 
ECHR as, ‘an entirely sensible statement of the principles which should underpin any democratic 
nation’ it suggests, at p. 6, that the UK negotiate a deal where the ECtHR’s judgments are advisory as 
opposed to a legal obligation.  
The Conservative Party, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservative’s Proposals for 
Changing Human Rights in the UK’, available at 
<https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/HUMAN_RIGHTS.pdf> 
accessed 5 January 2017. 
In its 2015 Manifesto, the Government repeatedly confirms its commitment to scrap the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and to and curtail the role of the ECtHR across a range of areas. 
‘The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015’, available at <https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto> 
accessed 5 January 2017.  
16 As posited by the MP and QC Dominic Grieve: 
Precisely because the Convention is dependent on peer group pressure for its observance, we 
[the UK] will offer an example and an invitation for it to be ignored by others. It is already the 
case that countries such as Russia and the Ukraine have used the UK position to procrastinate 
on implementing judgments. Others will do the same and the Convention will be further 
Page 17 of 391 
 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 The Origins of the ECHR and the ECtHR 
The ECHR was created in the aftermath of the Second World War as a treaty-based system 
protecting the human rights agreed to as fundamental by all the founding states. These have 
since been endorsed by later signatories. Under the supervision of the ECtHR, contracting 
states agree to be subject to challenge by citizens on their legislative, administrative and 
judicial decisions. Since its adoption by the Council of Europe in 1950 and entry into force in 
1953, the system of enforcement has developed into a modern and sophisticated body of 
autonomous law that has a major impact across European societies. That body of law 
continues to grow, to integrate: (1) new ECHR community understandings of the normative 
scope of the generally defined rights (interpreted by the ECtHR); and (2) standards for 
responding to challenges with the particular application of those norms (overseen by the 
ECtHR).  
The purpose of the ECHR is, as set out in its Preamble, to maintain and further human rights 
by providing greater unity through common understanding and observance/enforcement. 
The signatories agree to pursue ‘a common understanding and observance of the Human 
Rights’ and resolve ‘to take the first steps for the collective enforcement’.  
The generally defined rights, which form the categories and limits under which more specific 
norms may be interpreted, are contained in Section I, which consists of Articles 2 to 18.  
A simple reading of the ECHR text makes it clear that the ECtHR is responsible for settling the 
common understanding or interpretation of the rights and overseeing their 
                                                                
challenged and undermined. Indeed, the impact will go further. Our current statements have 
already had an effect beyond the member states of the Convention. The UK position was used 
by Venezuela in justifying ignoring obligations under the American Convention on Human 
Rights [...] The President of Kenya cited it at the time when the United Kingdom and other 
were pressing him to cooperate with the ICC, of which Kenya accepts jurisdiction. And this is 
before one looks at the beneficial impact which will be lost if the ECHR ceases to be viewed as 
a benchmark for citation in courts in places such as India and South Africa. 
D. Grieve, “Is the European Convention Working?” (2015) European Human Rights Law Review, 584, 
592. 
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observation/enforcement or application.  The literal wording under Article 32 gives the ECtHR 
the wide-reaching jurisdiction of deciding ‘all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto’. It also expressly authorises the 
ECtHR to determine for itself the limits of this jurisdiction: ‘In the event of dispute as to 
whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.’ In accordance with the wording of 
Article 32, contracting member states that disagree with either ECtHR’s involvement or 
ultimate decision must still follow it or otherwise be in breach of the ECHR.17  
Chapter Two will argue that the wording does not, however, equate to suggesting that the 
ECtHR has unlimited power and cannot be criticized and questioned about the legitimacy of 
its actions. It is inferable that in making those determinations the ECtHR should be mindful 
that it does so in accordance with the government object and purpose of the ECHR and the 
limits that places on the validity of the exercise of this authority. The judge-made tools that 
have developed over time in its acquis reinforce that the ECtHR is itself concerned not to 
overstep the mandate given to it, albeit that this work questions whether those tools are 
satisfactorily deployed and consistent in their usage. Mindfulness of government object and 
purpose is also part of the wider international law system. 
This work considers that it is at least partly the lack of certainty about how the ECtHR is to 
render its function that is causing accusations against it of judicial activism. The ECHR text 
alone cannot establish how the ECtHR should proceed when: (1) interpreting new 
constructions of the norms that form part of the common understanding or the scope of the 
protected rights; and (2) the standards or requirements that apply to the states to show 
satisfactory application/observance of those norms. 
1.2.2 The Convention System 
Any person who considers that their ECHR rights have been violated by a state party can take 
their case to the ECtHR. Allowing the right for individuals to go before the ECtHR is a unique 
feature of the ECHR, as traditionally only nation states are considered actors in international 
                                                                
17 With the caveat of in extremis evidence of bias or grossly unjust results. 
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law.18 It remains the only international human rights agreement providing this individualised 
protection. This unique characteristic has allowed the ECtHR to develop ECHR rights with 
relative independence and speed, and this is perhaps responsible for criticisms of the Court 
resulting from what some see as an unrestricted or undisciplined growth in its enforcement.  
Judgments finding a breach are binding on the respondent state(s)19 and they are obliged to 
execute them if they are to comply with their international law duties and not risk the 
reputational costs of refusing to meet those obligations.20 Additionally, other member states 
are likely to respond in their national law, to avoid possible action in the future, criticism and 
political embarrassment. While this system of enforcement relies upon the states concerned 
                                                                
18 The European Union is perhaps the closest comparison in creating a system that gives individual 
citizen’s rights upon which they may directly rely (direct effect). However, the EU system relies on the 
national courts to apply EU law. The role of the EU Court of Justice is limited to: (1) interpreting the 
meaning and requirements of the law after a request from the national court or tribunal, in order that 
the national court may determine the outcome on the facts of the individual case; and (2) should the 
EU Commission bring enforcement proceedings, ruling on whether the national system is in breach of 
its EU duties e.g. the courts are not correctly interpreting or applying the law. 
19 Article 46 of the ECHR states that:  
‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any 
case to which they are parties.’ 
20 As it is for the member state to implement the judgment of the ECtHR there is, in practice, a certain 
amount of leeway in implementation. On this point, see N. Bratza, “The Relationship between the UK 
Courts and Strasbourg” [2011] European Human Rights Law Review 505.  
However, should it become established practice not to implement judgments or to ask the ECtHR to 
reconsider its ruling then the pressure on states held to be in violation to comply is reduced. This is 
more apparent if the route for implementation is considered. 
Decisions of the ECtHR against a state are implemented through the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers receives reports about progress remedies the violation 
and may apply pressure as necessary. The Parliamentary Assembly will also pressurise states to bring 
their laws into conformity. This process is reliant upon the member states working collectively and 
willingly intervening in the internal affairs of each other, this means that if the ECtHR fails to provide 
convincing rulings the effectiveness of those decisions will ultimately decline.  
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complying with the ruling, the political embarrassment of being found in breach and the link 
with membership of the EU21 means that ECtHR judgments are normally honoured.22  
The majority of contracting states (now including the UK, after the Human Rights Act 1998) 
have incorporated into national law the ECHR rights and ECtHR case law interpreting the 
norms that they encompass and standards for application. Thereby reducing the need for 
individuals to resort to going before the ECtHR to have their rights upheld and the ultimate 
likelihood of the state being found to have failed in its observation. 
1.2.3 Criticism of the ECtHR 
Most recently, the UK, triggered by high-profile rulings on prisoners’ voting rights and on 
barriers to deportation, has been very vocal in its criticism of an apparent increase in 
                                                                
21 Article 6(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) states:  
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 
1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law. 
The EU Court of Justice has held that the ECHR has “special significance” in its case law. Nold v 
Commission, Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491. 
22 In 2017 the number of cases brought to a successful conclusion reached an all-time high: 
The number of cases closed reached an all-time high thanks to a new policy of enhanced 
dialogue with states, resulting in more – and timelier – closure decisions in the face of positive 
developments. In 2017, the Committee of Ministers closed 3 691 cases compared to 2 066 in 
2016, including many repetitive cases in which individual redress had been provided. In 
particular, there has been an important increase, over 30%, in the closure of cases revealing 
structural problems which had been pending before the Committee for more than five years. 
As a result, the total number of cases pending at the end of the year has decreased by around 
25%, and is now down to some 7 500 (as compared to some 11 000 in 2014). The number of 
structural problems under supervision also decreased by around 7 %. 
Council of Europe and Committee of Ministers, ‘Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: The 11th Annual Report 2017’ (March 2018), page 
7, available at <https://rm.coe.int/annual-report-2017/16807af92b> accessed 9 May 2018.  
The Department for the Execution of Judgments provides access to a searchable list of all judgments 
currently outstanding against all contracting states, available at 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/default_en.asp> accessed 20 November 2016.   
Page 21 of 391 
 
intervention by the ECtHR.23 There is a perception that judicial intervention by the ECtHR is, 
inappropriately, threatening the separation of powers between the law and politics by too 
readily questioning the political decisions of government and the reviews of national courts 
within that democratic system.  
If true, the suggestion that the ECtHR is exceeding its authority undermines the very 
legitimacy of some judgments. Even if not true, it still represents harmful speculation, 
potentially undermining trust and confidence in the system.  With perhaps a little dramatic 
flair, the point is well made by the UK judge Lord Hoffman who when discussing an expanded 
recognition of the right to privacy and the role of ECtHR judges commented: 
What legislative power the judicial representative of Slovenia can wield from his 
chambers in Strasbourg. Out with this pernicious American influence. What do their 
courts or Founding Fathers know of human rights [referring to the notion of 
representation of the people]? It is we in Strasbourg who decree the European public 
order. Let the balance be struck differently, I say, and all the courts of Europe must 
jump to attention.24 
Lord Sumption also observed:  
[T]he [Court] […] has become the international flag-bearer for judge-made 
fundamental law extending well beyond the text […] [It] develops the Convention […] 
so as to reflect its own view of what rights are required in a modern democracy.25 
Lady Hale has commented: 
“There is indeed a serious debate in Strasbourg itself about the limits to its evolutive 
approach.”26 
                                                                
23 Research has pointed to an “unprecedented” legitimacy challenge. See R. Spano, “Universality or 
Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity” (2014) 3 Human Rights Law Review 
487, 488. 
24 Lord Hoffman, “The Universality of Human Rights” (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 416, 429. 
25 Lord Sumption, “The Limits of Law, 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur” (20 November 
2013) available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf> accessed 15 October 
2016. 
26 Lady Hale, “Lady Hale at the Warwick Law Lecture 2013: What’s the Point of Human Rights?”  (28 
November 2013) available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131128.pdf> accessed 22 
October 2017. 
Page 22 of 391 
 
Support beyond the UK of views that the ECtHR has gone outside the agency that contracting 
member states are comfortable with is suggested by the failure of states to respond promptly 
and effectively to judgments. There are approximately 7,584 pending cases as yet unresolved 
by the violating respondent state and a frequency of new so called “cloned” cases even after 
a clear ruling on the same issue.27 Given the political embarrassment of any refusal to comply 
with human rights rulings, this suggests a growing strength of feeling. 
                                                                
Concerns were also raised by Lord Laws that the role of the Court: 
[I]s not to make marginal choices about issues upon which reasonable, humane and informed 
people may readily disagree […] 
Fundamental values possess at the very least an irreducible minimum. But short of that, the 
balance to be struck between policy and rights, between the judiciary and government, is 
surely a matter for national constitutions. 
Lord Laws, “The Common Law and Europe” Hamlyn Lecture at Inner Temple Hall (27 November 2013) 
available at <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/laws-lj-
speech-hamlyn-lecture-2013.pdf> accessed 22 October 2017. 
And by Lord Judge: 
My profound concern about the long-term impact […] on our constitutional affairs is the 
democratic deficit […] in our constitutional arrangements parliament is sovereign [...] 
It would make sense for the [Human Rights Act] to be amended, to express that the obligation 
to take account of the decisions of the Strasbourg court did not mean that our supreme court 
was required to follow or apply those decisions, and that in this jurisdiction the supreme court 
is, at the very least, a court of equal standing with the Strasbourg court [...] 
Are we […] prepared to contemplate the gradual emergence of a court with the equivalent 
jurisdiction throughout Europe of that enjoyed by the supreme court in the United States of 
America? 
Lord Judge, “Constitutional Change: Unfinished Business”, Constitution Unit, University College 
London (December 2013) available at <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/constitution-unit-
news/181213> accessed 22 October 2017. 
27Council of Europe and Committee of Ministers, ‘Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: The 11th Annual Report 2017’ (March 2018) puts 
the number of cases where implementation has not been completed at around 7,584 and the total 
number of new repetitive cases at 1,154 at the end of 2017 available at <https://rm.coe.int/annual-
report-2017/16807af92b> accessed 9 May 2018.  
Note also, Burdov (no 2) v Russia in which the ECtHR said that:  
The State has thus been very frequently found to considerably delay the execution of judicial 
decisions ordering payment of social benefits such as pensions or child allowances, of 
compensation for damage sustained during military service or of compensation for wrongful 
prosecution. The Court cannot ignore the fact that approximately seven hundred cases 
concerning similar facts are currently pending before it against Russia.’ 
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Fig 1.2 New ECtHR Cases28 
 
Fig 1.3 ECtHR Cases Pending Resolution29 
                                                                
Burdov (no 2) v Russia, Application No 33509/04, Judgment of 15 January 2009, para 133.   
28 Council of Europe and Committee of Ministers, ‘Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: The 11th Annual Report 2017’ (n 27) 57.   
29 ibid 57.   
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Recent research has reached similar conclusions based on comparative in-depth reports, 
covering fifteen contracting states. It revealed: (1) sparse criticism in Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden; (2) moderate criticism in France, 
Hungary, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Turkey; (3) strong criticism in the UK; and 
(4) hostile criticism in Russia.30 
The debate around the role of the ECtHR has reached the stage where Council of Europe 
members in the Brighton Declaration have called for an evaluation of the ‘fundamental role 
and nature of the Court’, suggesting the current system may not ‘secure the viability of the 
Court’s key role in the system for protecting and promoting human rights’.31 The criticisms 
made in the Brighton Declaration can helpfully be broken down into three key areas of 
concern: 
                                                                
30  P. Popelier, S. Lambrecht and K. Lemmens, Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Intersentia:2016). 
31Note in particular the points relating to the longer-term future of the ECHR system and the ECtHR, 
as set out below. 
Declaration 30: 
This Declaration addresses the immediate issues faced by the Court. It is however also vital to 
secure the future effectiveness of the Convention system. To achieve this, a process is needed 
to anticipate the challenges ahead and develop a vision for the future of the Convention, so 
that future decisions are taken in a timely and coherent manner. 
Declaration 31: 
As part of this process, it may be necessary to evaluate the fundamental role and nature of 
the Court. The longer-term vision must secure the viability of the Court’s key role in the system 
for protecting and promoting human rights in Europe. The right of individual application 
remains a cornerstone of the Convention system. Future reforms must enhance the ability of 
the Convention system to address serious violations promptly and effectively. 
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Fig. 1.4 Member State Concerns taken from the Brighton Declaration 
1.3 Research Objectives 
There is already significant literature concerning the current approach of the ECtHR in making 
judgments. Such work provides valuable insights, documenting how the ECHR system has 
operated and evolved, and will be used extensively in this research project. However, it is 
suggested that existing work alone cannot establish satisfactorily a method for identifying the 
legitimacy of the approach that has developed. A framework of principles for analysing the 
legitimacy of the ECtHR’s procedures, in accordance with the authority and degree of 
autonomy recognised in the ECHR, is required to evaluate the approach evident in case law 
and proffer improvements to the judicial model.  
In acknowledging that the interpretation of human rights norms and the standards for 
application is not conclusively settled, the power of the ECtHR must then flow from its 
acceptance as an authority to resolve that uncertainty for legal purposes (i.e. as an agent on 
behalf of its principals). The authority of the ECtHR as a law-making body flows ultimately 
from the consent of citizens as offered by their democratic representative (the State) in 
signing the ECHR. The ECtHR must comply with what can be reasonably inferred about the 
3. Lack of prioritisation of 
the more serious breaches. 
2. Undermining of the 
democratic process. 
1. Unlimited growth of the 
ECHR system, beyond its 
mission.
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limits of that consent, drawing from the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement to 
appreciate the underlying shared government object and purpose of the member states. 
The legitimacy of the ECtHR’s choices in relation to its enforcement mandate is, therefore, 
dependent upon whether they are in line with the object and purpose of the agreement. Yet 
there is limited existing research considering the nature of that given authority and even less 
about its implications. As the extensive range of resources deployed in this work will illustrate, 
the reasons for this lacuna include the breadth of different legal disciplines that must be 
blended to make any meaningful progress on the task. It has even been suggested, by the 
ECtHR itself, that a consistent judicial strategy is simply not feasible for dealing with cases that 
come before it.32  While certainly a difficult task, this work would question whether it is 
appropriate to altogether abandon the attempt.   
The subject matter is also both controversial and emotive, given it involves a system that has 
for a number of years proven itself extremely effective in making changes widely accepted as 
positively transforming the everyday lives of people and supporting ground-breaking 
                                                                
32 Dean Spielmann, while President of the European Court of Human Rights, commented that: 
To provide the best possible response, our Court necessarily treads a narrow path. We face a 
constant challenge as regards the acceptability of our decisions. This question is all the more 
sensitive as our legitimacy is conferred on us by the States that we find against, and our 
position is therefore far from easy. We do not follow a particular judicial strategy, but it goes 
without saying that we do think about how our judgments will be received [emphasis added].  
‘European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2015, Speech on the Occasion of the Opening of the 
Judicial Year on 30 January 2015’, (March 2016) 978-92-871-9894-5, page 34 available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2015_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 November 2016.   
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developments.33 Asking too many questions could be seen as dangerous and most would 
agree, as does this work, that withdrawal from the ECHR would be most unfortunate.34  
Additionally, some may be unconvinced at the ability to impose any limit upon the work of 
the ECtHR given the wording of Article 32 of the ECHR. However, to suggest that the drafters 
of the ECHR, by not expressly limiting the ECtHR to the object and purpose for which it was 
made, historically granted it unlimited discretion and no means of accountability for delivery, 
does not accord with the expectations of any legal institution for transparency and legal 
certainty.35 In any event, the present relevance of whether member states are satisfied that 
their sovereignty is impacted to no greater an extent than to what they agree is shown by 
                                                                
33 The achievements of the ECtHR in interpreting the ECHR rights is impressive, are set out in chapter 
13 of The Council of Europe, ‘The Conscience of Europe, 50 years of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, (Strasbourg, 2010) ISBN 978 1 906507 45 9, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Anni_Book_content_ENG.pdf> accessed 5 January 2017. 
The Legal Affairs and Human Rights Department of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, in collaboration with the Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex, has published an 
information document compiling selected examples of the positive impact of the Convention within 
the member states. ‘Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights in States Parties: Selected 
Examples’ (January 2016) AS/Jur/Inf, available at <http://website-
pace.net/documents/19838/2008330/AS-JUR-INF-2016-04-EN.pdf/12d802b0-5f09-463f-8145-
b084a095e895> accessed 19 November 2016.  
34 In terms of a loss of valuable insights between the member states and joint monitoring and, from a 
more self-interested perspective, a loss political stability that increases the potential for conflict and 
the non-economic movement of people elsewhere. 
35Systems such as the ECHR, despite dealing with a particularly difficult area, must still strive to create 
rules with as much clarity as possible to comply with the Rule of Law. Fallon explains: 
‘The Rule of Law is an ideal that can be used to evaluate laws, judicial decisions, or legal 
systems [emphasis added].’  
R. Fallon, “The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse”, Columbia Law Review, 97 (1997) 
1, 8-9.  
As Lady Justice Arden explains:  
A principal badge of judicial accountability in national courts is that judges show restraint in 
their decision-making and do not venture into those areas which should be left to national 
Parliaments.  For Strasbourg, there is a constant tension between its international obligation 
to interpret the Convention and national sovereignty. 
Lady Justice Arden, ‘An English Judge in Europe: An article based on the Neill Lecture given in Oxford 
at the invitation of All Souls College, Oxford, 28 February 2014 in celebration of the past Wardenship 
of Lord Neill of Bladen’, 12, available at <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lj-arden-an-english-judge-in-europe.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2016. 
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their recent attempts to now influence how the ECtHR exercises its judicial discretion over 
them.36  
Finally, there is the point that the rights in the ECHR are both partially defined and explained 
in Section I the text, as are the limitations that can be placed upon those rights in practice. 
There is also a range of autonomous legal rulings or acquis from the existing body of ECtHR 
case law. This may be thought sufficient to avoid future dispute about: (1) the interpretation 
of the norms that fall under the scope of the rights; and (2) the standards for the application 
of those norms.  But, as this work will show, that is far from the case.  
When rights come into conflict or are raised in a new context, divergent interpretations of 
the consequences of combining the existing norms mean new ones are constructed. It may 
be unclear which of these “candidate norms” is required and must be adopted as falling under 
the scope of rights.37 Even when a new norm is interpreted as falling under the parameters 
of a right i.e. as a common societally understood basic moral principle of general application 
that ignores specific legal facts instead being demanded in abstracto by all humans, the in 
concreto application of those enduring underlying general norms to particular circumstances 
may leave a large margin of discretion.  
If the reasoned interpretation of human rights were uncontroversial and easily discernible 
from higher recognised norms, one may question why the member states felt any need to 
interpret the broad categories of rights that are found in Section I of the ECHR at all. Or, 
conversely, why it took such an extended period of negotiation for the states to agree to those 
                                                                
36  As already noted, the addition of the Protocol 15 requirement for subsidiarity and margin of 
appreciation in the ECHR Preamble.  
37  Collins notes with regard to intentional law in general (this work suggests the problems are 
magnified for moral questions): 
[N]ormative disputes are often structured in terms of divergent interpretations of existing 
legal rules; that different, sometimes potentially conflicted, legal rules, entitlements or rights 
will exist independently of each other without any obvious relation between them; and that, 
prior to law’s ascertainment in certain adjudicatory contexts, it may be questionable where 
particular candidate norms actually “exist” in the first place – this being particularly the case 
at the international level, where adjudicators are left to fill the gaps caused by international 
law’s uncoordinated and decentralised law-creating processes. 
R. Collins, The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law (Hart: 2016) 157. 
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definitions that are included and their refusal or inability to provide even more detailed 
specification. That there is no mathematically certain route to identifying what human rights 
require is evident. 
While the author appreciates that the work proposed in this examination is extensive and 
challenging, it is feasible to undertake an exploration of evidence including the text and 
history of the ECHR to “reasonably” interpret the shared government object and purpose and 
thereby the mandate and underlying authority of the ECtHR. From that ECtHR function, 
further “reasonable” conclusions can be reached about the implications of that authority in 
respect to legitimate rulings. Any framework of analysis for legitimacy will, as is generally the 
case in international law research, be open to challenge but it will pose important questions 
and support the carrying out of appropriate comparative analysis. It will support the 
development of a proposed corrective model and will be at the very least a valuable starting 
point in taking the important debate forward and raising new avenues for discussion. 
There is a substantial body of different theoretical perspectives on the basis for and means of 
determining moral truths or, to be more precise, a justified societal approach to the 
construction of moral norms. The influential work of Kant and Gewirth is accepted as the basis 
to provide a rationale and a process for moral reasoning by agents. These theoretical theses 
will be explored in generality for their ability to provide clarity on human rights norms and 
also in relation specifically to the ECHR system. Where gaps are left by the preferred 
conception of justice, which is reasoned to be the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), in 
the legitimate approach to be taken by the ECtHR, those gaps must be filled in accordance 
with a reasonable appliance of the ECHR’s object and purpose in light of its original 
negotiation and by the relevant rules of wider international law. The relevance of state 
agreement, via consent, is based on a development of the Rawls’ social contract theory, which 
values the sovereignty of states while accepting there are universal norms of moral agents 
which transcend national borders.  
There is existing research applying international relations theory to the negotiation of the 
ECHR to identify its object and purpose, setting out the reasonably inferable ambitions of the 
project and the methods for reaching them as accepted by the consenting founding member 
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states. 38  This work builds upon that research by making original points concerning the 
implications of that shared basis (republican liberalism). Specifically, republican liberalism 
means there must be a primacy of a liberal democratic approach via the nation states to first 
interpreting local societally constructed moral norms, translating those understandings into 
legal norms, and then applying them. The ECtHR, in sifting through the diverse ways in which 
the governments of the various member states interpret norms and establish standards for 
their concrete application, must do so in a manner that respects the outcomes of the 
operation of liberal democracy. Such an approach is in accordance with republic liberalism, 
and is also a conception of justice that supports norms under the PGC as being dialectically 
constructed by the operation of equal and free agents. The ECtHR’s interpretation of what 
form the ECHR community human rights norms must be based on evidence of practices by 
the governments of the member states that could show common moral justificatory 
understandings. Similarly, standards for the application of those shared norms must be drawn 
from the consistent approaches and standards for delivery in those states. 
The review of theoretical jurisprudential approaches to human rights, when combined with 
international law theory interpreting the original object and purpose of the ECHR and its 
subsequent growth, creates an original picture of the project and the place of the ECtHR. This 
supports the development of the framework of principles governing the institutional 
autonomy of the ECtHR, which both enables and limits its role.  
By drawing together existing research on how the ECtHR has developed new norms when 
interpreting the rights and standards for their application and comparing this with a 
framework for analysis of legitimacy, it will be possible to reach some conclusion about the 
cogency of allegations made against the current judicial approach to decision-making. Where 
allegations against the ECtHR are supported, identification and evaluation of a possible 
improved judicial model designed to provide greater legitimacy in its rulings and more 
effective enforcement and development of the ECHR may be undertaken.   
                                                                
38 This work uses the extensive research of Moravesik. As set out in A. Moravesik, “The Origins of 
Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe” (2000) 54(2) International 
Organisation 217. 
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1.4 Thesis 
The thesis this work seeks to defend is that: 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) faces criticism from contracting states, who are 
of the view that its adjudicative technique and aspirations take it beyond its legitimate 
mandate. This view must be taken seriously, on the assumption that the criticisms in question 
share a common and coherent ground.  
The basis of coherent critique presupposes the existence of shared criteria that might allow 
one to ascertain three things: (1) the basis for a legitimate ECtHR mandate on human rights 
and the scope and limit of that authority; (2) the elements of a conforming approach by the 
ECtHR regarding interpretation and application (a framework); and (3) the possibility of an 
improved judicial model for decision-making in accordance with the framework. 
The first part of the problem requires a sufficiently determinate understanding of how a 
legitimate mandate to adjudicate on human rights was first acquired by the ECtHR and what 
were/are the implicit expectations for the exercise of this judicial authority once established.  
The Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) provides a basis for human rights beyond the limits 
of the laws or customs of any particular culture or government. Such purposes are reasonably 
inferable from the text of the ECHR and its negotiation. This forms the foundations for an 
ECtHR mandate, offering a potential insight into the first part of the problem. But the 
potential for reasonable debate about rights interpretation and application requires a means 
of coordination between agents, meaning that states continue to play a vital role. It is possible 
to develop an internationalised democratic social contract theory, which values the 
sovereignty of states under the rule of law and which, in turn, sees the existence, protection 
and promulgation of human rights as intrinsic to this politico-legal model of internationalised 
civil society.  
States may consent to international cooperation and to be subject to oversight in order to 
secure compliance with the PGC as a proper government purpose. But a clear government 
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purpose for cooperation must also include some express or inferable agreement on a means 
for constructing human rights norms that could represent citizens at large.  
The second part of the problem concerns the way the ECtHR approaches the task of 
interpretation and application of human rights law. This exercise of judicial autonomy must 
inevitably reject the mechanical and static notion of a distinct division between making law 
(legislation) and its subsequent interpretation and application. Rather, we require a complex 
synthetic dynamic theory for legitimate interpretation and application that explains the 
continual construction of an ECHR body of law by following the implications of a common 
European political, moral, legal and cultural dialectic.  
A synthesis of these two perspectives offers the opportunity to build a critical model of the 
phenomena and to develop important principles for a framework to guide the ECtHR. This 
supports the third part of the problem, a corrective model for decision-making to support 
more legitimate and effective future operation and evolution. 
1.5 The Research Question and Objectives 
In order to provide a clear focus and direction for the research, a research question was 
established: 
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In light of the research question, the project may be defined as having four main objectives:  
Since its inception, the European Court of Human Rights has been charged with 
demonstrating an increased willingness to find member states in violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. While some evolution in the interpretation of rights is 
necessary and the requirements for application to secure rights are to be expected to 
become less fluid as the Court develops its acquis, some participants allege that the nature 
of these ongoing developments cannot be reconciled with the Court’s mandate.  
(1) To what extent is the mandate of the Court identifiable and relevant to the scope 
and limits of its authority? 
(2) Based on that authority, what are the elements of a corresponding exercise of 
judicial autonomy (a framework) and has an expansive interpretation of rights and 
a reduced margin made available to member states in applying them, exceeded 
that authority?  
(3) If discrepancies are identified could a corrective model for decision making by the 
Court be proposed, to support more legitimate and effective operation and future 
evolution of the system? 
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Objective 1 – To establish a coherent basis 
for evaluating human rights systems and 
the relevance of consent to legitimate 
institutional oversight 
•Defining human rights as an exercise in
jusitied moral reason by agents who must
consent to allocate authority to
institutions.
•Application of theories on human rights
and recognition of limits upon assuming
any indisputable approach, beyond
showing some views cannot be supported
as reasoned and some systems for
resolution cannot be reasoned in
accordance with the methodology of the
PGC.
•Recognition of the need, within a unified
and functional society, for agents to
consensually accept (via a social contract)
as binding the potentially reasoned
outcomes developed via a potentially
reasoned procedure.
•Reliance upon institutions to which agents
give authority and corresponding
autonomy in order to settle what the basic
principles are and to resolve conflict.
•Establishing the role of state consent and
the consequent relevance of the original
basis of the ECHR, placing institutional
authority in the ECtHR.
•Recognising the role of the state as an
accepted authority overseeing and
representing the collective purposes of
citizens: (1) interpreting societal norms
(societal expectations) including those
justified moral norms that are enduring
and form the basis for justice and fairness
between citizens; (2) translating those
general principles into legal norms; and (3)
applying them.
•Establishment of the consequences of that
sovereignty in necessitating evidence of
on-going state input and consent to the
operation and procedures of the ECtHR if it
legitimately expects decisions to be
followed.
•Maintaining that the object and purpose
of the founding member states is the basis
upon which authority was originally
consensually ceded to the ECtHR, and
continues to limit the legitimate use of its
discretionary powers in accordance with
its institutional authority.
Objective 2 – To establish the common 
government object and purpose of the 
ECHR, and the consequences for a 
framework of analysis for assessing the 
legitimacy of ECtHR procedure in line with 
its authority
•Establishing a reasonably inferable
agreed original basis for the ECHR.
•Analysis of materials contemporaneous
with the negotiation and signing of the
ECHR in order to identify the international
relations theory that most closely fits the
agreement as a shared government object
and purpose.
•Exploring the reasonable implications of
the identified prominent theory for the
mandate of the ECtHR.
•Identifying the consequences for the
legitimate authority of the ECtHR and
developing a framework of analysis for
assessing Court procedure.
•Consideration of the reasonably implied
consequences of the object and purpose of
the ECHR (as a means to fill the gaps left
by the express terms relating to the
autonomy of the ECtHR).
•Exploring the impact upon the ECtHR's
authority to make declarations on the (1)
interpretation of the in abstracto
normative scope of the rights; and (2)
standards for the in concreto application of
those principles by states.
•Development of a framework of analysis
comprising elements to assess the
legitimacy of the ECtHR procedure, in line
with the implications identified.
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1.6 Methodology  
The first phase of the project: establishing the scale and relevance of the challenges made 
against the legitimacy of the ECtHR, involves empirical research. Quantitative research, drawn 
from the publications and statistics of the ECHR system, reveals problems such as those 
relating to non-compliance with judgments and rising caseloads. Qualitative research finds 
concerning observations from key ECHR stakeholders and academics suggesting perceived 
problems and a possible deepening of views that could undermine the future effectiveness of 
the system. 
Empirical research is used in the next phase of the project: exploring of the history of the 
ECHR system. Qualitative investigation supports reasoning concerning the object and purpose 
of the system and also the resulting conclusions about the reasonably inferable implications 
Objective 3 - To propose a corrective 
judicial model
•Development of tenets that would
underlie a structure for a legitimate
judicial model for the ECtHR.
•Identifying the pillars for a reasonable
model, that is in accordance with the
elements of the framework of analysis.
•Development of a proposed improved
judicial model.
•Creation of a detailed model, utilizing the
helpful principles of the ECtHR's current
approach.
•Comparing the ECtHR's current approach
against the framework for legitimacy and
proposed model.
•A review of the approach currently used
by the ECtHR as against the proposals.
•Identificiation of any suggestion of
possible slippage from its authority within
the framework of analysis.
Objective 4 – Evaluation of the proposed 
model using case law
•Testing problem ECtHR cases against the
proposed judicial model.
•A review of the facts and arguments
made in challenging cases, with
hypothetical testing of the potential for
the proposed model to respond to
criticisms about the judicial approach,
notably securing greater appropriate
deference to the democratic process and
transparency and accountability in the
future.
•A review of proposals for wider reform
altering the express terms of the ECHR.
•An exploration of the potential for future
research into reforms of the ECHR regime.
•Based upon proposals put forward in
relation to the ECHR and in relation to the
operation of the European Union's Court
of Justice.
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for the approach to be taken by the ECtHR in light of its mandate. This phase also uses cases 
and analysis to explore the judicial tools currently used by ECtHR. 
Empirical research is also deployed in the last stages of the project: the development and 
evaluation of a corrective judicial model. Qualitative information is drawn from a range of 
case reports to evaluate the current judicial model of the ECtHR and then to assess the 
theoretical impact of the proposed corrective one. 
However, this project requires more than simply empirical research; without a theoretical 
reconstruction of the ECtHR in its legal context, there is nothing against which to form a 
critical view of the ECtHR’s autonomy and authority and thereby the judicial model it adopts 
in its decision-making. It is, therefore, the exploration and application of philosophical theory 
of law that principally enables an original contribution to be made relating to: (1) the authority 
of the ECtHR; (2) an analytical framework for legitimacy in its decision-making; and (3) a 
proposed corrective model.  Theory is used as a means to make sense of the real-life empirical 
phenomenon of the ECHR system.  
1.7 Approach 
The option of a dedicated literature review chapter was considered, but an integrated 
approach was determined to be more appropriate for this project. The range of relevant 
topics includes: basic rights and autonomy; legal authority; international law; global 
regulating bodies; and judicial doctrines and tools. Separating the survey and analysis of 
existing materials on these varied points would risk loss of focus on the research question and 
isolating points that only together develop into a means of engaging with the research 
problem.  Embedding the literature throughout the work effectively situates it within the 
context of the project and enables both the relevance of and any gaps in current knowledge 
on each area to be combined and linked together into an organised and systematic 
consideration. 
The examination and analysis to be carried out to respond to the research question and 
achieve the four research objectives falls into eight phases, which correspond broadly with 
the chapters of the research: 
Page 37 of 391 
 
Phase One (Objective One) 
A. Exploration of the overall role and importance of the ECHR project. 
B. Identification of core criticisms about the legitimacy of the operation of the ECtHR, based 
on those raised consistently by key public figures, including political and judicial commentary. 
C. Development of objectives and a methodology for responding to the criticisms. 
Phase Two (Objective One) 
A. Application of natural rights theories relating to moral constructivism as the basis for the 
“substantive” legitimacy for the human rights. Specifically, practical dialectically necessary 
reasoning by agents in accordance with the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). 
Consideration of the limitations of pure reason as a sole basis for the ECHR project in practice, 
without an acceptance of: (1) dialectically “contingent” compromised reasoning by agents in 
societies; (2) further development of procedures to interpret which of the possible justified 
moral claims developed through the informal practical discourse of agents (social 
interactions) represent the proper shared public principles of general application; and (3) an 
authority to translate (propose and produce) those societally understood expectations into 
legal norms and to then apply them in practice to particular circumstances according to 
appropriate standards. 
B. Explanation of the need for a degree of consistency and compromise regarding the process 
for interpretation and application of rights, required by the PGC between interacting agents. 
Consideration of the consequent reliance upon consent by agents in a society to certain 
procedures and institutions with an accepted authority to resolve uncertainty and thereby 
unite the construction of reasoned interpretations and applications, even when some agents 
disagree with a particular outcome: “procedural” relative legitimacy.  
C. Consideration of routes to restrict the autonomy of any such institution, based on the 
institutional authority to which its agents consented. This grant is conditional upon serving a 
particular public (as opposed to private) purpose, or when the institution is an international 
one, a government purpose that could properly be common to all the signatory states. Only 
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when decisions are made reasonably in accordance with that object purpose, does an 
institution have a legitimate expectation that its decisions should bind.  
D. Evaluation of the potential for questions of legitimacy to impede the effectiveness of 
decisions by an institution if judgments are consequently not respected and followed in 
practice. 
Phase Three (Objective One) 
A. Application of the theory of a social contract as providing the basis for sovereign states 
having the presumed consent of agents to protect moral norms, translate societal 
understandings into legal norms and apply those principles.    
B. Identification of possible routes for arguing that international institutions may also hold 
authority, via consent by states to surrender national sovereignty to an international body for 
a public government purpose such as better securing justified moral norms that can be 
interpreted as being commonly understood between the signatories. 
C. A consideration of what the text of the ECHR reveals about the particular object and 
purpose of the agreement, concluding that the central uniting theme is reinforcement of the 
recognition of national democracy as the process consented to by agents to represent their 
dialectic collective moral construction of generic human norms and to ensure standards for 
their proper delivery. 
D.  Explanation of the broad consequences of that trust in democracy in what this work argues 
are the two different stages for the ECtHR judgment process: (1) the interpretation of the 
normative scope of the rights i.e. the moral norms constructed in abstracto by the operation 
of a representative democracy as the basis of freedom and justice; and (2) judicial review of 
standards for the in concreto application of those underlying principles of general application 
to particular circumstances: (a) a procedurally correct democratic review based upon facts 
and expert opinion; and (b) reasonableness of the ultimate substantive choices made. 
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Phase Four (Objective Two) 
A. A review of what can be reasonably inferred about the government object and purpose 
shared by ECHR member states, to respond to issues concerning the authority of the ECtHR 
unresolved by the consideration of its text alone.  
Notably, in the in abstracto interpretation of the normative scope of the rights, to ascertain 
and reconcile the differences in the parameters of rights as constructed by the plurality of 
societies (the member states) and, in the in concreto application of those principles of general 
application to particular circumstances, how to settle the margin of discretion left to the 
democratic representatives in the context of particular societies. This margin being required 
to allow for different circumstances, for example social, economic and security concerns, and 
for particular customs, policies and practices. 
B. Exploring evidence from the text and from the ECHR’s negotiation, to reasonably infer the 
theory of government purpose most strongly associated with providing authorisation for the 
ECtHR by the member states. Specifically, that of republican liberalism which requires 
deference by an international body to democratic decisions made by a sovereign state. 
C. Formulation of relevant criteria or guiding elements for a framework of analysis for 
assessing the legitimacy of judicial procedure based on the extent of the authority and 
autonomy of the ECtHR under republican liberalism. 
Phase Five (Objective Three) 
A. Review and selection of the principles under a judicial model that would best fit with the 
framework of analysis, producing tenets underlying the structure for a legitimate approach 
(for detailed development in Phase Six and then for use in Phase Seven to review the ECtHR’s 
current approach). For example, with regard to in abstracto norms interpreted as falling 
under the parameters of a right, the requirement for significant state consensus. With regard 
to the application in concreto of those general norms, the tools of subsidiarity and a 
procedural and substantive margin of appreciation.  
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Phase Six (Objective Three) 
A. Mapping of the current approach for judgment used by the ECtHR against the elements 
identified as limiting its authority under the proposed framework of analysis for assessing the 
legitimacy of the Court procedure. 
B. Evaluation of the extent to which divergence of the current ECtHR judicial approach from 
the proposed framework links to the criticisms of member states (set out in the Brighton 
Declaration) indicating validity of the concerns.  
C. Formulation and explanation, with appropriate illustration using facts and arguments from 
existing case law, of a proposed improved corrective model for judgments by the ECtHR in 
line with the framework.  
Phase Seven (Objective Four) 
A. Testing the proposed corrective model against the facts and arguments made, in 
challenging cases, with hypothetical testing of the potential for the proposed model to alter 
outcomes and respond to criticisms about the current ECtHR approach, notably securing 
greater appropriate deference to the democratic process, transparency and accountability in 
the future. 
Phase Eight (Objective Four) 
A. Overall conclusions and identification of the scope and requirements for further work. 
B. Consideration of further work to include a review of proposed improvements that may 
involve altering the express terms of the ECHR (hence beyond the remit of this research). 
Existing proposals and those drawn from other systems of international law are to be 
considered. 
1.8 Chapter Outlines 
The work is structured into eight chapters that cover the eight phases: 
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Chapter One 
This chapter has identified three consistent concerns in relation to the operation of the ECtHR 
and the implications of a resulting erosion of confidence in the ECHR system. The research 
objectives determined are designed to respond to the concerns and the research 
methodology to achieve them has been defined.  
Chapter Two 
The chapter explores the vital role played by the concepts of individual consent and legitimacy 
in all legal systems (including the ECHR). The chapter then uses existing literature to explain 
why decision-making authorities entrusted with a legitimate authority to settle human rights 
disputes face particular difficulties, given the uncertainty surrounding what human rights 
norms actually are and require.  
The chapter explores a number of possible theories for interpreting the ECHR. It concludes 
that moral scepticism or a legal realist explanation must be discounted, given that the 
agreement does recognise there are universal moral norms. A positivist interpretation of the 
rights is also unsuitable, as the ECHR has openly idealist undertones, providing an underlying 
basis to assess the merit of law beyond mere construction by legislature and courts. While 
natural law is rejected as a coherent basis for the idealistic human rights under the ECHR, the 
parties to it must consider that there are natural rights.39 Moral constructivism provides a 
basis for objectively correct reasoning on the natural rights, with Alan Gewirth’s PGC the route 
to explain human rights recognition under the ECHR, by providing a process for moral 
reasoning by agents and the identification of justified norms.  
However, the PGC gives only a basis for moral internal reasoning by individuals. The PGC can 
be used to form a criterion for reason: a decision could not stand that was, for example, 
arbitrary, appealed to an unvindicated or alien authority, discriminated against the inherent 
characteristics of some agents or was based on reasoning that is incoherent or irrelevant. It 
                                                                
39 For the purposes of this work, natural law consists of those processes endowed by God or rules of 
nature independent of human intervention whereas natural rights are a purely human concept based 
on their inherent properties as moral agents. 
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does not, however, purport to provide a complete response with definitive answers in 
practice to every issue, and imperfect agents may in spite of their best endeavours come to 
incorrect conclusions. As such, dialectically “contingent”, as opposed to dialectically 
necessary, understandings of norms under the PGC may be relied upon. These contingent 
constructions are justified and moral norms provided a process for reasoning and systems for 
societal compromise on that reasoning are in place to comply with the PGC, by safeguarding 
against subjectivity and promoting equality and freedom.  
Given that agents in a society may only reasonably “settle” upon which of the potentially 
morally reasoned interpretations of the normative scope of human rights are to be protected 
and how, agents must consent to use a reasonably structured system to reach a binding 
compromise, any such system has two points to consider: (1) settling which potentially moral 
understandings of public rights and duties emerging from society form the “compromised” 
legally recognised in abstracto principles that underly everything else40; and (2) standards for 
the practical application in concreto of those principles of general application to particular 
circumstances. 
Human rights protection is concluded as relating to: (1) negatively abstaining from decisions 
relating to interpretation and application that could not be in accordance with the criteria for 
reason under the PGC (rare); (2) honouring a system of governance in accordance with the 
PGC to positively select between “candidate” reasonable interpretations of the normative 
scope of rights; and (3) requiring authorities to comply with standards for that system (e.g. 
democratic due process) in ensuring the application of those principles of general application 
to particular circumstances.  
The various institutions given the power to deploy the accepted potentially moral system of 
governance, political as well as judicial, may legitimately expect their decisions to be accepted 
given moral agents must consent to such power. However, that use of authority is legitimate 
only if exercised via a process that demonstrably shows the institution remained within the 
                                                                
40 These principles are generic, something that all agents commonly reason as a right or duty for all 
generally rather than being limited to specific circumstances. They can be considered as basic norms 
that represent the general consensus on basic society understandings. Such norms are viewed as 
permanent and not subject to a changeable world, they are the very cores of justice and fairness.  
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confines of the mandate given by the consent of its principals.41 While it is the PGC that 
provides the substantive legitimacy or justification for human rights decisions, in practice 
institutions tasked with their upkeep are more often assessed against procedural legitimacy. 
That procedural legitimacy comes from being potentially in compliance with the PGC but also 
being in accordance with the consent to a particular system by the principals (for example the 
citizens of a state) whom first give it authority. For example, the operation of liberal 
democracy across Europe flows from the consent of citizens, the principals, to that form of 
government.  
A procedure may provide relative moral legitimacy to its outcomes, thereby constructing 
justified norms, in being: (1) potentially in accordance with the PGC by promoting objective 
dialectical reasoning by free and equal agents, and utilizing the outcomes of that societal 
reasoning42; (2) consented to by agents within a society; and (3) effective in resolving which 
“candidate” potentially reasoned normative interpretations under the rights are to be 
adopted, translating those norms into law, and securing application of those principles of 
general application to particular circumstances. 
The chapter notes that ECHR may go further than protecting only those norms that any 
human agent anywhere would recognise. By forming into states, agents may agree to protect 
and promote rights and duties that are perhaps not universally true and independent of the 
laws or customs of any particular culture or government. There may be some principles that 
are not natural, but are basic to that state. For ECHR states, with Europe’s shared political 
traditions and ideals, principles of general application that form overlapping and common 
societal expectations between those governments may be more substantial than those that 
are truly universal. Provided this ever-higher construction of principles is built upon the solid 
moral foundations of the PGC then these could form a justified, appropriate and binding 
interpretations of the rights for all ECHR member states.  
                                                                
41 States gain authority from the consent of moral agents (citizens), and international bodies from the 
consent of states. 
42 For example, informed by empirical evidence from the outcomes of everyday social interactions and 
political decisions made by those who are representative of and accountable to the citizenship.  
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Chapter Three 
The chapter considers the concept of legitimate authority based on the consent of agents. It 
uses existing literature to translate this into institutional authority. Institutions provide their 
principals with a service to better deliver a particular shared public purpose, a government 
purpose on behalf of the public as a whole. That service is given legitimately when the 
authority acts to reasonably fulfil only that purpose (the mandate) and subject to an 
appropriate procedure demonstrating compliance.  
The chapter assesses the continued reliance upon states, as a system that may validly claim 
authority regarding the government purpose of human rights settlement and application. It 
then explores the relevance of a shift of some of that power to international bodies, such as 
the ECtHR. It considers the routes established in literature on international law for that shift 
and concludes that, despite criticisms, state consent remains, in practice, central to 
interpreting the shared government purposes behind international instruments such as the 
ECHR and the mandate of international institutions such as the ECtHR.  
The government purpose behind the ECHR is reasoned by the chapter to relate to negative 
protection of human rights norms but also to their positive development between the 
member states. The negative role of the ECtHR is clear under the ECHR mandate. It must 
prevent state interpretations and applications of human rights that could never accord with 
the PGC criteria for reason (rare). But it goes beyond such a limited function, to include a 
positive role for the ECtHR in: (1) unifying which of the different “candidate” reasonable 
interpretations of the normative scope of rights constructed by the member states form the 
common ECHR position; and (2) overseeing the application of those principles according to 
common standards.  
State consent creates this positive role for the ECtHR – modifying the agreement of moral 
agents to compromise on moral norms at the national level (the national social contract) to 
include a degree of compromise at the international level (a type of international social 
contract, emerging from increasing international socialisation constructing international or 
regional jus cogens of principles of norms). This has resulted in international agreements such 
as the ECHR. State acceptance under such international contracts is, however, only for a 
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particular government object and purpose that may be far narrower than the role a national 
government must perform. In reality and, for now at least arguably by necessity given the 
limits of a cosmopolitan international community, states retain the vast majority of the 
authority and responsibility for the interpretation and application of the moral principles and 
norms underlying their national society, and that limits the nature of the authority ceded to 
international institutions such as the ECtHR. 
The appliance of state consent as the basis for the object and purpose of the ECHR, giving the 
ECtHR its legitimate mandate, is a logical place to gather evidence on the reasonably inferable 
shared government object and purpose of the membership. The first consideration must be 
the ECHR text that all of the membership signed but, where there are gaps or ambiguity in 
that text, the original negotiation by the founding member states is the next obvious point of 
agreement (subject to any clearly inferable later consent to change). While the chapter 
concludes that the ECHR text was authorised to be interpreted widely and progressively, 
developments not clearly indicated must still be made and justified in line with the 
agreement’s overall object and purpose.  
The chapter concludes that the clear uniting factor is the acceptance of national liberal 
democratic government as the best process to compromise on societal understandings of 
moral principles and the application of those norms of general application to particular 
circumstances. Subject to the possibility of any candidate norm complying with criterion for 
reason under the PGC, the purpose of the ECHR is to develop and secure human rights as 
commonly understood in European countries that have liberal democracy. Democracy is a 
process with systematic safeguards in line with the PGC, giving a type of “democratic (relative) 
legitimacy” to the norms that are reasoned by the organs of a democratic state following 
correct procedure. Democracy is accepted as the route to deliver the public compromised will 
of moral agents and, while still dialectically “contingent”, the more the reasoning of different 
agents is represented in constructing norms the more likely any consistent understanding will 
fit with what is dialectically necessary. This is more so when the agents are spread across 
different states and consistent constructions of in abstracto principles still emerge despite 
cultural and social differences. 
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Where all agents could reason dialectically on an issue, the principles constructed by that 
public reasoning, as embodied through their democratic representatives, are supreme 
(provided the norms could accord with the criteria for reason). It is only where all agents could 
not reason publicly, that the operation of democracy ceases to reflect the reasoning of which 
all agents with capacity are equally capable. This is when there is a shift from interpretation 
of public norms, the general societal expectations or principles of general application, to the 
particular application to specific circumstances. For example, where the question relates to: 
(1) individual cases; (2) points outside the knowledge or experience of everyone; or (3) 
introduces a risk of bias or self-interest. At that point reliance must by necessity shift from 
the whole public to reasoning by those agents who are, for example, better informed, 
independent, accountable, and have the skills or expertise to review evidence. This is the 
point at which the operation of democracy is necessarily subject to judicial review checking 
whether due process was followed, the identification and proper treatment of factual 
evidence, comparative law, and the proper consideration of views from experts in the given 
field. 
For stage one, interpretation in abstracto of the normative scope of generic rights that apply 
generally, the work notes that there is no reason to accept that the reasoning of “experts” on 
the principles is necessarily more valid than that of other agents. As such, the constructions 
of the democratic process, which represents the proper public will of all the people is 
supreme, unless clearly unreasoned under the PGC. 
Once the matter moves to stage two, the in concreto application of those principles that must 
balance competing interests in individual cases and in particular circumstances, democracy 
still retains the ultimate authority to settle the matter. Reasoning representative of what all 
agents “would” agree to continues to be the route for moral compromise and the role of 
democratic government (be it legislature, executive or judicial) continues to embody the 
proper will of the people. However, only those agents aware of the particular facts and able 
to apply expertise would be able to contribute to the construction of a correct response. It is 
the role of democratic representatives to be informed of the facts and to consider this expert 
evidence. Once the question moves beyond the generic, there is also a danger of a 
government body failing to ensure it is correctly informed before deciding, rushing to 
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decision, or bowing to popularism, bias, greed or prejudice. Without proper procedure and 
oversight, facts could be ignored or misinterpreted, expert evidence could be missed or not 
properly considered, or the response might not be in accordance with the information 
available. This stage therefore requires the government to demonstrate it acted within a 
“margin of appreciation” in light of that information. This includes a procedural margin 
requiring a due democratic consideration that is, for example, balanced, open, transparent 
and informed. It also includes a substantive margin, within which the state must have reached 
a reasonable and proportionate decision based on the available evidence.  
Questions remain, however, about which democratically constructed normative 
understandings developed by the democratic governments of states can be used by the ECtHR 
to provide the common ECHR rights and duties. Questions also remain about the margin left 
to states within which to apply them. A process for legitimate interpterion of the commonly 
understood normative scope of the ECHR rights and setting common standards for the 
application of the principles requires a more in-depth evaluation of the object and purpose 
of the agreement. 
Chapter Four 
The chapter reviews what can be reasonably inferred from principles of international law 
about the shared government object and purpose of the ECHR. The findings are applied to 
respond to aspects regarding the authority of the ECtHR unresolved by the consideration of 
the express terms in its text and the PGC as the method for justified moral constructions of 
human rights.  
The chapter concludes that the object and purpose of the ECHR, reasonably inferable as 
revealed by the negotiation and initial drafting, is to secure the aims of republican liberalism. 
As a particular conception of the characteristics of the system, this should influence how 
ECtHR judges approach cases. 43  Republican liberalism has a focus on promoting and 
                                                                
43  While in relation to a point more remote than a judge’s interpretation of a particular legal 
agreement, their very concept of law, Capps explains the relevance of underlying conceptions as 
influencing judges very helpfully: 
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reinforcing national democracy. The function of the ECtHR is to secure an overarching ECHR 
justice of a more constitutional nature, and not directly individual justice.  
The consequences of republican liberalism are explored by the chapter. It is argued that the 
ECtHR must rely upon the democratic government in the states for evidence of democratically 
constructed moral positions on the interpretation of the rights and of evidence of shared 
standards for the particular application of those general principles. In interpreting the in 
abstracto moral principles that are democratically recognised as falling under the normative 
scope of the ECHR rights, the practices of different states must show that a norm is commonly 
understood by government. That understanding is shown by state consensus in practices that 
could be reasonably interpreted as supporting the norm claimed as being a common 
construction.  
In determining whether a state has complied with those commonly held principles of general 
application in its in concreto application to particular circumstances, again republican 
liberalism means that it must be for the state democratic governments to provide protection. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the ECtHR does not have access under the ECHR system to 
the infrastructure (or the simple proximity) that is necessary to understand and then to 
effectively respond to issues at a national level. This means that the role of the ECtHR is 
limited to one of oversight, and not the provider of individual justice. With regard to oversight 
of the correct application, the ECtHR must recognise the principle of subsidiarity and thereby 
a margin of appreciation. When the ECtHR measures state performance against standards 
other than overarching procedural requirements for due democratic process in any decision 
making (the procedural margin of appreciation), then degree of state consensus on any 
specific expectations for delivery or on the relevance of expert opinion must play an 
                                                                
[T]he concept of law is an account of its essential features. So, for example, if a norm has these 
features, it can be correctly called a law […] [W]hen a judge decides a case, he will […] employ 
a concept of law. The concept allows him to identify what is peculiarly legal about the various 
norms invoked be litigants. These norms are then employed to determine the outcome of the 
case […] Divergence in the concepts of law held by judges leads to a different account of the 
norms which are to be applied and the outcome of the case. In this context, philosophical 
debates concerning the correct concept of law may well have a significant practical effect on, 
or be the source of criticism of, judicial practice […] 
P. Capps, “Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law” (Hart Publishing:2009) 2. 
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important part in determining the reasonableness of the state’s substantive decision (the 
substantive margin of appreciation).   
These points inform the development of the framework of analysis for assessing the 
legitimacy of ECtHR procedure, which the work applies in relation to a proposed judicial 
model for the Court’s future operation and evolution, illustrated in Fig.5.1. 
 
Fig. 5.1 [from Chapter Five] Elements from the Framework of Analysis for Assessing the 
Legitimacy of ECtHR Procedure 
Chapter Five 
The chapter explores a range of possible options with respect to the elements in the 
framework of analysis for assessing the legitimacy of ECtHR procedure, before settling upon 
Directed/contained 
authority
Current/informed
Acknowledgement of 
subsidiarity (and a margin 
of appreciation)
Limited to oversight 
Acknowledgement of the 
democratic process
Transparency and 
consistency
Effectiveness
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the tenets that must underlie the structure and form the building blocks for the review of the 
Court’s current approach and the development of a proposed corrective judicial model. 
The ECtHR, as an agent of its principals, must act within its mandate if it is to claim legitimacy. 
One response to the problems of expansion of the project beyond the purpose of its agents 
and securing directed/contained authority, would be to limit protection to the 
interpretations and applications envisaged by the founding member states back when the 
ECHR was first signed.  
However, the chapter suggests this would be too restrictive given the shared government 
object and purpose of the ECHR as reasonably inferred: to support the democratic 
construction of moral norms and standards for application in line with the PGC and remain 
current and informed in its oversight as the world changes. As such, it is necessary to 
determine a reasonable approach for development in line with that object and purpose, while 
still acknowledging the democratic process and subsidiarity in keeping with the continuing 
sovereignty of the states. 
The ECHR is informed by the express aim set out in its Preamble to look for points of unity 
and commonality in the national democracies or the “common understanding”. This arguably 
introduces expressly the idea of consensus as a tool, although some more limited 
developmental ability on the part of the ECtHR could have been implied even in the absence 
of such a reference. 
Democracy is the keystone that holds the ECHR project together in accordance with 
republican liberalism, if faith in its validity is chipped away then the whole structure built up 
around it becomes weakened. If that keystone is removed as the apex, with democracy no 
longer the most important element of the structure, it collapses. If national democracy is to 
be reinforced as the “right” approach for reasoning upon and to secure moral rights, the 
chapter argues that only when a generic in abstracto principle can be interpreted from 
government practices across the member states will it have ECHR recognition. There must be 
evidence that the democratic process, which when properly administered is seen as 
presumptively correct, consistently resulted in construction of a moral norms. To be the 
consistent outcome of democratic government, norms do not, however, need to be 
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universally recognised across the member states. Under republican liberalism, democracy to 
be viewed as successful must be trusted to “normally” reveal the correct response but history 
(and the need for the ECHR) tells us that is not completely reliable. As such, it is suggested 
that a significant majority consensus is sufficient (with some safeguarding caveats).  
Regarding the in concreto application of those commonly understood principles of general 
application to particular circumstances, the ECtHR is not to simply substitute the findings of 
the national democratic system with its own, but rather to review whether the government 
decision falls under the margin open to the respondent state. Under republican liberalism, 
there is a strong presumption that national democratic states are best placed to make the 
decisions. Provided the state applied due democratic process and utilised relevant evidence 
and expertise to make an informed choice, there is a strong prima facie presumption that the 
substantive outcome of that correctly administered democratic procedure is reasonable. 
Contrary indications may come from the absence of presence of consensus in practices by 
similar member states facing comparable problems or from a consensus in expert opinion 
recognised by a majority of member states. 
The key tenets of any legitimate judicial model are selected, in Fig. 5.2, as:
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An admissibility criteria limiting the ECtHR's intervention to 
cases in which the outcome will potentially have a significant 
impact.
For a new norm under the parameteres of the right at issue to 
be recognised as democratically constructed in the first in
abstracto stage of the ECtHR’s decision making, consensus in 
confirmatory practices from a substantial majority of the 
member states is necessary. 
This creates prima facie recognition as a community wide norm 
to be translated into a ECHR legal norm by the ECtHR.
The assessment of application of that  norm in concreto by a 
state must be based primailry upon a judicial review of the  
adequacy of the democratic evaluation and use of relevant 
factual evidence (of the case and social background) and expert 
opinion. 
Where a state complied with the procedural requirements, 
there must be  a default to the substantive decisions reached 
creating a strong prima facie assumption they are reasonable.
Where it did not, that must be a breach in its own right and a 
review, that follows due-process, would normally be required. 
The margin left to the state in the judicial review of whether its 
subtantive decisions were those of a reasonable person must be 
signficantly influenced by the degree of consensus on delivery in 
similar member states, to the extent that 
comparable/equivalent issues are raised.
Fig. 5.2 [from Chapter Five] Tenets Underlying the Structure for a Legitimate Judicial Model for the ECtHR 
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Chapter Six 
The chapter assesses the current approach of the decision-making of the ECtHR and identifies 
a number of shortfalls against the framework of analysis and its tenets underlying the 
structure for a legitimate judicial model.  
Notably, the ECtHR does not have a particular judicial strategy. Furthermore, its approach to 
settling points such as consensus and the margin of appreciation is unpredictable.  Consensus 
among states relating to interpretation of the rights and standards for application is found 
with varying numerical and geopolitical significance in the evidence presented and, 
sometimes, very little evidence of confirmatory member state practices at all. In the 
interpretation stage, a margin of appreciation is allowed to states when this work would 
suggest there must be none. Once a norm is recognised as falling under an ECHR right, it is a 
generic and in abstracto principle of general application i.e. a right or duty that applies to 
everyone. There is no need for such a norm to vary and it must surely be uniform if states are 
to respect it as a universal, permanent and fixed responsibility. The need for variation arises 
only in the particular in concreto application stage, where changeable and varied situations in 
particular circumstances of the different in states and in specific cases means there may need 
to be some flexibility. Finally, in the application stage, democratic due process is not always 
sufficiently factored into the margin left to the state, with no clear separation of the 
procedural margin of appreciation and the substantive margin.  
Arguably this results in: (1) expanding interpretation of the normative scope of the rights, 
which are not understood by the states as forming part of the agreement; (2) an artificially 
reduced margin of appreciation that fails to take sufficient account of due democratic process 
in national political reasoning and of work of national courts, which is further narrowed by 
reliance upon expert opinion that is not recognized by states; and (3) an overall perceived 
expansion of the ECHR project beyond its purpose.  
The chapter proposes an improved corrective model, as illustrated in Fig. 6.4: 
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Necessity of an 
interference with 
the principle 
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limitations. 
Is the decision of 
the respondent 
State reasonable, 
could it be 
proportionate? 
 
Procedural margin of appreciation: 
In reviewing the application of the principle 
has the respondent State (i) used due 
democratic process, (ii) applied relevant 
facts (of the case and social background), (iii) 
considered nationally recognized expert 
opinion, and (iv) considered international 
opinion from expert authorities commonly 
recognised by the governments. 
If not, this is a breach in its own right and the 
substantive decision is unsupported. 
 
Substantive margin of appreciation: 
Was a conclusion of the respondent State, in 
light of the factors identified in the procedural 
margin, one a reasonable person would find 
justified and is it consistent with other 
applications? 
Procedural margin of appreciation: 
As above. 
 
Substantive margin of appreciation: 
Was the decision of the respondent State to 
interfere disproportionate: (i) was there a 
legitimate aim for the interference, (ii) were 
the means employed suitable, (iii) were less 
restrictive means available, (iv) was the 
response disproportionate resulting in a 
negative outcome that no reasonable person 
would think justified by the overall aim?   
 
The preliminary 
question: Is the case 
admissible? 
 
Stage one: Does the 
claim fall under the 
interpreted normative 
scope of the right at 
issue in abstracto? 
 
Stage two: Has the 
State correctly applied 
the principle in 
concreto? 
 
 
The margin 
available for 
substantive 
decisions is 
affected by the 
following: 
(i) The 
importance of the 
principle. 
(ii) Level of 
consensus in 
recognized expert 
opinion. 
 (iv) To the extent 
that there are 
comparable 
issues, consensus 
in decisions on 
delivery by a 
significant sample 
of similarly 
affected member 
States* 
(v) Local social 
consensus. 
(vi) Sensitivity of 
the issue. 
 
* Consensus on the 
desire to deliver in 
a particular manner 
AND actual delivery 
separately relevant. 
For non-absolute rights. 
If due process followed, strong prima facie 
presumption favoring the substantive decision. 
 
Fig. 6.4 [taken from Chapter Six] Proposed Corrective Judicial Model for the ECtHR 
Page 55 of 391 
 
Chapter Seven 
The chapter applies the proposed corrective judicial model to prominent and often-cited 
rulings that resulted in significant controversy. The cases considered include areas such as 
terrorism and deportation, prisoner voting, same-sex marriage, secondary striking, life 
imprisonment and gender reassignment. 
Consideration is given to the hypothetical ability of the proposed new approach to have 
responded to the points made by the respondent states in past cases. While the use of the 
proposed model shows that disagreement in these types of cases is perhaps inevitable, it is 
concluded that the corrective model could well have resulted in different outcomes in some 
of the cases and may have lessened criticisms from the member states and also the individual 
applicants. It would have resulted in more transparent, consistent and clearly justified 
outcomes at each of the different points of the judgments.  
Chapter Eight 
In the concluding chapter, the contributions of the work are summarised and areas for future 
work identified.  
A review of the negotiation and wording of the original agreement indicates that republican 
liberalism is a reasonably inferable categorisation of the shared government object and 
purpose. In keeping with the express terms found in the ECHR Preamble, this places the 
promotion and reinforcement of national democracy at the heart of the arrangement. 
The review is used to produce a framework of analysis comprising elements to assess the 
legitimacy of the ECtHR’s rulings and a number of tenets that must underlie the structure for 
a legitimate judicial model. These are applied to the current processes of the ECtHR to assess 
any validity in the concerns raised by member states. This is original work and analysis and 
represents one of the major contributions to knowledge from the research project. 
It is concluded that the process could be appropriately strengthened and a proposed 
improved model for ECtHR rulings is developed, the second major original contribution of the 
work. The most important changes are: (1) the recognition of two stages to the ECtHR process, 
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interpretation and application, each raising different evidential requirements; (2) evidence of 
significant majority consensus between the member states is essential in interpreting the 
scope of a right; (3) a separate procedural and substantive margin of appreciation should 
always be expressly considered in relation to application; (4) correct application of procedural 
requirements by the member states means a strong prima facie presumption that the 
substantive determination is acceptable; and (5) evidence of the presence or absence of 
consistent applications in similarly affected member states on an issue must be factored in, 
in determining the reasonableness of the substantive decision. 
The proposed corrective judicial model is applied hypothetically to a number of cases, and it 
is concluded that it provides a theoretically viable way forward, that could improve legitimacy 
by improving the deference of the democratic process and securing greater transparency, 
consistency and accountancy on the part of the ECtHR.  
Having demonstrated the potential of a model to improve the operation of the ECtHR under 
the current terms of the ECHR, the chapter notes that further work may be undertaken to 
consider whether some of the positive aspects of the model may be further strengthened 
through possible future reform to the ECHR. While this further work would require significant 
and more detailed analysis beyond the scope of the current research project, the chapter 
does provide some broad discussion for future exploration.  
The two most promising potential future reforms are identified by the work as relating to 
formal input by respondent states and applicants in the choice of remedies by the ECtHR and 
to the creation of provisional judgments, an idea put forward by Lady Justice Arden. These 
judgments would happen before a case even reached the ECtHR, wherever the Court views 
that it may, soon, and significantly expand its jurisprudence through new interpretations or 
standards for application. 
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2 Chapter Two 
 
Legitimacy in Law and a Valid Approach to 
Securing Human Rights 
 
The concept of legitimacy in legal systems and 
challenges for objectively correct human rights 
reasoning 
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2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a number of important points that relate to the first phase 
of this project. It identified three consistently made concerns about the operation of the 
European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) in accordance with the European Convention 
on Human Rights (the ECHR), as set out in the Brighton Declaration. These are the concerns 
to which this work will respond. 
 
Fig. 1.4 [taken from Chapter 1] Member State Concerns taken from the Brighton Declaration 
The last chapter also identified evidence of a trend for complaints and non-compliance by 
member states with respect to judgments by the ECtHR. However, any apparent link between 
dissatisfaction and non-compliance is a valid criticism of the ECtHR only if, as the system 
stands, its judicial approach in some way justifies the complaints levelled against it. As such, 
this chapter is concerned with phase two of the project in determining a basis that may be 
used to assess the legitimacy or validity of the concerns. 
3. Lack of prioritisation of 
the more serious breaches. 
2. Undermining of the 
democratic process. 
1. Unlimited growth of the 
ECHR system, beyond its 
goals/mission.
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2.1.1 Legitimacy and Authority 
John Finnis reasons that law is authoritative, with a general or presumptive obligation for one 
to obey it, because it is integral to securing the “common goods” for human flourishing.44 
Political authority is justified as a means for coordination of a community45 and ‘the sheer 
fact of effectiveness is presumptively (not indefeasibly) decisive [emphasis added]’.46 Finnis 
argues for a strong presumption that law from an effective power should be followed rather 
than questioned. This presumption may be defeated exceptionally where laws are manifestly 
unjust in attacking the basic common good: 
Of course, this derivation of the relevant normative consequences is not indefeasible. 
That is to say, the conjunction of the principle with the opportunity is only 
presumptively sufficient to justify the claim to and recognition of authority. Those 
who use their empirical opportunity, or even their legally recognized authority, to 
promote schemes thoroughly opposed to practical reasonableness cannot then 
reasonably claim to have discharged their own responsibilities in reason, and may be 
unable to justify their claim to have created a good and sufficient exclusionary reason 
affecting the responsibilities of those whose compliance they are seeking or 
demanding [emphasis added].47 
Implicit in this support for legal authority, there are recognised limitations on how that 
authority is to be exercised so as to legitimately require individuals to follow the decisions of 
a law-making institution. Even with the strong presumption of authority favoured by Finnis, 
the laws legitimacy is open to question, albeit infrequently, based on practical 
                                                                
44 J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press: 2011). 
These basic goods are, for Finnis, those identified by practical reasonableness as necessary to fulfil 
individuals as moral agents, being [at 155]:  
[A] set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves 
reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of 
which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a 
community. 
The seven basic goods are identified by Finnis as: life; knowledge (for its own sake); friendship and 
sociability; play (for its own sake); aesthetic experience; practical reasonableness, i.e. the ability to 
reason correctly about what is best for oneself and the freedom to act on those decisions; and religion. 
45 ‘Authority (and thus the responsibility of governing) in a community is to be exercised by those who 
can in fact effectively settle co-ordination problems for that community.’ ibid 246. 
46 ibid 247. 
47 ibid 246. 
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reasonableness. This work, however, considers that the legitimacy of any legal authority 
should actually be reviewed and monitored regularly (a position that is in line with the ECHR 
and routine international oversight of national legal systems). It is not only manifestly unjust 
choices that may be challenged. 
There are a number of weakness to the position taken by Finnis which may be used to justify 
a more robust challenge of the exercise of legal authority. Whilst the power of an authority 
to coordinate is logically important to agents, the possession of that power is in itself 
insufficient to demand that all decisions be followed. There must be a clear and proper 
government purpose within the constitutional framework of that society.  
Merely because agents do follow an authority, it cannot be presumed that they do so in a 
way that is for the common good. As Boylan notes: 
What I find problematic about contractarian or agreement theories as justifications 
for human rights (or for morality that creates the context for consent) is that they are 
so invested in asserting that people acting within some constraints […] will generate 
a normative conclusion that is sufficient to yield to consent. What is there about 
agreement that yields positive normativity? There are many agreements that are 
made that are strikingly immoral […] What agreement produces is a voluntary pact 
between people or between institutions/countries. But agreements can be bad (as 
judged by the PGC [the principle of generic consistency], for example). The 1939 Nazi-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was an agreement that was voluntary – but the ends for 
which it was conceived were evil. There are countless other examples like this. 
[emphasis added].48 
Furthermore, Finnis does not articulate a particular form of political government as a means 
for just decision-making with regards to the common goods. A form that supports the 
participation of agents and reflects the social organisation in which they live must be part of 
legitimacy for individual agents, if they are to accept that their needs are better met by 
cooperation with other agents under a system of government. As Duke cautions: 
The problem with such a position from the perspective of a more robust conception 
of the relationship between the authority of law and the common good is that it sets 
out from the epistemic and moral autonomy of the individual in abstraction from the 
                                                                
48  M. Boylan, “Justification in Morality and the Law” in P. Capps and S. Pattinson (eds) Ethical 
Rationalism and the Law (Hart Publishing: 2017) 84. 
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forms of social organization and participation that the concrete fulfilment of such 
autonomy presupposes [emphasis added].49 
If one is to support legal decision-making authorities as necessary to achieve certain basic 
public goods between agents within a society – justified moral rights and duties that Finnis 
recognises exist objectively beyond any theories based on contract or consent – then the 
processes for the exercise of that authority must too be supportive of those moral norms. In 
the immunities view of moral rights, they stem from those freedoms that are necessary for 
the self to develop.50 This view is in keeping with the ECHR, the Preamble focuses upon 
“fundamental freedoms”. Such a process must include agent participation (whether actual or 
through political representation and accountability) and consideration of empirical evidence 
of the ways in which “free” agents exercise their autonomy in the everyday life and reach 
compromises with others doing the same.  
Once there is an acceptance of public goods that are objectively justified and morally valid, 
then any system must show itself to comply with that underlying conception of justice by 
building upon the PGC with a system that is effective in terms of people complying with it and 
having the potential to support the dialectic methodology of the PGC.  This compliance cannot 
ever be presumed merely because decisions are habitually followed. Instead, legitimate 
exercise of authority depends upon: (1) interpretations of the common goods and their 
application having the potential to accord with objective reasonableness under the PGC (i.e. 
not manifestly unjust); and (2) a process for the settlement of interpretations and application 
that respects agent participation and empirical validity.  Such a view is apparent in the ECHR, 
which is rooted in a liberal view of democratic government as the correct system for 
coordination (versus rival “wrong” systems such as communism and totalitarianism). 
                                                                
49 G. Duke, “Finnis on the Authority of Law and the Common Good” (2013) Legal Theory 44, 52. 
50 As Pildes notes: 
In the […] immunities view, rights emanate from some conception of the self; rights demarcate 
spheres of belief and conduct insulated from majoritarian preferences to enable fundamental 
attributes of that self to develop […] I believe it is the dominant view of rights in the 
contemporary political culture […] And it is a view for which many, in academic writing as well 
as public discourse, ﬁnd inspiration in the work of Dworkin.   
R. Pildes, “Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights” (2000) 29(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 309, 311. 
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Theories dispute the claim of Finnis that there is any general or presumptive duty to obey the 
law, even within a “just” state (for the purposes of the ECHR, a liberal democracy). Notably, 
the work of Raz through the Normal Justification Thesis (NJT), requires the legitimate exercise 
of legal authority to be judged each and every time it is exercised.51 The NJT justifies an 
authority only where a service is given to its principals: 
[T]he normal way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to have authority 
over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to 
comply with reasons which apply to him […] if he accepts the directives of the alleged 
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to 
follow the reasons which apply to him directly.52 
For Raz, a legal system must be legitimised in relation to every law that is passed in order for 
an individual to be reasonably expected to follow it. Any law must be interpreted as being for 
a clear and proper government purpose under a proper constitutional framework, or be 
otherwise illegitimate as a law if it cannot be made to fit. This work takes the NJT as providing 
a more supportable explanation of legitimate legal authority than the less probing review of 
theories such as that of Finnis. Under the ECHR, an expectation of review of national 
government decisions on “the law” is apparent and is not limited to only extreme unjust 
choices. The same expectation of appraisal must be true also of the decisions on “the law” 
made by the ECtHR itself. As it questions the observance of the member States to the ideals 
of liberal democracy, so to must it be subject to that same respect for adherence to the 
outcomes of the operation of such democratic government.  
While the ECtHR has the power to make decisions on the interpretation and application of 
the ECHR and its Protocols, it must use its authority legitimately each time it is exercised and 
that means providing reasoning for decisions that any subject is likely to accept as being 
better to comply with over their own. Its principals53 must be convinced not to follow their 
                                                                
51 This is not to say that agents should routinely “pick and choose” at will which laws to follows. Rather, 
that they should not follow the law unquestioningly but treat it is instead more like a “knowledgeable 
friend”. See J.Raz ,”The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition” (1985) 1 Notre Dame Journal of 
Law, Ethics and Public Policy 139, 148. 
52  J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press: 1986) 53. 
53 For international law, the principals are the states but those states are representative of human 
agents (the citizens). 
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own independent reasoning over the law, or to be bound by another rival power. An 
important part in considering the purpose of the principals in agreeing that the ECtHR may be 
placed to make decisions that are better complied with than their own must come from the 
ECHR text.  
Under Article 32 of the ECHR, the ECtHR has the authority to decide upon all matters relating 
to both the “interpretation and application” of human rights: 
Jurisdiction of the Court  
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which 
are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47.  
2. In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall 
decide. 
A literal reading of Article 32 would identify the meaning of this provision as giving the ECtHR 
complete and apparently unlimited authority on anything it self-proclaims as raising human 
rights. This does not, however, fit with how a legal system should work if it is not to rely upon 
threat or habit. Under the NJT, the way that the ECtHR provides its service must engender 
support in its principals, who are free to question the legitimacy of that process of reasoning. 
Otherwise the expertise of the ECtHR is open to question and the cost to those agents of 
agreeing to its coordination will be too great. It must be possible to defend the legal decisions 
as having objective grounds.  The problem, for international law in general, is that: 
Conventions often under-specify the content of international law, and it is this under-
specification that creates the normative space that is filled by the interpretative 
practices of the international courts and bureaucracies. These interpretative practices 
establish what international law is taken to be, but they simultaneously raise 
questions about how the authority of the law develops beyond the state. Officials 
cannot straightforwardly appeal to the texts of the treaties to claim authority; they 
must seek other grounds, such as an appeal to expertise; substantive justice, 
economic, political and social dynamics; or interpretative techniques drawn from 
domestic administration and so on.54 
                                                                
54 P. Capps P and H. Olsen (eds), Legal Authority Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press: 2018) 
4-5. 
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The service conception of the NJT requires that an authority demonstrate its expertise and its 
ability to coordinate. The term expertise in this context relates to the capacity to apply 
knowledge appropriately, such expertise is likely to be marked for example by its ‘steadier 
will, less likely to be tainted by bias, weakness or impetuosity, less likely to be diverted […] by 
temptations or pressures’.55 Coordination problems arise when ‘without a coordinated effort, 
some good, which can in principle be secured at an acceptable cost, will be lost’.56  
Under the NJT the ECtHR has legitimacy via its service as a power for judicial review, there is 
a recognised need for coordination on human rights issues and the Court has the degree of 
removal and the expertise and skills necessary to review government decisions. However, 
legitimacy goes beyond the mere provision of a service by the exercise of power, to include 
also how that service is provided. For an individual to consider themselves bound, they must 
be satisfied of some element of objectivity in judgement. It is this objectivity that means the 
ECtHR may legitimately expect its principals to recognise it as, in the words of Raz, a 
“knowledgeable friend” and to follow that authority. 
2.1.2 Human Rights Objectivity 
The ECHR cannot be handled as a body of rules, it is clear that the agreement is idealist rather 
than a positivist in its understanding of a moral foundation to society. An idealist basis for 
human rights may come from: (1) natural law or moral realism if one is satisfied of an 
authority’s ability to “discover” truths set by God or the laws of nature; or (2) natural rights 
based on the human construction of justified moral norms by a correct and rational evaluative 
process for reasoning.  
This is not to deny the relevance of a particular contractual or consensual agreement between 
agents in a society, provided those agreements do not go against natural rights ideals. As this 
chapter will argue, moral agents will agree to cooperate and thereby create such agreements 
with which they may be legitimately expected to comply. While not necessarily universally 
objective, decisions taken in accordance within the provisions and spirit of such agreements 
                                                                
55 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press: 1986) 75. 
56 J. Raz, “Facing Up: A Reply” (1989) 62 Southern California LR 1153, 1190. 
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require an authority to look beyond individual standpoints and self-interest to those of all of 
the public. They are also effective in the necessary task of coordination and are in accordance 
with the morally necessary requirement for social coordination. Such decisions have a degree 
of moral justification that may not be universal, but is relative to that society, and may claim 
legitimacy relative to that arrangement.  
This chapter will argue that a legal system may legitimately hold an expectation that its 
principals will follow decisions only provided the interpretations and applications are not 
merely pronounced based on subjective values and beliefs, but based rather on objective 
reasoning reached via an agreed and appropriate process. As a legal system, the ECHR cannot 
rely upon: (1) a purely positivist formalist argument based upon a strict reading of the text; 
or (2) natural-law theories or moral realism as a basis for objective moral truths. It does not, 
however, find legal realism or moral scepticism as supportable positions for legal systems in 
general and particularly not for the ECHR.  It argues instead for natural rights constructed by 
humans, a more policy-oriented or social conception of correct morally justified law.  
A natural rights approach is based upon: (1) the ability of moral agents within society to 
reason objectively on justified moral norms; and (2) the need for a system between agents in 
a society in order to compromise on: (a) which “candidate” moral norms, those that could 
under the PGC be interpreted as falling under the normative scope of a human right, form the 
societal principles upon agents have compromised – those principles underly everything else 
and form the permanent basis of justice and fairness for coexistence in society; and (b) 
decisions regarding the application of those principles of general application to particular 
circumstances i.e. specific cases, changeable situations, and varied contexts.  
Natural rights reason law is a normative social practice; it is a dialectic evaluative process 
guiding moral agents in constructing justified societal generic norms. The accepted system for 
a society identifies the shared understandings that form the societal interpretation of 
fundamental rights underlying the whole of society, their normative scope, and informs the 
standards for assessing everyday application. 
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2.2 Formalism 
A legal positivist view of the legitimate exercise of authority by the ECtHR would emphasise 
the importance of the ECHR as a treaty, along with international custom. This provides a 
helpful starting point in directing the ECtHR; the Court clearly must be informed by the object 
and purpose of the ECHR and the agreement itself is the most obvious place to begin. 
Specifically, reliance on formalism requires the text to establish all that the ECtHR needs to 
know about: (1) the overall government object purpose of the principals (states); and (2) the 
efforts or actions reasonably necessary as the means to accomplish that mandate.  
As is standard practice, the overarching motivations and expectations under the ECHR are set 
out in its Preamble and this forms the first key indicator of object and purpose: 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity 
between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued 
is the maintenance and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms; Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which 
are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the 
one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common 
understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend; Being 
resolved, as the governments of European countries which are likeminded and have a 
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take 
the first steps for the collective enforcement […] 
It is apparent from the text of the ECHR Preamble that the member states expressly agree: 
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Fig. 2.1 Object and Purpose in the ECHR Preamble    
The text has revealed important points about the government object and purpose of the 
member states, but it leaves a number of ambiguities about the mandate of the ECtHR. To 
show that the ECtHR is acting within its legitimate authority, any framework for decision-
making will need to respond to major remaining questions: 
There are natural rights and 
duties simply by virtue of 
being human
•These rights are those that
support the object and
purpose of the ECHR -
maintaining "freedom".
•Free choice therefore informs
reasoning on the recognition
of human rights.
•The object and purpose is to
further human rights for a
liberal and free socieity.
Political democracy is 
required to maintain rights
•Recognition that no judicial
system alone should make all
choices about interpretation
and application of the rights.
•A political system is also
needed for effective
protection.
•The object and purpose is to
encourage representative
democracy, as the route for
securing fundamental
freedoms in a liberal and free
society.
•National systems of
democratic government
(including politcal bodies and
courts) normally upohold the
rule of law.
Common understandings 
and approaches to the 
rights are expected 
•Reference to "understanding"
and "observance" suggests it
may be more about reaching
a compromise via correct
democratic reasoning than a
definitive correct answer on
the normative content of the
rights and their application.
•Reference to "common"
suggests that a shared
position, attributable as held
between principals, is
acceptable.
•The object and purpose it to
move towards ECHR unity in
securing via democratic
government fundamental
freedomes in a liberal and
free society.
Page 68 of 391 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 Objectives from the ECHR Preamble Requiring Clarification 
A response to these questions would provide the detail necessary to produce a framework 
for ECtHR judgments, by identifying a reasonable approach to settle disputes on the 
normative substance of the rights (understanding/interpretation) and appropriate standards 
by which to assess the particular observance/application of those principles of general 
application.  
 
Fig. 2.3 Solutions for Resolving Substance and Standards for Application of Rights   
The issues we must settle in relation to the ECHR via a reasonable interpretation of evidence 
from the text and beyond are thus threefold: (1) a shared governmental purpose of the 
principals; (2) the efforts or actions by the ECtHR that could properly be reasoned as a means 
to achieve that mandate; and (3) what this means for the ECtHR when resolving ambiguity 
How to produce a 
reasoned interpretation of 
the normative scope of 
rights and how they 
apply?
•What constitutes a reasoned
approach that all the
principals could accept as
having some objective
validity regarding the
interpretation and
application of the rights?
What is the role of national 
democracy in resolving 
uncertainty?
•A valid approach appears to
involve the local systems of
democratic government
(including political and
judicial elements).
•What are the roles that
remain at the national level
i.e. the balance of power
between member state
governments and the ECtHR?
How can a common 
understanding and 
observance be reasonably 
developed?
•Is there a distinction
between understanding (the
intereptation of the
normative substance of the
rights) and observance (their
application)?
•What is meant by common,
does it require absolute
agreement between the
memeber states as
principals or something less?
•How can the ECtHR
reasonably infer common
understandings from the
agreement and practices of
member states?
Fundamental Freedoms
Maintain 
Human Rights
Set out in ECHR 
Part I 
Interpreted by 
"X" Process
Standards for 
Application Set 
by "X" Process
Page 69 of 391 
 
about how to settle the normative scope of the rights, standards for application, and 
monitoring of state compliance. 
Moving beyond the ECHR Preamble for guidance, its Articles can be used to resolve some 
ambiguity about the finer points required by its object and purpose. The text of the ECHR 
provides an express basic interpretation of each of the rights it protects, reflective of the 
rights as commonly understood by the member states at the time of its signing. The 
categories of ECHR human rights are limited to a list contained in Section I, which consists of 
Articles 2 to 18. Each right is broadly interpreted via a definition of its general extent and the 
circumstances in which application may be restricted in particular circumstances.  
This ‘formalist’ type understanding of legal reasoning would, however, rely upon the detail 
that is provided by the ECHR text being sufficient to supply a determinate answer to all 
questions asked of the ECtHR.  Brian Leiter says: 
“Formalist” theories claim that (1) the law is “rationally” determinate, i.e., the class of 
legitimate legal reasons available for a judge to offer in support of his decision justifies 
one and only one outcome either in all cases or in some significant and contested 
range of cases (e.g., cases that reach the stage of appellate review); and (2) 
adjudication is thus “autonomous” from other kinds of reasoning, that is, the judge 
can reach the required decision without recourse to non-legal normative 
considerations of morality or political philosophy.57   
A formalist claim requires that the ECtHR can, by applying the unique logic of legal reasoning, 
use its superior judicial intellect to “discover” simple ethical truths from within the legal 
system, thereby giving an integrated answer to all possible questions. Yet, as Leiter explains, 
such a process of “mechanical deduction” is not possible. In the absence of the ECHR 
agreement setting out comprehensively and in minute detail all of the possible normative 
aspects of the rights, such arguments fall short of providing a means for indisputable 
objective reasoning that the principals of a system must accept. As Hart argues, a legal norm 
inherently entails an “open texture”.58   
                                                                
57 B. Leiter, “Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?” (2010) 16 Legal Theory 111, 111. 
58 Per Hart, norms: 
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Take, for example, the protection under ECHR Article 3 against ill-treatment: 
Prohibition of torture  
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
At first sight, the apparently unambiguous direction under Article 3 that such acts are never 
permitted seems clear. Yet, it is not clear what amounts to prohibited treatment. There are 
different possibilities for its normative interpretation; the substance of the right may be 
limited to extreme suffering, physical harm and permanent damage, or could include mental 
anguish and humiliation. Also, there is the question of what it meant by subjecting a person 
to that treatment. It could be limited to not undertaking it oneself or extended to not 
exposing people to a risk of it from other parties. Even after the briefest consideration of 
what is set out as an absolute right, questions are then raised requiring the normative 
parameters under Article 3 to be further interpreted via an objectively justified process for 
moral reasoning before they can be applied. Given that the text of Article 3 does not in itself 
provide the definitions required to be certain of the moral norms it incorporates or sufficient 
detail to read between its lines, the ECtHR will need a different methodology to look beyond 
its terms to settle its scope or normative substantive parameters.  
                                                                
[H]owever smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point 
where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been 
termed an open texture. So far, we have presented this, in the case of legislation, as a general 
feature of human language; uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of 
general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact. It is, 
however, important to appreciate why, apart from this dependence on language […] we 
should not cherish, even as an ideal, the conception of a rule so detailed that the question 
whether it applied or not to a particular case was always settled in advance, and never 
involved, at the point of actual application, a fresh choice between open alternatives […] It is 
a feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative one) that we labour under two 
connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate […] The first handicap is our relative 
ignorance of fact: the second is our relative indeterminacy of aim. If the world in which we 
live were characterized only by a finite number of features, and these together with all the 
modes in which they could combine were known to us, then provision could be made in 
advance for every possibility.   
H. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press: 1961) at 128. 
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Fig. 2.4 Illustration of the Limits of ECHR Text as a Route to Derive Aspects of Interpretation 
and Substantive Application 
Another example comes from ECHR Article 8, which recognises that everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, home and correspondence. This right is, however, 
qualified (as are most under the ECHR) and may be limited for a range of reasons. ECHR Article 
10 guarantees the right to free expression, and forms one reason why Article 8 may be 
interfered with. This raises the question of when a public figure can generally expect to have 
their privacy protected, in spite of a free press with the freedom to report on issues of interest 
to the public. When not been applied to a specific case, this is a principle of general 
application. The response to this question of the normative scope of Article 8 cannot be 
formed from a reading of the text of Article 8 and Article 10 alone, requiring instead an 
externally soured response constructed by methodology beyond deduction from the ECHR’s 
wording alone. 
Furthermore, once a generic in abstracto moral justified norm is interpreted under a right, 
there remains uncertainty about how that principle of general application is to be applied in 
concreto to particular circumstances. For example, whether the details of a specific story 
about a politician’s family life should be published in the public interest, or what type of 
treatment a specific person may be subjected to if expelled to another country and the risk 
of maltreatment occurring at a given time. 
Similar difficulties occur with relying on established case law relating to interpretation and 
application of the ECHR rights to settle what should be done in cases raising new points. The 
potential for cases raising a similar starting point of already accepted principles to raise 
significant dispute about scope and application is demonstrated by an iCourt illustration 
generated from its database to show the network formed by references to ECtHR case-law 
where article 14 (non-discrimination) was mentioned. Each node represents an individual 
Fundamental Freedoms
Maintain 
Human Rights
Torture 
Prohibited
Scope 
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"X" Process
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case, linked in with earlier cases setting norms interpreted as falling under Article 14 and 
standards for application. 
 
Fig. 2.5 Article 14 Network of Cases59 
What has been explained so far shows the limits of relying solely upon the text of the ECHR 
to determine the normative parameters of the rights and to assess the application of those 
principles of general application in particular circumstances. In at least some cases, confining 
an analysis to ECHR text alone to discern what government purpose and democratic common 
understanding demands could actually force the ECtHR to make decisions contrary to the 
consent of the principals and most certainly would give rise to serious concerns about 
deviation from its mission and an undermining of democracy. 
                                                                
59 iCourts Database of International Courts, ECtHR - Article 14 Network' available at 
<http://icourts.dk/networks/sigma/article14/> accessed 12 May 2018. 
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However, while denying the ability to rely on inductive reasoning based on the text of the 
agreement and the acquis of the ECtHR as resolving all questions under the ECHR, this work 
does not suggest there can be no legitimate element of applying established case law to 
respond to points that are sufficiently similar. It will argue that a criterion for reason and the 
rule of law require a degree of consistency and predictability in ECtHR outcomes, as does the 
reliance principally on national governments (via the legislature, executive and judiciary) to 
uphold its judgments.  
What the work suggests is that developments determined primarily by the use of existing case 
law must be done with the upmost caution. The danger of any court attempting to expand 
legal rules based upon a claim of formalism or rationalist reason developed from existing law 
is that the judges become removed from the actual objectives of the agency as determined 
by its principals and their normative reasoning: 
[T]o positions more and more remote from the life which they regulated, with the 
result that they regulated it with an ever-decreasing feeling for its realities.60  
The methodology of the PGC lends itself to moral norms being forged in social interactions, 
which shape and strengthen shared societal understandings of generic rights and duties 
required for all ends and experiences. The public understandings that develop over time 
inform the national governments, allowing them to propose and produce the legal norms that 
have a justified moral status and form part of an effective legal system. Focusing too greatly 
on the rules without looking behind them risks, as cautioned by Olsen and Toddington, 
underemphasising: 
[T]he social processes through which legal rules become meaningful […] [W]e argue 
that valid legal rules are not only members of a formally structured legal system, but 
are also mediated and mediating products of the relationship between law and 
society.61 
For human rights issues in particular, the inappropriateness of the ECtHR working in isolation 
and not both considering and respecting social constructions as reflected by national 
                                                                
60 H. Oliphant, “A Return to Stare Decisis” (1928) 14:2 American Bar Association Journal 71, 72. 
61 H. Olsen and S. Toddington, “The Scandinavian Roots of a New Approach to Legal Knowledge” (2012) 
4/139 Retfærd 57. 
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governments is a clear threat to securing acceptance of the validity of its decisions. There is 
evidence showing that support for an international court drops following decisions which are 
unpopular with the public of its member states.62 Human rights should be recognisable to 
humans as the rights and duties underpinning and governing their daily relationships with one 
another. This is the case for all systems of law, but is particularly so for human rights given 
they arise from the dialectic reasoning necessitated by daily interaction. This examination will 
suggest that safeguarding a harmonious society, and the need for and ability of humans to 
strive for that moral coexistence, is the very basis for any common recognition and 
commitment to maintaining human rights and an objective approach to their evaluation and 
identification. 
2.3 Legal Realism 
A legal realist view would argue that judges begin with the conclusion to a case and work 
backward. The reasons given by judges are simply rationalizations for decisions that they had 
already arrived at because of their intuition and non-legal evidence such as empirical 
information. There is then no a priori validity to the law, experience must serve as the guide.63  
This approach could provide only at best empirical validity drawn from social practice and 
social experience. Olsen and Toddington set out the consequence were a realist stance to be 
adopted: 
[J]udges do not reason about the meaning and valid application of law, they simply 
end up with ‘beliefs’. So, where we might refer to the value-laden ideal of deliberative 
legal reasoning as aiming at ‘axiological validity’, this traditional notion of the judicial 
ratiocination required to establish legitimate interpretation of the laws might now 
conveniently be contrasted with what Ross holds to be the demystified, 
non-metaphysical, empirically accessible phenomenon of judicial behaviour in belief 
– and the unvarnished report of what biographical members of the judiciary allegedly 
perceive as valid, is now to be referred to as ‘empirical validity’.64 
                                                                
62 E. Voeten, "Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of the Courts”, (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
411, at 435. 
63 See A. Ross, On Law and Justice (University of California Press; 1959).  
64 H. Olsen and S. Toddington, “Legal Realism: In Search of a Science of Law” (2016) 4 Retfærd 22, 30. 
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The central critique of realists in relation to formalism is that it fails to reflect the “transactions 
of life”.65 This is a concern that this work accepts, empirical validity is an essential element of 
legal validity. But it is not, in of itself, sufficient for legitimacy or in line with the idealist ECHR. 
As Olsen and Toddington explain: 
We can say […] that Formalism is inadequate as a model of legal reasoning and also as 
an ontological commitment for legal science. It fails to acknowledge fully the 
transformative and dynamic activity required by what Oliphant refers to as ‘legal 
treatment’. Law is transformative in that it is able to categorise and re­code the 
conflictual ‘interactions of life’ into interactions through law. It is dynamic because in 
doing so it must continually develop – not just search for, but invent – the normative 
resources that sustain its own procedural and normative autonomy. It must do this in 
a way that responds to real normative concerns pragmatically, creatively, inventively, 
and in a sustainable and legitimate fashion. This is what is meant by legal validity. To 
succeed, therefore, in demonstrating that legal validity does not reside as an 
inherently essential property of formal doctrine or procedure is not enough; the 
Realist critique must go on to affirm that it is to be found in the dialectic of a mutually 
conditioning interaction between legal doctrine and social life.66 
What is required is a route for a decision-making process inline that is both morally informed 
to produce justified norms and also empirically valid. Olsen and Toddington conclude:  
Legal Realism’s critique of Formalism cannot be coherently or relevantly configured 
methodologically as an amalgamation of Legal Positivism and Logical Empiricism. 
Rather, we argue that only when an empirical inquiry into legal phenomena is 
combined with an ethically informed verstehende sociology can we break the circle of 
formalism and establish legal theory as a science of legal validity [emphasis added]. 
2.4 A Moral Constructivist Approach: Kant, Rawls and Gewirth 
The ECHR agreement represents an underlying assumption that in a free society there are 
certain universal natural rights. The ECHR Preamble identifies the rights it incorporates as:  
[T]hose fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the 
world [emphasis added]. 
The rights apply at all times and are so above individual sovereign nation states. If the ECHR 
wording alone is not sufficiently clear to demonstrate that conclusion, this view of universality 
                                                                
65 See Oliphant, H. (n 60) 73-74. 
66 Olsen, H. and Toddington, S. (n 64) 29. 
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is evidenced in the conviction during its negotiation that it would prevent "evils" such as those 
committed during the Second World War, for which perpetrators had been held legally to 
account despite the lack of any formally recognised positive laws against such atrocities at 
the time67, and moreover in the surety that the rights contained in the ECHR would ensure it 
would act as a "beacon"68 to which other states would one-day aspire.  
Yet why there is any such assumption and furthermore the actual basis for these universally 
valued norms is not so readily apparent. As we have already reasoned a justification and an 
approach are necessary if the ECtHR is to command respect in asserting its authority as 
legitimately resolving questions on the point. The government object and purpose under the 
ECHR must, therefore, involve the means of accommodating this uncertainty to the 
reasonable satisfaction of the parties to it. 
The basis for accepting the ECtHR’s authority to settle questions on human rights must be one 
that may reasonably be attributed to all the principals who consent (or at least are taken to 
have consented) to be subject to the ECHR. While the ultimate principals are the individual 
agents whom comprise the citizens of the states, for practical purposes we will need to be 
satisfied by the body acknowledged as representing them when entering into an international 
agreement on their behalf – i.e. the member state. It is, therefore, a government purpose 
                                                                
67 The assumed status of these crimes against humanity beyond any formalist positivist approach was 
explained by Quincy Wrights shortly after the Nuremberg Trials:  
The assumptions underlying the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, and the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal are far removed from the 
positivistic assumptions which greatly influenced the thought of international jurists in the 
nineteenth century. Consequently, the activities of those institutions have frequently been 
vigorously criticized by positivistic jurists [...] [who] have asked: How can principles enunciated 
by the Nuremberg Tribunal, to take it as an example, be of legal value until most of the States 
have agreed to a tribunal with jurisdiction to enforce those principles? How could the 
Nuremberg Tribunal have obtained jurisdiction to find Germany guilty of aggression, when 
Germany had not consented to the Tribunal? How could the law, first explicitly accepted in 
the Nuremberg Charter of 1945, have bound the defendants in the trial when they committed 
the acts for which they were indicted years earlier? 
See W. Quincy "Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment" (1948) 42(2) American Journal of 
International Law 405; 405-407. 
68 David Maxwell-Fyfe, a key figure in the drafting of the ECHR, described it in a 1950s speech as, “a 
beacon to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, and a passport for their return to the midst of the free 
countries”. 
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that must be found to reasonably form a basis for cooperation under the ECHR. The 
justification must work both at the time of the ECHR’s conception and also as a plausible 
continuing basis upon which to unite agents in the modern world as the governments choose 
to continue their membership or to now join. It must be a reasonable interpretation of a clear 
and proper government purpose that could be shared between the states, government 
purposes being those acceptable to the public at large (all agents) and are not just the private 
intentions or values of the particular negotiators.   
One possible basis for the ECtHR making objective determinations, rather than subjective 
pronouncements, about ECHR rights is a belief in universal divine or natural laws. If it were, 
in addition, possible for the ECtHR to assert superior knowledge or skill to all others in 
proclaiming the correct interpretation and application of such rights, irrespective of other 
opinions, then the allegations of illegitimacy made against it would be responded to 
conclusively.  
However, there is simply no basis for faith in a particular religion or in the laws of nature that 
is acceptable to all agents and, even if the work were to presume one of those grounds is 
accepted by all the ECHR’s subjects e.g. Christianity, there is still no way of providing an 
uncontested resolution to what it requires in terms of interpretation and application.69 
This work, while not denying that natural or divine laws could exist, does not therefore 
consider that it provides a useful route forward for resolving the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s 
decisions to the satisfaction of all its principals. Draghici notes: 
[H]uman rights treaties are distinguishable from other agreements by virtue of their 
prominent "suprapositive" aspect—the underlying normative principles embodied in 
positive norms, whether "natural law, religious traditions, universal morality". It is, 
however, insufficient for judges to affirm what they assume to be the content thereof. 
                                                                
69 There are a number of clear contradictions between religion and human rights as now recognised, 
key conflicts identified by Henkin relate to freedom of religion and religious choice, equality and non-
discrimination, gender distinctions and capital punishment. L. Henkin, “Religion, Religions, and Human 
Rights.” (1998) 26(2) The Journal of Religious Ethics, 229. 
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International tribunals entrusted to apply specific treaties (rather than natural law) 
cannot purport to have the monopoly on truth.70 
This work, therefore, accepts that the ECtHR cannot legitimately fulfil the object and purpose 
of the ECHR with reasoning based solely upon some unprovable notion of divine or natural 
laws.   
The work does not, however, accept the view of value sceptics that this means that law cannot 
be both objective and normative. The sceptical challenge from Koskenniemi explains the 
apparent conflict, that the evaluative element in forming norms means they must always be 
subjective: 
Organizing society through legal rules is premised on the assumption that these rules 
are objective in some sense that political ideas, views or preferences are not. To show 
that international law is objective - that is, independent from international politics - 
the legal mind fights a battle on two fronts. On the one hand, it aims to ensure the 
concreteness of the law by distancing it from theories of natural justice. On the other 
hand, it aims to guarantee the normativity of the law by creating distance between it 
and actual state behaviour, will, or interest. Law enjoys independence from politics 
only if both of these conditions are simultaneously present.  
The requirement of concreteness results from the liberal principle of the subjectivity 
of value. To avoid political subjectivism and illegitimate constraint, we must base law 
on something concrete - on the actual (verifiable) behaviour, will and interest of the 
members of society-states. The modern view is a social conception of law. For it, law 
is not a natural but an artificial creation a reflexion of social circumstances […] 
This argumentative structure, however, which forces jurists to prove that their law is 
valid because concrete and normative in the above sense, both creates and destroys 
itself. For it is impossible to prove that a rule, principle or doctrine (in short, an 
argument) is both concrete and normative simultaneously. The two requirements 
cancel each other. An argument about concreteness is an argument about the 
closeness of a particular rule, principle or doctrine to state practice. But the closer to 
state practice an argument is, the less normative and more political it seems […] An 
argument about normativity, on the other hand, is an argument which intends to 
demonstrate the rule's distance from state will and practice. The more normative a 
rule, the more political it seems because the less it is possible to argue it by reference 
                                                                
70 C. Draghici, “The Strasbourg Court between European and Local Consensus: Anti-democratic or 
Guardian of Democratic Process?” (2017) Public Law 11,13. 
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to social context. It seems utopian and - like theories of natural justice - manipulable 
at will. 71 
The difficulty with such scepticism is that that the solution is to abandon normativity in 
understanding law and resort instead to the formalist type of approach. Such approaches 
were dismissed above as potentially disengaging from real human culture and thus 
undermining the laws legitimacy. Voyiakis explains that: 
[B]y accepting the main sceptical claim that any attempt to produce an account of 
international law that is both objective and normative is doomed to fail. It would then 
make its way out of the sceptical challenge by abandoning or relaxing the claim to 
normativity. In practical terms, this strategy would favour a formalist approach to 
international law, according to which propositions of international law may be 
objectively valid or invalid depending on whether they can be properly inferred from 
certain valid premises, but they do not generally create any moral rights and 
obligations for international agents.72 
This is not in accordance with the ECHR, which is clear in its understanding of such moral 
imperatives. It is also, as Dworkin notes, a problem that such sceptic argumentation holds 
that there is “no right answer”, which is itself somewhat ironically an objective moral claim 
based on evaluation (showing that in practice even sceptics make moral judgements).73 
Morality is a part of how society functions and it is clearly accepted under both the ECHR and 
wider international law by recognising human rights. A means of holding objectivity and 
normativity compatible is therefore required. The implication of value scepticism is cautioned 
by Voyiakis with the following examples: 
[S]cepticism entails that our disagreements about, say, the morality of the invasion of 
Iraq or the permissibility of abortion have no subject matter, for there is nothing that 
we actually disagree about. If our evaluative judgements are no more than reports of 
our subjective feelings or emotions, then our debates about matters of value amount 
to no more than exchanges of reports of our respective psychological states, with 
nothing to share or divide between them. Indeed, if the sceptics are right, the very 
idea of evaluative agreement or disagreement is inherently confused, for both of 
                                                                
71 M. Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law” (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law 
4,7-8. 
72 E. Voyiakis, “International Law and the Objectivity of Value” (2009) Leiden Journal of International 
Law 51,54. 
73 R. Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it” (1996) 25 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
2. 
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these attitudes require some issue, a case on which people's views may be said to 
converge or differ. A further implication of value-scepticism is that evaluative 
arguments can never be interesting in themselves, for such arguments only tell us 
things about the speaker, not about the way things are.74 
It is clear and unavoidable in relation to scepticism and legal realism that, as we noted when 
dismissing strict formalism, moral evaluative judgement is required under the ECHR and that 
some decisions may be held morally justified and others not. This means that human thought, 
if we reject natural law based external features of the universe or moral realism where the 
content and authority of the law is independent of willing, must play a central role in natural 
rights constructions that are morally “correct” by virtue of a justified approach to reasoning. 
Furthermore, if we reject scepticism and legal realism then there must be a systematic means 
to assess validity of that process of human thought both as individual agents and through the 
cooperation of agents jointly reasoning and compromising via organs of the systems of 
governance which agents in society recognise. As Attwooll notes: 
The term ‘legal idealism’ has various meanings. These include: the notion that laws, 
and the rights and duties they confer, genuinely exist, in which legal idealism is 
opposed to legal realism; the notion that law is intimately connected with moral or 
social values, in which legal idealism is opposed to legal positivism; the notion that 
one can move from certain premises about human reason and will to systematic 
principles for legal development and decision-making; and the notion that one can 
derive systematic principles of a similar kind from the requirements of social life. It is 
also sometimes used to imply too much faith in the capacity of law to solve problems. 
The enduring issues of legal idealism concern establishing systematic principles for 
legal development and decision-making.75 
Dworkin’s contribution to the question of a moral system for constructivism is that we can 
identify the interests of others in our reasoning and look beyond self-interest to formulate 
coherent moral views. Thought does exist and can be used to reason with respect to one’s 
own norms, the “content of our mind”, but also to reason using our knowledge of the world 
                                                                
74 E. Voyiakis (n 72) 58. 
75  E. Attwooll, Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Taylor and Francis: 1998) available at 
<https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/legal-idealism/v-1.> accessed 7 September 2018. 
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and of the minds of others.76 Such evaluations are then seen as objective interpersonal, as 
opposed to subjective, standards. As Davidson explains: 
I do not say that there cannot be real differences in norms among those who 
understand each other. There can be, as long as the differences can be seen to be real 
because placed within a common framework. The common framework is the area of 
overlap, of norms one person correctly interprets the other as sharing. Putting these 
considerations together, the principle that emerges is: the more basic a norm is to our 
making sense of an agent, the less content we can give to the idea that we disagree 
with respect to that norm. Good interpretation makes for convergence, then, and on 
values in particular, and explains failure of convergence by appeal to the gap between 
apparent values and real values (just as we explain failure to agree on ordinary 
descriptive facts by appeal to the distinction between appearance and reality). There 
is thus a basis for the claim that evaluations are correct by interpersonal - that is, 
impersonal, or objective - standards. For if I am right, disputes over values can be 
genuine only when there are shared criteria in the light of which there is an answer to 
the question who is right. Of course, genuine disputes must concern the values of the 
very same objects, acts, or states of affairs.77 
Another argument made by sceptics against the ability to evaluate objectively is based on 
relativity, as set out by Mackie: 
The argument from relativity has as its premises the well-known variation of moral 
codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the 
differences between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such 
variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which 
entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support 
[…] subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it 
difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths […] In short, 
the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in 
the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect 
different ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of 
them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values.78 
Some disparities may be explained by differences across different communities and cultures. 
Such variation can occur with objective reasoning when it comes to the application of norms 
in particular situations, known as “situationism”. Where there is no such explanation, the 
                                                                
76 See D. Davidson, Essay 13 “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” in Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation (Oxford University Press: 1984).  
77 D. Davidson, Essay 3 “The Objectivity of Values” in Problems of Rationality (Oxford University Press: 
2004) 50-51. 
78 J. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin: 1990) 36-37. 
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point should be made that the existence of agreements such as the ECHR is in recognition 
that reasoning and actions can be flawed. Sometimes agents uphold personal beliefs, values 
and standards, rather than trying to reason interpersonally and objectively, or act selfishly. 
Divergence is therefore to be expected, but that is not proof that there is not a morally 
justified or correct answer. The point should also be made that there is a significant deal of 
consistency on human rights norms recognition in different societies.79 
It is in accordance with the ECHR that agents may together construct human rights through a 
constructivist procedure of correct practical reason upon interpersonal public or generic 
norms (i.e. moral constructivism of natural rights as opposed to “discovery” of natural laws). 
Moral constructivism provides an explanation of why there are justified human rights norms 
(as against scepticism) without any reliance on natural law or moral realism. 
 
                                                                
79 As Galanos notes: 
[T]he extent to which it is said that we disagree on questions of morality is over-exaggerated 
and stimulated by controversial issues such as abortion. What if we were to choose a more 
straightforward example such as genocide? Is it conceivable that someone may advocate the 
rightness of genocide? Moreover, there is empirical evidence showing a considerable amount 
of moral agreement across cultures. For example, the ‘Golden Rule’ of Christianity, ‘Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you’, is also prominent in numerous non-Western 
cultures. In addition, it is questionable whether we disagree more about moral propositions 
than we do about scientific ones. The example of disagreement between cosmologists and 
radio astronomers about the interpretation of certain radio-astronomic observations 
demonstrates that there are scientific areas where there is widespread disagreement. 
C. Galanos, “Universal Human Rights in the Face of Cultural Relativism and Moral Objectivity: 
Preaching or Teaching?” (2010) UCL Jurisprudence Review 29, 36. 
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Fig. 2.6 Moral Constructivism as the Method for Deriving Aspects of Interpretation 
Alan Gewirth80 suggests a way of constructing norms by examining the implications of agency 
– from the point of view of the prospective, purposive agent who recognises the simultaneous 
vulnerability of and indispensable importance of what we can refer to as the generic 
conditions of agency – that is, the general wherewithal to operate as a viable purposive being 
employing means in pursuit of voluntarily chosen ends. Gewirth’s contention is that all agents 
must – on pain of contradiction qua continuation of the viability of their prospective, 
purposive agency – regard interference with their generic conditions of agency (GCAs) as 
impermissible. This amounts to claiming rights to one’s GCAs.  On the basis that these rights 
are claimed on the sufficient basis that one is an agent, all agents can and must claim these 
rights, and all agents must acknowledge the validity of this claim on this sufficient criterion. 
The acknowledgement of rights claims to GCAs thus reciprocally function as the 
acknowledgement of duties to other agents. The Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) 
emerging from this analysis thus states that all agents should respects the generic rights of 
others as well as themselves. The PGC is thus a process by which all agents can morally reason 
upon justified norms and the demonstrable implications that they necessarily must, 
dialectically, accept apply to them and all others simply by virtue of being an agent and acting 
accordingly. This process for construction of norms would thus require that moral reason 
consistent with the PGC inform the routes adopted by the ECtHR in its processes for decision-
making on the expanded normative interpretation of the parameters of right and setting 
standards for the application. 
2.5 Pure Reason and The Principle of Generic Consistency 
While it is not possible to be sure of the precise individual motives and thinking behind the 
individual agents of the states involved in the negotiation process 81  or why new state 
                                                                
80 A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press: 1978). 
81  The values behind the founding of the Council of Europe are very wide ranging, including a 
cumulative moral heritage based on Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christianity, and the humanism of 
the French Revolution. A. Robertson, The Council of Europe: Its Structure, Functions and Achievements 
(Stevens and Sons Ltd: 1961) and   A. Robertson, The Council of Europe: European Institutions. 
Cooperation, Integration and Unification. (Stevens and Sons Ltd: 1973). 
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representatives continue with that membership, it is the public government purpose that is 
relevant. A proper government purpose, that could be common to members, may be inferred.  
The first point that is requisite by any reading of the ECHR is that there are some norms that 
are accepted as a moral duty governing behaviour towards one another, simply by virtue of 
being human. This conclusion is inescapable; the term “human” rights itself conveys that 
belief.82  Furthermore, if these rights are susceptible to review under the ECHR, there must 
then be an acceptance that reasoning may be applied in a way that allows meaning and a 
measurability of those duties.  
For Kant, the reasoning applied to discover justified moral norms was transcendental; they 
stem from universal aspects of the understanding in the form of a priori concepts that 
structure the apprehension of external phenomena in our sensory experience. These a priori 
concepts are deducible transcendentally rather than empirically in that they appeal to the 
conditions under which knowledge of the empirical world is possible. They are objectively 
justified83  in that each one is founded on a premise that applies to any possible human 
experience, one to which all reasonable humans would logically agree. A process of mental 
synthesis is applied to the premise, to establish the a priori concept. 84 Each begins with a 
premise about: (1) the self-attributability of pure mental items in all possible representations 
capable of accompanying them but distinct from them, an awareness of one’s own mind, in 
                                                                
82 Green explains these rights are recognised as, ‘they arise out of, and are necessary for the fulfilment 
of, a moral capacity without which a man would not be a man’ See T. Green Lectures on the Principles 
of Political Obligations (Longmans Green:1917) 47 cited in D. Boucher, “The Recognition Theory of 
Rights, Customary International Law and Human Rights” (2011) 58 Political Studies 753, 756.  
83 As Kant says: 
The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, 
so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become 
possible. 
I. Kant, 1781-1787, Critique of Pure Reason, I. Kant and N. Smith (Palgrave Macmillan: 2003) B126.  
The numbers marked "A" and "B" indicate the pages of the first (1781) and second (1787) editions. 
84 In Kant’s table of categories, there are twelve including: Unity, Plurality, and Totality (the Categories 
of Quantity); Reality, Negation, and Limitation (the Categories of Quality); Inherence and Subsistence, 
Causality and Dependence, and Community (the Categories of Relation), and Possibility-Impossibility, 
Existence-Nonexistence, Necessity-Contingency (the Categories of Modality). 
ibid A80/B106. 
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accordance with the necessary unity of apperception; or (2) a premise about a necessary and 
universal feature of our experience of norms that cannot be explained by association. The a 
priori concepts enable synthesis of manifest representations.85  
The transcendental argument works by stepping back from the external world of truth and 
falsity, instead asking, “under what conditions is knowledge possible”? For Kant, knowledge 
of an external world – empirical knowledge – presupposed a set of concepts which make the 
idea of a relation between the subject and a norm coherent in terms of explanation. Events 
occurring in space and time and according to the concept of causality do not so much describe 
the external world but describe the format in which our understanding is made whole and 
coherent. It is thus more likely that space and time and causality are attributes of the 
understanding first and foremost, this is what Kant called phenomenal knowledge, whatever 
the world is like in itself is perhaps unknown to us. To know such things is beyond our 
phenomenal capacities which are determined by our time-shaped, space-shaped, causality-
shaped accuracy of understanding and perception. 
In relation to how this might rationalise with respect to human rights, Kant has written 
extensively on the point. The transcendental method in moral philosophy, for Kant, starts 
from the conditions under which moral behaviour and moral critique would be possible. The 
first thing that is necessarily true, is that moral behaviour and moral critique makes sense only 
if it is addressed to beings that are free. In other words, beings who, unlike empirical objects, 
are capable of transcending the sphere of causality and determination in order that they can 
make a choice. The choice can be based on reason only if it is genuinely free and the reason 
cannot be explained away by reference to a determining appetite. Thus, there must be 
reasons that are substantive in themselves to ground an explanation for a free action. These 
reasons cannot be specific to one’s own appetites and interest, for these motivations are 
simply causal determinants. The test for freedom, therefore, is to universalise one’s maxims. 
If one can universalise one’s maxims then one escapes the determination of the will by 
                                                                
85 Kant explains:  
By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different 
representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. 
ibid A77/B103. 
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contingent causal motives. The simple idea of freedom thus leads us to the cusp of a moral 
imperative.   
According to Kant, the categorical imperative or the “supreme principle of practical reason” 
provides an objective moral route to justified human rights norms. Norms are moral if 
reasoned to have general authority, requiring that agents follow as they would wish (and 
expect) them to apply to others.86 A moral norm must be disconnected from any particular 
conditions, including the identity of the person or the particular physical details surrounding 
the proposition. Kant’s formulation, the “formula of universal law”, is:  
Act according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should 
become universal law.87   
Kant’s metaphysical view is not a position that is necessarily acceptable to all under the ECHR. 
Many would argue that human knowledge can originate only from senses experienced in the 
external world and not from pure reason. 88  In spite of the challenge to the view that 
transcendental reason can be applied, Kant makes the vital argument that moral reason is 
transcendental and does depend upon presupposing a higher norm arrived at a priori that 
acts as a supreme moral principle. Toddington explains: 
Kant […] points out that Reason suggests that any particular moral imperative 
presupposes a more general one, and that a justificatory regress becomes 
immediately apparent. In other words, the validity of any particular moral norm 
implying some corresponding duty to act does not merely presuppose a more general 
normative ground; it points to the existence of a supreme moral principle.89 
                                                                
86 Agents must respect other agents because of Kant’s formula of free will as an end in itself, with fits 
with the ECHR’s focus on liberty and fairness, it requires:  
So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. 
I. Kant, 1785, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University: 2012). 
87 ibid. 
88 For example, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume.  
89 S. Toddington, "Dialectical Necessity and the ‘Is-Ought’ Problem”, in P. Bauhn (ed), Gewirthian 
Perspectives on Human Rights (Routledge: 2016) 63: 67. 
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The wording of the ECHR makes it clear that the principals have accepted that there is a 
supreme moral principle to which they are subject. The right to “freedom” is the fundamental 
starting point in its Preamble. However, this transcendental knowledge must somehow be 
reasoned in the real world through experiences and the norms developed by that reasoning 
must be supported by other agents within a society if it is to be upheld. That is why the ECHR 
Preamble relies upon the operation of “democracy” and “common understanding”. It is in 
only an experiential worldview, requiring the comparing and contrasting of solutions between 
agents, that a process is formed that would support experiences being applied in an 
objectively moral manner, susceptible to evaluation. This results in the construction of values 
and principles of general application that are reasoned to be universally correct. Here, the 
work of Gewirth builds on Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative by adding an 
implied empirical content. The PGC provides a concerted attempt to explain how such norms 
could be correctly constructed through moral reasoning in the worldview.  
Gewirth’s PGC says that moral agents ought to respect the generic rights of freedom and that, 
as a result, some undeniable imperatives or norms must bind all.  To be so, the norm must be 
shown to be “dialectically necessary” for all agents. It is “dialectic” reasoning as it is based not 
on some transcendental approach, but rather on the inferences and discourses between 
agents. These concepts are socio-anthropological, recognising that social systems incorporate 
‘basic assumptions of purposive, practical and linguistically mediated characteristics of 
human association.’90  It is “necessary” for the agent to claim, with integrity, to be acting in 
accordance with a norm that arises from their general application of the attributes of human 
agency, and not particular features pertaining to them as an individual. They must then 
logically apply that generic imperative to other agents, as a necessary normative 
commitment. Gewirth explains: 
I shall then, view the agent as a person who is rational in that he is aware of and can 
give expression to the generic features that conceptual analysis shows to pertain 
necessarily to his actions, including the logical implications of these features. It is 
important to note, however, that it is not the dialectically necessary method that 
determines the generic features of action and hence the general standpoint of agency 
itself, since the contents of these features are independent of what any agent may 
                                                                
90 H. Olsen and S. Toddington (n 61) 65.  The work distinguishes, at p.77, three functions of the law: 
social-anthropological, technological and representational.  
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think they are. But once these features have been ascertained, as indicated above, the 
method operates to trace what judgments and claims every agent logically must make 
from this standpoint.91 
There are two key components to the PGC. The first is that: 
[E]very agent logically must hold or accept that he has rights to freedom and wellbeing 
as the necessary conditions of his action, as conditions that he must have; for if he 
denies that he has these rights, then he must accept that other persons may remove 
or interfere with his freedom and well-being, so that he may not have them; but this 
would contradict his belief that he must have them.92 
A purposive agent must accept he has the rights to freedom and wellbeing necessary to 
successfully pursue his actions for a purpose that he regards as good, if he is to defend that 
freedom against other persons.93  
The second component is that: 
[T]he agent logically must accept that all other prospective purposive agents have the 
same rights to freedom and well-being as he claims for himself.94 
An agent must accept that, if they have these rights to freedom and well-being by virtue of 
their agency, all other agents must have them also.95 
The logic behind the necessity requirement is summarised by Beyleveld:  
                                                                
91 Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press: 1978) 44. 
92 A. Gewirth, “The Epistemology of Human Rights,” Social Philosophy & Policy 1(2) (1984) 18. 
93 Gewirth:  
Since the agent regards as necessary goods the freedom and well-being that constitute the 
generic features of his successful action, he logically must also hold that he has rights to these 
genetic features, and he implicitly makes a corresponding right-claim. 
A. Gewirth (n 91) 63. 
94 A. Gewirth (n 92) 18. 
95 Gewirth: 
The agent holds that other persons owe him at least non-interference with his freedom and 
well-being, not because of any specific transaction or agreement they have made with him, 
but on the basis of his own prudential criteria, because such non-interference is necessary to 
his being a purposive agent. 
Gewirth, A. (n 91) 66. 
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The dialectically necessary argument has three stages [...] Stage I contends that any 
agent (e.g., Albert) contradicts that he is an agent if he does not accept that he 
generically instrumentally (i.e., in order to pursue or achieve his own purposes, 
regardless of what these might be) ought to defend his possession of the generic 
conditions of agency. Stage II argues that it follows purely logically that it is 
dialectically necessary for Albert to consider that he has rights to the generic 
conditions of agency (i.e., that, subject to Albert’s will, other agents categorically 
ought to act out of respect for Albert’s need for these conditions). Finally, stage III 
contends that it follows purely logically that it is dialectically necessary for Albert to 
consider that all agents have these ‘generic rights’ equally. Since Albert represents any 
agent, it is dialectically necessary for all agents to accept that all agents have the 
generic rights.96 
As the ECHR Preamble confirms expressly that it is concerned with the rights humans require 
for “freedom”, the PGC is singularly appropriate for securing that purpose. It appears 
embedded within the ECHR system, with its notions of fundamental freedoms echoing its 
ideals. Olsen and Toddington endorse the notion of the PGC as a means of explaining the 
ECHR:  
In short, a document like the European Convention on Human Rights presupposes the 
validity of the PGC even if its originators and signatories dispute the methodology of 
arriving at the PGC, or are entirely unaware of the PGC.97 
There remains debate about whether human rights truly exist on this basis and resulting 
charges that the understandings of the basic norms emerging through agreements such as 
the ECHR are in reality more of the Westernised view, imposed by a small but powerful group 
of states.98 However, the role of this work is not to consider the validity of the underlying 
assumption behind the ECHR project itself. It accepts that the states that are members of the 
ECHR (as well as people relying on its provisions and the ECtHR) must be bound by the 
reasonable consequences of the agreement’s recognition that there are human rights.  If the 
                                                                
96 D. Beyleveld, “The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights” 13(1) 
Human Rights Review (2011) 1, 2-3. 
97 See H. Olsen and S. Toddington, Architectures of Justice: Legal Theory and the Idea of Institutional 
Design (Ashgate Publishing: 2007) 7. 
98 See for example R. Panikkar, "Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?" (1982) Diogenes 
30:75 -102 or the review of cultural prisms and human rights (including Asian and Islam takes on 
human rights) included in S. Sedley, “Human Rights and the Whirligig of Time” (2016) Edinburgh Law 
Review 1, 2-5. 
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membership accepts that there are human rights, it must also accept that there are 
categorically binding requirements for a society. As Beyleveld explains: 
[A]ccepting that there are human rights, or that there are categorically binding 
requirements of any kind of action, logically requires accepting the PGC […] as the 
supreme criterion of practical reasonableness. 
Consequently, all legal systems that recognise human rights […], all who view law as a 
matter of obligation, and all who consider that there are categorically binding 
requirements on action, must take the PGC to be a necessary criterion of legal validity. 
Conventions on human rights must, as conventions on human rights, be interpreted 
to conform with the PGC.99  
In relation to the objective of providing a basis for reasoned normative interpretation of the 
rights under the ECHR, the work can now provide further clarification of a legitimate means 
for their construction. 
  
Fig. 2.7 The PGC as the Method for Deriving Aspects of Interpretation 
The dialectically necessary claims that an agent must make are not “truths” in the sense of 
assertoric propositions, but they are claims about what an agent must value if one seeks long-
term to engage in the business of employing means to ends that one has the freedom to 
choose.  Norms recognised by “everyone” simply by the internal reasoning possible by virtue 
of being an agent in a society are far from “black letter” and measurable by any scientific 
                                                                
99 D. Beyleveld, “Legal Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of Generic 
Consistency” (1996) 9(1) Ratio Juris 15, 15. 
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standard, but they are objective in the agent having gone beyond thinking only subjectively 
to justify principles of general application. 
Gewirth provides guidance on the types of rights that may constructed in accordance with 
the PGC and how they may be balanced against one another to form more normative detail, 
through the Criterion of Degrees of Necessity for Action.100 There are three distinguishable 
categories of goods: basic, non-subtractive, and additive. According to the criterion, basic 
rights override non-subtractive rights, which, in turn, override additive rights.101 
Basic goods are capacities without which an individual cannot act and would thereby lose his 
status as an agent, for example the right to life, basic bodily integrity, health and mental 
equilibrium.102 The basic goods are the minimum capacities necessary for effective action 
within a society and yet there may be disagreement on which candidate norms are included 
within them. As Boylan explains, the basic goods do not prescribe justice allocation among 
heterogenous groups: 
[W]hat about the sub-groups within any society that require particular goods for 
action such as: (1) very pure air to breathe; (2) very pure water to drink; and (3) 
quantities of vacant, underdeveloped land. Providing these goods may be basic for 
their ability to act, but they can be in direct conflict with various goods that the 
business sector sees as basic goods to them. In other words, conflicts between goods 
are supposed to be adjudicated on their being more proximate to action. But what if 
there is no “absolute” way to determine this. According to worldview of one group 
“p” is proximate to action, and to another “not-p” is proximate. Unless we trivialize a 
basic good as a minimum number of calories and maintaining a minimum core body 
temperature, we cannot arrive at objective standards.103 
                                                                
100 A. Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago University Press: 1996) 45-46. The criteria were 
previously referred to as the Criterion of Degree of Needfulness for Action. 
101 A. Gewirth (n 91) 53-58. 
102 Gewirth explains: 
The basic goods, which are the general necessary preconditions of action, comprise certain 
physical and psychological dispositions ranging from life and physical integrity (including such 
of their means as food, clothing and shelter) to mental equilibrium and a feeling of confidence 
as to the general possibility of attaining one’s goals. 
ibid 54. 
103 M. Boylan, “Choosing an Ethical Theory” in M. Boylan (ed), Gewirth: Critical Essays on Action, 
Rationality, and Community (Rowman & Littlefield: 1999) 74, 85. 
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What amounts to a basic good according to one’s reasoning may depend upon one’s 
worldview: 
If we understand basic goods as entailing those essential goods necessary for 
individual effective action within the society, then we are forced to consider whether 
the following are basic goods: (1) a telephone [today this could include a mobile]; (2) 
a computer [today this could include access to the internet]; (3) an automobile; and 
(4) a college education. These various candidates for basic goods have been debates 
[…] over the years. All of them might be necessary for effective action within the 
society.104 
If we are not to “trivialise” basic goods, as Boylan cautions, a route is necessary for at least a 
relative settlement of which out of number of “candidate” norms is the one that a society 
adopts. For example, via the operation of democracy. 
Gewirth’s next category of non-subtractive rights maintains an agent’s capacity to act, for 
example use of resources, being able to plan for the future, not being lied to or stolen from. 
Additive rights increase that capacity, for example the right to education, a career, or to 
marry. All raise the same challenges when it comes to their recognition, again emphasising 
the need for a means of compromise within a society. 
This consideration of the PGC shows its value as it allows an objective route to justify the 
selection and the relative weight of those norms that deserve moral protection. Yet, even 
accepting the PGC as the substantive justification and means of deriving human rights norms, 
it does not address our problem that it remains impossible to produce definitive proof of their 
actual substance. Gewirth notes: 
Thus while the dialectically necessary method will continue to uphold the normative 
necessity of the generic rights […], the more specific rights that will be derived from 
them may have elements of contingency – only, however, as to their derivation, not 
as to requiredness of their enforcement or fulfilment […]105 
As the section below considers, while the PGC provides a basis for the ECHR and the 
requirement to enforce and fulfil rights formed in pursuance of the PGC, in terms of the actual 
                                                                
104 ibid 84. 
105 A. Gewirth (n 100) 105. 
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processes of the ECtHR, it provides a means only to identify reasoning that could not comply 
with a criterion for reason (immoral) and to identify a process for decision-making that could 
not support moral reasoning. That leaves a very wide range of candidate norms that could be 
moral and different decision-making routes that could all make moral determinations. Views 
between individual agents vary significantly on these points and there is no way to prove 
definitively that any one is the dialectically necessary determination. As Patterson explains, 
even if the project accepts the premise:  
[T]hat political, legal and moral kinds have a hidden essence – there is little hope that 
such kinds will ever be identified in any manner comparable to natural science. The 
reason for this is quite simple: there is no agreed procedure for resolving 
disagreements in matters of value.106   
Thus, the problem of different agents internally reaching conflicting views on those crucial 
points will somehow need to be externally resolved by the ECtHR if it is to perform its function 
of effectively guarding the rights in pursuit of the PGC.  On this point, the work suggests that 
dialectically contingent (i.e. one thinks that) as opposed to dialectically necessary (i.e. one 
logically “must” think that) interpretation will have to be utilised in the construction of many 
norms evaluated as rights and duties arising under the PGC. While contingent, the operation 
of a system such as democracy means that the process of reasoning “can” be correct and 
minimise subjectivity. This means that the norms constructed via democracy with have at 
least relative legitimacy. In a democracy, nobody is assumed to have a privileged access to 
moral truth, but all have equal standing in evaluating what to do in constructing norms that 
form the principles underlying society. 
2.6 Dialectically Necessary Norms: A Negative Method for Reviewing 
Construction 
The methodology for delivering Kant’s discipline of reason requires a form of self-examination 
and a system of precautions: 
                                                                
106 D. Patterson, “Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts” (2006) 26 (3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 545, 552-553. 
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[W]here, as in the case of pure reason, we come upon a whole system of illusions and 
fallacies, intimately bound together and united under common principles, its 
[reason’s] own and indeed negative lawgiving […] seems to be required, which, under 
the title of a discipline, erects a system of precautions and self-examination out of the 
nature of reason and the objects of its pure employment.107 
Reason is thus negative, lawgiving, and is a self-discipline. The implications of this are 
explained by O’Neill: 
Any law giving that is to be both self-imposed and negative – that is, without content 
– can impose no more than the mere form of law. The discipline of reason can require 
only that no principle incapable of being a law count as a fundamental principle for 
governing thought and action. Any fundamental principle with determinate content 
would implicitly subject thought and action to some or other “alien” or unvindicated 
“authority”. Hence Kant views the fundamental principle of reason as that of 
governing both thinking and doing by principles that others too can adopt and 
follow.108 
This is in keeping with, the categorical imperative or supreme principle of practical reason 
which we already noted as: ‘Act according to that maxim [norm] by which you can at the same 
time will that it should become universal law’.  
What is apparent from this is that reason is, in Kant’s words, “no dictator”. O’Neill explains 
that, ‘there is no algorithm that fully determines the content of reasoned thought and 
action’.109 Nor, according to Kant, should we, ‘expect from reason what obviously exceeds its 
power’.110 The implications of this are set out by O’Neill: 
Reason offers only necessary conditions for thought and actions – in Kant’ terminology 
a “Cannon” for adequate thought and action […] Since the non-speculative theoretical 
use of reason has only regulative warrant, we can aim at the systematic unity of 
knowledge, but only in awareness that the ideal of completeness is not attainable 
[…]111 
                                                                
107 I. Kant, 1781, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge University 
Press: 1996).  
108  O. O’Neill, Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press: 2015) 28. 
109 ibid 28. 
110 I. Kant (n 107). 
111 O. O’Neill (n 108) 28-29. She later considers, at p.35, that:  
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Returning to the wording of Kant, the discipline of reason may be used only, ‘to mark out the 
path towards systematic unity’.112 The question remains, what this means for a court such as 
the ECtHR tasked with ensuring that states remain on that path. That reason is no dictator 
does not remove the ECtHR from its responsibility to reflect the common understandings.  
That innumerable interpretations of moral norms and decisions on how they should be 
applied may all meet the constraints of reason causes difficulties for their settlement, but 
there are at least modes of unreason against which the ECtHR can “negatively” guard. O’Neill 
explains three, as identified by Kant: 
A. To posit ‘capacities, insights and transcendent authorities’.  
B. To assume that thinking and acting can be ‘wholly arbitrary or non-lawlike’. 
C. To assume that the ‘fundamental principles of thought and action can appeal only 
to some local authority’.113 
Kant further provides three maxims that, together, comprise the sensus communis. 114 
Reasoning that could not accord with this criterion for reason would be immoral. Once more, 
the work of O’Neill helpfully summarises: 
A. No submission to “alien” authorities.  
However, taken alone, refusal of submission might ‘lead to anarchy or to isolation’. This is 
avoided by the second maxim. 
                                                                
[B]ecause this discipline [reason] constrains but does not generate what count as reasoned 
ways of thought and life, the task of reason cannot be defined in terms of some final product 
– a completed edifice of reason, comprising a finished system of all truths – but only in terms 
of a process of subjecting proposed thought and action to the discipline. Reason dictates 
neither thought nor action; its discipline is construed as a process, not as the once and for all 
discover of secure foundations. 
112 I. Kant (n 107). 
113 O. O’Neill (n 108) 30. 
114 I. Kant, 1790, Critique of the Power of Judgement, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews (Cambridge 
University Press: 2000). 
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B. Agents are required to ‘think from the standpoint of others – that is, that their 
thinking be based on principles that are at least possible for others’.  
Despite having a means by which the ECtHR may challenge a view as being necessarily 
unreasoned and immoral, this still leaves a lot of scope. Any process of thought or action that 
is guided by both of the first two maxims - ‘rejecting “lawgivers” and maintaining 
“lawlikeness”’ – will most likely be in ‘constant flux and revision, hence may well generate 
contradiction and hiatus’. This makes a third maxim ‘indispensable for a sustained process of 
thought or action that embodies the two’. 
C. A sustained process of ‘consistency-restoring review and revision’.115 
 
                                                                
115 O. O’Neill (n 108) 33. 
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Fig. 2.8 The Criterion for Reason 
The ECtHR, then, is able to claim a negative role in testing the interpretations and applications 
of the rights developed by the reasoning of agents, ruling that some are immoral given the 
constraints of reason. For example: (1) where the reasons given are incoherent e.g. reasoning 
that is irreconcilable with the right such as “to provide housing to those in need, limited to 
those who earn more than the minimum wage” or is irrelevant to it such as “to provide 
housing to those who are in need, provided they are of good moral character” or “rape is 
prohibited, unless the victim was previously paid for sex”; (2) interpretations and applications 
that could not be the possible will of everyone (e.g. promoting violence, false promising, 
revenge, coercion or theft, or victimising a group based on personal inherent characteristics); 
or (3) appeal to an unknowable “alien” authority such as religion or nature.  
Unreason:
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We can also add to the list of negative grounds for challenge the Criterion of Degrees of 
Necessity for Action. So, it would not be possible to argue that a basic right be limited because 
of a non-subtractive or additive right. 
In its negative role, the ECtHR has the relevant expertise and degree of removal to provide 
effective oversight. If, however, the ECtHR is going to move beyond ruling only when a 
normative interpretation on the parameters of a right or decision on application is absurd and 
thereby have a greater impact on the positive way forward, a basis beyond the criteria for 
reason must be found. The negative role is insufficient, for the ECtHR to effectively secure 
rights it must have a means of identifying positively between a multitude of candidate 
interpretations and different standards for application.  
In terms of its positive developmental role, the ECtHR certainly has the skill to develop 
interpretations and applications that are lawlike and could be the correctly reasoned will of 
everyone. However, it is not clear why any agent should necessarily submit and follow the 
ECtHR’s reasoning above their own or that of others, such as the government of their state, 
when they could have reached different conclusions that also satisfy these basic 
requirements. In keeping with the NJT, legitimacy relies upon the ECtHR demonstrating why 
its decisions should be respected over one’s own or those from conflicting authorities.  
Unless the ECtHR can show it is intrinsically better placed to reason on these points according 
to the PGC then, without some other means of showing a relationship between the Court and 
agents giving it legitimate capacity to command obedience, such as one developed through 
agreement by contract or consent, it is itself an “unvindicated” authority on the positive 
aspects of interpretation and application of the rights.   
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Fig. 2.9 The PGC and the Need for Methodology Relating to Positive Aspects of Interpretation 
and Application 
The work now has sufficient information to identify the negative objective of the ECtHR to 
guard against reasoning that would be immoral under the PGC. When it comes to the positive 
objective of the ECtHR, it is necessary to explore further the implications of a shared 
government purpose in signing the ECHR and what that means for a reasonable approach for 
the positive construction of rights. 
2.7 Positively Constructing Human Rights 
Constructing norms using the PGC is particularly difficult, as it is a question that can be settled 
through only an internal process of self-reason. Kant explains: 
To think for oneself means to look within oneself (i.e., in one’s own reason) for the 
supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times is 
enlightenment. Now this requires less effort than is imagined by those who equate 
enlightenment with knowledge, for enlightenment consists rather in a negative 
principle in the use of one’s cognitive powers; and those who are exceedingly rich in 
knowledge are often least enlightened in their use of it. To employ one’s own reason 
means simply to ask oneself, when one is urged to accept something, whether one 
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finds it possible to transform the reason for accepting it, or the rule that follows from 
what is accepted, into a universal principle governing the use of one’s reason.116  
We must, according to the theories of Kant, be neutral as between differing “conceptions of 
the good”. Views vary greatly, meaning individuals may feel very strongly that they have the 
better understanding of the coverage of a right i.e. the principles of general application that 
fall under it and also of the factors that allow interference with those principles in particular 
circumstances. Yet, another individual may genuinely hold an equally strong opposing view 
with the same self-confidence that their own understanding is correct. Taking modern 
examples of debates, abortion and euthanasia show extremes of different views or 
interpretations of the “right” moral justified norms.117 
The potential for divergence is perhaps most clearly shown by views and practices once 
reflecting widely held convictions as acceptable in society, later being labelled as erroneous 
and unsupportable. Notable, now “unthinkable” examples from still relatively recent 
European history include slavery, women's rights and corporal and capital punishment.118 The 
                                                                
116 I. Kant, 1786, “What Does it mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”  trans. A. Wood and G. Giovanni, 
in Religion and Rational Theology (Cambridge University Press: 1996) 7. 
117 There remains significant uncertainty about when life begins. The ECtHR has held that the point at 
which life starts remains a matter that should be left to the discretion of States (Vo v France, 
Application No.  53924/00, Judgment of 8 July 2004). 
118The observation of apparent inconsistencies in legal principles has resulted in an entire movement, 
postmodernism, questioning the very existence of universal truths and instead attributing rights held 
out as moral norms to be relative and the result of changing social, cultural, economic, technological 
and political circumstance. As Stacy explains: 
Postmodernism as a form of legal analysis has only recently emerged from the earlier 
broadening influence of the phenomenon of socio-legal studies that took place from the early 
1970s to the mid–1980s. This jurisprudence attempted to move beyond the idea of law as an 
autonomous discipline and incorporate the insights of the social science disciplines. New 
jurisprudential discourses of law and economics, critical legal studies, women and the law, law 
and literature, and indigenous people and the law, sprang up in law schools […] This new body 
of scholarship employed interdisciplinary approaches to legal analysis to demonstrate that the 
legal regime is linked to social, economic, political and cultural contexts. They questioned the 
bedrock assumption of jurisprudence; namely that law is a self-contained, autonomous 
system. 
See H. Stacy, Postmodernism and Law: Jurisprudence in a Fragmenting World (Stanford University 
Press: 2001), 44. 
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interpretation and the application of human rights is in constant flux as societal attitudes 
"evolve".119  
Even the work of Gewirth himself, in attempting to derive more detailed moral norms from 
those already recognised by, is subject to challenge. Wellman argues: 
He [Gewirth] derives the right to education from the right to productive agency 
because education “is a prime means for the development of productive agency” (p. 
149120). One ground of the human right to employment is that it “serves to counter 
the threat that unemployment poses to basic well-being” (p. 221). He defends the 
human right to economic democracy by arguing that “it helps to maintain that control 
over one’s behaviour that is the essential feature of freedom” (p. 273). To my mind, 
none of these causal connections is right enough to establish the strict necessity that 
is required to derive a right from another more basic right.121 
While the rights set out by Gewirth are a reasonable interpretation of the higher norms from 
which they are formed, it may be possible to reason otherwise. They are only, as such, 
candidate principles. Gewirth accepts that there are two key problems in deriving specific 
rights: 
First, all humans have rights to freedom and well-being as the necessary conditions of 
their action and generally successful action. Second, some good, X, is required for 
persons to have freedom or well-being or both. Third, therefore persons have a right 
to X. 
However, Gewirth explains: (1) someone may have a prior right to X; and (2) such arguments 
make very strong assumptions about factual or causal connections.122 
A human agent may reach what is, from their perspective, a moral conclusion and believe it 
to be free of bias. However, given that we have rejected the feasibility of “pure” 
transcendental reasoning as a means of constructing moral principles in practice, in favour of 
                                                                
119  As explained by Lord Bingham when considering a mandatory death penalty, there is an 
expectation that expectations and understandings of rights must change, 'in light of evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society'. Reyes v R [2002] UKPC 11, at para. 
26. 
120 All page references related to A. Gewirth (n 100). 
121 C. Wellman, “The Community of Rights by Alan Gewirth” (1999) 108 (429) Mind 162, 164.  
122 A. Gewirth (n 100) 104. 
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dialectically contingent societal reasoning in light of experience, such decisions are influenced 
inevitably by reflecting upon the possible application to that person's own life and so upon 
their own individual identity, culture and experiences.123  
This does produce challenges with the PGC as an approach for the positive interpretation of 
rights, as Williams considers. The dialectically “necessary” requirement requires an agent to 
be conceived as a rational agent “and no more” but in reality, agents have particular features 
and desires. This, argues Williams, makes the task unintelligible124 and leaves no room for an 
individual self.125 However, the requirement can be saved using an argument developed by 
Beyleveld, that an agent can be bound by both the norms he holds because of his “particular 
contingent properties” and also those arising through properties that “make him an agent like 
any other agent”.126 Because to enjoy his particular properties and achieve his purposes, 
whatever those ends, certain freedoms are always necessary in order for him to do so 
                                                                
123  For a consideration of the impact of the environment and social interactions on the thinking 
process, see G. Foxall, “The Contextual Stance” (1999) 12 Philosophical Psychology 25. 
124 Williams argues:  
We are concerned with what any given person, however powerful or effective he may be, 
should reasonably do as a rational agent, and this is not the same thing as what he would 
reasonably do if he were a rational agent and no more. Indeed, that equation is unintelligible, 
since there is no way of being a rational agent and no more. 
B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Fontana: 1985) 63. 
125 Williams concludes:  
How can an I that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to 
live a life that respects its own interests? If morality is possible at all, does it leave anyone in 
particular for me to be? 
ibid 70. 
126 Beyleveld supports the point with the following premise of judgment in a self-reflecting agent:  
For me (Albert) to think of myself as a particular real (i.e., finite, embodied) agent, I must think 
of myself as having the particular powers and characteristics that distinguish me from any 
other real agents that make me the particular agent that I am; but, equally, I cannot think of 
myself as the particular agent I am without recognizing that I am a particular agent, and I 
cannot think of myself as a particular agent unless I think of myself as an agent, as possessing 
the properties and characteristics that make me and any other agent (e.g., Brenda) agents. 
D. Beyleveld, “Williams’ False Dilemma: How to Give Categorically Binding Impartial Reasons to Real 
Agents”, Journal of Moral Philosophy (2013) 204, 208. 
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successfully. Without these general public rights, justified moral norms of general application, 
there can be no individual self within a society.127   
This work accepts that, from the standpoint of an individual agent, their consideration that a 
right must be interpreted in a particular way is intrinsically tied up with their own unique 
thoughts about how it could apply to their particular existence. Reasoning on interpretation 
is unavoidably tied with their own ends and experiences, however much they try to apply the 
logic of dialectical necessity. 
 
Fig. 2.10 The Link between Application and Interpretation 
Agents have admittedly different starting points in reasoning, because of how a norm would 
apply to them and affect their informal social interactions, but this does not mean that agents 
cannot come to a point where some views on norms must generally converge for the ends of 
any agent to be upheld. Where identified, these societal expectations are generic and beyond 
                                                                
127 Beyleveld concludes:  
Far from it being the case that the idea of being categorically bound to an impartial principle 
renders unintelligible the idea of the individual self, it actually grounds this idea (and the idea 
of an individual self) through the idea of an individual self.  
ibid 225. 
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those of smaller groups. Provided that they could accord with the PGC, these are justified 
moral principles in being recognised as having general application and in proving effective in 
creating a functioning population. They are the principles which form the underlying and 
permanent public rights and duties all recognise as the basis for justice and fairness in that 
society. Such norms are evidenced in the consistent elements of practices between 
interacting agents. But the difficulty remains in finding an acceptable means to identify that 
convergence by collecting the evidence of practice, interpreting what shared public values 
are attributable to the behaviour, and translating that into law for application. 
An agent is bound to consider for themselves where that point of merger could be, before 
thinking as broadly as they can about how their actions will affect others. Thinking of others 
should be possible, it is not necessary to have the same ends and experiences in mind, as 
there is a point at which the interests of all agents meet. But, while the process of 
existentialism is a valuable resource, no one individual can be sure they have reasoned 
correctly on what the correct public position should be. As explained by Kierkegaard: 
Human reason has boundaries [...] But people have a rattle-brained, conceited notion 
about human reason, especially in our age when one never thinks of a thinker, a 
reasonable person, but thinks of pure reason and the like, which simply does not exist, 
since no one, be he a professor or what he will, is pure reason. Pure reason is 
something fantastical [...]128  
It is impossible to be sure which individuals have correctly reasoned and identified a generic 
imperatively required norm.129 So, while it is possible to infer agreement of agents to the idea 
of universal rights via the PGC, it does not automatically follow that the dialectically 
contingent reasoning of any one agent should be entrusted as being the best place for 
development of a reasoned understanding of the dialectically necessary norms. 
                                                                
128  S. Kierkegaard; H. Hong and E Hong eds. and trans. Kierkegaard's Writings, XII: Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Volume II (Princeton University Press: 1992) 99.  
129 On this point, the work of Arthur Schopenhauer is of note. He argues that humans are motivated 
by their own basic desires, that: ‘Man can indeed do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wants’. 
See A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Presentation (translated by R. Aquila and D. Carus) 
(Longman: 2008). 
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Given the potential for lawyers to instinctively defer to judges, having been trained to follow 
the decisions of judges in the national systems, it may be tempting to respond to the concerns 
about contingent reasoning by individual agents by simply replacing their reasoning on norms 
with the reasoning of a court or at least allowing a court to sift the candidate norms from a 
wider pool of agents to select the understanding that they prefer. But, this is not necessarily 
a solution that agents must accept.  
The crucial point is that judges are susceptible to many of the same dangers as other 
agents. 130  In relation to the ECtHR, it is an unavoidable conclusion that despite best 
endeavours to be impartial, its judges are still subject to external influences irrespective of 
any attempt to look past them. It is impossible to view ECtHR judges as removed from the 
real world, as they also live within it and will have a particular (some may argue removed to 
that of many other agents) worldview.131  
It is arguable that the immersion of judges into a formalised system of law may actually result 
in their view being less representative of the outcome from dialectic moral discourse between 
agents when it comes to the interpretation of the normative parameters of an ECHR rights 
and of the standards for correct application. It may be contended that only in experiencing 
                                                                
130 An example of the limitations of reliance on judicial training to produce consistent results comes 
from the UK, with highly trained judges within the same state reaching different conclusions based on 
the same facts. In a “Review of Year” by Michael Fordham QC, Blackstone Chambers at the JUSTICE 
Annual Human Rights Conference (13 October 2017), it was noted that out of 24 human rights cases 
he identified as coming before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal was overturned 14 times. 
131 In relation to US constitutional cases in the Supreme Court which also deal with the interpretation 
and application of “shared” principles across a diverse range of US states, Marmour concludes 
following a review that: 
The justices’ moral, political, sometimes even religious, convictions tend to influence, not to 
say determine, the outcome of their decisions on constitutional matters, though, of course, 
rarely the public reasons for them. The reasons are always cast in legal terms and phrases as 
legalistically as possible.  
None of this is news, of course […] But this begs an obvious question: Why do we go for it? 
What moral-political reasons can support a constitutional structure that gives an essentially 
nondemocratic institution […] not (professionally or politically) accountable to anyone, the 
power to prevail over the decisions of the democratically elected […]? 
A. Marmour, “Randomized Judicial Review” in T. Bustamante and G. Bernardo (eds.), Democratizing 
Constitutional Law: Perspectives on Legal Theory and the Legitimacy of Constitutionalism (Springer 
International Publishing: 2016) 13. 
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differing needs, desires and obstacles in the real world can the true considerations and 
consequences of holding to certain values be understood, an impossibility for any small group 
of individuals who cannot be representative of the whole beyond the desires and familiarities 
they hold.132 An awareness of how the law functions in the world must form part of the 
development of that law. This work has already accepted that agents may reason based upon 
their own existence and, arguably, reasoning may not be a practical guide to thought and 
action without including consideration of the relationship between the possible norm and its 
effect. Empirical reality is necessary to dialectic reasoning. As explained by Balkin and Siegel:  
[L]egal principles are intelligible and normatively authoritative only insofar as they 
presuppose a set of background understandings about the paradigmatic cases, 
practices, and areas of social life to which they properly apply. A principle always 
comes with an imagined regulatory scene that makes the meaning of the principles 
coherent to us. When that background understanding is disturbed the principle 
becomes "unstuck" from its hermeneutic moorings; it no longer seems clear how the 
principle applies or even whether it should apply [emphasis added].133 
The PGC is useful as means for viewing empirical reality through a moral lens but it does still 
rely on that empirical experience to make ethical judgements. As Olsen and Toddington 
explain: 
A critical Idealism accepts the impossibility of concept-neutral observation and 
consequently can be understood from here on in as the view that scientific endeavour 
is not reporting ‘what we find’ (for there is no way of knowing ‘what we find’ without 
a conceptual apparatus), it is the search for some defensible and non-arbitrary 
conceptual apparatus that provides us with a critical orientation to empirical 
experience and a purchase for critical ethical judgement.134 
                                                                
132 Everyday social processes are environments in which current understandings and rules are tested 
as they come into conflict, requiring reasoning to form views and to act. This experience may develop 
new determinations of principles and also of how rules and actions may respond. This means it is 
possible for the legal protection under a right to move on even if in the past the view was that it was 
unavailable in similar circumstances. See D. L. Jones, “The Global and the Local: “System” and 
“Lifeworld” in the Study of World Order” (2001) Co-operation and Conflict 36(3): 297, 300. 
133 J. Balkin and R. Siegel, "Principles, Practices and Social Movements" (2006) 154(3) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 927, 928. 
134 Olsen, H. and Toddington, S., “Legal Realism: In Search of a Science of Law” (2016) 4 Retfærd 22, 
25. 
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Under the principle of hypothetical imperatives there is a, ‘practical necessity of a possible 
action as a means to achieving something else that one wills [...]’.135 This follows from the 
maxim: ‘Whosoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has a decisive influence on those 
actions) the indispensable necessary means to it that are within his power.’136 This means 
that norms may relate to what an agent cannot do to another as it will deny them an end, and 
also to providing the resources necessary for agents to have the opportunity to achieve that 
end. It is only when the fuller range of ends is being considered, that the understanding of 
the norms generally required by all agents to be free can be fully developed. A better 
alternative to relying on judges to be representative of wider society is therefore needed. 
If the PGC holds true, then certain principles are of consistent importance to anyone’s ends 
and so should theoretically be consistently informing and influencing agents as they reason 
and interact going about their activities. They radiate out to increasingly remote levels, and 
constructions by agents should ultimately overlap into the shared constructed justified moral 
norms. These constructed principles are morally justified, in that they represent agents in a 
society striving for fair outcomes of general application. Societal principles may also exceed 
the demands of the PGC in “any” society, but be a moral public position within a given society 
forming part of its unique enduring structure of justice and fairness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
135 I. Kant, 1785, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press: 2012). 
136 ibid. 
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Fig. 2.11 Norms of Consistent Importance to Anyone’s Ends 
Using social contract theory, it is accepted that individuals may not always do the moral thing 
but the community within a nation sovereign state at least represents an agreement to strive 
to take account of the needs of others so as to avoid any break-down in order.  
For Hobbes, states and the social contract are the alternative to living in a brutal “state of 
nature” in which self-interested people would be in constant conflict: “The condition of man 
[…] is a condition of war of everyone against everyone”. 137 For Locke, the state of nature 
                                                                
137  The argument made by Hobbes was, for its time, radical suggesting that legal authority and 
obligation are based on the individual self-interests of all members of society who are understood to 
be equal to one another. The position of a sovereign (the monarch) was not because of they had an 
essential authority to rule over the rest but rather because their absolute authority is necessary to the 
survival of that society.  
It is because of self-interest that agents agree to rationally submit to sovereign under a social contract 
as the alternative is a state of nature where “life is nasty, brutish, and short”. No rational person would 
prefer that position:  
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time or war where every man is enemy to every 
man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what 
their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there 
is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of 
the earth, no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no 
commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much 
force, no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, 
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would be a peaceful one of liberty in which persons are free to pursue their own interests and 
plans, free from interference. It is the pursuit of property and conflict that moves man from 
the state of nature and requires a social contract.138 For Rousseau also, man has fallen from 
a state of nature under which human are free and has need of a social contract to now 
safeguard freedom because of private property and the “progress” of civilization creating 
issues including dependence and economic and social inequalities.139  
Rawls in his later theory of justice goes further than the notion of the state of nature, using 
the device of the “original position” to explain why agents would form a social contract to 
secure stability and to maximise the rights of all.140 For Rawls, as for Kant, agents have the 
moral capacity of judging norms from a generic and impartial standpoint. The morally justified 
principles of general application are discovered via impartiality by imagining persons in a 
hypothetical situation, the original position, under which agents operate under the “veil of 
Ignorance”. In the original position one is denied any particular knowledge of one’s 
circumstances, such as one’s: state, gender, race, particular talents, disabilities, age, social 
status, and ends. Under these conditions an agent can construct objectively justified moral 
principles for a just society, as they could not know which would favour their own specific 
circumstances. Rawls describes his theory as “justice as fairness.” This more rationalist 
account of the basis for a social contract is more in line with the PGC and the argument of this 
                                                                
and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.  
T. Hobbes, 1651, Leviathan (Wordsworth Editions Limited: 2014). 
138 J. Locke, 1690, The Second Treatise on Civil Government (Prometheus Books: 1986). 
139 Rousseau: 
The social pact, far from destroying natural equality, substitutes, on the contrary, a moral and 
lawful equality for whatever physical inequality that nature may have imposed on mankind; 
so that however unequal in strength and intelligence, men become equal by covenant and by 
right. 
J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings (ed.) Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge 
University Press: 1997). 
140 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press: 1971). 
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work. Kant supports the view of Rawls that this cooperation, to avoid the state of nature, is 
itself a moral imperative.141 
If moral norms required by the PGC are consistently reasoned in a society, because of a 
commitment under a social contract based upon a conception of “justice as fairness” to do 
the moral thing in relation to other agents, what is needed is a methodology as part of a social 
contract for extraction where the norms intercept to form the principles of general 
application. This means that while the PGC provides the substantive justification, it is the 
procedural justification under a social contract that allows a legal system to move into the 
positive construction of the normative scope of rights and settlement of contested points 
about the principles they encompass. 
Even with a community fully committed to Gewirthian moral principles, imagined by 
Beyleveld as Gewirthia, Beyleveld explains that there will be contested “interpretations and 
applications” that require authoritative public settlement. This is “the external problem of 
authority”, a community that is morally divided. The need Beyleveld recognises for some form 
of procedural justification for the imagined Gewirthia, is in keeping with the call in this work 
for an at least relatively legitimate process under the ECHR system: 
Of course, the extent of moral pluralism in any community is a matter of degree, but, 
even where just one dissenting citizen believes that the legal regime is making a 
fundamental error (by reference to principles that the dissenter accepts but the 
regime rejects), it is incumbent on those who support the regime to explain why the 
dissenter is bound – that is, why even the dissenter should regard the legal regime as 
having authority.142 
The argument continues: 
                                                                
141 Taking the Kantian view, agents must as a matter of practical reason reject a state of nature based 
on unilateral will and submit to an omnilateral will determined by an allotted external power:  
[Each agent in a community must] resolve upon [...] the principle that it must leave the state 
of nature [...] unite itself with others (with which it cannot avoid interacting), subject itself to 
a public lawful external coercion, and so enter into a condition in which what is to be 
recognised as belonging to it is to be determined by law and is allotted to it be adequate power 
(not its own but an external power). 
I. Kant, 1797, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press: 2003) 90. 
142 D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, “Consent in the Law” (Hart Publishing: 2007) 310. 
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[O]ur particular interest is in clarifying how far we can run with a procedural 
justification to “bind in” those who dispute the authority of law or who claim to be 
free to follow their consciences rather than the legally authorised rules or 
determinations. After all, if the relationship between representative governing agents 
and citizens can be assimilated to that between a principal and a representative agent 
or treated as analogous to private governance within a club, citizens (just like 
principals and club members) will be bound by acts taken by their representatives or 
delegates within the scope of the authority. The fact that citizens did not know in 
advance what particular decision would be the outcome of the process, or that they 
would now prefer some other rule of determination, will not release them from their 
procedural bond.143 
While procedural justification is then necessary, that leaves the question of how to determine 
what the procedure is. Clearly, for the purposes of human rights agreements, it must be one 
that could comply with the PGC but that may allow more than once process for determination 
and decision-making. Beyond that, however, it is concluded that the consent of agents to a 
particular regime is the best relatively legitimate route to securing the PGC and stability. This 
is a stance endorsed by Beyleveld: 
Proceduralism thus throws up its own questions for determination, and we seem to 
need a further level of proceduralism to resolve the matter. However, this threatens 
to become an infinite regress of one layer of proceduralism on another. At this level, 
we can say that the procedural turn that best serves the PGC is one to which agents’ 
consent.144 
As Toddington explains, this type of civil society via a social contract is necessary for the PGC: 
In [Kant’s] Metaphysics of Morals the much maligned “mono-logical” subject finds the 
moral law within, and with the law comes freedom, duties and rights; but the 
unilateral determination of right on the basis of a principle as general as Kant’s 
versions of the Categorical Imperative can bring only conflict. The necessary 
implication of the destabilising potential of unilateral right is the move to an 
agreement to institutionalise the determination of Right and transform a myriad 
individual wills into an omnilateral authority acceptable to all. This achievement is the 
mark of Civil Society.145 
                                                                
143 ibid 310. 
144 ibid 320. 
145 Toddington, S. “The Moral Truth about Discourse Theory” (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 217, 227-228. 
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The reasoning that follows in Chapter Three proposes that the legal recognition for this comes 
initially via the democratic operation of governments and courts in nation states and, as 
necessary, international institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.12 Norms of Consistent Importance to Anyone’s Ends Recognised Via Democracy    
Any society must reach agreement on: (1) what potentially moral process is accepted for the 
construction of principles, those rights and duties that inform everything else as the 
foundations of justice and fairness; and (2) given it is infeasible for all agents to be directly 
involved in every decision, the appropriate placing of agency in institutions to: (a) represent 
that process of societal dialectic construction, (b) the translation into legal norms (proposal 
and production), and then (c) application of the principles of general application to particular 
circumstances. 
For a functional society, there must be an accepted system able to determine authoritatively 
when a societal norm exists, which may be proposed and then produced as a legal norm. That 
system must also be able to ensure such general principles are executed correctly. The 
rational need for such a system, to avoid the alternative of conflict or failure to try and reflect 
justice as it would be reasoned under the original position, means that if effective in uniting 
citizens as free equals and avoiding conflict, there is already some degree of legitimacy to 
whatever system is adopted and its procedures.  
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The crucial question is the existence of a system to which a society defers, whether via 
consent or at least attachment.146  Those subjected to rules enacted in a particular form 
should freely respect them despite any divergent personal views. They must accept the 
expression of the omnilateral will as above their unilaterally held one. 147  As Olsen and 
Toddington explain: 
[L]aw must simultaneously be distinguished from voluntary, consensual and 
subjectively reasoned forbearance; but in a form in which the capacity to threaten and 
coerce is justified, and where the incentive to comply is justified notwithstanding the 
threat.148  
It is not feasible or helpful for such a system to rely upon only the interpretations of norms 
which all its agents have actively reasoned upon and expressed consent to form a collective 
principle. This would be too slow and cumbersome. Equally, not all agents can be involved in 
making choices about how to apply principles of general application in particular 
circumstances. As Hart explains, it is necessary that a legal system include accepted 
"secondary" or power-conferring rules.149 These secondary rules empower particular bodies, 
following specific methodology or procedures, to pass or pronounce upon the law e.g. in the 
UK parliament passes law according to set processes and the courts interpret and apply that 
                                                                
146 On the idea of "attachment" to a particular narrative or project that citizens accept see J. Balkin, 
"The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture" 4 Widener L. Symp. J. 167 (1999). While its 
argument is directed at to the American Constitution, under the ECtHR the same type of commitment 
is made in relation to shared European traditions of democracy and the declared human rights.  
147 It is for this reason that criticisms in relation to the operation of the ECHR are of importance even 
though, as it stands, most of the rulings made under the system are implemented. It is not enough for 
rules to be followed they should also be respected. The special status of the ECHR means there is a 
particular stigma associated with any failure to comply meaning particular care is needed in its 
interpretation. As commented on by Letsas in relation to the ECtHR:  
[I]ts judgments have always enjoyed publicity and respect amongst contracting states. There 
are several reasons behind this success [...] First, that the Convention is widely treated (by 
states, individuals, and courts) as a source of important duties which courts must get right as 
a matter of law. Secondly, that the status of the ECHR rights as justiciable rights against the 
government is treated as morally significant when it comes to interpreting their scope and 
limits. 
G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press: 2007) 39. 
148 H. Olsen and S. Toddington, “Legal Idealism and the Autonomy of Law”, Ratio Juris, 1999, vo.12, 
286, 291-292. 
149 H. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press: 1961). 
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law subject to rules established in legislation and by the common law. That power is based 
upon an acceptance by society of the validity of the secondary rules, making it vital they are 
as clear as possible.150  
Therefore, the expression of legal autonomy in interpreting and applying law flows from 
“institutional autonomy” as a route to a legitimate expectation for others to follow decisions 
on those points. As Venzke explains, semantic authority provides a basis for the evaluation of 
legal judgments. It relates to, 'an actor's capacity to influence and shape meanings as well as 
the ability to establish its communications as authoritative reference points in legal 
discourse.'151  
The question then is, what is the power conferred or institutional autonomy between national 
and international institutions in resolving questions about the democratic interpretation and 
application of human rights? 
2.8 A System for Constructing Human Rights  
 
2.8.1 Summary of the Findings on the Basis for Constructing Rights 
The preceding analysis made a number of important points in relation to the construction of 
human rights under the ECHR. (1) The ECHR has an idealist rather than a positive realist 
undertone and supports natural rights. (2) The rights it guarantees must be developed in line 
                                                                
150 This need is explained by Danilenko:  
Domestic and international experience demonstrates that a legal system which lacks more or 
less clear criteria separating its content from politically desirable rules, moral rules or courtesy 
runs a risk of allowing a high degree of subjectivity in the ascertainment of the applicable rules 
of conduct. If the formal tests of validity delineating law from non-law are absent or are not 
sufficiently clear, the subjects of law, law-applying institutions and commentators will tend to 
invoke in support of their positions the most different rules allegedly constituting "law". The 
inevitable result of such a trend will be a general decline in the authority and normative power 
of the law. The law will lose much of its quality as a body of rules having a special binding 
character, which is lacking in all other social norms. 
G. Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 1993) 16, 17. 
151 This is a question of the actors who enjoy the semantic authority to interpret law. On this see I. 
Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists 
(Oxford University Press: 2012) 63. 
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with the PGC. (3) As a route for the moral construction of justified rights, the PGC relies upon 
dialectic discourse between agents as they experience the real world. (4) Agents will, under 
the PGC, create systems for compromise on the interpretation of moral norms and to 
safeguard their application. (5) The legitimacy of these systems will be subject to: (a) the 
criteria for reason under the PGC, (b) coherence with already established principles and 
norms of the society, (c) compliance with secondary power conferring rules, (d) meeting 
government standards (e.g. democratic due process), and (e) empirical validity. 
The implication of the relevance of dialectic discourse is that, while legal realism alone is 
dismissed as an appropriate basis for the rulings of the ECtHR to be legitimised, empirical 
evidence is still a very relevant to identifying the outcomes of the PGC’s operation within 
society.  
The role of institutions means that while secondary rules are not, as positive law would 
suggest, sufficient alone to provide legitimacy they are an important part of an agreement 
between cooperative agents for which the PGC recognises a need.  
For any authority to claim legitimacy in relation to its decisions about the interpretation and 
application of law, it is as such relevant to consider: (1) compliance with secondary rules; (2) 
fit with empirical evidence; (3) potential compliance with the criterion for reason in 
accordance with the PGC; and (4) coherence with existing principles of the system and its 
form of governance (e.g. democracy).  
Applying this to the three types of power within a state, some broad observations can already 
be made. These powers are: (1) the legislative power; (2) the executive power; and (3) the 
judicial power.  
The legislative power to make and change the law should be made, in accordance with the 
PGC, by institutions that are representative of all agents within a society. It is the consistent 
norms that emerge through dialectic discourse in the real world that best represent principles 
underlying society under a social contract for freedom and equality. The representative 
institutions are the political bodies or, to be more precise, under the ECHR directly elected 
representatives such as a national parliament. They interpret the public will, to form laws in 
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accordance with a proper public (as opposed to private) government purpose which must 
include the moral norms of that society.152 
The executive power is to carry the laws into effect, that is to execute or carry out the laws 
with the assistance of a police force, a military force and the civil service, overseen and funded 
by the political institutions. 
The judicial power is to interpret the law in accordance with the proper government purpose, 
and to apply the law to disputes and conflicts that arise between the state and the individual 
and to disputes and conflicts that arise between individuals. This power rests with the courts 
and tribunals.  
In reality, as part of their task construing legislation national courts may be required to fill in 
any gaps and such gaps may raise issues of a moral nature. But it should do so in light of the 
object and purpose of the legislature, considering what could be a proper government 
purpose AND whether that purpose is in accordance with the evidence of the background 
circumstance of the law.153 That evidence could include, for example: the face of the text, 
explanatory notes, statements made in a parliament, and reports from law reform bodies. In 
the UK the background evidence may include: Law Commission reviews and proposals, 
                                                                
152 Rousseau notes: 
‘As soon as any man says of the affairs of the State "What does it matter to me?" the State 
may be given up for lost.’ 
J. Rousseau (n 139). 
153 What is looked for are the proper justifications for the law in question. As Evans explains, that the 
search is for ‘the public interest reasons in favour of the rule […] that were thought to justify making 
it part of the law’.  
Evans continues:  
Whether these concerns actually motivated legislators is irrelevant. We can see this when we 
think how odd it would be for a lawyer to argue that the purpose of a particular provision was 
really to gain extra votes in a marginal electorate and that consequently it should be 
interpreted to best achieve that purpose.  
J. Evans, “Controlling the Use of Parliamentary History” (1998) 18 New Zealand Universities Law 
Review 1, 19. 
Page 117 of 391 
 
departmental green and white papers, select committee reports, and any government issued 
guidance.  
Any interpretation should not, recognise new types of claim if it goes beyond the reasonably 
inferable government purpose or if the matter is too political e.g. when there are significant 
unresolved moral issues. 154 In those cases, while a court’s choice may be one of the many 
candidates for further normative interpretation under the existing law, it really requires that 
selection between alternatives to be made by the legislature, as the representative of the 
public will. This is more often the case when the interpretation is in relation to human rights 
claims. 
When interpreting the purpose of the legislature, the national court is well placed given: (1) 
an ability to reconcile how the law fits together coherently with other domestic rules; (2) 
appreciation of the process for proposing and producing legal norms; and (3) relative 
closeness to the relevant empirical evidence that must form part of interpreting the 
government (public as opposed to private) purpose of the legislature.  
As stated above, when applying the law in resolving disputes between individuals and 
ensuring government decisions observe standards, the national court’s closeness to the 
empirical reality is useful. Relevant standards include compliance with secondary rules, 
empirical validity, correct democratic process, and the criterion for reason under the PGC. 
While an international court can identify the more overt government failures, a national court 
is better placed to appreciate the more locally nuanced issues. For disputes between 
individuals, the national court is well placed to appreciate the realities those individuals face 
given the national customs, policies and practice. It is also required to act to resolve the 
dispute, there is no alternative but for the national court or tribunal to apply the law. 
                                                                
154 Given that the authority of a court can be justified only in an instrumental way, even a national 
court would still have basis only for a weak form of judicial review leaving the law open to further 
interpretative activity by citizens and political institutions. On this, see T. Bustamante, ‘On the 
Difficulty to Ground the Authority of Constitutional Courts: Can Strong Judicial Review be Morally 
Justified?’ in T. Bustamante and G. Bernardo (eds.), Democratizing Constitutional Law: Perspectives on 
Legal Theory and the Legitimacy of Constitutionalism (Springer International Publishing: 2016) 29. 
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There are, however, notable differences in an international system. First, international 
systems normally (note the possible exception of the EU Parliament155) lack any directly 
elected political institution. This causes problems with making or changing the law on the 
basis of societal developments relating to new public understandings of principles or to 
changes in the environment for their application. Legislative power still, by necessity as well 
as choice, largely rests with national governments. The requirement for state consent (or 
consensus) permitting any alteration to an agreement thus forms a key element in 
international law. Second, international courts are far removed from the legislators who 
propose and produce the law, as the representatives of the proper public will, and distant 
from the empirical reality of the citizens of the different member states. Third, the 
international courts are not the only means for applying the international law. National courts 
and tribunals often remain the first line for resolving any legal disputes under an international 
agreement, trusted to do so without any right to appeal in the absence of significant evidence 
of a failure in that duty. These considerations must limit international judicial authority when 
interpreting and applying vague law under international instruments. 
With regard to interpretation, the lack of political status means any international authority 
must surely be more cautious in any expanding “interpretation” of the commitments to which 
a state originally consented. For human rights in particular, it has already been noted that 
interpreting what falls within those widely defined higher principles often raises new possible 
moral constructions that are more suitable for political resolution. Interpretation that raises 
new principles is making choices on behalf of a whole society, a role still mostly reserved for 
states. Making leaps in the normative interpretation of a right without referencing agreement 
within the states as evidence, is arguably in reality akin to attributing a revised purpose for 
the membership. Such changes should be subject to clear evidence of some form of consent 
from the political organs of the member states, whether express or through showing a new 
common understanding of the normative scope of rights from state practice. National courts 
already impose limits on interpretations that are too political, for international courts that 
                                                                
155 The EU Parliament is itself subject to some criticism of its representativeness and accountability, 
and is not purported to be a replacement for national political bodies. 
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are further removed from empirical awareness and accountability to the electorate, this must 
also be an expectation. 
With regard to application, international courts face challenges because of their removal from 
the empirical position within particular states and also a lack of infrastructure to support the 
detailed investigations possible within a national system. Also, the need for international 
application to resolve disputes arises only where the national application has fallen short of a 
minimum standard. They are not the only means of resolution given the complete national 
systems of government.156 Where there is any significant doubt about a settled standard 
under the agreement, the international court need not try to force one. As such, it may be 
expected that there will be substantial deference to national choices and rulings about 
implementation.  
It is the role of the national democratic representatives to act as the embodiment of its 
citizens, making reasonable and fully informed decisions (with a fall back on national courts) 
on what constitute public rights and duties and how to apply them. The ECtHR must rely upon 
the practices in the states and trust the ability of the national government, including oversight 
by the national courts, to develop and safeguard rights in accordance with societal 
understandings and needs. For the ECHR law to be legitimate in terms of reflecting the public 
interpretations of norms, essential for compliance with the PGC, safeguarding democracy and 
ensuring effectiveness, it must be built upon the law as it is developed nationally by 
representative government. The ECtHR is not directly elected157 and may not attempt to 
                                                                
156  The national legal system has to be able to resolve all issues that come before it. It has no choice 
in an incomplete system but to fill-in any gaps left indeterminate by existing legal norms, while being 
mindful of any societal norms. The national court has the necessary authority to fulfil that function 
and is also well-placed to do so. It is within the particular society (in keeping with the principle of 
subsidiarity), and accountable element within the democratic system making decisions that are 
subject to review and possible reversal.  
157 Here, the author is mindful of media reporting describing ECtHR judges as “‘unelected”, when in 
fact they are elected by parliamentarians in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. That 
is, however, incomparable with direct election of political bodies. 
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gauge public opinion across the diverse range of member states itself.158 The judge’s personal 
views always should be minimised in their impact. 
2.8.2 The Stages for Constructing International Legal Rules 
This work suggests that there are two stages to the protection of norms under an 
international legal system. First, interpreting the meaning of the text and its normative scope 
in accordance with a proper shared government object and purpose. That interpretation, if it 
is to accord with a public purpose as the basis for consensual cooperation under an 
international social contract, must comply with the common goods as understood by citizens 
that the government (their representative) is trying to secure. Second, the application of 
those norms should be interpreted for the benefit of the public in any given situation.  
When governments create national legislation or enter into international arrangements, 
individual citizens are not a party to the agreement and particular circumstances cannot all 
be known to and considered by a government. The proper motivation is a government, as 
opposed to private, purpose i.e. a purpose for citizens at large. This work argues that for 
international agreements any meaning attributed to ambiguous text must be based on a 
public purpose and interpreted to the reflect how citizens understand the public goods the 
state is securing via membership.  
The ECHR government purpose, in relation to human rights, relates to the protection of 
commonly understood moral justified norms as developed by the operation of democracy 
across the membership. These principles are of general application, and must be 
disconnected from any particular conditions, including the identity of the person or the 
particular physical details surrounding the proposition. In contrast, the application of those 
principles of general application to particular circumstances is contingent upon variable 
conditions. Application no longer raises constant and universal issues upon which a “public” 
position proper may be taken, but rather requires the in abstracto principles to be applied in 
concreto to present and variable circumstances. 
                                                                
158 Except in exceptional circumstances, such as the judgments being ignored of national court finding 
a clear conflict between interpretation or application by the government and public values. 
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As an example, an international treaty on environmental standards may have as its 
government purpose the strategic aims of combating climate change, conserving and 
enhancing natural capital, and preventing risks to health and wellbeing. These may form part 
of a public purpose, understandable by and relevant to the ends of all citizens. Such normative 
aspirations may be interpreted as the shared government purpose of the member states, 
provided there is evidence that they are accepted by those governments either expressly or 
by implication as falling under the remit of the treaty. Questions of the particular application, 
where the text is unclear, would relate to the matters beyond the reasoning of the public at 
large, such as the levels of reduction necessary, use of technology, balance against 
commercial interest, or application to a particular case or situation.  
The stages suggested, taken from a definition by Harvard Law School, correspond to two 
points that are referred to in the ECHR itself159 and also in many other international legal 
agreements: 
Fig. 2.13 The Harvard Law School Distinction between Interpretation and Application160 
Distinguishing between the interpretation and the application of norms in international law 
is not, as Gourgourinis explains, without its critics: 
The difference between the interpretation and application of norms in international 
adjudication has been an obscure issue in international legal doctrine, the two terms 
                                                                
159  ECHR Article 32 ‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as 
provided […] [emphasis added]’.  
ECHR Preamble a ‘common understanding and observance of the Human Rights […].’ 
160 Harvard Law School, ‘Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties: Article 19. Interpretation’ reprinted 
in (1935) 29 AJIL (Supplement: Research in International Law) 937, 938–39.   
Interpretation
‘the process of determining the meaning 
of a text'
Application
'the process of determining the 
consequences which, according to the 
text, should follow in a given situation’*
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frequently being employed interchangeably. It is hence occasionally said that a 
distinction between interpreting and applying international norms is difficult, or even 
impossible, to draw. For instance, Sir Frank Berman 161  has remarked that in 
international law:  
“[T]here is a virtually inseparable link between interpretation and application; 
jurisdictional clauses in treaties invariably cover, as a portmanteau category, 
“disputes over the interpretation or application of the present treaty”, in such 
a way that the competent tribunal is not required to distinguish the one from 
the other.”162 
This work concludes that, while in practice the line may sometimes be blurred, there is a 
theoretical distinction between interpretation and application. It is suggested that 
interpretation relates to identifying the understood public purposes which states continue to 
act to protect via an international treaty. For human rights, those public purposes would be 
the principles of general application understood as being for all (as opposed to smaller 
groups) and essential to freedom. Those norms are accepted by all citizens as universal and 
enduring, having been constructed by the dialectical reasoning of agents while interacting 
and finding a point at which all individual ends and experiences necessarily intersect. The 
norms understood by society to have that basic status have continued to evolve since the 
ECHR was entered into, and so too must the interpretation that may be attributed to the 
government purpose in entering and then persisting with a treaty for their promotion. Just as 
when the ECHR was first entered into there would need to be an interpretation of the public 
understandings behind the common government purpose then: today, where ambiguous text 
permits, modern, common understandings may prevail.  
In contrast, the application relates to how those common understandings of public norms are 
to be executed in given situations. In human rights, how the principles of general application 
are to be applied in particular circumstances.  
A helpful metaphor is provided by Rousseau who contrasted his resolving to walk towards an 
object with his feet actually carrying him there.163 One is in an in abstracto abstraction to 
                                                                
161 F. Berman, “International Treaties and British Statutes” (2005) 26 Statute LRev 1, 10. 
162 A. Gourgourinis, “The Distinction between Interpretation and Application of Norms in International 
Adjudication” (2011) 2 (1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 31. 
163 Rousseau: 
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reach an object, the other the in concreto delivery. We may all generally agree that we want 
to secure housing for all164, but the ways in which we can practically achieve that public 
purpose is contingent upon variable circumstances between cases and in different states.  
The crucial point to consider next is where the institutional authority to make determinations 
on interpretation and applications lies within international agreements. This work argues 
that: (1) international judicial interpretation must be based upon common understandings of 
the government purpose shared by the principals, as evidenced by government agreement or 
practices that establish the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; whereas (2) 
determination on the adequacy of the particular application of a publicly understood purpose 
comes from compliance with standards that enable independent oversight by a court tasked 
with international judicial review of national delivery (e.g. the ECtHR). 
The common government purposes of a treaty are first set by the terms entered into by its 
principals. In signing the agreement, they were motivated by ends and experiences 
understandable to them as political representatives of the public at large, so non-lawyers.165 
The reaching of an agreement to cooperate was not the result of any rarefied process of legal 
reasoning for which only lawyers are trained. As such, the role of international judges in the 
interpretation stage is to settle the meaning of a term based not upon any technical process 
of legal reasoning but upon a process that seeks to reasonably identify the government 
purpose as understood by and uniting its body of principals. It is this shared government 
purpose that must first direct a court as to its mandate in overseeing its execution, hence they 
are the first stage in any judicial process. If an international treaty is to remain relevant to 
serving the public good in question, the government purpose may be interpreted beyond how 
                                                                
Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one moral, i.e. the will which 
determines the act; the other physical, i.e. the power which executes it. When I walk towards 
an object, it is necessary first that I should will to go there, and, in the second place, that my 
feet should carry me. 
J. Rousseau (n 139). 
164 It is worth noting that this would require further interpretation of the normative scope of that 
principle e.g. would the right cover making housing affordable or include paying for that housing and, 
if so, what would be the general point at which the pubic reasons there is a duty to pay?  
165 Albeit that they will likely have secured legal advice on the possible implications for application 
during the drafting. 
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it would have been originally understood to incorporate any new understandings about that 
government purpose. Evolution in understanding may be inferable from subsequent 
agreement or current practices of member states, showing that the common understanding 
between the principals has developed. 
What is a reasonable process for settling upon the government objects as they are now 
understood as continuing to unite the principals under a treaty may be identified by: (1) 
established rules of international law such as express state consent or implied consent 
through consensus; and (2) the original terms and the nature of the particular agreement, 
whether found expressly in terms of the treaty or implied from its overall object and purpose 
and negotiation. This will be explored in Chapter Three. 
When it comes to the application to secure the interpreted public understandings, it is well 
within the established normal remit of courts to determine the requirements for execution 
and to then assess the adequacy of delivery. There would, otherwise, be no effective 
agreement. However, a reasonable approach to that judicial review of delivery must still be 
in accordance with the overall object and purpose of the undertaking and may allow a 
significant margin to states in their choices and expected standards must still be influenced 
heavily by the norms and practices of principals showing any public agreement relating to 
delivery of the government purpose. This too will be explored in Chapter Three. 
As an example, taken from wider international law supporting the argument that there are 
two steps raising different types of consideration for an international court, the examination 
will use the right of free movement of workers within the European Union. 166 In its case law 
on this as a government purpose driven by a public understanding, the Court of Justice of the 
EU (CJEU) has interpreted the right to movement as meaning “economic activity”. That was 
the CJEU identifying the understanding of the principals of the shared government purpose 
                                                                
166 For a paper on the development of law on the free movement of workers, see V. Hatzopoulos, "The 
Concept of ‘Economic Activity’ in the EU Treaty: From Ideological Dead-ends to Workable Judicial 
Concepts" Department of European Legal Studies, Research Paper in Law 06 / 2011 (2011) available 
at <https://www.google.co.uk/url?url=https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-
paper/researchpaper_6_2011_hatzopoulos.pdf%3Fdownload%3D1&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U
&ved=0ahUKEwj4lcf227XRAhWBuBoKHQH3BDsQFggWMAA&usg=AFQjCNHXa3RqivvRRMWoHtX6U
DmOTNR_uw> accessed 9 January 2017. 
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to create a free market, including movement of workers. That interpretation was developed 
as it was reasonably understood by its principals (the EU Member States). It was not the CJEU 
itself deciding this should form an aspiration as a public normative expectation for the public 
good but rather a response to what it reasoned the EU Member States had initially agreed to 
as an understood object and how those states could now be taken to understand its extent.167 
The CJEU could have interpreted the text to include workers to include “social activity” but to 
have done so without considering whether this was a shared understood government 
objective would have been to expand the agreement beyond what it members consented to 
on behalf of citizens in general to perform a public good. Only when it came to what was 
meant by being economically active, a technical question beyond the understanding of all 
people, requiring evidence and expertise in relation to particular facts and circumstances, did 
the consideration shift to application and the CJEU judges begin making determinations about 
the standards for execution.  
                                                                
167 The ability for original understood government purposes to develop over time as they respond to 
evolving societal expectations and realities is reflected in the case law around this point: 
 From a 'market citizen' to 'European social citizenship'  
Freedom of movement of workers was established as a core instrument at the service of the 
single market, helping to redistribute labour from Member States with high rates of 
unemployment to those with a shortage of labour. However, besides this economic aspect the 
free movement of workers also has a social aspect, reflected in workers' desire to raise their 
standard of living. Freedom of movement shifted from being a mere instrument of economic 
integration to serving a broader objective of EU integration, based on EU citizenship and thus 
on individuals, to be placed at the heart of the EU [CJEU judgment of 03.07.1986, C-66/77 
Lawrie-Blum, para 12]. The CJEU stated that "Union citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States" [CJEU judgment of 20.09.2001, C-
184/99 Grzelczyk, para 31] and started basing the equal treatment principle on EU citizenship 
status, so that worker status was no longer the sole criterion opening up access to social 
benefits to EU citizens in their host Member State. The case law of the CJEU, but also EU 
legislation on free movement, shaped not only in economic but also humanitarian terms [S. 
O'Leary, "Free Movement of Persons and Services", in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and 
G. De Búrca (ed.), 2011, p. 510], have brought about a genuine paradigm shift, from a concept 
of economically active citizens as actors in the Single Market to a notion of Union citizenship 
ensuring a quasi-complete inclusion in the national social community [S. Giubboni, "Free 
Movement of Persons and European Solidarity" (2007) 13(3) European Law Journal 368]. 
E. Poptcheva, European Parliamentary Research Service, 'Freedom of Movement and Residence of EU 
citizens: Access to Social Benefits' (6 October 2014) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140808/LDM_BRI(2014)140
808_REV1_EN.pdf> accessed 23 September 2018, page 4. 
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The argument developed by this work in relation to the distinction between the two stages is 
not to deny that it can sometimes be challenging to differentiate between interpretation and 
application, but that there is no reason for a court not to reasonably attempt to do so.  
This work suggests that a question moves beyond interpretation only if it relates to applying 
a public purpose to particular situations rather than general application. Under an 
international agreement, interpretation is concerned with those areas in which it is in theory 
possible to unite all agents behind a norm, and to then determine how far such united 
position has been reached by the political-wings 168  across the membership. Until 
interpretation of public norms is settled, new norms require a political interpretation of 
societal expectations as constructed by government. Only once the consideration shifts 
beyond the reach of the general public to the application to individual cases or particular 
circumstances, does the question move away from raising needs upon which the public could 
be expected to effectively reason. This application stage may require expert knowledge and 
relevant experience. The matter is no longer purely political when it requires particular skill 
or expertise to appreciate the different possible perspectives of the correct outcome or not 
everyone will appreciate the details of an individual case. This occurs when, for example: (1) 
expert knowledge, skills and experience on a particular circumstance is required beyond that 
of the of “general” public reasoning; or (2) the consideration is only in relation to certain 
individuals or groups. 
When there is any doubt about whether an issue raises questions of interpretation or 
application, it is suggested that the question is presumed first to be one of interpretation. It 
is the states that must first have given the authority to an international court to secure shared 
government purposes as understood by them. Unless there is a means to argue for a settled 
position on what those common understandings relevant to a particular case are, it cannot 
be acceptable for a state to be held accountable for non-application of any that remain 
disputed. An international court must work from a settled minimum interpretation of the 
                                                                
168 Responsible for legislating as the representative of and with the executive authority to bind its 
citizens. 
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rights and duties to which states are subject under an agreement, as a first stage, before it 
can move to application as a second. 
Another given reason for resisting formal separation of interpretation and application, 
identified by Gourgourinis, is one that, arguably, instead emphasises the very distinction 
between the treatment of interpretation and application that this work concludes is 
necessary: 
A […] stance favouring the non-distinction between interpretation and application has 
been taken by Serge Sur who viewed interpretation of as ‘omnipresent in the judicial 
activity’, extending ‘to all that comes under the legal process’ and thus, fully 
encompassing all possible aspects of application.169  Perhaps, then, the problem lies in 
the fact that reference is often made to the position that ‘interpretation is an art, not 
a science’ and thus, not being subject to black-letter rules but rather relating to 
presumptions,170 so that distinguishing between two legal concepts (interpretation 
and application), one of which appears to escape full apprehension by legal science 
(i.e. interpretation) may appear feasible only in a limited manner [emphasis added].171 
This work would note that the difficultly of applying legal science to interpretation cannot be 
a reason to simply ignore that it raises different considerations. Principals can have bound 
themselves only to an agreement to which they have consented. They do so because of a 
public government purpose. It seems appropriate that any interpretation of the extent of that 
undertaking may only go so far as a possible understanding of that government purpose 
shared by the member states of an agreement. The fact that “presumptions” may need to be 
made about why principals enter into and continue with agreements and what the common 
understandings are does not mean that no attempt at a reasoned approach should be made. 
Nor should the labelling of the outcome of any reasonable approach by the ECtHR to 
interpreting the understood common government purposes as still being mere 
“presumptions”, undermine the relevance of such an approach in showing more legitimacy 
                                                                
169 S. Sur, L’interprétation en Droit International Public (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 
Paris 1974) 31. 
170 Gourgourinis notes as examples: R. Jennings, ‘General Course on Public International Law’ (1967) 
121 RCADI 323, 544; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn 
Routledge: 1997) 365; A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP, 2000) 184; and C. Amerasinghe, 
Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2nd edn CUP, 2005) 33.  
171  A. Gourgourinis, “The Distinction between Interpretation and Application of Norms in International 
Adjudication” 2 (1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2011) 31, 32 
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than would otherwise be present.  This work would also argue that, given the acceptance of 
the need for legal authorities to provide coordination, provided the approach taken is one 
that is reasonably in accordance with the overall object and purpose of an agreement there 
is then an expectation that the presumptions produced are binding on the principals as part 
of the necessary consequences of agreeing to part of the system.  
This work will argue that liberal democratic political reasoning, representing as it does the 
procedure by which agents engage in moral societal constructivist reasoning in accordance 
with the PGC, could represent part of an objectively justifiable process for normative 
interpretation of the rights. Democracy is also directly referenced in the ECHR Preamble, and 
has an impressive pedigree as an effective system for the states that are members of the 
treaty. What at first sight may seem, as referenced by Gourgourinis, to be nothing more than 
“presumptions” are not so if they are drawn from liberal democratic government 
understandings, with a process of determination by which the ECtHR could reasonably be 
seen to utilize the national democratically constructed interpretations.  
From the above, the terms in abstracto and in concreto can be helpfully incorporated into a 
definition of the two different stages of legal considerations by the ECtHR:  
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Fig. 2.14 Interpretation as an In Abstracto Exercise and Application as In Concreto 
2.8.3 Stage One – Interpretation 
The first consideration for the ECtHR relates to the in abstracto interpretation of the 
normative parameters of the ECHR right at issue. This must be the first layer of consideration, 
representing the understanding of the shared government purposes of the member states to 
which they consent to apply. It is these common understandings – the enduring and 
underlying societally constructed norms – that, provided they could comply with the PGC, 
constitute:   
[T]he basic modes of normativity to which all other concepts must adjust. They are 
fundamental not only to the law but to all other normative phenomena we might 
associate with it, such as morality and social or cultural convention. The concepts that 
fall into this category form the basic notions of right, duty, liability, competence and 
so on, and what is implied or entailed by the employment of these ideas in the 
analysis, characterisation or adjudication of disputes. The associated forms within 
•Understandings of the common government 
purposes that unite the principals (states) in action 
under the ECHR i.e. the primacy of democracy and 
the democratic intepretations of the normative 
scope of the rights.
•National understandings settled by political 
representatives, producing law in accordance with 
the outcome of dialectical discourse by all citizens.
•Common national understandings identified by 
ECtHR and translated into ECHR legal moral norms.
Interpretation in abstracto
•The consequences for observance of the ECHR 
principles of general application in particular 
circumstancess.
•Standards of application by states overseen by the 
ECtHR.
Application in concreto
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which these concepts operated are also part of this first tier of concepts which include 
notions like rule; principle; scaling; weight and status.172 
If the PGC holds true, then agents in society are, while perhaps not knowingly, able to reason 
in an objective and thereby justified manner on the norms they hold to be morally true as 
rights and duties for all. While in abstracto these principles of general application are formed 
by thinking upon every day experiences. As stated earlier, norms that must be recognised by 
“everyone” simply by the internal reasoning possible by virtue of being a human agent living 
in a society are far from black letter and measurable by any scientific standard. But they are 
objective and morally justified, the agent having gone beyond thinking only subjectively. This 
means that in relation to interpretation of those moral norms anyone’s ends demand 
everyone’s interpretations (provided they could accord with the criteria for reason) and could 
be at least as valid as those of any lawyer or court. [Although legal expertise would be 
essential to ultimately translate societal expectations into workable legal norms ready for 
application.173] 
In identifying the scope of the rights, the ECtHR must be respectful of the more local political 
systems for reaching a compromised dialectically contingent understanding of the normative 
requirements. These local systems feed-up the principles held by individual agents to an 
increasingly higher level – ultimately the ECtHR itself. It becomes more of a challenge to find 
the point at which reasoning intersects as the size of the group of people forming the relevant 
“public” increases and ends and experiences become more varied. How and where the ECHR 
system accepts this political compromise at an ECHR level can be achieved is the central 
                                                                
172 H. Olsen and S. Toddington, “The Scandinavian Roots of a New Approach to Legal Knowledge” 
(2012) 4/139 Retfærd 57, 65.   
173 Olsen and Toddington explain: 
Law regulates interaction and association. It directs, choreographs, and translates 
linguistically and conceptually the interaction of particular individuals with particular things in 
particular situations […] In legal doctrine and practice, everyday objects and contexts are 
represented precisely and formally in ways which serve the purposes of transforming social 
interaction into legal interaction. 
ibid 67   
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element of appreciating what aspects the member states and the ECtHR are to perform in 
relation to interpretation of human rights. As Collins comments: 
The pre-emptive capacity of the law seems to depend upon incorporating, centralising 
and streamlining law-determining processes or institutions; substantive autonomy 
eventually implies – indeed, necessitates – institutional autonomy. In this respect, a 
legal system’s “secondary rules” would need to offer guidance that goes beyond 
identifying legal norms (and, perhaps, clarifying the relationships between them), 
having to outline procedures and processes, not only for determining the validity and 
meaning of those norms, but also for clarifying which official or authorised body has 
the ultimate say in any continuing conflict – that is, whose view is ultimately to be 
determinative [emphasis added].174  
Any part of a legal system, including the ECtHR, must therefore work within an effective, wider 
system by which a society organises itself and reflect an appreciation of the reasoning of its 
agents in that system, if it is to effectively work as ‘transformative, dynamic and organic’ with 
the ‘endless variety of [agent’s] normative concerns and expectations’.175  That system will 
require not only a judiciary, but also a political wing. 
 
                                                                
174 R. Collins, The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law (Hart: 2016) 158. 
175 H. Olsen and S. Toddington (n 172) 58. 
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Fig. 2.15 Elements of Government 
Given all of the different elements that influence a society, it cannot be presumed that the 
legal system forms the best route for representing the will of agents in relation to underlying 
human rights and such an assumption would be particularly problematic for an international 
court. It is the political system that does so, which forms a coordinated set of principles, laws, 
ideas, and procedures relating to a particular form of government (for example, liberal 
democracy).176    
This work argues that a legal system must respect that political representatives are primarily 
responsible for reflecting the interpretations of agents regarding the generic moral 
imperatives, the principles, that unite a society. This leaves the question of how conflicting 
                                                                
176 For a challenge to the view that judges are better moral reasoners than democratically elected 
legislators see J. Waldron, “Judges as Moral Reasoners” (2009) 7(1) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 2. The article examines whether the ability of judges to engage in responsible and 
high-level moral reasoning is adversely affected by their duty to apply the law and legal doctrines. It 
also considers the extent to which reasoning morally on one's own account differs from doing so on 
the account of society as a whole, and whether legislatures are better able to conduct the latter task 
because of the dynamics of large group decision-making. 
Agents
Social
Cultural
Economic
Political
Executive
Legal
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views reached by political representatives in the different member states are to be reconciled 
by the ECtHR. 
2.8.4 Stage Two – Application 
The second stage of the ECtHR decision-making process relates to the in concreto application 
of the in abstracto principles constructed by the political representatives of agents, when 
consideration shifts from generic evaluations of what we should all expect onto particular 
evaluations relating to individual cases and specific problems. This is at a less fundamental 
level, moving beyond the general societal reasoning that all/any agents are inherently able to 
consider by simple virtue of being a moral agent in a society. This reasoning requires agents 
to have access to specialist evidence, expertise and experience.    
Not “everyone” will understand the peculiar issues raised by a case without having relevant 
facts and expert advice. The type of reasoning is also often completely removed from the 
everyday reasoning in which all agents engage. There is also a need to take into consideration 
the existing rules of the wider legal system, in order to ensure consistency-restoring review 
as required by the rule of reason and a coherent body of law.  
These types of issue raise the areas where oversight of the political process is entrusted to 
judicial review by authorities such as the ECtHR, requiring the particular skills of lawyers or 
legal technology. A court will have the role of providing legal oversight of political reasoning 
at this stage, through a judicial review of the appropriateness of the evidence used, ensuring 
that the established process to reason on point of application was exercised, and checking for 
consistency of the outcome with the wider law. 
This leaves the question of when the ECtHR can challenge state decisions on application. 
Some decisions would clearly not comply with the criteria for reason under the PGC by 
applying out of date knowledge, being inconsistent with the principle they claim to uphold, 
not fitting with the wider existing legal system, making factual errors, or being based on 
reason that could not be accepted by all, irrespective of personal characteristics (for example, 
that one gender is more valuable than the other or that one sexual preference is the only right 
one). Others may not have followed a procedure that considered appropriate evidence or 
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applied democratic principles and due-process to decision-making. The ECtHR may then act 
but, outside of that limited number of cases, it is not immediately clear prior to further 
analysis when the Court may challenge the democratically recognised national political 
representatives’ positive choice between a number of potentially reasoned responses. The 
state must enjoy a significant margin, particularly where there is a lack of consistency in the 
standards shown by the norms and practices across the member states. 
2.9 Chapter Conclusions 
None of the above should be taken as a view that the ECtHR can avoid becoming involved in 
or even settling debates that raise moral elements. Rather, it suggests that the approach of 
the ECtHR must endeavour to make a distinction between: (1) the types of moral questions 
best determined purely by political process representing the societal construction of generic 
norms as underlying public principles (subject only to the extreme choices that are against 
the criterion for reason under the PGC or wholly unrepresentative of public morality on the 
issue); and (2) questions concerning how to respond to specific cases and circumstances 
beyond the understanding of all agents to generally reason upon when applying the 
principles. This latter type of question, which this work terms the application, may be 
subjected to judicial review of the decision-making process used by a state and of the 
reasonableness of the ultimate decision made. Bogdandy and Venzke argue: 
The fact that a judicial decision implies a choice between alternatives has prompted 
some authors to describe judicial decision-making generally as political. This 
qualification also emphasises the multitude of interests and motives that can guide 
the judge in her decision. Still, the realisation of judicial choice and discretion does not 
prevent the distinction between judicial and political law-making. Rather, that 
differentiation credits the fact that fundamentally different institutions are at work, 
operating in fundamentally different legal settings [emphasis added].177    
                                                                
177 A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke. In Whose Name: A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication 
(Oxford University Press: 2014) 109. 
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It may not always be possible to neatly separate the stages, but having structured institutional 
rules provides the best available safeguard and a court must be trusted with applying them 
as fairly as possible.178 Collins comments:  
The point is not that moral and prudential reasoning fail to enter into elements of the 
process of legal reasoning, or the law's application and enforcement [...], but only that 
the law be capable of providing a point of finality through the decisions or acts of 
authorised officials – so long as there is acceptance of the structural and institutional 
rules capable of sustaining the finality of legal reasoning then law can be sustained at 
the systematic level as a coherent, autonomous system of public practical reasoning 
[emphasis added].179 
To summarise, even with some agreement on what are the highest-level norms for a society 
and codification through legal agreement (as in the Articles of the ECHR), human rights are 
invariably stated in general terms. This leaves many aspects of their interpretation and 
application unclear and open to substantial debate. This not a criticism; it would be impossible 
to have drafted them to be complete. As treaties are durable pieces of legal text that can only 
be amended by international agreement, they may even be intentionally drafted at a high 
level of generality. 
To conclude this chapter, progress has been made by the identification of: (1) moral 
constructivism through practical reasoning (specifically the PGC) as the substantive 
justification for human rights under (at least) the ECHR’s conception of justice; (2) the 
negative role of the ECtHR in ensuring an unreasoned response does not stand; (3) the need 
for moral agents to consent to resolve uncertainty about the positive construction of 
dialectically necessary (or at least contingent) public norms through a process for 
coordination within a society; (4) procedural justification (specifically liberal democracy) 
forming the basis for the legitimate authority to select between candidate norms; (5) the 
legislative political authority as the interpreter of the general societal norms, translator into 
legal norms, and funder of the executive; (6) national courts been required to fill gaps left by 
the legislature with interpretation and application but refrain when political questions are 
                                                                
178 See Article 56(1) ICJ Statute: ‘The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based’. 
179 R. Collins, ‘Modernist Positivism and the Problem of Institutional Autonomy’ in R. Collins and N. 
White (eds.), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the 
International Legal Order (Routledge:2011) 32. 
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raised or there remains significant debate; (7) the reasonableness of political interpretations 
being subject only to the extreme choices that are against the criterion for reason under the 
PGC or wholly unrepresentative of public morality on the issue; (8) decisions by the legislature 
and its executive branches on particular application of principles been more readily judicially 
reviewed (in accordance with the PGC, empirical reality, use of expert evidence, due 
democratic process and reasonableness); (9) the role of international agreements to perform 
particular government objects and purpose; and (10) international courts being more 
cautious when interpreting the meaning of law to refrain from making purely political choices 
and being more cautious when challenging the national government application if procedural 
requirements for reasoned decision-making were met. 
However, it is only by closer consideration of the nature of national systems and international 
law that the more detailed elements of the government object and purpose of the ECHR 
system and its consequences for the ECtHR’s role can be appreciated.  
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3 Chapter Three 
 
Placing Legitimate Authority 
 
Legitimate authority in states and delegated 
authority to international bodies 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two suggested the need to adopt a form of moral constructivism in accordance with 
the Gewirthian ‘Principle of Generic Consistency’ (PGC), as the basis for grounding the claims 
to the universality of human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
In a dialectically contingent sense, the PGC is the conception of justice that all the members 
of the ECHR must logically have accepted in acknowledging the existence of rights and, 
reciprocally, the existence of duties to rights bearers.  
The most concise synopsis of this argument is that if an agent accepts that other agents hold 
certain rights, then they also accept that those agents are entitled to whatever generic 
conditions are required to exercise those rights. This is equivalent to affirming the PGC itself 
and this foundational principle provides a starting point for a concept of legitimacy. 
Interpretations and applications of the ECHR rights must be capable of being framed as 
justified moral norms in general accordance with the PGC.   
There might very well be a plurality of more or less reasonable (PGC-compatible) 
interpretations of human rights legislation, and a systematic approach to developing the 
normative scope of the rights in question would be alert to developing a method for choosing 
between a variety of plausible reasoned views.  To avoid begging the moral question in these 
situations by recourse to metaphysical argument, constructing the optimum normative 
solution to these problems must be based on a procedure that provides a “procedural 
legitimacy”.180 Such a procedure must accord with the PGC, be accepted by the agents in a 
                                                                
180 For instance, Korsgaard characterizes Kantian constructivism as law being formed through process 
(procedural realism) as there ‘are answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures 
for arriving at them’ not because there are independent moral truths 
What distinguishes substantive from procedural realism is a view about the relationship 
between the answers to moral questions and our procedures for arriving at those answers. 
The procedural moral realist thinks that there are answers to moral questions because there 
are correct procedures for arriving at them. But the substantive moral realist thinks that there 
are correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts 
that exist independently of those procedures, which those procedures track. 
Korsgaard, C., ‘The Sources of Normativity’ (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge 
University, 16 – 17 November 1992) <https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-
z/k/korsgaard94.pdf> accessed 16 December 2017, 38. 
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society on this basis, and thus require decisions to be made in the interests of important agent 
rights.  
According to the ECHR, it is the operation of liberal democracy that provides procedural 
legitimacy to the interpretation and application of the rights. The role of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) is oversight of the operation of democracy, guarding against clearly 
unreasoned decisions, and to some extent ensuring the development of a “common” 
understanding in relation to interpretation and consistency in standards for the approach to 
application between the member states.  
Phase Three of this project requires a more detailed development of the concept of 
institutional authority under a procedural justification (procedural legitimacy) of legal 
systems and an assessment of the extent to which, over time, authority has in part shifted 
from states to international bodies. This chapter thus begins with consideration of state 
authority, followed by the more difficult task of explaining the basis for recognising 
international authority. 
If authority to settle matters is required to unify the interpretation of and to ensure proper 
application of norms between interacting agents, then the evolution of states governing that 
process within particular bounded territories could be predicted as a means to enable agents 
to live harmoniously. The acknowledgement of the need for societal co-ordination under an 
a least hypothetical social contract by those who are to be governed by a system and its 
procedures provides a general rationale of social legitimacy. If it accords with the PGC, which 
would itself call for such coordination, that system also has morally justified legitimacy.  
However, providing reasons for developing shared moral norms and cooperation between 
agents in an intra-state convention is far more challenging than at state level as it must appeal 
to a much larger collective, and its authorities must be increasingly remote from the everyday 
lives of agents. Three things might be noted: (1) coercion is not a reasoned system for securing 
law; (2) the moral norms interpreted as general duties in one society may represent only a 
“candidate” view on what is the right universal construction under the PGC; and (3) local 
understanding and application of principles may vary because of normative and cultural 
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differences between societies. It is difficult 181 , in the absence of active and deliberate 
agreement between long established states to give a plausible coordinatory argument for the 
existence of consent to external intervention.  
At international level, this perhaps explains why, outside of a treaty agreement, instances 
where a call to action by multiple-states against another under a type of international social 
contract has been successfully galvanised, have been restricted to situations raising: (1) 
interpretations of normative values with near unanimous acceptance across different states, 
cultures and types of political system; and (2) actions by a state so clearly in opposition to 
those principles that they are in breach of what any state could possibly reason in response 
to the issue it is facing.  
It follows that the ECHR project, as a more ambitious undertaking than that most basic 
endeavour, must rely upon some express agreement by agents for international interaction. 
It is the initial express agreement that gives the ECtHR greater potential scope in making 
binding decisions. Specifically, the agreement of contracting states (as the representatives of 
citizens) consenting to a type of enhanced co-operation. A state would do so because it 
represented something of value to the way of life of its citizens. As the principals to a contract 
giving the ECtHR power as an agent to secure a public good, states must accept international 
coordination can better deliver their government purpose. But it is the delivery of that 
government purpose that motivates them to give the ECtHR its mandate. Therefore, by 
inferring what overall government object and purpose brought the member states together, 
the limits of authority given to bodies overseeing the aims of particular international 
agreements may be determined and acknowledged. That acknowledgement would include 
routes for that authority when interpreting evolving understandings of the government 
purpose, and the limits for judicial review in relation to application of norms. 
The central theme of liberal democracy as the express shared value of the ECHR has already 
been noted, but this chapter develops the more detailed points that may be reasonably 
                                                                
181 Although not impossible with in extremis human rights violations. 
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inferred from the text of the Convention and its negotiation to support the delivery of the 
intended co-operation between its contracting states. 
3.2 The Importance of State Consent 
Traditionally, there has been an acceptance that nation sovereign states are completely 
autonomous.182  In turn, international law was viewed as being built entirely upon state 
consent. However, given the recognition by this project of certain moral norms or objectively 
true forms of rationality in Chapter Two, such a position is untenable in relation to the 
underpinning argument. More modern reasoning instead accepts that states are no longer 
viewed as the foundation for international law. Their very legitimacy is in fact grounded in 
their recognition as being in accordance with the conditions set by global law and acting 
within the areas of competency that fall within the national domain.183 There is the moral 
                                                                
182 The centuries of roughly 1500 to 1789 saw the rise of the sovereign states under, which the 
citizenry of an independent state is defined as sovereign. Collins suggests it was only sometime 
between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the older traditions of the law of 
nations developed into the systematic, institutionalised practice in accordance with the modern 
understanding of international law. R. Collins, The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law 
(Hart: 2016) 19. 
183 As Kumm argues: 
[N]ational constitutional legitimacy is not self-standing. The legitimacy of national 
constitutions is not only a matter between “We the People” and the national constitution. 
National constitutional legitimacy depends, in part, on how the national constitution is 
integrated into and relates to the wider legal and political world. Domestic constitutional law 
has to be embedded in the right way in an appropriately structured international legal system 
for it to be legitimate. One of the core purposes of international law is to create and define 
the conditions under which a sovereign state’s claim to legitimate authority is justified. States 
have a standing duty to help create and sustain such conditions and an international legal 
system that is equipped to fulfil that function. The relationship between domestic and 
international law is neither one of derivation nor of autonomy, but of mutual dependence. 
National and international law are mutually co-constitutive. The constitutional legitimacy of 
national law depends, in part, on being adequately integrated into an appropriately structured 
international legal system. And the legitimacy of the international legal system depends, in 
part, on states having an adequate constitutional structure. The standards of constitutional 
legitimacy are to be derived from an integrative conception of public law that spans the 
national-international divide.  
M. Kumm "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law"  
(2013) 20(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 605, 612. 
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need for a hypothetical international social contract, as Rawls would argue under the veil of 
ignorance and in the original position we could not know which state we would live and must 
rationally recognise basic rights that are universal. 
Yet given the challenges of interpreting and applying those universal truths as set out in 
Chapter Two, it has been further argued that routes for human compromise resolving 
differing reasoning must play a major part in the actual interaction of agents. 184  In 
international law, the construction of law still relies upon a means of resolving which different 
expressions of universal values form the global standard. Without a form of collective-
government to provide a source of authoritative constitutional values, the extent of 
international law rules would be very limited. The majority of the body of international law 
must be founded upon the identification of some prior social institutionalisation accepted by 
a body of citizens. For now, it remains the case that this collective of cooperating agents is 
primarily located at state level, the level at which most normative construction of at least 
contingently justified moral rights occurs. 
                                                                
He summarises the argument: ‘[T]he foundation of constitutionalism is the idea of free and equal 
persons governing themselves through law as part of an international community of equally sovereign 
states.’ 
M. Kumm "Constituent Power, Boundaries and Identity: On the Justificatory Depth of 
Constitutionalism - A Rejoinder to Neil Walker" (2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 914.  
184 Walker notes the role played by the exchange of reasoning on universal laws and different forms 
of voice and accountability in relation to settling their requirements:  
Global law, I argue, embraces the two major templates of law’s mode of intervention in the 
world. It includes both ratio – law understood as enjoying a presumptive rationality of its own, 
and voluntas – law understood as an expression and instrument of human will […] [T]here is a 
non-metaphysical universalism according to which different universal forms of rationality 
within and across different species and sub-species of global law as ratio engage with one 
another in a vocabulary of universal normativity, understood as involving the open exchange 
of always provisional claims or accomplishments rather than the closure of a definitive 
‘covering-law’. What we find here is the development of new legal trends that are 
presumptively cosmopolitan […] And […] global law also involves direct attention to the logic 
of will formation and revision. It does so by focusing on the legal process values according to 
which different expressions of voluntas are (at least partially) constructed and audited within 
law, and through which many forms of global law as ratio – for example, as regards human 
rights protection or the spread of administrative law values, are themselves opened up to 
different forms of voice and different accountability constituencies. 
N. Walker, “The Shaping of Global Law” (2017) 8(3) Transnational Legal Theory 360; 363 – 364. 
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International law continues to be state-centred, because it is assumed that the state system 
is the legitimate exercise of sovereignty in accordance with the consent of citizens.185 States 
continue to have a strong institutional order, demonstrably able to create, interpret and 
enforce laws followed by the majority of a population. States may not be a perfect social and 
legal systems, but they are well-established and effective in managing populations. As such, 
states retain a powerful role and state consent remains a central consideration in 
understanding any agreement. 
However, given the partial disaggregation of the state. 186  We now see a history of 
international cooperation 187  and an increased practical necessity for supra national 
authoritative entities. This has resulted in what this work will refer to as “international law” 
implying law-making bodies and enforcement mechanisms such as those we see operating 
under the ECHR. 
Whilst accepting there are interesting arguments about whether such international bodies 
truly create "law" in the strict sense, for the purposes of this work the arguments of Hart will 
be adopted insofar as accepting that international norms do form a system that is 
authoritatively interpreted and enforced in recognition of limits on state sovereignty.188 The 
decision to view the ECHR as a genuinely legal system is necessary to support this project in 
analysing the practices of the ECtHR, given the arguments already made suggesting that to be 
effective its judgments must be routinely and voluntarily followed, with that stability assured 
through accepted and clearly applied procedures. As Capps explains in relation to 
international law in general:  
[I]f once accepts that such practices are not law, then one must consider how we 
should characterise them. What are self-styled international lawyers really up to? 
                                                                
185Letsas, suggests that a commitment-based legitimacy, rather than authority-based, may better 
explain why states comply with the Court. The initial commitment made by states is more viable than 
the Court’s authority. G. Letsas, “The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy”, in A. 
Follesdal, B. Peters, and G. Ulfstein, (eds.), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights 
in a National, European and Global Context, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 126. 
186 See A. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press: 2004) 34. 
187 See W. Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University Press: 1964). 
188 See H. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press: 1961), Chapter 10 on International Law. 
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They might simply be deluded figures, who think they are able to constrain the self-
interested actions of states. Alternatively, they might be "noble liars" who use a set of 
moral principles, coupled to the public commitments of states, to criticise State 
behaviour. But in such circumstances, we should recognise that state action is 
unconstrained by law and that international relations are largely the product of 
power-relations. It seems to me that in such circumstances there is a prima facie moral 
reason to render the normative practices of international lawyers more like a form of 
law so as to effectively constrain the actions of states.189 
State systems no longer enjoy ultimate legal authority. Rather, it is shared with other systems 
in cross-cutting activities and obligations extending beyond the control of national borders. 
However, this acknowledgement of international systems, with non-state entities claiming 
legal authority, does not require their positioning in relation to states according to some type 
of vertical relationship, either above or below states. Instead, the current international 
relationship is more horizontal with appropriate mutual recognition and respect between 
international entities and states.  
Any attempt to place international law as a superior governor of the conduct of states, 
particularly on constitutional matters such as human rights, would serve only to heighten 
criticism of its validity, in particular given the reliance upon national democracy by the 
participants to the ECHR (explored later).190  
                                                                
189 P. Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart Publishing: 2009) 3-4. 
190 Collins comments: 
I maintain […] that the purpose of any legal order has to be understood within the context of 
the kinds of political relations which pertain in the society or community in question. To see 
the purpose of international law as one of regulating or governing international politics is to 
misconstrue the nature of the political relations which pertain at the international level, which 
are fundamentally different from the relations of political subordination that exist within the 
state. The overall “institutional purpose” of law within a plural, “horizontal” society (such as 
arguably exists at the international level) must instead be understood in a way which is 
meaningful to the participants in that society. 
R. Collins, The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law (Hart: 2016) 12-13. 
Buchanan reasons: 
Whether or not the most comprehensive and defensible ideal [as opposed to non-ideal] moral 
theory of international law will include a uniquely primary role for states is a complex question 
– and one that probably cannot be answered until we have much more developed examples 
of moral theories of international law than we now possess. Nevertheless, it could be argued 
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Recognition of the international authorities by the states, which remain powerful 
participators, persists therefore as an important aspect of any international system. In 
particular, for agreements such as the ECHR, which claim authority with regard to what 
remain largely internally controlled public order concerns, this recognition by the state is of 
particular importance. Public order is still upheld in practice through the resources and the 
infrastructure of national systems and without member state acceptance the rulings of the 
ECtHR would have no effective legal impact. 
                                                                
that even the best ideal moral theory will include a prominent place for something like states 
[...] 
First, as Kant emphasized, a plurality of territorially based units each having considerably 
powers of self-government is probably preferable to the risk of inescapable tyranny that a 
world government would pose. Second, a world government might be intolerably inefficient. 
Third, persistent pluralism with regard to conceptions of public order and justice speak in 
favour of a plurality of political units, within which different values can find effective 
expression; and primary jurisdiction over a territory is the most reliable way to protect 
pluralism. Fourth, some (including most famously Rousseau) argue that there are limits to the 
scale of the public units in which democracy can flourish and that a democratic global state is 
not possible. For all of these reasons [...] the division of the world’s area into something 
resembling states may be morally defensible if not wholly attractive, quite apart from the fact 
that for the foreseeable future we are likely to be stuck with a system in which States are the 
most prominent constituents. 
A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 
(Oxford University Press: 2004) 55-56. 
Kumm comments: 
The idea of self-government of free and equals lies at the heart of the tradition of liberal-
democratic constitutionalism. The guiding ideal of global order this gives rise to is a world of 
liberal democratic constitutional states, collectively subjected to the authority of international 
law. The point of international law is to authoritatively define the conditions under which 
sovereigns can govern themselves as well as provide the legal space for sovereigns to 
coordinate their activities and cooperate as they deem fit. The relationship between domestic 
and international law is neither one of derivation nor of autonomy, but of mutual 
dependence. National and international law are mutually co-constitutive. The constitutional 
legitimacy of national law depends, in part, on being adequately integrated into an 
appropriately structured international legal system. And the legitimacy of the international 
legal system depends, in part, on states having an adequate constitutional structure. The 
standards of constitutional legitimacy are to be derived from an integrative conception of 
public law that spans the national-international divide. 
M. Kumm "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law"  
(2013) 20(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 605, 625. 
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The question, given the role of nation sovereign states, is why should individuals within a 
nation be concerned to abide by decisions made in systems beyond their own? The answer is 
that while there may not have been a decision by individuals to give authority to any particular 
international body or bodies, the state as their representative has given that authority on 
their behalf. So, while the true principals of the ECHR contract are the individual voters, it is 
the state which represented that unified acceptance by granting the authority on their behalf.  
It is within the power of the sovereign will of the voters within a nation to allow the state to 
consent by proxy to an international order and subject itself to that agreement.191  
Arguments of state recognition outside of any express state agreement to membership are 
possible through theories such as "consensus".192 However, norms assumed to apply to all 
states regardless of their agreement are limited and notoriously difficult to establish.193 Given 
the existence of a treaty positively codifying some shared categories of moral norms and 
encouraging cooperation on them, thereby supporting a wider protection, the focus of this 
work is not human rights as they may be understood and apply to all states but rather on the 
rights as interpreted and applied in ECHR member states. With its common government 
object and purpose, shared norms are more readily identifiable and the division of 
responsibility between the Council of Europe, ECtHR and national governments may be 
                                                                
191 On the general point that a state may so bind itself, despite later dissatisfaction, see SS Wimbledon 
[1923] PCIJ, Series A, no. 1 at 25: ‘[T]he right of entering into international agreements is an attribute 
of State sovereignty.’ 
192 This principle is referred to as a pluralist justification of human rights, based on norms appearing 
across different world views. On this point, see E-J. Kim, “Justifying Human Rights: Does Consensus 
Matter?" (2012) 13 Human Rights Review 261. 
193 As Gardbaum reasons:  
There is perhaps general agreement that a small, but critical, core of the most important 
human rights law has achieved jus cogens and, thus, higher law, status as binding treaty 
makers and probably also trumping conflicting custom [...] although there is less consensus 
about how - the process by which - norms achieve this status, which may prevent the list from 
being added to. 
S. Gardbaum, "Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights" (2008) 19(4) The European Journal 
of International Law 749, 756. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights purports to serve this role, hence not requiring the status 
of a treaty. Its application has proved, as predicted, to be limited to challenging acts of only the most 
serious nature and so the more obvious and indisputable applications of its rights. Despite this, it still 
faces heavy criticism for having exceeded what may be claimed as universally accepted in custom. 
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identified. The difficulties with higher principles mean that, in spite of some positive guidance 
in the ECHR, the shared government purpose of the signatories and what that reasonably 
means for procedural legitimacy in interpreting the government understood normative scope 
of the principles must be further explored. A reasonably inferable proper government object 
and purpose behind the ECHR is the central question. 194 
This is not to suggest that the authority of an organisation like the ECtHR is limited only to 
express powers, explicitly laid out in its constituent instrument, or that the interpretation and 
application of law becomes set on the date of signing. But it does propose that any implied 
developments must be reasonably in accord with its object and purpose and respect the 
current pace of development of the membership. Collins and White explain:  
[T]he attribution of certain legal capacities provides evidence of objective legal 
personality, which then gives rise to specific competences, the context of which is 
determinable through application of the implied powers doctrine [...] which defines 
the scope of such competencies by reference to the organisation's functional purpose 
and organisational structure [emphasis added].195 
The pronouncement of legitimate law by the ECtHR depends on its authority to interpret 
different elements of the ECHR’s provisions, with an expectation of adherence to that 
decision or "compliance pull".196 There is, as Tomuschat insists, a distinction between the 
“philosophical ought” and the “legal ought”. For the purpose of understanding the role of the 
                                                                
194 Collins comments:  
[A]t a doctrinal level the structures of modern international law can be said to rest ultimately 
upon a positivist epistemology. To make this claim is not necessarily to endorse a position of 
unalloyed sovereignty, nor to assert that international law operates on the basis of state 
voluntarism - that every State must consent to every legal norm but only that the basis of the 
authority of legal norms lies in their procedural (as opposed to moral or prudential) 
acceptance by those subject to the law. 
R. Collins, “Modernist Positivism and the Problem of Institutional Autonomy” in R. Collins and N. White 
(eds.), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the 
International Legal Order (Routledge: 2011) 25-26. 
195 R. Collins and N. White, "Between Independence and Accountability: Exploring the Legal Autonomy 
of International Organisations", in B. Reinalda (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Organisation 
(Routledge: 2012) 119: 122-123.  
196 A state is expected to comply with international obligations only where a rule has been created in 
‘the proper manner’ and so creates a ‘compliance pull’ as the right thing to do. See T. Franck, The 
Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press: 1990). 
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ECtHR, it is the legal ought which is of concern. The ECtHR must be viewed as a mechanism, 
designed as one element of an overall project or enterprise to ‘translate human rights as legal 
proposition into a living reality’.197 This argument builds on the concept of constituent power, 
where authority is generated, but does not accept that constituent power itself provides the 
foundations for a legal authority or that such authorities are not still subject to the PGC.198 
However, it does challenge any dismissal of the acute relevance of the formative grounds and 
conditions for an authority to its legitimate operation.199 For practical purposes, that makes 
                                                                
197 C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Realism and Idealism (Oxford University Press: 2008) 2-5. 
198 See Kumm: 
I have argued […] that constituent power is not basic in normative terms, because its exercise 
is itself internally authorized and circumscribed by non-derogable principles that it is the task 
of constituent power to specify and concretize in the act of constitution-giving. It is the idea 
of free and equals governing themselves through law that authorizes and circumscribes the 
exercise of constituent power and that guides the interpretation of positively enacted 
constitutions. Even on the foundational level the constitutionalist project is normative and 
justificatory, not empirical/sociological.  
M. Kumm "Constituent Power, Boundaries and Identity: On the Justificatory Depth of 
Constitutionalism - A Rejoinder to Neil Walker" (2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 914, 920. 
199 Walker argues that the founding pact is of central importance, given the need for a recognized 
collective authority and the difficulties of this emerging outside of agreement by the states: 
[N]o matter how little reliant the justification of continuing constitutional authority within the 
state may be or should be in terms of the founding pact, at the very least some attention to 
those foundations provide a way of identifying the self-imagined extent and boundaries of the 
community involved in the process of ongoing justification. These foundational traces supply 
a base point of orientation, the indispensable platform upon which a collective authority 
comes to recognize itself over time; and, in so doing, as able to engage in the “recursive 
internalism” by which later iterations of “We the People”, typically given through voice 
through themselves duly “constituted” democratic forms of representation, reflect upon and 
seek to review the ambitions and correct the shortcomings of their earlier common selves. 
“The international community”, however, cannot serve the same orienting function of 
emergent collective self-identification at the post-national level. Scattered in various 
fragments, the post-national institutional configuration lacks the constitutive unity to provide 
an anchoring identity. What is more […] its dispersed and democratically underdeveloped 
institutional forms struggle to provide the organizational coherence or nurture the sense of 
common attachment necessary to overcome that original impediment and generate a 
robustly reflexive collective post-national self […]’ 
The risk of not recognising the role of constituent power is to undermine compliance with the 
decisions of authorities, and to question the reason of constructed forms of governance and guiding 
principles to the extent that there would be a lack of any collective orientation and direction:  
The danger here is twofold […] it is both motivational and epistemic. If there are no broadly 
endorsed and engaged collective transnational identities eligible to assume the mantle of the 
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the key issue for this work the exercise of functions reasonably accepted by the member 
states as belonging to the ECtHR under the joint enterprise; or the Court's role in the regime.  
Despite the challenges of this exercise, it is a necessary part of recognising the ECHR as a legal 
system. Collins explains this is encapsulated in the key aspects of modern international law 
and the drive to provide rules that guide its ordering. Collins cites a study by the International 
Law Commission, that explicitly confirmed the need for a systematic reading: 
It is often said that law is a “system”. By this, no more need be meant than that the 
various decisions, rules and principles of which the law consists do not appear […] 
randomly related to each other. Although there may be disagreement among lawyers 
about just how the systematic relationship between the various decisions, rules and 
principles should be conceived, there is seldom disagreement that it is one of the tasks 
of legal reasoning to establish it.200 
Collins notes: 
Accordingly, to recognise that international law can be understood as a system – and 
in that sense demonstrates a certain autonomy – is to acknowledge the simple, though 
not less important, point that international legal rules are not just “rules of thumb” 
[…] Rather, they derive their validity from source-based criteria endogenous to, and 
determined by, the system itself. As self-evident as this understanding might appear, 
however, the important point is that this systematicity is not something in-built or 
intrinsic to the very nature of international relations. Like any legal system, 
international law is a social construct and has come to be understood in this way 
because this systematic understanding is deemed meaningful and important to 
                                                                
“international community” transnational constitutional law will either not succeed in making 
effective regulatory claims upon a state-centred world […] And if […] one […] instead treats 
the constituent claim as largely detached and externally constructed rather than as reflexive 
and internally generated […] the very same lack of grounded collective orientation and 
direction may render […] general normative criteria insufficient as a guide to the proper 
distribution of constitutional authority. Even if unobjectionable in principle, these general 
normative criteria are too vague to provide clear and uncontroversial guidance in the absence 
of just that continuous reflexive negotiation and precision of meaning that an actual process 
of collective self-identification might allow. 
N. Walker, “The Return of Constituent Power: A Reply to Mattias Kumm” (2017) 14(4) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 906, 909-910. 
200 International Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Finalized by M. Koskenniemi" (2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, at 23. 
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international legal participants – states, lawyers, diplomats and other actors – as a 
basis of association in their mutual relations.201 
The appropriate starting point is therefore to explore the ECHR itself, using accepted 
principles of international law interpretation accepted by the international participants to 
that agreement.202  
3.3 Interpreting the Treaty 
In identifying the meaning of treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 
the accepted routes. These routes of interpretation extend beyond express terms but remain 
controlled. In relation to those rules, Venzke explains that: 
They are the point of reference for discussing what counts as legal interpretation and 
what does not. No matter what reasons or motivations drive an interpretation, it 
                                                                
201 R. Collins, The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law (Hart: 2016) 6. 
202 The criteria for recognising a rule as constituting law, referred to here as "formal sources", does 
not deny that there may be higher criteria in operation based on universal principles or that they may 
well be imperfect. Danilenko explains (at 24):  
[T]he concept of formal sources in no way seeks to explain the ultimate reason for the 
authority of the international legal system as such. It simply proceeds from the fundamental 
assumption that international law is a system of rules operating as law of the international 
community. Nor does the doctrine of sources seek to explain all the ways in which states and 
other international actors create international legal obligations. The concept of sources of law 
relates to procedures or processes for establishing common rules of conduct constituting 
positive law. 
But the need for such formality cannot in practice be ignored if international law is to be workable, as 
Danilenko argues (at 25):  
Although the metaphor "source" has a certain static flavour, the real purpose of the concept 
of formal sources is to define the positive law process or the law-making processes leading to 
the emergence of rules of positive law. At the same time, the concept of sources deals with 
those procedures both from a law-making and a law-applying perspective. From the law-
making perspective, sources of law determine legitimate processes by which a rule acquires a 
legally binding force. From the point of view of law-application, procedural rules governing 
law-making emerge as positive law tests used by subjects of law and law-applying agencies 
for an objective identification of the resulting legally binding rules. In the international system 
the legitimacy of the asserted legal rules directly depends on whether the arguments are 
based on tests derived from the prescriptions governing the accepted process of law making. 
G. Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 1993). 
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needs to be couched within the argumentative standards contoured by the rules of 
interpretation.203 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties demands that the ordinary 
meaning of provisions of a treaty be given 'in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose'.  
As stated in Article 31 para. 2 of the Vienna Convention, the preamble to a treaty forms an 
integral part of the context. The preamble is also very useful for the determination of the 
object and purpose of the instrument to be construed. In relation to the ECHR, its Preamble 
is an essential source for this work in assessing the legitimate authority of the ECtHR. 
However, as this work has already noted in Chapter Two, there are important issues which 
are not addressed by it. Some of these issues may be clarified by considering the other 
elements of the text of agreement. However, review of the documentation alone will only 
progress the argument so far, other elements relating to the context in which the agreement 
was made must be addressed.  
An understanding of the will or force behind an agreement must, where documentation alone 
is insufficient, come from analysis of the circumstances at and around the time of signing.204 
This makes not only the text of the ECHR but also the context and drafting process leading to 
                                                                
203 I. Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists 
(Oxford University Press: 2012) 50. 
204  The reasoning behind the primacy of what was agreed under a treaty is expressed by the 
International Law Commission in its work on the appropriate codification of international customary 
law:  
[I]n the years ahead the codification of convention will continue to be considered as the most 
effective means of carrying on the work of codification. Its preciseness, its binding character, 
the fact that it has gone through the negotiation stage of collective diplomacy at an 
international conference, the publication and wide dissemination of the conventions, all these 
are assets that will not be lightly abandoned [emphasis added]. 
2 YILC 230 (1973). 
Also, see Helfer who suggests that there is an assumption of, 'perfect correspondence between 
domestic preferences and the state's international commitments at the time of ratification' and so 
'domestic opposition to compliance or pressure to exit from the treaty should increase if the state 
adheres to the treaty in its overlegalised form'. L. Helfer, "Overlegalizing Human Rights: International 
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes" (2002) 
102 Columbia Law Review 1832, 1855. 
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its creation relevant for consideration. This is not a task of discerning the particular intentions 
or mental state of all the drafters. This would be difficult in the extreme and they are likely in 
reality to have had very different views in different areas.205 In addition, this is not a case of 
interpreting a private agreement between parties where a court’s only role is to distribute 
rights and duties according to the parties’ intentions. This is a public act, a government 
purpose on behalf of citizens at large, on the part of the governments who signed the ECHR. 
The construction by a court here relates to how the ECHR may be interpreted as having a goal 
that fulfils a clear and proper governmental purpose. 
It must be possible for the ECtHR to reasonably interpret from the agreement and its 
negotiation some shared, generally accepted government object and purpose between the 
states.  As expressed by Barak:  
[A]n interpreter should not seek the motivations that propelled the members of the 
legislative body to vote in favour of the statute but rather should focus on the general 
objectives they sought to achieve.206  
Therefore, while a definitive understanding of the will of the states may be impossible, it is 
possible and necessary to require a "reasonable" interpretation of the generally accepted 
objective and purpose, based on the evidence available. Reasonable is not the same as the 
now largely debunked restrictive interpretation approach. 207  Closely associated with the 
                                                                
205 See P. Allott, “The Concept of International Law” (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 
31, 43. 
206 A. Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press: 2005) 134. 
207 A “restrictive interpretation” was once favoured by the International Court of Justice, as set out in 
the Lotus judgment to safeguard state sovereignty under which only explicit prohibitions could limit a 
state:  
‘Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed’.  
Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10, 4, at 18.  
The Court explained the implications of this in the advisory opinion on the Treaty of Lausanne of 1925: 
If the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing between several admissible 
interpretations, the one which involves the minimum of obligations for the Parties should be 
adopted. 
Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, Advisory Opinion, 1925 PCIJ Series 
B, No. 12, 7, at 25. 
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object and purpose rule is the effective interpretation argument. This prefers an 
interpretation that is most effective in enhancing the purpose of the treaty. What is required 
is a reading that does not go too far or, conversely, fail to go far enough. Without relying on 
concepts such a “reasonableness”, it would prove impossible to legitimise international 
orders as being complete and coherent, when in reality the states exhibit many core 
differences. Reasonable is a somewhat uncertain term, perhaps reflective of the wider issue 
of the “lack of density” to the rules of international law208, but the term is still necessary as 
the best available response to this indeterminacy. As Corten argues:  
Over and above particular cases, the use of the notion of "reasonable" provides 
legitimacy to the international legal order as a whole, by presenting an image of a 
closed, coherent and complete legal system. From that perspective, references to 
reason suggest an ideal of unity and community of values that is particularly 
remarkable in an international society which is very loosely integrated, and which is 
characterised by decentralised centres of power and acute cultural and political 
differences. In fact, the very presence in international discourse of references to the 
                                                                
A fuller analysis of the "restrictive interpretation" approach, including the cases above as well as a 
number of others, is provided by in L. Crema, “Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive 
Interpretation(s)” (2010) 21(3) The European Journal of International Law 681, 684 - 685 
However, as Crema explains, more recent international decisions confirm that the rule of restrictive 
interpretation in favour of State sovereignty is no longer in force. Crema selects as a good example 
the Iron Rhine arbitration, decided in 2005:  
The doctrine of restrictive interpretation never had a hierarchical supremacy, but was a 
technique to ensure a proper balance of the distribution of rights within a treaty system. The 
principle of restrictive interpretation [...] is not in fact mentioned in the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention. 
Iron Rhine, arbitration (Belgium v. The Netherlands) (2005), at [53].  
The ICJ again pointed to the non-existence of this rule in Costa Rica and Nicaragua:  
[T]he Court is not convinced [...] that Costa Rica’s right of free navigation should be interpreted 
narrowly because it represents a limitation of the sovereignty over the river conferred by the 
Treaty on Nicaragua. 
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (2009), at [48]. 
208 Warbrick comments: 
The very lack of density to the rules of international law … their uncertainty, their 
incompleteness and [...] sometimes their incoherence one with another, increases the 
opportunity for imaginative interpretation for whoever takes on the task. The line between 
the legal and the political is drawn from a different place in the international legal system than 
it is in a developed, domestic order. 
C. Warbrick, “Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law: An Assessment” (2000) 11 European 
Journal of International Law 621, 626-27. 
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notion of "reasonable" is indicative of the persistent problem of legitimacy of a legal 
order which is neither based on a common ideology nor controlled by a centralised 
enforcing body.209  
A focus on an overall purpose as reasonably understood does mean looking back to what will 
be termed in this work as the "original purpose". However, this is not the same as limiting the 
project to the "original understanding" of its likely effect. The actual interpretation and 
applications of that project may later vary from what the drafters may or even could have 
predicted at the time but it may be argued that the continued nature and aspirations of the 
project or its “function” should be kept in line with the original object and purpose agreed. It 
is only the understanding of what the original purpose requires that may evolve, in the 
absence of express renegotiation by member states. 
3.3.1 The Preamble 
The next issue to consider is whether any clarity about the functions of the ECHR legal system 
and the functions remaining with sovereign states may be inferred from the text.  
The ECHR Preamble reads: 
Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the 
foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand 
by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and 
observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend […] 
The Preamble makes it clear that, while democracy is limited by fundamental rights, from a 
pragmatic point of view democracy is seen as the system for protecting and, by extension of 
that same logic, of capturing liberal thinking upon their meaning. Democracy is the procedure 
for both interpreting the rights, developing or constructing their normative content to give 
substance, and for their application according to expected standards.   
                                                                
209  O. Corten, “The Notion of Reasonable in International Law: Legal Discourse, Reason and 
Contradictions” (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 613, 618. 
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Fig. 3.1 The Cycle of Democracy and Human Rights 
If the fundamental freedoms are “best” maintained by a political democracy, then the best 
“common” understanding of human rights norms must also flow from the effective operation 
of democracy as it applies and thereby continually evolves the understanding of principles 
that generally apply. Thus, a cycle is created of justified moral norms being recognised by 
democracy as falling under the scope a right and then the rights being further interpreted 
within democracies, with ever more detailed norms emerging via that process to then be 
observed.  
In relation to the ECHR's approach, this addresses one of the conceptual difficulties with the 
ability to limit democracies, summarised by Gould:  
While different theories of justice have grounded individual liberties and rights in 
various ways, it has remained less than clear whether the introduction of 
constitutional guarantees by a democratic or consensual procedure is what legitimises 
these rights, in which case they would be grounded in the value of democracy; or 
whether these rights have a normative claim that is independent of, or external to, 
such procedures. That is, are such rights constituted as rights by their democratic or 
Best maintained by 
democracy
Common 
understanding and 
observance of 
human rights
Fundamental 
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consensual recognition, or is the imperative to institute them based on their prior and 
autonomous status as rights?210 
The ECHR Preamble accepts that there are limits on what a democracy may do, this work has 
already recognised that there are some norms and executory responses that may “not” be 
reasoned as they cannot comply with the criteria for reason. In an original position, it may 
also be possible to identify beyond the negative protection against unreasoned choices, to 
positively construct rights and duties that have “prior and autonomous status as rights”. But 
the original position cannot be in actuality created, democracy represents a concerted effort 
to reason morally while living under the necessary social contract. The use in the ECHR 
Preamble of the word "understanding" in relation to rights reflects the arguments already 
made about the difficulties of any purely objective determination of what “is” the necessary 
meaning. The most to be hoped for is a "common" accepted construction of the 
interpretation and the standards for assessing application between the member states.  
If the ECHR project were limited to testing for clearly immoral understandings, rules and 
actions, then it would be a far more limited system than the one that has developed. 
However, the ECHR Preamble refers to the development of “common understanding and 
observance”. The membership is, therefore, required to seek progress in producing 
consistency in the positive construction of norms which develop under the rights as 
interpreted throughout the multitude of different democracies forming the membership and 
in standards for application. The listing and partial definition of particular norms as rights 
based on how they were understood at the time infers as much, even in the absence of such 
a statement of intent. 
The ECHR system must assume that democracy is equipped to routinely make choices which 
represent the common construction interpreting principles of general application as well as 
ensuring the particular application follows standards for their safeguarding. The institutional 
legitimacy of the ECtHR is also then tied in with it promoting whatever is required to show 
democratic legitimacy. An update to fig 2.3, from Chapter Two, can now be made: 
                                                                
210 C. Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press: 2004) 14-15. 
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Fig. 3.2 Solutions for Resolving Substance and Standards of Rights   
As explained by Bustamante, democracy as a process provides a justification of legal authority 
more robust than the purely service provider-based concept of legitimacy posited by Raz in 
the Normal Justification Thesis. It moves beyond providing a service of resolving disputes, to 
morally justifying “how” that service is given: 
This provides a justification of (legal) authority more robust as compared to the Normal 
Justification Thesis. Let us call it the Democratic Justification Thesis (DJT). This thesis 
can be asserted thus: an institution has intrinsically legitimate authority over a person 
[…] when the directives of this institution are the outcomes of a fair-decision process in 
which such person has a right to an equal participation. The Democratic Justification 
provides, thus, the most powerful justification available for the authority of a legal 
institution [emphasis added].211 
3.3.2 Democratic Legitimacy 
In a functional legal system in accordance with the NJT, subjects must normally follow the 
decisions reached despite some individuals not agreeing that all the outcomes are in 
accordance with their internal reasoning. However, this does not prevent the search for a 
procedure that is itself of moral form.212 People must believe that the state reflects their 
views and interests, avoiding individual subjectivity. As Kant explains, an omnilateral 
judgment is one that expresses, 'all the wills of a community together'.213 While it is not 
possible to guarantee that decisions may not later be judged as wrong, morally grounded 
procedures may provide some safeguard against immoral decisions.214  
                                                                
211 T. Bustamante, ‘On the Difficulty to Ground the Authority of Constitutional Courts: Can Strong 
Judicial Review be Justified?’ in T. Bustamante and G. Bernardo (eds.), Democratizing Constitutional 
Law: Perspectives on Legal Theory and the Legitimacy of Constitutionalism (Springer International 
Publishing: 2016) 52. 
212 See L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press: 1969). 
213 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) (Cambridge University Press: 1996) 48. 
214 See Rawls:  
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A review of the ability of democracy to meet the criteria for reason at this point has two 
benefits.  First, it is necessary to check that democracy could fit with the criteria developed in 
line with the PGC. Second, in so doing the important elements it possesses that make it a 
correct procedure can be explored. These elements are those to be respected as well as 
protected by the ECtHR and so start to inform the framework developed in Chapter Four, 
building upon the notion of a Democratic Justification Thesis to support procedural legitimacy 
in Court judgments.    
In accordance with the idea of the categorical imperative, a system may claim legitimacy only 
if it forms part of a process that both could be accepted by all agents as one which is 
supportive of self-reflection and the deployment of reason.215 Clearly, a system that relies on 
coerced agreement is not sufficient. As O’Neill explains, that ‘does not outlive the coercion, 
and does not reach the uncoerced’.216 The better image, as proposed by Kant, is one that 
supports “reasoned exchange” and “free debate”.217 In his words: 
Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it limit freedom 
of criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself a damaging 
suspicion. Nothing is so important through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it 
may be exempted from this searching examination, which knows no respect for 
persons. Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has no 
dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of 
                                                                
'Ideally, a just constitution would be a just procedure arranged to insure a just outcome.'  
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press: 1971) 197.  Rawls continues, at 198:  
Clearly any feasible political procedure may yield an unjust outcome. In fact, there is no 
scheme of procedural political rules that guarantees that unjust legislation will not be enacted. 
In the case of a constitutional regime, or indeed any political form, the idea of perfect 
procedural justice cannot be realised. The best attainable scheme is one of imperfect 
procedural justice. 
215 This mitigates some of the issues with the theory of a social contract and justification of there being 
any one system which is preferable. All that is necessary is that the adopted system could be 
consented to by all. 
216  O. O’Neill, Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press: 2015) 25. 
217 ibid 25. 
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whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objection 
or even his veto [emphasis added].218 
Any system that requires authorities within a legal system to empower and incorporate the 
reasoning of agents which, in keeping with the PGC, are supportable by everyone within a 
society, is to be welcomed. 219 It must encourage evaluation and discourse by agents in a 
manner than can be shared with and promote unified thinking with other agents. Democracy, 
as a system intended to safeguard against dictatorial or totalitarian states with a lack of 
transparency and accountability in leadership and to promote freethinking and the sharing of 
ideas, provides one such system that could in theory be supported by all.220 This view is 
famously supported by Rawls who, perhaps a little too boldly, takes the position that only 
views developed by a particular political democracy could deliver the type of public reasoning 
demanded to construct the principles from the original position: 
                                                                
218 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge University Press: 
1996).  
219 The well-known work of Rawls and his constructive procedure based on the hypothetical original 
position under the veil of ignorance is interesting here. See Chapter Two (n 140). 
Rawls conceived of a hypothetical process in which agents constructed principles in the abstract from 
behind a veil of ignorance that would remove all information about their particular characteristics (e.g. 
gender, ethnicity, social status, gender and conception of the good). See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Harvard University Press: 1971) 12. Via a process of ‘reflective equilibrium’, agents could go back and 
forth and then, ‘eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses 
reasonable conditions and yields principles that match our considered judgements duly pruned and 
adjusted.’ See J. Rawls (n 214) 20. But how is that reflection to be achieved? 
220 The rationality behind democratically representative and accountable institutions as moral decision 
makers is supportable by building upon Kant’s idea that people’s actions should be influenced by 
moral truths with the arguments made by Habermas' on the relevance of the "lifeworld". He 
distinguishes between the “system” and the “lifeworld”. While the system is heavily influenced by 
external factors and may not be representative of a diverse population, individual agents removed 
from such considerations are able to identify the better arguments and hold the system to account. 
See J. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society 
(Beacon Press: 1985).  
Arguably, in claiming moral superiority or a “better” view on a dispute than those with life experience 
is to strip those individuals of their humanity in removing the relevance of their everyday and so 
extensive self-reasoning. 
The lifeworld, or the lived realm in the public sphere, has a greater potential for free thought and 
communication and the informal, culturally-grounded understandings and mutual accommodations 
that develop in it are a valuable resource in law-making. See J. Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action: Vol.2: The Critique of Functionalist Reason, Volume 2 (Polity: 1987). 
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Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens, of 
those sharing the equal status of citizenship […] [it] is public in three ways: as the 
reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the good of the 
public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is public, being 
given by the ideals and principles expressed by a society’s conception of political 
justice, and conducted open to view.221  
There must be caution in suggesting that democracy is justifiably to be taken as the universally 
correct process for identification of objects in accordance with the PGC; it may be only the 
Westernised view. However, while there are other systems of government that could be up 
to that same basic task of normative justification, democracy is the system clearly espoused 
by the ECHR. For the ECHR legal system to move away from it as the procedurally legitimate 
means of constructing the human rights, it would require a drastic renegotiation of the most 
fundamental assumption of the agreement.   
Democracy provides the basis for uniting those societies that have “chosen” it, and all 
member states of the ECHR do so expressly,  and allows the norms of a society practical 
effect.222 The absence of any credible alternative basis, for example, the historic dependence 
upon religion or upon social convention, is a key justification for reliance upon democracy to 
                                                                
221 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press: 1993) 213. 
222 As O’Neill explains:  
The thought that public reasoning takes place among fellow citizens in bounded societies is 
fruitful because those citizens can be taken to share certain fundamental commitments. Their 
shared civic commitments to liberalism, to democracy and to the continued existence of their 
bounded society provide a basis for debating or justifying its specific political arrangements.  
Yet the very fact that citizens are assumed to share these commitments may also hamper the 
justification of fundamental political arrangements. If the commitments to liberalism, to 
democracy and to the continued existence of a bounded society are taken as given, the 
answers to certain fundamental questions about justice, such as the justice of secession or 
annexation, or the justice of liberalism or democracy, are prejudiced. Even coherentist 
justifications must do more than reiterate commitments. The thought that public reasoning 
may take place only among fellow citizens may seem inadequate because it excludes 
reasoning that crosses boundaries or engages with those who are not fellow citizens. 
O. O’Neill (n 216) 91-92. 
This view is supported by some of the reasoning behind the ECHR. First, the potential for the ECHR 
project to enlighten non-democratic states outside of the ideals of the Convention and bring them 
into the fold suggests at some view that agents living in non-democratic states may reason enough of 
the same values to have a desire to join. As such, ignoring their understandings is not necessary. 
Second, the ECHR itself is based on understandings that are beyond any particular state or society.  
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settle coordination issues.223 On all aspects upon which the use of the democratic process 
could comply with the criteria for reason, there is no basis for the ECtHR to challenge the role 
it is given under the ECHR as the superior route for moral construction.  
The consideration by Rawls in selecting democracy as his preferred system is useful in 
reasoning how democracy plays its role, but may also be used to suggest its limits. Citizens 
within a particular civil society or sovereign nation state (given a hypothetical agreement or 
“social contract” to join together and look after each other’s interests) have: (1) a particular 
motivation to treat each other’s views as having equal status i.e. that they not only may, but 
must influence their reasoning; and (2) a practical ability to successfully communicate with 
those other agents, given they have at least some common points from which to start. 
For the PGC to operate through democracy, it would appear to be linked to whether all agents 
can be relied upon to think of the positions of others and are able to meaningfully 
communicate with them about their reasoning.224 It is submitted that this causes a variation 
                                                                
223 As explained by Lord Sumption in relation to growth of law as filling a vacuum:  
The spread of Parliamentary democracy across most of the world has invariably been followed 
by rising public expectations of the State [...] The State has become the provider of basic 
standards of public amenity, the guarantor of minimum levels of security and, increasingly, 
the regulator of economic activity and the protector against misfortune of every kind. The 
public expects nothing less. Yet protection at this level calls for a general scheme of rights and 
a more intrusive role for law [...] This expansion of the empire of law has not been gratuitous. 
It is a response to a real problem. At its most fundamental level, the problem is that the 
technical and intellectual capacities of mankind have grown faster than its moral sensibilities 
or its co-operative instincts. At the same time other restraints on the autonomy and self-
interest of men, such as religion and social convention, have lost much of their former force, 
at any rate in the west. The role of social and religious sentiment, which was once so critical in 
the life of our societies, has been largely taken over by law [emphasis added]. 
Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of the Law’, (20 November 2013), 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala 
Lumpur, page 3 available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf> accessed 21 
November 2016. 
224 As Toddington explains:  
Social contract theorists in general, and Kant and Rousseau in particular, have argued that 
some process of universalisable reasoning relating to individual and collective human interests 
is prior to the moment of consensual incorporation into Civil Society. Civil Society, as Rousseau 
and Kant point out so emphatically, is not merely a stable or event respectful and generous 
community […] but a population united under the principles of equality and sovereign law. The 
creation of this public power is effected by a transformation of individual wills into an 
omnilateral or General Will, and this General Will is legitimised by its aspiration to a honour a 
Page 162 of 391 
 
in the role of democracy in the two stages of: (1) interpretation of the normative parameters 
of a right; and (2) application of the principles of general application to particular 
circumstances. 
3.3.3 Democracy in the Stages for Human Rights Protection 
Where all agents could morally reason on an issue, the outcome of that reasoning, as 
embodied through their democratic representatives, is then supreme in accordance with the 
Democratic Justification Thesis (provided it could accord with the criteria for reason under 
the PGC). It is only where all agents could not do so, where a question raises points outside 
their knowledge or experience or introduces a risk of bias or self-interest, that the execution 
of that general understanding is necessarily subject to the views of experts in the given field.  
Democracy views a system representing the reasoning of all agents as the best means of 
reaching a moral and an accepted compromise on societal principles i.e. rights and duties and 
when they may be restricted in particular circumstances.225  Ideally, this public reasoning 
would also be determinative of how those principles of general application should be applied 
in specific cases and situations. Clearly it is not possible for every agent in a society to actually 
get together and reach these compromises, and some agents may not have the time, skill or 
will to explore issues, so instead democratic representatives are used as the embodiment of 
agent’s will. While the reality may be questioned, the assumption of democracy is that the 
outcomes from the reasoning and compromises of these representatives is equivalent to the 
outcome that, hypothetically, would be secured if all agents were able to responsibly do the 
same with public-spiritedness rather than self-interest.  
                                                                
principle identical to that enunciated in Habermas: to tie legitimacy to the pursuit of 
generalisable interests.  
S. Toddington, “The Moral Truth about Discourse Theory” (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 217, 227. 
225 The fact that some reasoning may represent a compromised outcome, not certainly the correct 
one, does not prevent the process of normative reasoning being objective. As Rescher explains: 
If we have done all that reasonably can be asked of us, the best that can reasonably be done, 
then there can be no need for further assurance […] A wholly justified claim to certainty and 
knowledge is compatible with a nagging element of theoretical doubt. 
N. Rescher, Scepticism (Oxford University Press: 1980) 40-41. 
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Majoritarianism has its place in a liberal democracy, as the recognition of “self-rule” by agents 
and as a means to hold the decision-makers to account. This is not the same, however, as 
simple majoritarianism.226 The use of elected representatives and the operation of PGC to 
filter the choices of the legislature, guard against the dangers of simple majoritarianism.227  
Here, the work of Brunder explains the balance: 
To the unelected court falls the task of specifying within the sphere of rational 
necessity the abstract principles that have been inscribed into a written constitution 
and of testing legislation against those principles to determine whether it could be 
assented to by free, worth-claiming citizens. To a majority of the elected legislature 
belongs the task of deciding by fiat which of the many ways of promulgating the 
common welfare that could be freely assented to is Law’s actual determination. Thus, 
majority consent is indeed validating of Law’s rules and, unless patently unreasonable 
in its result, owed respect by a court; but this is only because the idea of moral 
membership requires it […] as the rule of decision in the area left free by what the 
same idea requires as a matter of theoretical necessity. Accordingly, provided that 
each body keeps to its proper sphere of operation – the supreme court to pure 
practical reason and the legislature to intersection between practical reason and 
empirical circumstances – there is no anti-democratic implication of judicial review 
not any inherent despotism in majority decision-making.228 
This means that, provided all agents could effectively reason on a point, then the democratic 
decision (provided it could accord with the criteria for reason) must be upheld as the true 
societal construction of a principle i.e. the norms of general application and when they can 
be restricted in particular circumstances. Brunder continues: 
Democracy is indeed defeated […] when the court substitutes its own judgment 
concerning what the common welfare or how best to attain it for that of the people’s 
                                                                
226 Rousseau notes that the general will ‘is always right and tends always to the public advantage; but 
it does not follow that the deliberations of the people always have the same rectitude’. Although, he 
does conclude that the general will is a representation of common interests from the process of voting. 
J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings (ed.) Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge 
University Press: 1997), Book II, Chapter 3, Whether the General Will Can Err, p. 57. 
227 Dworkin advocates a rights-oriented liberalism: 
A right against the Government must be a right to do something even when the majority thinks 
it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for having it done. 
R. Dworkin, 1971/1997, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury Academic: 2013) 234. 
228 A. Brunder, Constitutional Goods (Oxford University Press: 2004) 213. 
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representatives; and the demos’s defeat is here just as much a defeat for the Law as 
its passing of a statute no self-respecting person could assent to.229 
This creates a distinction for the weighting to be given by the ECtHR to the decisions of 
democracy between two stages in human rights issues of interpretation and application.  
 
 
Fig. 3.3 The Two Stages in Resolving Human Rights Questions 
For stage 1, the interpretation in abstracto of the normative scope of rights and when those 
norms can be limited in particular circumstances, the work notes that there is no reason to 
accept that the reasoning of “experts” on norms is any more valid than that of other agents. 
The operation of the PGC is not comparable to a mathematical exercise. The political 
representatives, chosen to speak on behalf of all citizens, therefore have the role of positively 
selecting between candidate norms and proposing and producing national law. The question 
for the ECtHR is which democratically reasoned understandings from the different member 
states form the ECHR legal position. 
Once the matter moves to stage 2 and in concreto application, securing the norms and 
balancing competing interests in individual cases and particular circumstances, democratic 
representatives act on behalf of all citizens in setting standards and applying them. The 
                                                                
229 ibid 213. 
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theoretical reasoning of all moral agents on the point continues to be the route for 
compromise. However, this stage requires that the democratic process show it is correctly 
informed and utilised expert skill in applying that knowledge. These procedural requirements 
are part of the overarching democratic standards for decision-making within any democracy. 
Other standards more specific to the particular case at hand may also be settled. 
In this in concreto stage, during our hypothetical meeting of all of agents, they could not 
possibly comply with the criteria for reason without the support of experts. The criteria 
require that the reasons for a decision are coherent; all agents could not possibly posit cogent 
lawlike arguments without reliance on experts. By extension, their democratic 
representatives must also appeal to and apply expert opinion in reaching decisions on 
application. The application stage must then include a procedural element, demonstrating a 
democratic process was used, facts checked, and relevant evidence properly considered. 
This application stage also introduces the risk, in moving beyond questions of interpretation 
with generic norms that apply to all agents – necessarily including the agent themselves, that 
the reasoning will be affected by factors such as prejudice, self-interest or fear of the majority 
of agents overriding the rights of the minority. This, combined with the gaps in understanding 
undermining the effectiveness of the electorate as a safeguard, means there must also be a 
substantive element to a court review. A conclusion about the existence in a specific case of 
an interference with a norm must be one that a reasoned person would reach given the facts. 
Furthermore, when the state argues that the interference with a person’s rights was 
necessary, the decision made must be one that a reasoned person would consider a 
proportionate response.  
The questions for the ECtHR in the application stage are: (1) how strong the presumption is 
that complying with democratic due-process means there is no breach by a state; (2) how to 
identify the democratically recognised standards for delivery of the particular norm; and (3) 
how wide the margin of discretion is for a state in its ultimate substantive decision before it 
can be found to have acted in a way that a reasoned person would not.  
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3.3.4 The Negotiation 
The review of the ECHR Preamble has allowed a number of vital points to be made about 
reasonably inferable aspects of a legitimate ECtHR process and will inform development of 
the analytical framework for assessing the legitimacy of the Court procedure developed in 
Chapter Four. It does not, however, address two central questions: (1) which democratically 
reached interpretations of the normative scope of rights can be used by the ECtHR as a 
“common” understanding; and (2) how the degree of choice left to states within which to 
operate in applying those principles of general application to particular circumstances is 
determined. Given a reading of the text was alone insufficient to address these points, the 
examination will need to explore what else can be found about the context and the object 
and purpose of the agreement from the negotiation progress.  
What the negotiation reveals about the motivations of member states binding themselves to 
the ECHR will be explored in Chapter Four, before the framework for analysis is set out. 
3.4 Chapter Conclusions 
The rationale that moved member states to become signatories of the ECHR and to continue 
abiding by the decisions of the ECtHR revolves around promoting democracy as the best and 
fairest system within individual states. Subsequent rulings of the ECtHR and observations 
from member states confirm democracy as the continuing common idea or central unifying 
element.230  Whilst the specifications of the quality of democracy leave much to be discussed 
                                                                
230 For example, see United Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey, Application No. 19392/92, judgment 
of 30 January 1998, para. 45, where the ECtHR explained:  
Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the European public order [...] That is 
apparent [...] firstly, from the Preamble to the Convention [...] [The Court] has pointed out 
several times that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and 
values of a democratic society [...] 
See also the Committee of Ministers Guidelines for Civil Participation in Political Decision Making (27 
September 2017) CM(2017)83-final available at <https://rm.coe.int/guidelines-for-civil-participation-
in-political-decision-making-en/16807626cf> accessed 8 May 2018: 
Considering that the participation of citizens is at the very heart of the idea of democracy; 
Considering that representative democracy, based on the right of citizens to freely elect their 
representatives at reasonable intervals, is part of the common heritage of member States;  
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– especially in a system where individual rights are seen as “trumps” over policy aims – we 
can accept the general point. Two questions that arise are: (1) which democratically reasoned 
interpretations of the normative scope of rights can be used by the ECtHR; and (2) how might 
we determine the scope of choice left to states within which to operate in applying the 
principles pertaining to rights? 
  
                                                                
Considering that direct democracy, based on the right to take part in elections and to launch 
and sign popular initiatives and requests for referendums, is a longstanding tradition in certain 
member States;  
Considering that participatory democracy, based on the right to seek to determine or to 
influence the exercise of a public authority’s powers and responsibilities, contributes to 
representative and direct democracy and that the right to civil participation in political 
decision-making should be secured to individuals, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and 
civil society at large;  
Emphasising that responsibility and accountability for taking decisions ultimately rests with 
the public authority that has the democratic legitimacy to do so […] 
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4 Chapter Four 
 
An Analytical Framework for Assessing the 
Legitimacy of European Court of Human 
Rights Procedure 
 
Origins of the agreement, consequences for the 
Court’s legitimate authority, and a framework 
guiding cooperation  
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4.1 Introduction 
Phase Four of the work is to construct a more comprehensive picture of the object and 
purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in moving towards a 
framework of analysis for assessing the procedural legitimacy of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). 
The earlier analysis leaves two areas of uncertainty regarding the relationship between the 
individual democratic member states and the overall ECHR system: 
1. In the in abstracto interpretation of the normative scope of rights, how might 
we identify and reconcile the different understandings democratically 
recognised by the plurality of societies under the ECHR as candidates for falling 
within the parameters of the right at issue and allowable restrictions in 
particular circumstances? 
2. In the in concreto application, how might we settle standards expected of 
states and the scope of permissible variation or “margin” available to the 
democratic representatives in light of: (a) the general standards for democratic 
decision-making and evidence on approaches regarding reasonable protection 
of the given norm; and (b) discretion in proportionately responding to 
particular circumstances and individual cases? 
A response to these points requires an exploration of the shared government object and 
purpose of the ECHR. By appreciating the common government purpose of the contracting 
states, it is possible to make a reasonable inference about the role of the ECtHR consented to 
by the membership. Specifically, in relation to the proactiveness of the ECtHR in finding 
common interpretations of the rights and how readily it should intervene in the application 
by the national systems. As noted in Chapter Three, the ECHR Preamble alone will not allow 
us to draw out the detail of what was originally and consensually agreed by the founding 
states. Wider evidence of the initial negotiation process and of subsequent reflections on the 
process is required here.   
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4.2 The Negotiation Process 
Evidence from a detailed review by Moravesik of the negotiation process and the early terms 
of the ECHR agreement does not support a clearly idealistic recognition by the founding 
states.231 There is no suggestion of an intention for a strongly inclusive order, empowered to 
routinely challenge individual national decisions with an ambitious normative objective.232 
The evidence supports a view that democratically determined decisions were not expected 
to be challenged, which is not in keeping with idealist motivations.233 Nor does the evidence 
indicate the agreement was only through a realist force,234  by the more powerful states 
                                                                
231 Moravesik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe” 
(2000) 54(2) International Organisation 217. 
232 In considering idealism as a motivator for the ECHR, the basis for cooperation, it is important to 
stress that this differs from accepting that the very idea of human rights is based on an idealist 
understating of moral values and principles. Instead, it is idealism as the motivator for states 
cooperating multilaterally in identifying and safeguarding those rights rather than securing them 
unilaterally within their own borders. Under an idealist approach cooperation occurs when states 
agree to have a strongly inclusive order.   
233 Moravesik, in his study on the origins of human rights, argues that such idealism in the negotiation 
would be evidenced by the states with a long history of democracy taking the lead as proponents of 
reciprocally binding obligations. ibid 222. 
The study continues (at 231) with an exploration of the willingness of the various founding 
governments to support elements of the design of the ECHR necessary to making it a reciprocal 
agreement. First, compulsory jurisdiction by an independent court.  Second, the right of individual 
petition giving individuals standing. Where both elements were voted for, that is defined as support 
for a reciprocally binding regime, whereas a vote against is counted as opposition.  
The founding member states were (at 232) divided by the study into: “established democracies” 
(systems consistently under democratic rule since before 1920), “new democracies” (those not in 
place by 1920 but firmly established during the negotiations and remaining so after), and “semi 
democracies and dictatorships” (systems that were not fully democratic by the time of the 
negotiations). In correlating support for a reciprocal regime against the length of democratic rule (at 
232), Moravesik observes an inverse-U-shaped relationship. All six new democracies supported 
binding human rights guarantees, while six of the seven long-established democracies joined the non-
democracies in opposing it. The results of the study call into question idealism as the decisive element 
in defining the objectives of the founding states. 
234 A realist interpretation of the ECHR would identify the original intent as safeguarding each self-
interested state’s own security (see J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton 
and Company: 2001)).  The agreement would be the result of force, exerted by the more powerful 
countries or by a threat to the states.  The objective of the agreement would be only to further the 
national interest by guarding against actions in other countries that may impose a threat externally 
beyond the state in question (see K. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (Columbia 
University Press: 1959)).  
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wishing to impose their own understanding of the rights upon others and forcing the issue.235 
Rather, it appears to have fallen somewhere between those two points, as a means to 
promote and safeguard the ideal of democratic rule in uncertain times – republican liberalism. 
This is in accordance with the view formed by work in Chapters Two and Three of trust in 
democracy as a correct means to construct and apply human rights, and proving relative 
moral legitimacy to those choices.  
Moravesik explains that the real motivation of the founding member states appears to have 
been partly their domestic self-interest:  
Establishing an international human rights regime is an act of political delegation akin 
to establishing a domestic court or administrative agency [...] creating a quasi-
independent judicial body is a tactic used by governments to “lock in” and consolidate 
democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-à-vis non-
democratic threats. In sum, governments turn to international enforcement when an 
international commitment effectively enforces the policy preferences of a particular 
government at a particular point in time against future domestic political 
alternatives.236  
Republican liberalism aimed to secure newly formed democracies across Europe with the 
support of established democratic nations to keep them on the right track. The newly 
established democracies would have been the most supportive of a reciprocal system to 
“lock-in” the core principles. Republican liberalism also explains why the longer “established” 
democracies were less inclined to be accountable themselves, while being content for other 
countries to be subject to intervention:  
The decision of any individual government whether to support a binding international 
human rights enforcement regime depends [...] on the relative importance of these 
two basic factors: Sovereignty costs are weighted against establishing human rights 
regimes, whereas greater political stability may be weighted in favour of it. If we 
                                                                
235 Given that the ultimate motivation for agreeing to the ECHR would be self-interest, Moravesik 
reasons that it would be anticipated that the more powerful states would have exerted the greatest 
pressure and so forced their ideology onto the smaller members, which in turn would have attempted 
to defend their sovereignty.  However, the study reaffirms the finding that the established democratic 
powers were not the drivers for the reciprocal undertaking and stresses that those states were also 
the great powers of the time. It is therefore indicated that neither idealism or realism account for the 
objective behind the treaty. Moravesik proposes the theory of republican liberalism as an alternative 
better fit. A. Moravesik (n 231) 222. 
236 ibid 219. 
Page 172 of 391 
 
assume that the inconvenience governments face is constant (or randomly 
distributed), it follows that a country is most likely to support a human rights regime 
when its government is firmly committed to democratic governance but faces strong 
internal challenges that may threaten it in the future. Its willingness to tolerate 
sovereignty costs increases insofar as the costs are outweighed by the benefits of 
reducing domestic political uncertainty.237  
States committed to the rule of law at the national level are likely to abide by the rule of law 
at the international level. Whereas states variable in their commitment at the national level 
are less likely to comply at the international level. Helfer and Slaughter argue: 
[S]tates committed to the rule of law domestically will be more law-abiding in the 
international realm, through the projection or transferal of their domestic habits. 
Accustomed to self-imposed constitutional constraints at home, constraints enforced 
by an independent judiciary, they are more likely to accept the constraints of 
international law as enforced by an international or supranational tribunal.238 
This means states less consistent in their commitment to democracy require a more robust 
intervention when something is going wrong and closer cooperation to “lock-in” its ideals. 
Thus, supporting the conclusions of Moravesik about the greater support of the new 
democracies when the ECHR was negotiated for a reciprocal agreement. 
In accordance with republican liberalism, the purpose of the ECHR was to stabilise public 
opinion on the merits of liberal democracy, particularly in new or flawed democracies.239 This 
                                                                
237ibid 228. 
238 Helfer, L. and Slaughter, A., "Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication" (1997) 
107(2) Yale Law Journal 273, 332. 
239 The continued focus on stability and the role of shared ground between the democratic States is 
evident in the report of the Council of Europe Steering Committee for Human Rights on the future of 
the ECHR system:  
In these turbulent and fragmented times, the European Convention on Human Rights is an 
anchor. As a basis for joint action between 47 member States, it empowers European 
governments to act together in order to combat shared threats to Europe’s stability, while still 
safeguarding liberty. Where politics stalls or falters, the Convention can move us forward, 
keeping the doors of diplomacy open even when relations are fraught. Not only does it provide 
a common ground between nations, based on agreed laws and shared values: by setting out 
the fundamental freedoms all in Europe must respect, the Convention is a source of cohesion 
in our increasingly diverse societies, too.  
Council of Europe, ‘The Longer-Term Future of the System of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (adopted December 2015, published June 2016) report of the Steering Committee for Human 
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would create a supportive and self-affirming group of member states providing mutual 
reassurance on the effective delivery of human rights through democratic rule.240  
The ECHR project was concerned more with internal reinforcement of democracy, with a state 
commitment to showing themselves as effective democratic bodies by allowing comparison 
of their delivery against the collectively understood human rights norms. The accepted 
understanding of republican liberalism is that it creates symbolic (or, in the case of the ECtHR, 
actual) international constraints which allow undemocratic decisions of future governments 
to be challenged at the national level. 241  Moravesik argues that the expectation, with 
republican liberalism as the motivation for cooperation, would not be to encourage significant 
international intervention, but rather to reinforce the existing national systems: 
Most participants [the founding member states] appear to have felt that domestic 
politics would remain the primary site of enforcement – all members were to be 
democracies, at least formally – with international controls serving as an external 
signalling device to trigger an appropriate domestic response. The ECHR [the 
Convention] was intended primarily to strengthen existing domestic institutions of 
judicial review, parliamentary legislations, and public action, not to supplant them.242    
This symbiotic relationship between the ECtHR and national democracy is a view endorsed by 
the Court itself. 243  For the established democracies, it was expected that their current 
                                                                
Rights, page 7, available at <https://rm.coe.int/the-longer-term-future-of-the-system-of-the-
european-convention-on-hum/1680695ad4> accessed 9 May 2018. 
240 As Sikkink comments:  
Human rights norms have a special status because they prescribe rules for appropriate 
behaviour and they help define identities of liberal States. Human rights then become the 
yardstick used to define who is in and who is outside of the club of liberal States. 
K. Sikkink, “Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights” (1998) (31)3 
Political Science and Politics 516, 520. 
241  P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putman, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and 
Domestic Politics (University of California Press: 1993).  
242 A. Moravesik (n 231) 238. 
243  The Convention is designed to incorporate a traditional civil liberties approach to securing 
"effective political democracy", as said by Guido Raimondi, President of European Court of Human 
Rights in a speech on parliamentary immunity and human rights: 
It would not be conceivable on the European system of protection of human rights with his 
court untied-so to speak-from democracy. In fact, we have a bond that is not only regional 
geographic: one cannot be a party to the European Convention on human rights if you are not 
a member of the Council of Europe; You cannot be a member State of the Council of Europe 
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practices would be found to be largely consistent, and there was even questioning as to why 
a treaty was needed between states already committed to democratic rule. The response to 
this is to affirm once more the acceptance that a collective means for measurement and 
intervention may be required to secure democracy against external and internal risks. The 
views of the United Kingdom, seen as a bastion of democratic values, are of interest here. Sir 
David Maxwell-Fyfe of the UK explained:  
In answer to the criticism that, as signatories will be limited to democratic States the 
Convention is unnecessary [...] our plan has the advantage of being immediately 
practicable; it provides a system of collective security against tyranny and 
oppression.244   
The next point is to consider what this collective object and purpose of promoting and 
securing national liberal democratic rule means for delivery by the member states and the 
ECtHR. 
4.3 Republican Liberalism and Authority 
4.3.1 Developments Require Democratic State Support  
The acceptance of the primacy of democracy, which still resides within the member states, 
negates viewing the agreement as federal. If a federal constitutional function could be shown, 
this would give the ECtHR considerable authority. As Bogdandy and Venzke argue:  
If international courts could be interpreted as having a constitutional function for the 
domestic legal orders, it would be possible not only to justify their de-coupling from 
                                                                
if you do not respect pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Hence a non-
democratic State could not participate in the ECHR: the protection of democracy goes hand in 
hand with the protection of fundamental rights and the need to protect the freedom, to 
protect the proper functioning of Parliament, which is central to democracy (as always said in 
the Court's case-law), it is certainly a requirement that is deserving of protection and so that's 
certainly balanced with the protection of human rights. 
Address [made in Italian] by G. Raimondi, ‘Allocuzione del presidente Raimondi alla presentazione 
dello Scudo in Ara Coeli’ (January, 2016) DPERonline n. 1/2016 Issn 2421 0528, pages 2 and 3 available 
at 
<https://www.academia.edu/22369691/Allocuzione_del_presidente_Raimondi_alla_presentazione_
dello_Scudo_in_Ara_Coeli> accessed 19 November 2016. 
244 Council of Europe 1975, I/120, extracted from A. Moravesik (n 231) 238. 
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an effective legislature. Such an understanding would also legitimise a creative and 
expansive interpretation of the legal foundations. 245 
Federalism would, however, require a strong central institutional autonomy that is lacking in 
the ECHR system.  As Capps argues, such strong autonomy may be achieved only through 'the 
establishment of the legislative, executive and adjudicative institutions associated with the 
sovereign state'.246 Under the ECHR these powers still lie within the democratic states, with 
no comparable separate Convention site of representation for citizens.247 As Collins explains, 
international law should not be defended as an, ‘autonomous system of rules capable of 
cohesively regulating international relations and pre-empting the political freedom of states’. 
This is not, however, necessarily a criticism or a suggestion of an institutional problem on the 
part of the ECtHR. Collins continues: 
[M]y aim in engaging with the structural peculiarities of a decentralised legal order is, 
ultimately, to argue that that this condition should not be thought of as a “problem” 
at all […] In fact, I will argue that the view that international law is somehow 
“constitutionally” deficient arises only because of the rather incoherent and 
unrealistic expectations we have of the international legal order.248 
                                                                
245 A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke. In Whose Name: A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication 
(Oxford University Press: 2014) 128. 
246 P. Capps, “Autonomy in Kant's Philosophy of International Law” in T. Collins and N. White (eds.), 
International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the International 
Legal Order (Routledge: 2011) 50. 
247 In contrast to the EU, which has a more federal structure. Notably, even the EU is subject to limits 
given the criticisms of its democratic deficit. This is despite continuing attempts to resolve those issues 
with an elaborate political system, providing the EU with a degree of its own democratic legitimacy. 
See for example, B. Rittberger, "Institutionalizing Representative Democracy in the European Union: 
The Case of the European Parliament" (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 18, S. Hobolt, 
"Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union" (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 88, and R. Kelemen "Eurolegalism and Democracy" (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 55. 
Despite the complex intuitional structure of the EU now including an elected parliament and its 
authority to create directly effective laws applied in a wide range of everyday situations, even it failed 
to claim itself as a "constitution" with effective control above its EU Member States given that those 
states still retain too much power. The issues are considered in M. Rosenfeld, "The European Treaty-
Constitution and Constitutional Identify: A View from America" (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 316. Given the more limited machinery and agreed areas for cooperation under 
the ECHR are perhaps even greater in relation to the ECtHR. 
248  R. Collins, The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law (Hart: 2016) 4. Collins also 
identifies that some of the same problems exist at national system. Therefore, the issues with the legal 
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In a review of the evolution of the ECHR regime and the relative positions and status of the 
ECtHR and national courts, Krisch concludes: 
While domestic and European human rights law have indeed become increasingly 
linked and Strasbourg decisions are regularly followed by national courts, this does 
not indicate the emergence of a unified, hierarchical system along constitutionalist 
lines. Instead, [...] domestic courts insist on the ultimate supremacy of their own legal 
order over European human rights law, and they have thus created a zone of 
discretion in deciding whether or not to respect a judgment of the ECtHR, allowing 
them to negotiate with Strasbourg on issues they feel particularly strongly about.249 
The underlying assumption of the ECHR undoubtedly supports a move towards greater 
constitutionalism at international level. But we have not yet seen sufficient progress towards 
constructing a European mechanism independently capable of giving such a project 
normative coherence. Whilst the ECHR system may be seen as a first step, there is not yet the 
structure or the support for a centrally driven process for constructing norms under the rights. 
It remains for state governments to determine public goods, forming the basis for an 
understanding of what public purpose national legislation or international cooperation is 
fulfilling. 
The Council of Europe incorporates the ECtHR, the Committee of Ministers and the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe but, as a whole, they are not sufficient to 
create the unity of a federal Europe or a public sphere capable of delivering the type of public 
deliberation necessary to provide it with independent democratic legitimacy 
The Committee of Ministers comprises the Foreign Ministers from the member states, or their 
deputies. The Committee meets at ministerial level once a year and at deputies' level 
(Permanent Representatives to the Council of Europe) weekly. It is a collective forum, where 
European-wide responses to problems facing society are formulated. The Committee’s 
decisions are embodied in European conventions and agreements, which are legally binding 
on states that ratify them or reach governments in the form of (non-binding) 
                                                                
system that is the ECHR do not mean that it may not, as with national legal system, still have the 
qualities necessary to operate. 
249 N. Krisch, “Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law” (2008) 71(2) Modern Law Review 
183, 215. 
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recommendations on matters for which the Committee has agreed "a common policy". The 
Committee is essential to coordination and building consensus amongst member states. In 
this sense it clearly has a political remit. However, we should not confuse political influence 
with the kind of legislative power that we expect of directly elected national government or 
even the more powerful international authorities, for example, EU institutions such as the 
Council of the European Union. The latter has the authority to pass binding secondary law, 
whereas the decisions of the Committee are binding only so far as they are adopted (or not) 
by the member states.250 
The Parliament comprises 324 representatives from the member state national parliaments 
and is again political in nature. It meets four times a year but again, unlike national 
parliaments or the EU European Parliament, it cannot pass binding law. 
The ECtHR, like other international bodies, is ‘open to criticisms with regards to constitutive 
normative categories such as “representation” and “legitimacy” but only should it attempt to 
claim a political role.251 The implications of this require acceptance of the limits upon the 
ECtHR. First, to understand the significance of the behaviour of a particular community 
                                                                
250 The ministers have the authority to commit their governments to the actions agreed on in the 
meetings. 
On this point, see the speech of Lord Hoffmann: 
The fact that the 10 original Member States of the Council of Europe subscribed to a statement 
of human rights in the same terms did not mean that they had agreed to uniformity of the 
application of those abstract rights in each of their countries, still less in the 47 states which 
now belong. The situation is quite different from that of the European Economic Community, 
in which the Member States agreed that it was in their economic interest to have uniform 
laws on particular matters which were specified as being within European competence. On 
such matters, the European institutions, including the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, were 
given a mandate to unify the laws of Europe. The Strasbourg court, on the other hand, has no 
mandate to unify the laws of Europe on the many subjects which may arguably touch upon 
human rights […] The proposition that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ is the banner 
under which the Strasbourg court has assumed power to legislate what they consider to be 
required by European public order. 
Hoffmann, Lord, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ (Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, 19 March 
2009) <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Universality_of_Human_Rights.pdf
> accessed 16 December 2017. 
251 Weber, M. (2004), “The Critical Social Theory of the Frankfurt School and the “Social Turn” in IR” 
(2004) 31(1) Review of International Studies 195, 205. 
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requires an appreciation of the local factors that influence it. These factors are something 
that a body external to that community may not fully appreciate. Second, ECtHR judges are 
simply not representative of the way in which law operates in practice in different societies 
and or of the views emerging from those who participate in and are impacted by decisions. 
They have a limited worldview. Third, the judges in the ECtHR are not afforded a 
democratically legitimate voice on through direct election and accountability. They must rely 
on evidence of understandings of the normative scope of rights from the practices of the 
better placed national governments, that have more direct knowledge, direct authority to 
represent, and more local accountability. For the same reasons, they must also normally 
presume that in applying those principles state government is better placed. 
Under the ECHR agreement as it stands, states remain best placed in being answerable to a 
comparatively small grouping of affiliated individuals and so representative of particular 
needs. As Presser argues, the rule of law itself requires that:  
[A]ny compulsion in the society must not take place arbitrarily, but must be subject to 
some restraints. That restraint comes from “popular sovereignty” based on reliance 
that, the best way to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power is to disperse political 
power as widely as possible and to lodge ultimate sovereignty in the citizenry.252 
By accepting the primacy of the national political democratic process to select between 
potentially reasoned responses, the ECtHR itself gains democratic legitimacy. The ECtHR does 
not directly claim the role of a representative body but acts as the conduit through which 
democratically reached normative interpretations of the rights and applications of those 
norms are channelled. In this manner, it may find the “common” positions to translate into 
ECHR law. By being subject to the rules developed by member states in accordance with 
democracy, the ECtHR is indirectly made subject to the citizenry. It is the citizenry who provide 
legitimacy to states, recognising a moral imperative to cooperate in free and equal society, 
and states that provide legitimacy to international institutions furthering the public good as 
understood by the citizens following dialectic reasoning. 
                                                                
252 S. Presser, “Legal History or the History of Law: A Primer on Bringing the Law’s Past into the 
Present” (1982) 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 849, 853-854.  
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Bogdandy and Venske explain why this is not only the current position in many international 
agreements, but is also likely to continue: 
Early euro-federalists and champions of a global parliamentarism might entertain the 
hope that supranational parliaments could carry the essential burden of democratic 
legitimation, like federal parliaments. By now, however, the insight has prevailed that 
the democratic process organised in the domestic constitutional orders constitute an 
achievement whose quality is hardly reproducible beyond the State in the foreseeable 
future. The legitimisation of international public authority should thus pick up on 
existing domestic pathways of democratic legitimation and supplement them with 
proper mechanisms. For international courts this means an intrinsic dependence on 
State-generated legitimation, which may well guide their work of interpretation [...]253       
The core values of the ECHR support the national state as the level for the democratic process 
of moral construction. Subject to the criteria for reason under the PGC, the best means of 
developing new normative interpretations of the rights and securing their application is 
accepted by the ECHR itself as through national democratic governments. 254  The ECHR 
Preamble confirms this and under Article 1, it is for the member states to secure the rights 
within their jurisdiction. There is clearly no implication that the ECtHR has taken away that 
role by assuming any direct control over the protection of rights.  
What remains then is a form of weaker institutional autonomy as compared to federalism, 
based on an interstate system. Capps explains:  
[I]n its weak form, institutional autonomy can be disconnected from the institutional 
form which is the sovereign state. In its weak form states collectively undertake the 
                                                                
253 A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke (n 245) 146.  
254 There are, in fact, dangers of suggesting a legal order in constitutional terms as the basis for the 
ECHR rather than as a delegation by States. Lindseth comments that the widespread practice of 
considering the European legal order in constitutional terms entails a ‘category mistake’ because: 
[T]he legitimation of supranational regulatory power (its ‘mandate,’ so to speak) has never 
been successfully located supranationally […] Rather, it has been located, how ever tenuously, 
in the enabling treaties themselves, akin to enabling legislation on the national level, 
empowering the supranational exercise of regulatory discretion within the capacious limits 
defined by those treaties. (p. 19)  
The constitutional approach does not fit with the configuration of systems such as the EU, Lindseth 
claims, because it requires international institutions to claim a self-legitimating capacity which they 
never had.  
P. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (OUP:2010) 
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administrative functions of international legal order through an interstate system. It 
is more like a league or confederation than a federated state of peoples.255  
This is not to suggest that the member states should be seen as “organs” of the ECHR system, 
but rather that they have a powerful “authoritative” role guiding the ECtHR in interpreting 
and applying it.256 
4.3.2 Democracy Results in Common Developments 
While not federal, this does not undermine the importance of the move from a mere co-
existence of the states with informal and ad hoc consideration and comment on the actions 
of others, to a real partnership with an increasingly constitutional role.257 The elements for a 
supranational constitutional court are helpfully set out by Fabbrini and Maduro as including 
the following: (1) jurisdiction beyond inter-state disputes, with the court able to rule on 
proceedings directly brought by individuals or upon request by another judicial body (usually 
a national court); (2) judicial powers analogous to those a national courts for example: to 
pronounce binding decisions (as opposed to recommendations), to review the lawfulness of 
legal measures for their conformity with the higher standards set by a treaty, to set aside non-
conforming legal measures or determine another court to do so or to adopt other effective 
remedies; (3) interpretation of the founding treaty as granting rights directly upon individuals; 
(4) development of a hermeneutic which is autonomous from international law recognising 
the founding document as an act of a new legal kind, endowed with interpretive rules of its 
own; and (5) a meaningful degree of effectiveness vis-à-vis the other institutional actors, with 
its decisions commanding respect.258 
                                                                
255 P. Capps (n 246) 50.  
256 T. Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (1982: Princeton University Press), cited in R. 
Collins, The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law (Hart: 2016) 11. 
257 For a discussion on the distinction between coexistence and cooperation amid the move to a more 
communitarian model, see W. Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia 
University Press: 1964) 19. 
258 Fabbrini, F. and Maduro, M., ‘Supranational Constitutional Courts’ (21 June 2017) iCourts working 
paper series no. 98, pages 5-7 available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2990277_code2133408.pdf?abstractid=299027
7&mirid=1> accessed 26 January 2018. 
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The ECHR creates a new transnational community with rights that extend beyond national 
borders.259 The acceptance of these rights as individually centred and the effectiveness of 
ECtHR rulings means that this community is (at least) heading towards a constitutional 
arrangement. The level of consistent interpretation by national judges across member states 
and the disapplication of national law conflicting with ECHR provisions and the case law from 
the ECtHR is increasing.260 The member states have by legislation and through their case law 
voluntarily limited their sovereignty by subjecting themselves to an authority that is, at least 
in some respects, more akin to a supranational constitutional body than a traditional 
international one. 261  Returning once more to the ECHR Preamble, where the idea of a 
“common” understanding (as opposed to national) and enforcement has already been 
identified, the wording also confirms both the desirability and the feasibility of this: 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity 
between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued 
is the maintenance and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [...] 
Being resolved, as the Governments of European countries which are like-minded and 
have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to 
take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the 
Universal Declaration, possibility for formalised collective action is recognised in the 
signatory States [emphasis added]. 
                                                                
259 Even well-established democracies under an agreement motivated by republican liberalism are 
subject to the collective view. Moravesik provides an explanation based on securing peace:  
According to republican liberal theory, established democracies have an incentive to promote 
such [human rights] arrangements for others – which may involve some small risk of future 
pressure on established democracies to deepen their commitment – in order to bolster the 
“democratic peace” by fostering democracy in neighbouring countries.  
A. Moravesik (n 231) 229. 
260  See G. Martinico, “Is the European Convention Going to Be ‘Supreme’? A Comparative-
Constitutional Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts” 23 (1) European Journal of 
International Law 401. 
261  See for example L. Helfer and A. Slaughter, "Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication" (1997) 107(2) Yale Law Journal 273. The work argues that the effectiveness of the ECtHR 
is linked to its supranational jurisdiction to hear claims brought by private parties directly against 
governments or against other individuals. Such powers enable the ECtHR to: 
[P]enetrate the surface of the State, to forge direct relationships not only with individual 
citizens but also with distinct government institutions such as national courts. (at 288) 
Page 182 of 391 
 
The ECtHR's central role in achieving this is made explicit, being tasked with ensuring the 
observation of the rights as undertaken by the states (see Article 19) 262 and resolving disputes 
over the interpretation and implementation (see Article 32)263.  
State support and acceptance of these wider ECHR community constitutional type principles 
is also real. The work of Krisch comments that: 
[I]n spite of [the] divergence on fundamentals, the interplay between the different 
levels of law has been remarkably harmonious and stable. There have hardly been 
open clashes; instead mutual accommodation and convergence have been the norm 
[...]264  
While falling short of a federation, the ECHR is a community-oriented system and the ECtHR 
is able to shape and influence the freedom of the individual states based on their place in a 
wider ECHR community. 265  The ECtHR is therefore able to exercise public constitutional 
authority in relation to that collective community, with the capacity to, ‘impact other actors 
in their exercise of freedom’.266  It may therefore effectively challenge the views of individual 
states even if some members are not content with the particular outcome267, based on 
                                                                
262Article 19:  
To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human 
Rights, hereinafter referred to as “the Court”. It shall function on a permanent basis […] 
263 Article 32:  
 The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention [...]' 
264 N. Krisch (n 249) 215. 
265 It is notable that the delegation of authority to an international court is representative of a strong 
commitment to enhancing the credibility of the ECHR system. As Majone explains: 
[A]n Agent [the member states] bound to follow the directions of the delegating directions of 
the delegating political could not possibly enhance the commitment. 
G. Majone, “Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance” (2001) 2(1) 
European Union Politics 103, 110. 
266 Taken from A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke (n 245) 112. 
267 This advantages of looking beyond a merely instrumental justification to the effectiveness and 
stability of the agreement, are identified by Eriksen in relation to the European Union. If instrumental 
rationality is used to assess the performance of an organisation: 
Action is conceived of as motivated by preferences and anticipation of consequences… 
However, functional interdependence and interest accommodation are inherently unstable, 
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collective commonly constructed interpretations of the normative scope of the rights, and 
acceptable responses in the application of them. Craven explains that human rights treaties 
may be viewed as creating regimes:  
[E]mbodying certain collective values [...] which both define and transcend individual 
states' legal interests. Since the treaty, according to this view, is the product of 
coordinated action by states acting in concert, the substantive values and protected 
legal interests embodied also partake of this character. In ratifying the treaty [...] 
states assume obligations not in relation to each other state ut singuli, but to all other 
participating states as a collective [...] Individual state interests, in other words, are 
entirely bounded by (and constituted within) the interests of the regime as a whole, 
and exist only insofar as they correspond with that of the collective. 
Given the emphasis [...] upon the nature of the regime as the source of legal interests, 
it would seem to follow that [...] it is the regime's institutions that must play the 
dominant role in determining the treaty's application and effect. The effect of 
reservations or the question of compliance [...] can only be determined by the 
centralised institutions that are constitutive of the regime, and are not matters on 
which individual states may (legally speaking) take a different view.268 
However, national democracy remains the system trusted to consistently deliver morally 
reasoned responses under republican liberalism. It is, therefore, expected that individual 
states with their own constitutions would require clear evidence of a collectively understood 
norm under a right before it could form part of the ECHR “constitution” of principles.  
 
 
 
                                                                
as actors will opt out of cooperation whenever they are faced with a better option. Interests 
make parties friends one day and enemies the next (Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 
(Free Press: 1964) 204). Therefore, a political order cannot be reduced to the pursuit of self-
interest or to the requirements of functional adaptation. Interests generate unstable 
equilibria (Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books: 1984)). Hence a common 
identity and common norms and values are required to motivate collective action.  
E. Eriksen and J. Fossum, “Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed” (2004) 
25(4) International Political Science Review 435, 440. 
268 M. Craven, "Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International Law" 
(2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 489, 516. 
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Fig. 4.1 State Constitutions and the ECHR System 
As will be explored in more detail in the following section, there is nothing morally wrong with 
agents paying special attention to their state. The state: (1) represents a point at which 
progress can be achieved on justified moral norms; and (2) even in a globalised world, 
differences in the understanding of constructed principles of general application will emerge 
from the differences in character from one state to another. Keller comments: 
Standards of justice arise from within particular communities, we might say, so there 
is nothing arbitrary or morally obnoxious about the citizen’s paying special attention 
to the community in which her own sense of justice and her own moral identity are 
grounded – where that community receives its political expression through a state.269 
However, it is no longer the case that the state remains, for a good citizen270, the only source 
of a deep moral identity. There is now a more outward looking, sharing of concerns across 
                                                                
269 S. Keller, “Civic Motivation and Globalization: What is it Like to be a Good Citizen Today?” in D. 
Thunder, The Ethics of Citizenship in the 21st Century” (Springer: 2017) 29, 30. 
270 S. Keller explains: 
To the extent to which a person’s beliefs are false and her deliberations misguided, she fails 
to perform well the characteristically human activities of forming beliefs and values and 
making decisions. Beginning from the question of what it takes for an individual human to 
flourish in her role as citizen, then, there is an intrinsic reason, not just an instrumental reason, 
to want her beliefs, values, and motives to be correct, or appropriate, or right-minded. 
ibid 33. 
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the world which must lead to faster sharing of views. In relation to the ECHR, once national 
norms reach the point of being common in Europe, so not essentially those of citizens of 
particular states, their application rightly becomes a supranational concern. 
4.3.3 Subsidiarity Requiring Evidence of Commonality  
The ECHR regime must be seen as a community operating alongside and not as a replacement 
to the member states. 271  It is therefore imperative that the ECtHR be legitimised and 
controlled when it intervenes in democratic choices, claiming the collective regime requires 
a different outcome. As Chandler notes:  
What was lost in the promulgation of human rights theory in the 1990s was the 
connection between rights and subjects that can exercise those rights, which was at 
the core of political accountability and democracy. Once the historical and logical link 
between rights and subjects of these rights is broken, then democracy becomes a 
meaningless concept. The epistemological premise of democracy is that there are no 
final truths about what is good for society that can be established through the powers 
of revelation or special knowledge. If we accept that people are the best judges of their 
own interests, then only self-determination can be the basis for collective self-
government. Democracy therefore is only a means to an end, to the realisation of the 
public good, because it allows people to define what that good is as well as to control 
the process by which it is realised [emphasis added].272  
This idea of self-determination is central to a liberal society which must protect individual free 
choice. However, the realisation of that free choice requires a type of public reason tied in 
with forces such as social convention and biology and with the content of social structures 
such as family and politics. Public reasoning is just as much a crucial part of a liberal 
democracy as is liberty and is essential to self-authorship by free agents. Brunder explains: 
                                                                
271 Capps explains the argument in relation to international institutions: 
I claim that international legal order can be, in part, achieved by states adopting a dual role as 
subjects and organs of the international legal order. Thus, an international legal order can be 
largely instituted on the basis of an interstate system. This system must, however, be founded 
on a set of constitutional norms which determine when the state acts as subject, or as organ, 
of the international legal order. 
P. Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart Publishing: 2009) 6. 
272 D. Chandler, "Universal Ethics and Elite Politics: The Limits of Normative Human Rights Theory" 
(2001) 5(4) The International Journal of Human Rights 72, 86. 
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One is free […] when one realizes one’s capacity for self-authorship, not by recoiling 
from one’s vulnerability to heteronomy, but by acknowledging the goodness of 
already existing social structures – for example, the family, cultures, collegial 
associations, and the political community – that in turn validate the worth of the self-
actuating self […] On the one hand, the self is heteronomous, because it depends for 
its worth on being a valued actualizer and perpetuator of an objectively existing social 
unit; yet on the other, heteronomy is reconciled to self-authorship, because the 
structures acknowledged as valuable reciprocally value the self-authoring self through 
whose conscientious endorsement their life is vibrantly reproduced and confirmed as 
good.273 
Self-authoring agents must be free to choose their stance towards the public good life and to 
influence the direction in which it continues to develop. The result is differing outcomes from 
those choices and different stances between societies towards the meaning of the public 
good. As Taylor explains:  
[A society] cannot hold together simply by the satisfaction of its members’ needs and 
interests. It also requires a common, or at least widespread set of beliefs which link its 
structures and practices with what its members see as ultimately significant.274  
Or in the words of English:  
[T]he civic nation is based on reasoned principles, not blood […] critical to this vision, 
is an understanding that adherence to principles of justice is cemented through shared 
sentiments, educational formation, and a broader political culture.275  
Fig 2.11 from Chapter Two can be updated thus: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
273 A. Brunder, Constitutional Goods (Oxford University Press: 2004) 30-31. 
274 C. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge University Press: 1975) 459. 
275W. English, “Varieties of Citizenship and the Moral Foundations of Politics” in D. Thunder, The Ethics 
of Citizenship in the 21st Century” (Springer: 2017) 13, 17. 
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Fig. 4.2 Norms of Consistent Importance to Anyone’s Ends in a Democratic Society 
Subsidiarity provides a means of reconciling the universalistic claims of the ECHR versus the 
often-pluralistic norms self-determining agents reasonably construct within a particular 
society.  It is not a sign of weakness in the ECHR system, but rather a positive means of placing 
responsibility with the democratic national authorities while enabling cooperation, assistance 
and intervention where necessary: 
[S]ubsidiarity can be understood to be a conceptual alternative to that comparatively 
empty and unhelpful idea of state sovereignty. The principle of subsidiarity provides 
an analytically descriptive way to make sense of a variety of disparate features of the 
existing structure of international human rights law, from the interpretive discretion 
accorded to states, to the relationship of regional and universal systems, while also 
justifying the necessity of international cooperation, assistance and intervention. In 
fact, subsidiarity fits international human rights law so well that the basic values of the 
principle can be regarded as already implicitly present in the structure of international 
human rights. If that is correct, then it is not surprising to find in the development of 
human rights law that other doctrines and ideas have arisen that function at least in 
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part as analogues to subsidiarity in addressing the pervasive dialectic between 
universal human rights norms and legitimate claims to pluralism.276 
In relation to the risks of an overzealous intervention by international bodies such as the 
ECtHR, the difficulties are apparent in the explanation of Bogdandy and Venzke: 
If public law, in accordance with the liberal-democratic tradition, is understood as a 
system that protects individual freedom and makes collective self-determination 
possible, every act with repercussions for these normative principles must come under 
scrutiny to the extent that these repercussions are significant enough to raise justified 
doubts about the legitimacy of an act.277 
The principle of subsidiarity resonates with the individualistic liberal tone and the ECHR's 
stated aim to protect fundamental freedoms278, by means of encouraging free and equal 
choice between people to reach a compromise through democracy.279 This is also in keeping 
                                                                
276 P. Carozza, "Subsidiary as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law" (2003) 97(1) 
American Journal of International Law 38, 40. 
277 A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke (n 245) 17-18. 
278 Note that the principle of subsidiarity was re-endorsed by all of the member states in the Brighton 
Declaration, with a call for it to be expressly incorporated into the Treaty. Protocol 15 has done so, 
with both it and the margin of appreciation now included. At the end of the ECHR Preamble, a new 
recital reads:  
Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention 
and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject 
to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this 
Convention. 
279 The starting point is the ECHR's preference for an individualistic view of rights. It is the support of 
equal liberty (equality of choice and opportunity) and not equality itself which forms the basic core 
value. This creates a presumption of an underlying freedom to promote one's own self-interests, hold 
individual views, participate in activities that give personal enjoyment, secure an unequal share of 
resources, and to enjoy free choice in whether and how to interact with others. 
However, part of valuable choice making involves interaction with others whether by design or 
necessity. According to Ringen: 
Reason is a social competence: I’ll be reasonable if you are. What enables me to be reasonable 
is trust that you will be reasonable in return. There is not much use in preaching to individuals 
about being reasonable in all things unless they live in an environment in which reason 
reasonably prevails. But reason is not only a social competence. It is also a competence in the 
individual. For a social environment to be created in which reason prevails, the individuals 
who make up that environment must be capable of and inclined to reason. That’s not enough 
for a culture of reason to emerge and persist; for that to happen individual inclinations must 
come together and be institutionalized so that each of us is able to live as we preach. But it is 
still necessary that individuals enter the social game with a willingness to reason. No 
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with the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), valuing freedom, equality and evaluative 
judgements on the part of empowered agents.  
Subsidiarity recognises that the best means of finding an appropriate balance is to enable 
decisions at the most local source of the issue. Higher intervention is called for only as and 
when necessary, for example, when there is local support for being held to the same common 
human rights standards as practiced in other similar states. Carozza explains how such limits 
must be justified:  
It [subsidiarity] envisages that just as the individual realises his fulfilment in a 
community with others, so do smaller communities realise their purpose in 
interactions with other groups [...] And, in turn, the "higher" groupings exist not just 
for their own sake but to assist the smaller, more limited associations in realising their 
tasks [...] The various human associations that constitute society (to the extent that 
they are healthy and functioning properly) are seen to fit together organically. In one 
direction, each larger grouping is understood to serve the smaller, and all in the end 
or understood to serve individual dignity; in the other direction, not only the 
individual, but also each level of human association is understood to be linked, by its 
very structure and purpose, to a "higher" one.280  
The nation state represents a point of collective self-determination before the ECHR system. 
These localised decisions on norms and their application are within the more contained, 
identifiable constitutional principles and public goods, culture and economic interests of a 
particular nation.  Exposure to these parts forming a particular democratic infrastructure is 
essential to representativeness of its citizens. Governments held accountable through 
election, and national court rulings are more open to genuine and realistic challenge by those 
elected representatives. As Brunder explains: 
The compatibility of political judgment with rule of Law implies that an elector may 
now be represented by a deputy in whom the elector sees a background and 
experience similar to his in own and in whose judgment the subject reveals his 
confidence by voting for him. Indeed, under certain social conditions, he me be 
adequately represented by a deputy for whom he did not vote […] and, carrying the 
same logic further, by a majority of those voting in an assembly even if his own deputy 
                                                                
convention can become institutionalized unless people bring with them those attitudes and 
beliefs that are the building blocks of conventions. 
Ringen, S., What Democracy is For: On Freedom and Moral Government (Princeton University Press: 
2007) 213. 
280 P. Carozza (n 276) 43. 
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voted with the minority […] [I]f the community is more or less homogeneous in culture 
and economic interest, then one can see oneself “virtually” represented in outlook 
and interests by like-minded deputies even if one has not personally helped to elect 
them, even if they are not one’s own deputies.281 
Unless the role of the democratic sovereign state is to be abandoned in favour of a more 
appropriate/effective international approach to liberal self-determination by agents, care 
must be taken not to unjustifiably undermine it. As this chapter has argued, the stage of such 
a comprehensive international system has not been reached yet. Bull raises the concern that: 
Carried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under 
international law is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be 
organised as a society of sovereign states. For, if the rights of each man can be 
asserted on the world political stage over and against the claims of his state, and his 
duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as a servant or a citizen of that state, 
then the position of the state as a body sovereign over its citizens, and entitled to 
demand their obedience, has been subject to challenge, and the structure of the 
society of sovereign states has been placed in jeopardy. The way is left open for the 
subversion of the society of sovereign states on behalf of the alternative organising 
principle of a cosmopolitan community.282 
The authority of the organs of the nation state should not therefore be unnecessarily 
undermined and caution should be exercised in the question of any use of judicial 
authority.283 This is not an attempt to de-legitimise the Council of Europe or the ECtHR’s 
                                                                
281 A. Brunder (n 273) 398-399. 
282 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Columbia University Press: 1997) 
146. 
283 Recognition of need for citizens to participate in shaping their local environment is recognised 
under the ECHR system in, for example, agreements relating to local government: 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its 
members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are 
their common heritage; 
Considering that one of the methods by which this aim is to be achieved is through 
agreements in the administrative field; 
Considering that the local authorities are one of the main foundations of any democratic 
regime; 
Considering that the right of citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs is one of the 
democratic principles that are shared by all member States of the Council of Europe; 
Considering that it is at local level that this right can be most directly exercised; 
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power of adjudication, but rather to recognise that its authority and autonomy has limits and 
that where there are doubts that the Court has been given the power to act, resolution should 
always be in favour of the state.  
4.4 Broad Consequences for the ECtHR 
The primacy of democracy under republican liberalism and the principle of subsidiarity, 
recognises the first place of authority in settling human rights as sovereign nation states. The 
dangers of an international court being too proactive, without a democratic mandate, are 
identified by Fonte:  
There is nothing particularly “universal” about the agenda of much of what passes for 
the “international community”. On the contrary, their agenda (on group rights, new 
definitions of “human rights”, limiting democratic sovereignty, abolishing the death 
penalty, and so on) is, for the most part, simply the views of “progressive” 
transnational elites. These are rarely the views of democratic majorities in democratic 
nations [...] This is not to imply that raw majoritarianism within a nation-state is the 
ultimate moral position. But [...] democratic procedures within democratic nation-
states are more effective, more comprehensive, and above all more just way of 
deciding what are universal human values.284 
States are the sole embodiment of the operation of the democratic process under the ECHR 
system; the ECtHR representing only a safeguard. What the ECtHR can offer is: (1) an 
authoritative system for settling the collective community minimum normative interpretation 
of the scope of rights; and then (2) a process of review for ensuring due democratic 
                                                                
Convinced that the existence of local authorities with real responsibilities can provide an 
administration which is both effective and close to the citizen; 
Aware that the safeguarding and reinforcement of local self-government in the different 
European countries is an important contribution to the construction of a Europe based on the 
principles of democracy and the decentralisation of power; 
Asserting that this entails the existence of local authorities endowed with democratically 
constituted decision-making bodies and possessing a wide degree of autonomy with regard 
to their responsibilities, the ways and means by which those responsibilities are exercised and 
the resources required for their fulfilment,  
Council of Europe, European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985) CETS122 available at 
<https://rm.coe.int/168007a088> accessed 9 May 2018. 
284 J. Fonte, “Democracy’s Trojan Horse, The National Interest (2004) 76,117 cited in N. Gvosdev, 
“Communitarian Realism” (2005) 48 American Behavioural Scientist (2005) 1591, 1596. 
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consideration in the application and a response that is in line with collective expectations for 
the standard of substantive delivery.  
In settling those points and applying them, republican liberalism gives the ECtHR a more 
“constitutional” oversight role. While under an idealist system there may be a strong 
suggestion of the delivery of individual justice being a primary objective, republican liberalism 
does not require the ECtHR to settle the application of every case that comes before it. It 
relies instead upon the national courts to do so, acting as an overseer only and then only 
where a sufficiently important collective community public law point is raised. The work has 
reasoned that in its constitutional type role, the ECtHR falls short of a federal system.  So, in 
addition to not being mandated to be the deliverer of justice in all cases, when it comes to 
determining what the community constitution requires, it is acceptable for it to have “gaps” 
in declining to select between candidate interpretations and standards for application.285 
Where such gaps exist, there is as yet no community response overriding the more local 
system and the national constitution and legal system should thus apply to resolve the issues 
rather than remain beyond the community standardised position. 
Several provisions of the ECHR indicate that the ECtHR is subsidiary to the national system, 
with its role one of review rather than a court of “fourth instance”.286 ECHR Articles 1 and 13 
place the primary authority for securing the rights with national authorities, who also have 
the obligation to make effective remedies available. Applicants are required by Article 35 to 
exhaust domestic enforcement procedures before petitioning the ECtHR.287  
                                                                
285 In contrast to an international treaty requiring a higher degree of detail and certainty, such as one 
relating to trade, banking or the environment. 
286H. Petzold, “The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity” in R. Macdonald, F Matscher. and H. 
Petzold (eds.) The European System of the Protection of Human Rights (M. Nijhoff Publishers: 1993) 
41-62. 
287 ECHR Article 1: 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention. 
ECHR Article 13: 
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This differs from the role that a national court plays in dealing with day-to-day cases based 
on national norms. The national court is the only means of settling the dispute at hand and is 
integrated into a comprehensive legal and political system for that state.288 An international 
court is concerned with situations only to the extent of some degree of agreement beyond 
the national level.   
4.5 Subsequent Agreements 
It is worth noting at this point any evidence of a possible change in the underlying object and 
purpose of the ECHR since its beginning. Given subsequent events could raises the question 
of whether there has been an alteration in the understanding of the old and new membership 
since the original negotiation. 
Major changes to how an agreement operate are reserved for contracting states to accept. 
For example, the ECHR initially made the right of individual petition entirely optional for 
member states and this was altered by Protocol 11 289 , which came into effect in 1998.  
                                                                
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority, notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
ECHR Article 35 (1): 
The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, 
according to the generally recognized rule of international law, and within a period of six 
months from the date on which the final decision was taken [four months once Protocol 15 is 
ratified by all Contracting States]. 
Note also the European Programme for Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals (HELP). The 
programme supports the Council of Europe member states in implementing the ECHR at the national 
level, in accordance with the Committee of Ministers Recommendation (2004) 4, the 2010 Interlaken 
Declaration, the 2012 Brighton Declaration and the 2015 Brussels declaration. This is done by 
enhancing the capacity of national judges, lawyers and prosecutors in all to apply the ECHR in their 
daily work. For more information, see <https://www.coe.int/en/web/help/home> accessed 12 May 
2018. 
288 Any national court decisions on what a constitutional principle requires may also later be subjected 
to wider challenge and possible reversal by higher courts or the legislature, as opposed to representing 
the more “definitive” findings of the ECtHR under the ECHR. 
289 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
restructuring the control machinery established thereby. 
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Another example relates to restricting that right to significant cases, accepted through signing 
Protocol 14.290   
Given that these system changes required express re-negotiation and agreement, what then 
of the even more problematic determination that the core object and purpose has altered. 
Claiming that the original negotiated remit of an organisation has grown without an express 
re-consultation of states would seem unsupportable without strong evidence.291     
It could be argued that mandating the right of individual petition represented such an express 
agreement that could have the potential change the underlying nature of the ECHR. This work 
has suggested that, initially at least, the ECHR was concerned more with constitutional justice 
than with individual justice. If Protocol 11 necessarily changed that position, then arguably 
there would need to be a revaluation of the direction of the ECHR. But the text of the Protocol 
does not clearly alter the nature of the ECHR292. This work suggests that it can be read instead 
as a means to improve its effectiveness, with the signatory states having agreed to it in:  
                                                                
290 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
amending the control system of the Convention. 
291 For agreements where the common objectives do regularly change, it is notable that new treaties 
are a common feature. A good example of this is found in the many manifestations of the European 
Union since its first inception going back to the 1957 Treaty of Rome.) A change to the form of 
enforcement does not necessarily alter the actual substance of the undertaking. See A. Guzman, How 
International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press, 2008) 131.     
292 This is a view endorsed as reasonable by Andrew Drzemczewski, the Head of the Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights Department of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe:  
The first general observation is that the title of Protocol No.11 referred to the “restructuring 
of the control machinery” of the Convention. Thus, the structural changes made, although 
profound, did not tamper with any of the rights already guaranteed in the body of the 
Convention or its protocols.” 
He went on to stress that there was no change in the power balance between the member states and 
the ECtHR: 
The rights and freedoms found in the ECHR and its protocols should first and foremost be 
firmly anchored in domestic law; Strasbourg should play merely a subsidiary role […] Any 
amelioration of the Strasbourg control mechanism – and irrespectively of how efficiently it 
operates – will not in itself ensure real and effective protection of human rights within States 
Parties to the ECHR. Therefore, the success of the Strasbourg system is contingent on 
adequate human rights protection in member States (thereby short-circuiting or even totally 
eradicating the need to go to Strasbourg) [...] 
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Considering the urgent need to restructure the control machinery established by the 
Convention in order to maintain and improve the efficiency of its protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, mainly in view of the increase in the number of 
applications and the growing membership of the Council of Europe [...] [emphasis 
added] 293 
Protocol 14 also arguably reaffirms the view that the focus is not on individual but rather 
constitutional justice. It seeks to filter out cases with less chance of succeeding, those that 
are similar to cases brought previously against the same member state, and those in which 
the applicant has not suffered a "significant disadvantage". The text confirms that it is not the 
objective or the nature of the whole ECHR which has changed, but rather a practical 
recognition that the system for delivery of those purposes is not effective. Signatories agree 
to it in:  
Considering the urgent need to amend certain provisions of the Convention in order 
to maintain and improve the efficiency of the control system for the long term, mainly 
in the light of the continuing increase in the workload of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe; Considering, in 
particular, the need to ensure that the Court can continue to play its pre-eminent role 
in protecting human rights in Europe [...] [emphasis added]294 
Protocol 16 goes further in supporting the view that under the ECHR the ECtHR is not 
principally tasked with the delivery of individual justice, but rather with securing that delivery 
by the member states. The Protocol will allow the highest courts and tribunals of a state to 
request the ECtHR to give advisory opinions on questions of principle relating to the 
interpretation or application of the rights, supporting the national judiciary as the chief 
providers of justice: 
1 Highest courts and tribunals of a High Contracting Party, as specified in accordance 
with Article 10, may request the Court to give advisory opinions on questions of 
principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms 
defined in the Convention or the protocols thereto.  
                                                                
A. Drzemczewski, The European Human Rights Convention: Protocol No. 11 Entry into Force and First 
Year of Application (Strasbourg: 16 November 1999) p. 356-358, available at 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/13600.pdf> accessed 8 January 2017. 
293 Preamble, Protocol 11, ECHR. 
294 Preamble, Protocol 14, ECHR. 
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2 The requesting court or tribunal may seek an advisory opinion only in the context of 
a case pending before it.  
3 The requesting court or tribunal shall give reasons for its request and shall provide 
the relevant legal and factual background of the pending case.295 
4.6 Analytical Framework for Court Authority and Autonomy 
Any judicial model for the ECtHR must be based upon a framework of principles that enable 
it to legitimately interpret the ECHR. The preceding work in this chapter reasons that the 
ECtHR arguably serves as only a functional regime between democratic nations. Its role is first 
identifying and then ensuring a proper national process of application of the collectively 
recognised interpretations of the normative scope of the rights.    
When developing an analytical framework for assessing the legitimacy of the ECtHR 
procedure based upon its institutional authority or autonomy, the following point must thus 
be kept in mind. The ECtHR depends upon the member states for the operation of democracy. 
It draws from democratic legitimacy for its own authority. Furthermore, it relies upon a level 
of uniformity in the recognition by democratic states of new normative duties under the 
scope of rights to demonstrate their commonality and shared standards for application. 
Without acceptable evidence of commonality, there is no justification for higher intervention 
in securing the protection of a collectively recognised ECHR principle. The ECtHR also relies 
upon commonality in the member states respecting certain international sources as evidence 
on understood principles of general application and of standards for best practice in their 
particular application. Some method is required to show consent by member states to these 
increasingly remote sources for guidance. 
At this point, it is important to note the concerns made by the member states, that the work 
has set out to address: 
                                                                
295 Article 1, Protocol 11, ECHR. 
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Fig. 1.4 [from Chapter One] Member State Concerns Taken from the Brighton Declaration 
If the ECtHR either: (1) interprets a common in abstracto norm as falling under a right before 
it has been recognised via the member states or; (2) intervenes in the in concreto application 
when due process was followed and the substantive decision is neither unreasoned nor 
outline with other similarly affected states, then the first and second concerns (unlimited 
growth and undermining democracy) may be valid. In terms of what is recognised as sufficient 
to show commonality between governments (at least for the purposes of the ECHR), the type 
and level of consent required must be settled.  
Even with evidence of a common new normative interpretation of a right, intervention into 
the decisions made by states about application of that norm may not always be desirable. 
The aim of the ECHR is to promote national democracy (underlining as opposed to 
undermining democracy) and the resolution of issues at the state level. Therefore, the ECtHR 
may be reserved in determining when it should become involved (seriousness of the breach). 
It will also need to provide a margin within which the democratic process can operate with a 
presumption that democratic choices are correct (hence avoiding undermining of democracy 
and respecting the principle of subsidiarity). 
At this point, it is possible to propose an analytical framework for assessing the legitimacy of 
the ECtHR procedure. The elements of the framework will form the points of reference for 
3. Lack of prioritisation of 
the more serious breaches. 
2. Undermining of the 
democratic process. 
1. Unlimited growth of the 
ECHR system, beyond its 
mission.
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developing the proposed improved judicial model and the deliverables against which its 
potential for success will be measured:
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Element Explanation Risk 
Transparency and consistency Clearly explained reasoning for judgments. 
 
Decision-making process with clearly defined 
stages for interpretation and application, always 
applied. 
Difficulty applying a decision outside of the 
specific facts of the case. 
 
Inconsistent development of law. 
 
Lack of clarity on what is required for a state to 
comply with its duty. 
 
Undermining of ECtHR accountability. 
 
Undermining of trust in the legitimacy of 
judgments. 
Directed/contained authority Acts as agent to secure the objects of its principals 
(the member states as representatives of 
citizens). 
Expansion beyond the goals/mission, slippage 
from securing government object and purpose, as 
represented by the signatory states. 
Current/informed Judgments need to keep pace with evolving 
understandings of the government purpose of the 
principals and to be informed by/harmonious 
with, wider international law. 
The ECHR ceases to be effective for agents and 
relevant internationally. 
Acknowledgement of subsidiarity and a margin 
of appreciation 
Local variation means that national democratic 
government choices are presumed to be correct. 
Unrealistic judgments. 
 
Judgments not in accordance with public values. 
 
Unimplemented judgments and loss of public 
investment – meaning the ECHR ceases to be 
effective. 
Limited to oversight  Not tasked with securing individual justice i.e. an 
appeal court. 
Excessive caseload, undermining local systems 
and overwhelming the ECtHR. 
 
Overly intensive review of state democratic 
decisions. 
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Acknowledgement of the democratic process The ECtHR is tasked with upholding and 
reinforcing democracy. 
 
Democratic decisions on interpretation of right 
are correct if they could accord with the PGC. 
 
Provided the democratic process is followed 
national decision-making on application should, 
prima facie, be upheld with a wide margin of 
appreciation. 
Undermining of the operation, relevance and 
faith in democracy as the best route to securing 
“human rights” and organising society. 
 
Undermining the very basis of the ECHR and the 
rights as listed in its text. 
Effectiveness Judgments upheld and decisions of the ECtHR 
influential in driving forward wider reform. 
Individuals do not secure an appropriate remedy 
and no systematic change. 
 
Decisions do not inform future law-making and 
public debate. 
 
Fig. 4.3 Analytical Framework for Assessing the Legitimacy of ECtHR Procedure 
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4.7 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The analytical framework has been developed in line with the object and purpose of the ECHR 
as a republican liberalist undertaking to better secure moral justified norms under the PGC 
within national democracies. It provides a means by which to develop and measure a 
legitimate approach to be adopted by the ECtHR in its judicial decision making. The elements 
included in the proposed framework address the three main concerns that have been raised 
by the member states in the Brighton Declaration: 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlimited 
growth of the 
ECHR system, 
beyond its 
mission
Directed/contained 
authority in line with 
consent and 
government object and 
purpose
Transparency and 
consistency in 
rulings
Aknowledgement 
of subsidiarity to 
national 
democratic 
government
Undermining of 
the democratic 
process
Aknowledgement of 
the democratic 
process 
constructing 
nomative 
interpretation
Aknowledgement of 
subsidiarity
Limited to oversight
Margin of 
appreciation with 
application in 
relation to 
application
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Fig. 4.4 Member State Concerns at the Heart of the Framework 
 
The concerns of the member states are thus at the heart of the elements captured by the 
analytical framework. The framework will be used to develop tenets that must underlie any 
structure for a legitimate judicial model by the ECtHR and the creation of a proposed 
corrective judicial model. These will be used to assess the current approach of the ECtHR to 
its rulings, to identify shortfalls, and to evaluate the theoretical impact, effectiveness and 
fairness of the proposed improved judicial model generated in Chapter Six. 
  
Lack of 
prioritisation of 
serious 
breaches
Limited to oversight, 
not focussed on 
individual justice
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5 Chapter Five 
 
Tenets for Building a Legitimate Judicial 
Model for the European Court of Human 
Rights 
 
An assessment of options for responding to the 
analytical framework for Court legitimacy 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The work has identified the need for the judicial process to respond to the concerns of 
member states: 
 
 
Fig. 1.4 [from Chapter One] Member State Concerns Taken from the Brighton Declaration 
In response to critical review and analysis of those concerns and identification of the 
reasonably inferable object and purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), as based upon republican liberalism, Chapter Four developed an analytical framework 
for assessing the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) procedure and 
for developing a proposed new corrective model. This comprised a number of principles: 
3. Lack of prioritisation of 
the more serious breaches. 
2. Undermining of the 
democratic process. 
1. Unlimited growth of the 
ECHR system, beyond its 
mission.
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Fig. 5.1 Elements from the Framework of Analysis for Assessing the Legitimacy of ECtHR 
Procedure 
This chapter represents phase five of the project, and explores and evaluates possible options 
for the development of a proposed corrective model in accordance with the elements of the 
framework to support legitimate and effective operation and evolution of the normative 
scope of the ECHR rights and the application of those principles of general application to 
particular circumstances.   
Earlier analysis has concluded that the ECtHR, as agent to its principals, must act within its 
mandate if it is to claim legitimacy. One response to the question of unlimited growth of the 
ECHR system and directed/contained authority, would be to limit protection to the normative 
interpretations of the scope of the rights and the standards for application envisaged by the 
founding member states at the time when the ECHR was first signed.  
Directed/contained 
authority
Current/informed 
decisions
Acknowledgement of 
subsidiarity (and a 
margin of appreciation)
Limited to oversight 
Acknowledgement of 
the democratic process
Transparency and 
consistency
Effectiveness
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However, it is suggested this would be too restrictive given the object and purpose of the 
ECHR and the need for it to remain current and informed. Nor is it in accordance with a 
progressive dialectical process of continuous reflection that moral social constructivism via 
the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and the operation of democracy would recognise.  
As such, this work must determine a reasonable approach for development in line with that 
object and purpose, while still acknowledging the relative legitimacy that comes from a 
democratic process and the principle of subsidiarity, recognising the role of the ECtHR is only 
oversight of more local systems. Here, it is useful to remind the reader of the two stages the 
work has reasoned as required in the ECtHR’s decision-making procedure; both require a 
transparent review by the Court in all cases and can now be further developed: 
 
Fig. 3.3 [from Chapter Three] The Two Stages in Resolving Human Rights Questions 
First, comes the in abstracto interpretation of the normative scope of the right at issue. This 
incorporates two steps: 
a) identification, via evidence of understandings from the democratic process of all 
member states, of the common norms recognised as falling under the scope of a right 
and any allowable reasons for restriction in particular circumstances, and  
b) definition of as a henceforth autonomous substantive legal principle of general 
application by the ECtHR, creating future consistency. 
The interpretation in abstracto of the 
normative scope of a right, the 
principles that all moral agents within a 
society agree (via their representatives)  
fall under its parameters.
The practical application of the 
principles of general application in 
concreto to specific individual cases and 
circumstances.
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Second, is the in concreto application of the principle of general application to particular 
circumstances. This incorporates two steps:  
a) review of the respondent state’s democratic decision-making process and use of 
relevant expert and factual evidence (overarching common democratic procedural 
standards of due process), and 
b) a ruling on the substantive validity of the state’s ultimate decision in relation to the 
particular case, while acknowledging the democratic process, subsidiarity and that the 
ECtHR is limited to oversight (noting particular common standards for the substantive 
application of the given norm in similarly affected states). 
The argument has been made that the first stage of interpretation is a generic question in 
abstracto, based on a democratic representation of the compromised dialectically 
“contingent” constructions of agents reasoning in accordance with the supreme principle of 
reason. It is that reasoning, in accordance with the PGC, which establishes the compromised 
version of principles a society agrees are of general application and form the underlying basis 
for justice and fairness. It is the task of authorities such as governments in states and 
international bodies to uphold these public goods, fulfilling a public or government purpose. 
For practical purposes, it is those principles constructed through democracy (unless immoral 
in that they could not have been generically reasoned 296 ) which represent the ongoing 
societal construction of the normative scope of rights under the PGC.  
This chapter will, after exploring other possibilities, consider consensus as the most 
appropriate tool for the ECtHR to adopt in determining that democratic agreement on norms 
within particular states has reached the stage of constructing a shared (rather than simply 
national) ECHR understanding between the contracting states. This common understanding 
must then inform the interpretation of a right by the ECtHR. This reinforces the democratic 
process but acknowledges that, while subsidiarity means norms presumably reflect only a 
particular nation, the ECHR agreement allows those principles which evolve consistently 
                                                                
296 Those which are not objectively reasoned but arbitrary, appealing to an alien authority or not 
possible for others. Note, however, as explored in Chapter Two that choices which can reasoned as 
such are rare and represent the more extreme views at either end of the political spectrum. 
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across a representative majority of member states to hold the status of universality between 
ECHR members.    
For the second stage of application of the principles of general application to particular 
circumstances in concreto, it is suggested that the choices of a democracy are more readily 
challenged. While the democratic process remains key, it cannot operate alone (in isolation) 
without reliance on expertise. While in some ideal world a society could aspire to the generic 
reasoning of as many agents as possible in identifying how to apply principles in each 
particular case, the reality is that particular skills and knowledge are needed at this point. 
Expertise relates not only to knowledge, but also the capacity to ensure that knowledge is 
applied properly. Not all agents have the aptitude, experience and training required for this 
level of detailed non-universalized reasoning.  
There is also the need to for effective supervision in the second stage, to guard against the 
unfortunate reality that when it comes to the application of generic moral norms to the 
specific, this is the point at which the process of popular democracy poses the greater risk of 
agents either consciously (selfishness) or unconsciously (active prejudice against the 
particular inherent traits of others or simply being unable to identify with them) acting against 
the PGC. Not all agents have the degree of independence necessary to guard against 
inappropriate choices. 
While it is primarily the role of the democratic representative to ensure that they act in the 
best interests of all, are informed by empirical reality and by current expert evidence, and 
have the skills to apply a due democratic review, they may not in practice always do so. They 
too may be affected by the same problems as their citizens and may bow to inappropriate 
choices based on popularism. Agents will find it more difficult to hold them to account given 
a lack of knowledge, interest and possible bias. Independent judicial oversight, as part of the 
principle of separation of powers, is thus critical in the second stage.  
For these reasons, the work determines that to show compliant application of principles in 
concreto, the choices of the democratic representatives in the member states must be 
reached by following due democratic process and also be demonstrably informed and limited 
by relevant factual evidence (of the case and wider social background) and by nationally or 
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internationally recognized expert opinion.  The ECtHR, therefore, has a vital oversight role 
under this second stage in accordance with the common overarching standards for 
democratic decision making.  
The work forms the view that legality of actions in the second in concreto stage of application 
requires the member state only to adequately carry out the function of democracy. A failure 
to follow due procedure is argued to be a breach by the respondent state in its own right and 
must mean that the substantive conclusion is unsustainable. Provided, however, that a state 
has followed the requirements and thereby worked within its procedural duty, its response is 
strongly presumed to be substantively correct. Substantive challenge would then be possible 
only if the state decision was not one a reasonable person would reach after weighing the 
available factual and expert evidence. 297  This could be the result of the state failing to 
manifest a norm with effective protection or, where an interference is necessary, responding 
disproportionality in limiting that protection as evidenced by conflicting consensus in expert 
evidence or in the common particular standards for substantively applying a right between 
similarly affected states.  
Most of the time, given that republican liberalism supports national democratic systems as 
the best means to secure the rights, there will be no issue for the ECtHR to become involved 
in and on the occasional instances when it is called to, it will often rule in the member states 
favour.298 Recognition of this is not, as Spielmann has aptly put it, the ECtHR "simply waiving 
                                                                
297 The reasonable person who would come to a decision, as opposed to a higher threshold such as 
Wednesbury unreasonableness, is in accordance with the progressive ambitions of the ECHR project 
under a republican liberalism understanding. Unreason was famously explained by Lord Greene MR: 
It is true to say that, if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable 
authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere. That, I think, is quite right; 
but to prove a case of that kind would require something overwhelming, and, in this case, the 
facts do not come anywhere near anything of that kind [emphasis added].  
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, 230. 
298 In 2015, approximately 400 applications were declared inadmissible or struck out of the list by 
Chambers, and some 6,400 by Committees. In addition, single judges declared inadmissible or struck 
out some 36,300 applications. ‘European Court of Human Rights: Annual Report 2015’, ISBN: 978-92-
871-9894-5 page 65, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2015_ENG.pdf> accessed 10 December 2016. 
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its power of review” but rather it appropriately "attributing responsibility” to the national 
authorities.299 
It has been suggested that a judgment of a court such as the ECtHR is more likely to be 
considered legitimate if: (1) those affected have had a say in it; (2) it reflects shared beliefs; 
or; (3) it has been made by an expert and authoritative person or institution.300 
The stages of the ECtHR process as formulated in this chapter meet those elements of 
legitimacy. The requirement for democratic consensus on interpretation and the deference 
to democratic decisions on application means citizens enjoy, at least in theory, their say and 
that decisions reflect shared beliefs and experiences. The ECtHR is able to insist on the use of 
expert evidence as part of showing democratic process in relation to application, and may 
itself provide expertise on the reasonableness of an interpretations and on the 
proportionality of application. 
5.2 Stage One – Interpretation  
The ECHR system does not require a complete position on all of the candidate principles that 
might ever flow as norms from the rights. The ECHR Preamble tasks it only with furthering a 
“common” understanding and observance of the rights and to take the “first steps” for 
collective enforcement of “certain” rights. Its role is not to replace the local democratic orders 
in this regard. It does not, therefore, require a set of norms comprehensive enough to provide 
a final response to all of the questions that an individual state system must address with 
regard to the scope of rights and duties.301 Only those understandings consistently developed 
                                                                
299 D. Spielmann, "Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and the National 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?', (2011-12) 14 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 381,381. 
300 Amos, M., “The Dialogue between United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights” (2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 557, 575–576. 
301 The state system must resolve issues at the national leaving no vacuum in the law, that is its 
function. In order to operate in that task, for national courts it may sometimes be necessary to fill gaps 
and thereby make a morally reasoned choice about a right in the absence of political guidance. The 
same is not true for the ECtHR. While a national court must always provide a settlement to any dispute 
between parties, the non-federal ECtHR is tasked only with resolving cases raising a commonly held 
European norm. 
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by agents within states forming the ECHR membership are those with common community 
democratic recognition. The task of the ECtHR in stage one and consideration in abstracto is 
thus to settle what is an ECHR wide constructed norm, under one of the higher rights 
categories in the agreement, that forms part of the common understanding of member 
state’s duties.  
It might, at least upon first consideration, be assumed that this will rarely be a challenging 
task for the ECtHR. The Articles under Section I of the ECHR set out the rights democracy 
understood to be universal at the time of signing, and also provide details on the then 
understood broad justifications for their limitation. However, as this analysis has considered, 
while various new norms have the potential to fall within the already recognised protection 
of a right, the rights never exist as wholly unconstrained by competing interests and so their 
scope is always reasonably debatable.302 The limits that agents in general may accept are 
arguably even greater by having (at least theoretically) chosen to compromise by living in a 
society under a social contract. This makes the ongoing development of the normative 
parameters of the rights unpredictable. The problem of the unpredictability of the reasoning 
of agents for the ECtHR is set out by Gerards and Brems:  
                                                                
An illustration of this comes from possible moral principles that have been refused by states as 
proposed additions to their ECHR obligations. For example, the UK has not ratified: (1) ECHR Protocol 
4, prohibition of imprisonment for debt, freedom of movement, prohibition of expulsion of nationals, 
and prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens; (2) Protocol 7, procedural safeguards relating to 
expulsion of aliens, a right of appeal in criminal matters, a right to compensation for wrongful 
conviction, a right not to tried or punished twice, and rights relating to equality between spouses; or 
(3) Protocol 12, a free-standing right to non-discrimination.  
These example also to serve to show that the reasoned interpretations of moral justified norms by 
international bodies, those that such bodies believe “must” be supported by a liberal democratic state, 
do not always accord with the understandings in fact produced by democratic government. This type 
of discrepancy is why care must be taken in interpretations claimed to fall under the parameters of 
existing rights by the implied consent of the member states. 
302 The ECHR itself acknowledges the reality that, by living in a society, there is an acceptance that 
rights are not always absolute, classifying most of those is lists as being either limited or qualified. 
These must be weighed to determine what the new sub-norm is and to determine the relative 
weighting of that new norm is against other norms and needs. For example, it is now established that 
as human rights norms physical integrity, free press and the right to protest all have a special status 
as expectations. On the other side, matters of national security weigh heavily as limitations, as do 
matters of economic crisis. 
Page 212 of 391 
 
The Court’s task is made even more difficult by the very nature of fundamental rights. 
It is well accepted that most fundamental rights are not absolutes, but can be limited 
if such limitations are sufficiently justified by objective and weighty reasons, such as 
the fundamental rights or of important general interests. One major question is 
whether the assessment of the reasonableness of an interference with a fundamental 
right could and should form part of the definition of that right, or whether definition 
and justification should be strictly separated […] When considering the prohibition of 
a book disclosing State secrets, in the end the actual scope of freedom of expression 
is determined both by the definition of that freedom and the balance that is struck 
between the freedom and the State’s interests in keeping State secrets. After all, 
authors only know the extent to which they can really exercise freedom of expression 
if the limits to the exercise of that right are delineated [emphasis added].303 
It is the view of this work that the rights in the ECHR are actually the outcome of reasoning by 
agents in the real world, creating solutions that apply in general to balance needs against 
limitations in accordance with the PGC. If it is the practical reasoning of agents, enabled 
through democracy, which resulted in the human rights recognised at the forming of the 
ECHR, then it must now be that same process of reasoning that is harnessed to develop them. 
The normative scope of rights under the ECHR is, therefore, to be delineated by the 
constructions of societal collective reasoning and the necessarily compromised underlying 
principles adopted via democracy on behalf of and acceptable to all agents. Until the stage 
where the ECtHR moves from in abstracto interpretation of the principles of general 
application to the second stage of in concreto application to particular circumstances, the 
outcomes of democracy have primacy (provided they are not unreasoned).  
In the application stage, this work argues it is beyond the competence and capacity of 
ordinary agents to reason upon how those generic norms should apply, for example, in 
complex situations or to facts particular to a specific case without first relying upon expertise, 
experience and safeguards against subjective interests and error. In that stage, democratic 
outcomes must be measured in terms of their procedural compliance with the common 
standards for democratic decision-making and the reasonableness of the substantive 
decision, taking into consideration the level of commonality in substantive application by 
similarly affected member states.  
                                                                
303 E. Brems and J. Gerards (eds.) Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press: 2013) pages 1 and 2. 
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To provide an example of the distinction between interpretation and application with human 
rights, it is appropriate to start by considering a national example. 304  The normative 
manifestation of protection of information about individuals within UK law was once limited 
to principles recognising protection against trespass, defamation and breach of confidence. It 
was not possible to adapt the existing legal principles to create a general right of privacy, this 
required a normative extension – a new interpretation as the public understanding developed 
through dialectic reasoning.305  In the UK, there was a marked unwillingness on the part of 
the courts to lead the way to a new general right of privacy, as they recognised that this was 
not the application of existing law but rather the interpretation of a new legal norm.  It was 
only when UK courts gained the authority under the Human Rights Act 1998 to apply the ECHR 
rights and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on normative scope, which included a general right 
to privacy, that this changed. 306  The UK protection now extends to include ECHR 
interpretations including principles such as the forming of relationships and the protection of 
personal data. It has since applied the new principle of general application to numerous 
individual cases, raising specific circumstances such as whether the particular story raises an 
issue of public concern versus the potential impact on a person’s career or family life. 
This work argues that the interpretation of the rights should come from the common 
understood norms of the member states. It must be assumed that the norms developed 
commonly by the states are structured on the existing coherent principles within the ECHR 
community, as states continue to act in accordance with the government or public purpose 
                                                                
304 Given that the ECHR is based upon collective recognition, it is these changes at the national level 
that ultimately lead to a shift at the collective international one. 
305 While the trigger for this shifting may have come from changing circumstances (as is the case for 
most social and legal reform) such as a public appetite greater media intrusion and advances in 
technology, it nonetheless involved a revaluation of the general balance between privacy and wider 
interests such as societal interaction, security and freedom of speech. The result was that a new 
societal norm emerged. 
306 That this was a political decision for the UK Government to take was affirmed in cases such as Kaye 
v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 and Wainwright v Home Office [2003] 
UKHL 53. This finally changed in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers (MGN) Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, by 
the time of the alleged interference with Ms. Campbell’s rights the Human Rights Act 1998 was in 
force. On these developments, see G. Phillipson, 'Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a 
Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act' (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726, 726-
728. 
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that membership serves. But there is still the need for a consistent and reasonable means to 
determine what that collective ECHR member state reasoning now requires. Without settled 
common normative parameters of the widely drafted rights from which to start, the task of 
the member states and the oversight of the ECtHR in safeguarding their application becomes 
unintelligible. In drawing out the norms held in individual states and furthermore deciding 
whether they are now common within the ECHR signatories, it is clear from the work so far 
that the ECtHR must determine an approach that is reasonably in accordance with the object 
or purpose of the agreement. 
5.2.1 Extrapolation 
If societies, for example states and the ECHR community, reach moral dialectically-contingent 
compromises on moral principles then the role of a court tasked with their upkeep must be 
to extrapolate those principles as well as they can in order to then apply them. It must surely 
be assumed that the law is structured on coherent principles, which can be correctly 
constructively interpreted.  
Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity states, in keeping with the argument advanced by this 
work, that judges should identify legal norms on the assumption that they were all created 
by the community as an entity, and that they express the community’s consistent moral 
principles. As Dworkin suggests, it should be possible to reasonably identify the principles of 
a community from trends in a particular system’s law, or a coherence within it. There is a clear 
political aspect to that norm construction, he claimed:  
I am defending an interpretation of our own political culture, not an abstract and 
timeless political morality.307  
Dworkin considered that long-held traditions form part of the “deep structure” of political 
and legal concepts and that this can be used to construct the “right” answer to cases: 
The deep structure of political values is not physical – it is normative. But just as a scientist 
can aim, as a distinct kind of project, to reveal the very nature of a tiger or of gold by exposing 
                                                                
307 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press: 1986) 216. 
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the basic physical structure of these entities, so a political philosopher can aim to reveal the 
very nature of freedom by exposing its normative core.308  
Dworkin’s “right answer thesis” states that proper interpretation would give the right 
outcome for that system. While it may be questioned whether there is ever only one 
outcome309, even if Dworkin’s theoretically ideal Judge Hercules could be found, an important 
point is made about the need for the “best” coherent interpretation to be constructed in line 
with community moral principles on justice and fairness.310 Dworkin separates constructive 
interpretation into three stages, the: (1) pre-interpretive stage; (2) interpretive stage; and (3) 
post-interpretive stage.311  
In the pre-interpretative stage, all relevant rules and standards that constitute the practice of 
the community, which are to be interpreted, have to be first identified. Then, in the 
interpretative stage, the interpreter settles on some general (as opposed to private) 
justifications for the main elements of practices identified in the pre-emptive stage. At the 
                                                                
308 R. Dworkin, “Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy” (2004) 24 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 1, 13.  
309 The examination must keep returning to the challenge that no universal system of comprehensive 
answers may even exist. These, by now familiar, problems and their relevance here are summarised 
by Mahoney:  
[A]n exercise in constructive interpretation does not seem capable of supporting the claim 
that some rights bind all persons. The convictions that are ratified by such an exercise are 
convictions that are too closely tied to a specific political and legal tradition to yield a 
Universalist understanding of rights [...] To establish that agents are bound to norms in this 
way requires a reason or principle that can be justified independently of an exercise in 
constructive interpretation. 
J. Mahoney, “Objectivity, Interpretation and Rights: A Critique of Dworkin” (2004) Law and Philosophy 
23: 187,207. 
But even within a system with a specific political and legal tradition, the same types of issues must 
surely arise that require constructive interpretation which all agents within the society could accept 
as justified i.e. based on objective reasoning about what that society must demand and guarding 
against the subjective reasoning of some or even one agent. This, for reasons explored earlier, seems 
more appropriate where possible for a political legislative body to determine upon rather than the 
judiciary.  
310 Dworkin defines constructive interpretation as the process of: 
‘[I]mposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make it the best possible example of 
the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.’ 
R. Dworkin (n 307) 52. 
311 ibid 65-69. 
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post-interpretative stage, the interpreter reviews his decision to ensure it best serves the 
justification and is coherent with the principles and rules of the legal structure. 
This raises the question of whether the ECtHR independently may extrapolate from ECHR 
community practices and existing rules what principles the ECHR rights must necessarily 
encompass in any new cases coming before it. To what extent is a deep structure for the right 
already discernible, and could the direction of development have been and continue to be 
predicted?  
This work suggests that while the ECtHR should seek to find consistent practice in the member 
states, to then interpret into general justifications/moral norms, it should normally rely on 
the national government (including national courts) analysis of practices and how those are 
to be interpreted into general principles. We must remember that: (1) it is not easy to decide 
what is a moral norm; (2) appreciating the empirical reality behind practices may require an 
understanding of the social setting; and (3) directly elected political representatives of a 
particular community are the system that agents have recognised for reaching collective 
compromise on the principles of general application.  
Even by accepting the confines of the PGC and requiring that a legal system be coherent in 
terms of building upon existing norms of principles, the deep structure is not simple to extract. 
As Alexy says, such coherence is in practice unobtainable as the system is never complete:  
Just as norms cannot apply themselves, a legal system as such cannot produce 
coherence. To achieve this, persons and procedures are necessary for feeding in new 
contents.312  
What of arguments, such as that put forward by Alexy, that a court may use “legal reason” by 
applying the criteria of discourse theory to secure correctness in process and thereby the 
outcome. While this work would deny any theory based upon pure procedural justice, it does 
accept that a procedure may warrant what may legitimately be accepted as correct results 
provide it is, in turn, warranted by a moral basis such as the PGC. 313 
                                                                
312 R. Alexy, “The Special Case Thesis” (1999) 12(4) Ratio Juris 374, 383. 
313 Eriksen reasons: 
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Alexy’s rules propose that every subject with competence to speak be allowed to take part in 
the judicial discourse, question assertions, introduce assertions, express attitudes, desires 
and needs, and be free from coercion in exercising those rights.314  But is there sufficient 
normative content in these procedural ideals to allow legal reasoning to make substantive 
progress in this regard? 
Toddington says: 
[T]he crux of the matter is that Alexy thinks that the D principle of rational 
argumentation can be re-created in, and supervised by, legal discourses to feed in to 
legal decision-making the ethical substance required to operationalise the weighting 
and balancing strategies he identifies as the essence of legal reasoning at the level of 
principle […] 315 
However, Toddington goes on to quote Alexy himself that: 
                                                                
Discourse theory holds that it is the procedures that warrant the presumption that it is 
possible to reach correct decisions: A norm N is correct when it is the result the procedure P 
(Alexy. R. 1995: Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp: 110). In a democracy the 
correctness of decisions depends solely on the procedures (Habermas (1996) “Reply to 
Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law”, 17 Cardozo Law Review 1477, 
1495).  In pure procedural justice it is fair procedures that ensure the right result; there is no 
independent criterion for such. For example, a chance procedure like gambling is a pure 
procedural model that ensures just outcomes without any reference to extra-procedural 
elements (Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press: 1971) 86). But if it is the 
procedure itself that warrants correct results, what, then, warrants the procedure?  There is 
a problem with a pure procedural conception of correctness, and hence with pure procedural 
conceptions of democratic legitimacy. Independent standards are required in order to 
evaluate the process or the outcome, according to constitutionalists. The latters make use of 
moral arguments, of substantive conceptions of what is right or good, in order to solve the 
problem of rational adjudication, without this ‘substance’ being neither legitimated nor tested 
democratically. It opens for jurist made law. The Supreme Court becomes the final arbiter of 
constitutional law. 
E. Eriksen, “Democratic or Jurist Made Law? On the Claim to Correctness” in A. Menedez and E. Eriksen 
(eds) Arguing Fundamental Rights (Springer: 2006) 69,69-79. 
314 R. Alexy, “A Theory of Practical Discourse” in S. Benhabib and F. Dallmayr (eds.) The Communicative 
Ethics Controversy (MIT Press: 1990) 165 
E. Brems and J. Gerards, Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Determining the Scope of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press: 2013) 1 and 2. 
315 S. Toddington, “The Moral Truth about Discourse Theory” (2006) 19(2) Ratio Juris 217,225. 
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General practical arguments have to float through all institutions if the roots of these 
institutions in practical reason shall not be cut off [...] [emphasis added]316   
The criteria proposed by proponents of discourse theory, such as Alexy, are relevant to a 
judicial procedural review of decision-making, in identifying whether proper communication 
that reinforces the demand for reason occurred. However, it is not discourse which provides 
a moral basis for society, but rather its reinforcements of the dialogical agent under the PGC 
as represented where possible by the political legislature.  
Per Toddington: 
The move from individual right to Civil Society and Law is a shift from natural morality 
to artificial morality, and it is the task of legal theory in the form of a theory of legal 
reasoning to frame a critical account of this artifice. Discourse Ethics cannot establish 
the fundamental canons of right that serve as the basis of Civil Society whereas, I have 
argued, the PGC can, but it can reinforce the universalising demands of reason and 
show us how Civil Society, once established, ought to value communicative 
institutions. From this point, the value of the distinction in Discourse Ethics between 
“ideal” as opposed to “distorted” communication can be fully expressed. Functioning 
within an established civil sphere and acknowledging the pre-discursive possibility of 
establishing fundamental and substantial norms of civil association, it can finally 
abandon (as it has largely abandoned) its ontological commitment to ethical truth as 
a property of “consensus” and the obfuscation of the appeal to the authority of the 
“communicative” or “dialogical” subject.317  
A court may then be part of a wider government system supporting dialectical reasoning and 
may use some of the more obvious suggestions of discourse theory to check that there was 
undistorted communication on the issue before it. The force of reason can prevail only when 
all affected are participants in a rational deliberative communication about a particular claim. 
However, this type of communication must pass through all institutions within a deliberative 
democracy including the political bodies and executive bodies if the “roots” are not to be cut. 
No court alone may produce a definitive response. As Eriksen comments: 
The interconnections between law and politics are many and intricate. For one there 
is a mutual relationship as only politics can give the norms that courts act upon. It is 
the legislative process that furnishes the legal system with normative inputs. But 
politicians can not work unless they observe the legal procedures that judges monitor. 
                                                                
316 R. Alexy N 312) 384. 
317 S. Toddington, “The Moral Truth about Discourse Theory” (2006) 19(2) Ratio Juris 217,228. 
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No valid law without politics and no legitimate politics without the law. Law is the 
lingua franca of democracy and democracy is the sole remaining legitimation principle 
in modern societies.318 
As the operation of PGC produce different dialectically-contingent results in a given society, 
in spite of existing ECHR law providing the same starting point, it remains the case that 
political systems and national courts have better authority and positioning to more ideally 
communicate upon and determine the societal norms principles and applications at the 
national level. Eriksen explains: 
Even human rights require democratic legitimation and public deliberation to be 
correctly implemented. They are unfulfilled until they have been codified and 
interpreted (and subsequently transformed to basic rights).  This means there are no 
fixed moral precepts, principles or concepts of justice that judges in a noncontroversial 
way can appeal to in order to adjudicate in case of conflicts.319 
The ECtHR is not representative of the wider public view and does not have the role of 
providing a public sphere for all citizens and affected parties to have their voices heard. As 
Erikson reasons: 
Common action norms can only be legitimately tested in the wider public sphere 
where competent citizens and all affected parties are present.  
“Once the judge is allowed to move in the unrestrained space of reasons that 
such a “general practical discourse” offers, a “red line” that marks the division 
of powers between courts and legislation becomes blurred. In view of the 
application of a particular statute, the legal discourse of the judge should be 
confined to the set of reasons legislators either in fact put forward or at least 
could have mobilized for the parliamentary justification of the norm” 
(Habermas, "A short Reply” (1999) 12 Ratio Juris 447, 447).” … 
The general problem […] is that judges should apply norms, not make them. 
Conceiving of the legal discourse as a special variant of the practical discourse blurs 
the distinction between legislation and application because it allows the judge to 
make use of normative reasons in general, not only the ones given by the legislators. 
Now Alexy may defend his thesis by pointing to the fact that in modern societies 
heavily strained by complexity the political system becomes overburdened and does 
not produce the required set of norms. When the legislator does not fulfil its function 
the courts have to intervene and upgrade the legal system so that it becomes possible 
                                                                
318 E. Eriksen (n 313) 69. 
319 ibid 83. 
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to handle the complexities facing it. It leaves the generation of norms to be handled 
autonomously by the discretion of the judges - hence the prevalence of delegation 
and framework legislation. The politicians are not doing their job in furnishing the legal 
system with the required normative premises and leaves to the discretion of the 
judges to find the ‘correct’ normative basis for adjudication. 320 
A claim that pure procedure in a court can provide better responses on human rights issues 
is not in accordance with the principle of democratic legitimacy that citizens, when acting 
within the possible bounds of the PGC, should be the final arbitrator of constitutional law. 
Eriksen concludes that: ‘Alexy’s solution gives too much leeway to the discretion of the 
lawyers as they become authorized to choose the decisive reasons themselves.’321 In terms 
of interpretation, what the ECtHR may appropriately claim is to be better positioned to: (1) in 
the pre-interpretive stage,  to identify the practices of  national governments (as opposed to 
the practices of agents directly); (2) in the interpretative stage, interpret the practices that 
are common between states to identify moral norms that are ECHR wide; and (3) in the post-
interpretative stage, ensure that those norms as translated into ECHR law, when reviewed, 
best serve that interpretation and are coherent with wider ECHR laws.   
A useful example of the implications of this for the ECtHR comes for the protection in the 
ECHR against torture or inhuman treatment.322 At the time the ECHR was agreed, capital 
punishment would not have been considered to amount to an unacceptable practice and yet 
now it is. More recently, attitudes towards physical chastisement of children have begun to 
change. However, could the ECtHR (or any agent) have reasoned that this development in the 
interpreted understanding of the general norms falling under the normative parameters of 
Article 3 “must” have occurred? It is only as the new norms were reasoned consistently in the 
discourse of deliberative democracy, revealed by practices in the state, that their status was 
recognised as part of the right. It was because of that shift in the values of agents, through 
their national democratic representatives, that the ECtHR could argue that prohibition of 
                                                                
320 ibid 84-85. 
321 ibid 85. 
322 Article 3 of the ECHR. 
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certain levels of pain or anguish are now an ECHR community wide human rights norm to be 
protected.  
5.2.2 Originalism 
An extreme response to the challenges of the ECtHR exceeding its legitimate authority would 
be to require it to abide strictly by the understanding of the terms at the time the ECHR was 
negotiated (textualism) or the types of cases to which the drafter intended it to apply 
(intentionalism).323 The difficulties of this approach, and the relevance of the concerns it is a 
response to, are best illustrated through case law.  
The case of Golder v UK324 required a decision on whether access to court for civil matters 
formed part of the Article 6 right to a fair trial. The argument made by the UK was that for a 
norm to be incorporated within the right it should have been explicitly included, and no 
reference was made under Article 6(1) to a right of access.325 In support of that position, 
reference was made to the wording of the ECHR Preamble in which signatory states declared 
a commitment only to taking the “first steps” for the collective enforcement of “certain'” 
rights. As such, not all candidate normative interpretations that “could” be properly 
attributed to a fair trial were necessarily protected as a principle that “must” form part of the 
right. The drafters could be taken to have adopted a “selective process” in determining which 
norms would actually fall as a general duty under the ECHR right. 
In response, the ECtHR accepted the UK position of the “selective nature” of the ECHR. This 
is in accordance with the argument of this work that state consent via the contract or treaty 
is paramount to the ECtHR’s mandate and its legitimate use of authority. However, the ECtHR 
went on to affirm, once more in accordance with the reasoning of this work, that those broad 
                                                                
323 A.  Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil” (1989) 57 U Cin L Rev: 841, 854 quoted in M. Greenberg 
and H. Litman, “The Meaning of Original Meaning” (1998) 86 The Georgetown Law Journal 569, 583. 
324 Golder v the United Kingdom, Application No. 4451/70, Judgment of February 21 1975.    
325 Article 6(1): 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law […] 
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rights protected, must be interpreted considering the object and purpose in the Preamble, of 
recognising features of the “common” spiritual heritage of the member states of the Council 
of Europe.  So, the real meaning of the normative scope of Article 6(1) does not come from 
constrictive reading of the text but instead is centred on the broader understood substance, 
as shared by member states. This work agrees that an understanding of the normative scope 
of the of the right must not be limited to the text itself, and there was the potential for the 
right to be interpreted to include access, as the ECtHR noted:  
While the right to a fair, public and expeditious judicial procedure can assuredly apply 
only to proceedings in being, it does not, however, necessarily follow that a right to 
the very institution of such proceedings is thereby excluded.326 
The ECtHR considered it inconceivable that Article 6(1) should have described in detail the 
procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit but not be understood as first 
protecting that which alone makes it possible to benefit from such guarantees. It reasoned 
that where there exists a dispute concerning civil rights and obligations, there should be a 
right of access to institute proceedings before courts. This is a reasoned interpretation of 
Article 6(1) that “may” properly be settled upon but it could be questioned whether it “must” 
be reasoned. If it is not a necessary interpretation327, this work would then argue that its 
recognition must be dependent upon common recognition in the practices of the member 
states.  
In terms of the reasonableness of an alternative position to that suggested by the ECtHR, one 
could argue that there is a distinction between contestation of a claim prior to legal 
proceedings and during proceedings. It may be properly reasoned that only in the latter is 
there any responsibility for the state to secure standards. Certainly, this was the reasoning of 
                                                                
326 Golder v the United Kingdom (no 324), at para 32. 
327 An interesting contrast relates to deaths in custody. In order to ensure the best protection of a 
recognised norm that life must be safeguarded when a person is arrested or detained, it “must” be 
necessary to require an effective (independent, prompt and transparent) investigation of deaths. 
Given the common understanding between states about the importance of the right to life (it has 
limited, as opposed to qualified status under the ECHR) it also seems one must presume causation i.e. 
if the state is unable to provide a plausible explanation how else harm occurred in such a controlled 
environment (Salman v Turkey, Application No. 21986/93, Judgment of 27 June 2000). The norms 
must follow from an effective protection, they are not an expanding understanding of the normative 
scope of Article 2 ECHR. 
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the UK328, and could explain why the ECHR text makes a distinction by referencing only a fair 
hearing as opposed to access.   
In his dissenting opinion Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (one of three ECtHR judges making similar 
points) warned about the consequences of reading an obligation, “which the Convention does 
not trouble to name, but at the most implies [...]”329 He argued that parties, “cannot be 
expected to implement what would be an important international obligation when it is not 
defined sufficiently to enable them to know exactly what it involves”.330 Even when a norm 
“may” (as opposed to “must”) be reasoned to fall under the substance of a right:  
It is for the States upon whose consent the Convention rests, and from which consent 
it alone derives its obligatory force, to close the gap or put the defect right by 
amendment, not for a judicial tribunal to substitute itself for the convention-makers, 
to do their work for them. Once wide interpretations of the kind now in question are 
adopted by a court, without the clearest justification for them based solidly on the 
language of the text or on necessary inferences drawn from it, and not, as here, on a 
questionable interpretation of an enigmatic provision, considerations of consistency 
will, thereafter, make it difficult to refuse extensive interpretations in other contexts 
where good sense might dictate differently: freedom of action will have been impaired 
[emphasis added].331 
While this work would allow inferences beyond those “based solidly on the language of the 
text or on necessary inferences drawn from it,” it would agree that “it is not for a judicial 
tribunal to substitute itself for the convention-makers”. The text of the ECHR need not be 
read how it would have been understood on the date of signing, but should not be stretched 
beyond the understanding that the membership could today reasonably be interpreted as 
holding based on evidence from common practices. 
                                                                
328 The UK argued that: 
‘[The] Convention does not confer on the applicant a right of access to the courts, but confers 
only a right in any proceedings he may institute to a hearing that is fair […]’ 
Golder v the United Kingdom (n 324), at para 322. 
329 ibid at para 28. 
330ibid at para 30. 
331ibid at para 37. 
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Another case is Young, James and Webster v UK332, which considered whether closed shop 
unions are compatible with the Article 11 right to freedom of association. The UK submitted 
that there is no norm that a person cannot be compelled to join an association, as such a 
meaning ‘had been deliberately excluded from the Convention [emphasis added]’333. The UK 
relied upon the statement in the ECHR preparatory works that: 
On account of the difficulties raised by the “closed-shop system” in certain countries, 
the Conference in this connection considered that it was undesirable to introduce into 
the Convention a rule under which “no one may be compelled belong to an 
association” [...]334    
The ECtHR reasoned (assuming, for the sake of argument, the norm had been omitted initially 
from the ECHR per the suggestions of the UK) that: 
[I]t does not follow that the negative aspect of a person’s freedom of association falls 
completely outside the ambit of Article 11 and that each and every compulsion to join 
a trade union is compatible with the intention of that provision. To construe Article 11 
as permitting every kind of compulsion in the field of trade union membership would 
strike at the very substance of the freedom it is designed to guarantee [emphasis 
added].335 
Again, objections were made against the ECtHR majority view. Three dissenting ECtHR judges 
commented: 
Reference to the substance of freedom of association is not relevant in the present 
context. Although the Court has often relied on the notion of the substance of the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention, it has done so only when the question was what 
regulation or limitation of a right was justified. It has held that even in cases where 
regulation or limitations were allowed explicitly or by necessary implication, they 
could not go so far as to affect the very substance of the right concerned. In the 
present case, however, the problem is whether the negative aspect of the freedom of 
association is part of the substance of the right guaranteed by Article 11. For the 
reasons stated above the State Parties to the Convention must be considered to have 
agreed not to include the negative aspect, and no canon of interpretation can be 
                                                                
332 Young, James and Webster v the United Kingdom, Application No. 7601/76; 7806/77, Judgment of 
13 August 1981. 
333 ibid at para 51. 
334 Article 20(2) of the United Nations Universal Declaration, Report of 30 June 1950 of the Conference 
of Senior Officials, Collected Edn of the Travaux Préparatoires, iv, at 262. 
335 Young, James and Webster v the United Kingdom (n 332) at para 52. 
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adduced in support of extending the scope of the Article to a matter which 
deliberately has been left out and reserved for regulation according to national law 
and traditions of each State Party to the Convention [emphasis added].336  
The concerns raise an important distinction, supporting the view of this work that the ECtHR 
has less autonomy regarding the in abstracto interpretation of the “very substance” or 
normative scope of a right compared to the in concreto application of those principles of 
general application in particular circumstances when questioning “what regulation of 
limitation of a right was justified.”  
This work would suggest that the ECHR preparatory works evidence the understanding at the 
time of the initial agreement, and that the member state understanding of their duties under 
Article 11 could develop subsequently. But it does accept the risks of new interpretations of 
the substance of rights identified by the dissenting ECtHR judges, in potentially moving 
beyond the points agreed upon by state parties. That the negative aspect of freedom of 
association “may” form a reasonable norm under the scope of the right is not the same as is 
being a “must”. The choice of the original states to exclude it from the definition shows the 
potential reasonableness of its denial as forming a necessary principle. This work would argue 
that an extension of the scope of Article 11 for its inclusion could not be based on the ECtHR’s 
reasoning alone, but rather upon evidence from the practices of the member states showing 
common democratic recognition of a societal principle. 
While this work rejects strict originalism as the solution for the ECHR agreement, it should not 
be ignored that there are a number of attractive points in such an argument. It is correct to 
be cautious about expanding a voluntarily entered agreement through uncontrolled 
interpretations, particularly one that seriously limits the legislative freedom of 
representatives. As succinctly put by Scalia in relation to the American Constitution dating 
back to 1791:  
‘The principle theoretical defect of nonoriginalism [...] is its incompatibility with the 
very principle that legitimises judicial review of constitutionality.’337   
                                                                
336 Dissenting opinion of Judge Sorenson. ibid at para 4. 
337 Justice Scalia: 
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Such traditional arguments of original understanding or originalism are rejected in this work; 
the examination relying rather upon the reasoning of necessary intendment. Given that the 
very design of the ECHR is to encourage progress and to continually monitor member states 
against common understandings of rights and their observation, it must be possible for its 
effect to alter, to enable it to promote improvement as a "living instrument", in line with how 
the understood moral norms develop in the ECHR community338 as new challenges arise.339 
                                                                
The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my view, is its incompatibility with the 
very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality […] [T]he Constitution, 
though it has an effect superior to other laws, is in its nature the sort of “law” that is the 
business of the courts—an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the 
usual devices familiar to those learned in the law.  If the Constitution were not that sort of a 
“law,” but a novel invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would there be to 
believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to the legislature?  One 
simply cannot say, regarding that sort of novel enactment, that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department” to determine its content.  Quite to the contrary, 
the legislature would seem a much more appropriate expositor of social values, and its 
determination that a statute is compatible with the Constitution should, as in England, prevail. 
Antonin Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil” (1989) 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 849, 854. 
At this point it is perhaps worth re-emphasising the problems caused where there is uncertainty 
whether interpretations are legitimately reached under the terms of the agreement. Note the views 
summarised in the report from the Commission on a Bill of Rights that the ECtHR is: 
[I]n effect abusing its function and exceeding its jurisdiction by adopting interpretations of the 
Convention which the original signatories either expressly rejected or would not have been 
willing to accept [emphasis added]. 
Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, “A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us”, Vol. 1 
published on December 18, 2012 at p.24. 
338 As the ECtHR explains in the interpretation of the ECHR, ‘regard must be had to its special character 
as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Loizidou v 
Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99. 
339 For a more recent example, see Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, regarding whether human trafficking 
falls under Article 4:  
[T]he absence of an express reference to trafficking in the Convention is unsurprising. The 
Convention was inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, which itself made no express mention of 
trafficking. In its Article 4, the Declaration prohibited “slavery and the slave trade in all forms”. 
However, in assessing the scope of Article 4 of the Convention, sight should not be lost of the 
Convention’s special features of the fact that it is a living instrument which must be interpreted 
in the light of present-day conditions […] In view of its obligation to interpret the Convention 
in light of present-day conditions, the Court considers it unnecessary to identify whether the 
treatment about which the applicant complains constitutes slavery, servitude or forced and 
compulsory labour. Instead, the Court concludes that trafficking itself [...] falls within the 
scope of Article 4 of the Convention [emphasis added].  
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History shows that settling understandings of human rights norms is difficult, if not 
impossible. It seems therefore unrealistic to ascribe an opinion to the founders of the ECHR 
in entering into the agreement, that their understandings of norms drawn from empirical 
reality at the time would, could or should freeze future development. They must have had an 
awareness the meaning attributed to the rights and the standards for application would 
evolve to remain relevant, and that it was not expected that an express renegotiation of the 
agreement would be required to consider new views. This need for growth with society is 
argued by Greenberg and Litman, in relation to the American Constitution:  
The flaw in the line of argument for fidelity to original practices is that original 
applications do not reliably reveal original meaning. In the light of the distinction, it 
cannot be assumed that the practices that were understood at the time to be 
consistent with a constitutional provision perfectly reflect the provision’s original 
meaning.340  
They continue:  
Since the applications of a rule can change while the rule remains the same (because 
of changes in views about the relevant facts), holding the rules constant does not 
require holding the applications constant. 341     
The argument progresses:  
Truly respecting original meaning requires bringing to bear all available knowledge, 
and since modern and original substantive beliefs can differ, respecting original 
meaning may be inconsistent with respecting original substantive views.342  
The implications of this acceptance of growth as part of an agreement such as the ECHR, are 
explained by Venske: 
                                                                
Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, Application No. 25965/04, Judgment of 7 January 2010, at para 272. 
340 M. Greenberg and H. Litman (n 323) 592.  
341 ibid 594. 
342 ibid 599. 
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The law cannot be tied down at any moment of formal (quasi-)legislation, in terms of 
legal sources or otherwise. It developed dynamically in the interplay between 
different actors who all pull and tug on what the law "really says".343  
This approach of reading in norms not expressly mentioned within a right, or even 
contemplated at the time of adoption, may sometimes be contentious. It is, however, a 
reasonably necessary and predictable outcome of the overall object and purpose of the ECHR. 
As Letsas reasons, human rights are:  
[M]eant to express a moral commitment to objective principles of liberal democracy. 
It follows that the European Court of Human Rights does not exercise illegitimate 
judicial discretion in looking for and allying these principles to unforeseen and 
controversial cases [emphasis added].344  
There are, however, always going to be greater difficulties for an international court (as 
opposed to national government body) associated with developing the normative scope of 
rights beyond the understating held at the time of drafting. This is not to deny the ECHR as a 
living instrument, but to caution against an ECtHR that is too dynamic in interpreting new 
norms under rights, without evidence of some form of post negotiation acceptance by the 
principals. 345  This work will argue states have impliedly accepted expansion via the operation 
of ECHR community consensus in national democratic practices. The work does so by 
accepting as an argument the broad principles under living originalism, and applying those to 
the ECHR. 
                                                                
343 I. Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists 
(Oxford University Press: 2012), Preface to the Paperback Edition 
344  G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press: 2009) page 3. 
345 The inability to go beyond the ordinary meaning of terms is apparent in ECtHR decisions such as: 
the right to life not extending to a positive obligation to assist suicide Pretty v the United Kingdom, 
Application No. 2346/02, Judgment of 8 July 2004; regarding the prohibition of inhuman treatment as 
extended to providing health care for a failed asylum seeker N. v the United Kingdom, Application No. 
26565/05, Judgment of 27 May 2008; or extending protection of private life to include public activity 
(hunting) Friend v United Kingdom, Application No. 16072/06 and 27809/08), Judgment of 24 
November 2009. 
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5.2.3 Living Originalism 
Despite the rejection of the more traditional argument of original understanding as a basis 
for approaching interpretation and application of the ECHR, "living originalism” provides an 
interesting balance between safeguarding state consent and keeping the ECHR relevant. It 
would allow evolution, but within only the confines of the original basis for cooperation.346 
Under the ECHR, that basis (the shared endeavour bringing people together) is that in 
accordance with republican liberalism democracies may form partnerships and thereby pool 
knowledge and resources in order to: (1) prevent any one member state sliding away from 
democracy as the governing political system; and (2) reinforce faith that individual member 
states are keeping pace with the progress wider democracy is making towards a moral 
construction of justified moral norms. In upholding these collective European interpretations 
of the normative scope of human rights and standards for their application, there are bound 
to be difficulties wherever any state does not agree with the ECtHR’s interpretation of a 
common ECHR community position based on national government practices. For example, 
questions may be asked about whether a collective community norm has to be unanimous in 
its recognition by governments i.e. the ECtHR must identify practice across all member states 
that could be justified in line with a newly interpreted norm. Alternatively, for the system to 
be effective in continually promoting and reinforcing democracy, some may suggest the pace 
of change should be driven by the most active governments with the practices of a small 
number of states (or even one) able to advance the ECHR normative position. Really, this work 
suggests that the position rests somewhere between the two extremes of consensus. 
The most restrictive approach to developing the normative scope of rights would accept that 
wherever there is still national dispute, judicial decisions may be viewed as “tainted” by 
politics, potentially undermining legitimacy. However, placing too much credence on political 
pluralism in determining the existence of an ECHR community norm or standard for 
application would be to undermine the effectiveness of the agreement. Notably, the 
arguments put forward by this work require it to be shown only that the object and purpose 
consented by the signatory states may be reasonably inferred as met by any new 
                                                                
346 See J. Balkin, Living Originalism (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: 2011). 
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interoperative development. To be effective as a judicial arbitrator, able to ensure that the 
partnership progresses, the ECtHR must be able to claim the authority to decide on 
reasonable (so not necessarily uniformly agreed) developments of that system relating to its 
interpretation and application. If so, it would suffice that the practices of some states may be 
interpreted as recognising new understood constructions of the rights. Part of the ECtHR’s 
role is the stabilization of the normative expectations underlying the ECHR system and it 
surely it could not be expected to be driven by the least progressive of the contracting states. 
The initial means of identifying the rights understood by the member states as applicable to 
all democratic nations for the purpose of the ECHR when it was drafted seems the reasonable 
means to apply in going forward. It is reasonable to accept that the ECHR represents a 
codification of norms that enjoyed customary recognition or consensus between the founding 
states at the time of signing.347 Yes, the exact wording used was the subject of significant 
negotiation but the states involved already claimed to respect them or were willing to accept 
them based on consensus. It was a codification of customary law, the practices of the member 
states, as Boucher explains:  
The codification of customary law, of the standards and obligations to which states in 
their practices and pronouncements were already deemed to be obligated, would give 
formal recognition to internationally and universally accepted standards. This may 
appear to be a conservative and essentially non-progressive view of human rights, 
rooted in the status quo and unable to develop beyond what is already accepted. 
There is no need, however, to be so pessimistic. Just as the common law of England is 
constantly in flux, and articulated by the skilful interpretation and mediation of 
interlocutor lawyers well versed in the art of persuasion whose purpose is to construct 
a story into which their interpretation of what the law intimates “fits” better than that 
of another, so the business of international law resembles this model. In no area of 
                                                                
347  The process of recognising and drafting legal customs at international level is known as 
“codification”, defined by Article 15 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Statute as: 
‘[T]he more precise formulation and systemisation of rules of international law in fields where 
there has already been extensive State practice, procedure and doctrine.’ 
Such codification does not mean that the principles then become static; the process of formalising 
their recognition may actually lead to a faster pace of customary law development.   
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law is legal formalism, that is, the view that the law has a literal meaning free of 
interpretation, less appropriate.348  
The use of this process as a supportable means for development is endorsed by the ECtHR.349 
New collectively reasoned understanding of the normative scope of the ECHR rights may be 
evidenced in the policies, practices and responses of individual democratic governments with, 
over time, patterns revealing consistency or areas of convergence in a sufficient range of 
states.350 Such evidence would mean the recognition of a new ECHR principle as falling under 
the scope of a right by the ECtHR, and the Court’s interpretation, if reasonably based on 
evidence of common practice, could not be validly open to criticism for unlimited growth 
unconstrained by its member states. Nor could accusations be made that the ECtHR was 
inappropriately undermining democracy by usurping its role. Rather, the ECtHR would be 
challenging the democratic practices of a small number of states (or one) as against the 
common position across a larger number of ECHR democracies. This approach is in 
accordance with a process for development that states could reasonably have foreseen, 
pursuing the same process of customary law that was relevant to understanding the 
normative parameters of the rights at the time of signing in order to understand it today.  
Villiger explains: 
The full meaning and scope of written terms may become clear by reference to the 
underlying customary law: the customary rule may supply a plausible meaning, define 
the context, fill in any lacunae or confirm the interpretation of the written terms.351 
                                                                
348 D. Boucher, “The Recognition Theory of Rights, Customary International Law and Human Rights” 
(2011) 59 Political Studies 753, 765. 
349 Judge Dean Spielmann, making a speech as President of the European Court of Human Rights, 
explained:  
"Comparative law is an essential part of the Court's methodology, used to gauge the degree 
of consensus that exists in Europe as regards a particular issue."  
Dean Spielmann, ‘Wither the Margin of Appreciation’, UCL – Current Legal Problems Lecture, 20 March 
2014, Page 5.  
350 For example, see cases relating to gender reassignment and the role of government consensus in 
establishing this as a recognised medical condition and a socially accepted part of a person’s sexual 
identity that there is a duty to protect. 
351 M. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: 2009) 21.  
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While the ECHR requires consensus only within its particular membership, the principles used 
to determine what constitutes (at least purportedly) a worldwide international custom, are 
useful in considering the reasonable requirements of proof that the threshold for European 
acceptance has been reached.352 The  reference to proof brings us to the question of what 
evidence is acceptable and what threshold is required, keeping in mind the object and the 
purpose of the ECHR in accordance with living originalism.  
                                                                
This proposition clearly has support in the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Villiger 
cites a judgment in which the ICJ explained in recognising an “inherent” right it was actually taking 
account of customary law as operating alongside the relevant international treaty and influencing its 
interpretation. In Military & Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua/USA) ICJ Reports 1986 94, para 176:  
Article 51 [of the UN Charter] […] is only meaningful on the basis that there is a natural or 
inherent right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be done other than of a 
customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the 
Charter. Moreover, the Charter […] does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content 
[…] [I]n the field in question […] customary international law continues to operate alongside 
treaty law. 
352 Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1961 confirms that interpretation 
of treaty text should consider any relevant rules of international law. The Legal Committee of the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe foresaw in August 1950 that "the Commission and the 
Court must necessarily apply such principles" in the execution of their duties and thus considered it 
to be "unnecessary" to insert a specific clause to this effect in the Convention (Documents of the 
Consultative Assembly, working papers of the 1950 session, Vol. III, no. 93, p. 982, para. 5).  
Among those rules are general principles of law and especially "general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations" (Article 38 para. 1 (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice). The 
International Court of Justice has confirmed this includes customary law, see for example Military & 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua/USA) ICJ Reports 1986 94, para 176:  
Article 51 [of the UN Charter] […] is only meaningful on the basis that there is a natural or 
inherent right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be done other than of a 
customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the 
Charter. Moreover, the Charter […] does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content 
[…] [I]n the field in question […] customary international law continues to operate alongside 
treaty law. 
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5.2.4 Finding Consensus 
There is significant debate about the means to determine when something becomes part of 
customary law. Yet, the rule of law requires the concept to be defined as far as possible, to 
produce rules capable of being applied to enable effective use by the ECtHR.353 
A good starting point is Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute, which 
defines it as, ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law.’ This still leaves the question of 
what is meant by "evidence" of practice, and furthermore what level of recognition between 
states is required for it to be "general".  
Evidence of Practice 
Guzman summarises the difficulties of evidence. In terms of "practice", Guzman points out 
that it is unclear whether states must be actively protecting a norm or whether it is enough 
that they make statements which express support for it in theory. The problem is that:  
State actions are more likely to reflect beliefs […] but are much less frequent. 
Statements are more common but are quite likely to be made strategically and less 
reliably offer information about state beliefs. 354 
Guzman goes on to explain, however, that if the action element is focussed on too greatly, 
then provided conduct is widespread it may be allowed even though it is accepted as falling 
short of what is the theorised ideal. Guzman cites torture as an example. However, there are 
likely to be many such concerns. Democracy may sometimes be inconsistent or careless in 
particular implementation choices given practical pressures, dangers or prejudices or even 
because of simple inertia. 
Applying this to the ECHR, the agreement’s very government object or purpose is to further 
human rights norms across Europe. It is, therefore, designed to support the ongoing ECHR 
                                                                
353 For criticisms relating to lack of clarity in the approach of the ECtHR, see L. Widhaber, A. Hjartarson 
and S. Donnelly, ‘No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2013) 33 Human Rights Law Journal 248. 
354 A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
186. 
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community construction of the normative parameters of the rights. This means that limited 
recognition for only norms already actively protected, would be inappropriate for an 
ambitious project. 355  As such, both statements of support and evidence of background 
understandings revealed in actions may reasonably be allowed as evidence allowing the 
interoperation of proper norms by the ECtHR.  
Mullerson views non-value laden norms as requiring little evidence beyond application in 
practice to confirm the acceptance of their binding nature, whereas value laden norms, such 
as human rights principles, are more based on their subjective value and so less damaged by 
a lack of actual practice or even by contrary practice: 
The more consistent and general a practice is, the lower the necessity to look for the 
subjective element confirming the acceptance of such a practice as legally binding. 
And on the contrary, strong opinio juris generalis is able to compensate the lack of 
consistency in “actual” practice.356 
So, the ECtHR has the ability to consider a wide range of evidence of practice in determining 
the opinio juris of the national governments. In so doing, it is seeking to codify what states 
are, as evidenced through statements, trying to achieve, as well as what they actually do 
                                                                
355 The ICJ supports the argument that the requirement is more consistency in the recognition of a 
right rather than its effective protection. It confirms that contrary practice does not prevent the 
formation of a rule of customary international law if it is condemned or denied. In Nicaragua, a case 
relating to non-use of force and non-intervention, it stated:  
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question 
should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete 
consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each other’s internal affairs. The 
Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding 
practice must be in absolute rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the 
existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, 
in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with 
a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of 
the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a 
recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained 
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, 
the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule [emphasis added]. 
ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgment of 27 June 
1986, ICJ Reports (1986) 98,186.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
356 R. Mullerson (1997) 2 ARIEL cited in B. Schlutter “Theory and Practice of the International Court of 
Justice and the International Ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia” in Developments 
in Customary International Law, Volume 62 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 2010) 32 
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achieve. These norms, while aspirational only, still exist despite a state failure to actually 
deliver (e.g. because of financial, economic, administrative or social constraints). They are 
manifest through their statements or actions. 
Provided the ECtHR supports its decision on whether opinio juris exists in different member 
states (i.e. its interpretation of the justifications for government practices) it would be difficult 
to challenge the legitimacy of that ruling. Without the ECtHR assuming this role of interpreting 
the reasons for government actions and statements to find any standard moral justifications, 
there can be no effective system for identifying new collective convergences.   
A General Practice 
Moving to the question of when a practice becomes "general" for the purpose of the ECtHR 
interpreting a “common” justificatory norm under the ECHR, there needs to be a reasonable 
approach to determining what threshold or number of member states is required to show 
consensus.  
Relying on the more traditional understanding of consent for recognising any new consensus 
(or the literal meaning of the word), the acceptance by each state must be “active” as opposed 
to more passive or implied acceptance. Clearly, that would be very restrictive, requiring open-
ended intergovernmental negotiation and limited by the invocation of key national 
interests.357  Berridge has defined consensus decision making as: 
‘[A]n attempt to achieve an agreement of all the participants in a multilateral 
conference [project] without the need for a vote and its inevitable divisiveness.’358 
A useful example of how limiting this would be, comes from Demir and Baykara v Turkey.359  
The ECtHR was required to consider whether the meaning or normative scope of the right of 
collective bargaining under Article 11 extended to include public sector servants 
                                                                
357 R. Collins, “Between Contract and Constitution: International Organisations and the Protection of 
Global Public Interests” in C. Michelon, G. Clunie, C. McCorkindale and H. Psarras (eds), The Public in 
Law: Representations of the Political in Legal Discourse (Ashgate: 2012) 69.  
358 G. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan: 2005) 24. 
359 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2008), 48 EHRR (2009) para 54.  
Page 236 of 391 
 
administering the state as well as private employees. Turkey argued that there was no 
obligation towards civil servants under the Article, as it expressly provided that: 
This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of 
these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of 
the State [emphasis added].  
As such, there was no need to demonstrate that the particular restrictions imposed were 
necessary and proportionate given there was no principle of general application to be 
considered. It also submitted that new obligations could not be implied in the absence of the 
state concerned having acceded to them.  
The first point made by Turkey was that, at the time of the ECHR's negotiation, the accepted 
democratically reached agreement was to exclude (by non-inclusion rather than express 
denial) the public sector from the normative scope of collective bargaining rights. This work 
has already rejected such arguments based on traditional originalism, subject only to rights 
that are expressly constrained by the ECHR text in terms of their future development. 
The second point made by Turkey related to the idea of requiring consent from each member 
state to allow the ECtHR to act.  The ECtHR took the view that a trend towards recognising a 
principle sufficed. The judges reasoned: 
[I]t is not necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the entire collection of 
instruments that are applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case 
concerned. It will be sufficient for the Court that the relevant international 
instruments denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in 
international law or in the domestic law of the majority of member States of the 
Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern 
societies [...] [emphasis added]360 
This work would agree that requiring absolute and active consensus is simply not in keeping 
with the ECHR project, a point made by Dzehtsiarou:  
It is clear that consensus in the Convention sense does not mean the unanimity that 
is needed for treaty amendment. It is more an expression of the common ground 
                                                                
360 ibid para 86. 
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required for the collective approach underlying the Convention system and the 
interaction between the European and domestic systems.361 
Even outside of a formal agreement such as the ECHR, with a built-in contractual agreement 
for contracting states to accept external norms where they are common to the ECHR 
community, such a limited approach has not been taken in relation to human rights. There is 
an accepted view in wider international law, that states failing to safeguard the most widely 
accepted human rights norms upon which there is a majority international consensus of 
understanding are nonetheless bound by them. This is often despite those few states 
consistently engaging in practices clearly contrary to them.362 Recognised human rights form 
a type of norm treated as being somewhat special and automatically enforceable upon other 
states, even leading to military intervention. Requiring active consent is not a basis that fits 
with international human rights, and certainly not for the ECHR. The ECHR’s very object and 
purpose is to drive change and to safeguard against any member states falling behind the 
democratic curve and failing to keep up at least the appearance that democracy is a consistent 
deliverer of the best reasoning on these norms.  
One approach that fits well with the unique nature of human rights is to allow instead for 
"implied" consent of states to accepting as binding norms understood as fundamental by 
other governments. States, assuming they are not individually convinced by the arguments 
put forward, may nonetheless accept they are subject because the collective number of other 
governments that do consider the norm forms a legal right that has reached a critical point, 
at which failure to adhere to that principle has an unacceptable potential cost in inter-state 
relations.363 When that tipping point is reached, it may be seen as a “big bang” and this 
normally occurs when the norm is shared across a number of states willing to exert pressure. 
                                                                
361 A. Kolver, V. Zagrebelsky, L. Garlickie, D. Spielmann, R. Jaeger and R. Liddell, “The Role of Consensus 
in the System of the European Court of Human Rights in Dialogues between Judges” (Council of 
Europe: 2008), p27 in K. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court 
of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press: 2015) 12. 
362 For example, at the Nuremberg trials or more recently the interventions made in the name of 
human rights in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya. 
363 See Guzman, who proposes that: ‘CIL [customary intentional law] should be defined as those norms 
that, because they are considered to be law, affect state payoffs.’ A. Guzman (n 354) 190. 
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As Yee explains: 
[O]ne makes the distinction between the process of formation and the ripening of 
customary international law [...] at which the opinio juris of the generality of States is 
formed, like a big bang. Before this moment, i.e. during the process of the formation 
of customary international law, a State may have its own opinio juris, not representing 
that of the community at large, may purposively champion it as that of the community, 
and may seek its blessing on that; but it nevertheless is acting at its own peril. That is 
to say, there is not yet fully-fledged opinio juris of the international community before 
this big bang moment.364  
The point at which sufficient pressure will mount is hard to predict in wider international law. 
Some states will have more impact than others, through greater economic power or 
ideological influence, and be able thereby to command greater respect and potentially co-
ordinate more effective intervention or to holdback such intervention should they disagree 
with the majority view.  
With the ECHR, however, there is the benefit of an express agreement to help inform this 
process of value sharing and remove some of the unpredictability in how and when pressure 
is exerted to comply. Note that earlier the work dismissed a positivist basis for the agreement, 
so the relative power of the member states should not be a factor in its ongoing evolution. 
Decisions of the ECtHR against a state are implemented through the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers receives reports about the progress of 
remedies with respect to violations and may apply pressure as necessary. Any member state 
failing to comply with any judgment will be under scrutiny. This overcomes to some extent 
the necessity for the ECtHR to factor in how strongly the membership support a new principle 
and the combined strength of the particular supporting states, in any decision about whether 
a judgment will be effective. 
All of the contracting member states have equal status as equally democratic nations, with 
an equal role on the Committee of Ministers. Their reasoning on principles and application is 
presumably of equal worth. One response would be to demand unanimity in recognising new 
principle. We have, however, already dismissed this option. Unanimous consent may be 
                                                                
364 S. Yee, Towards an International Law of Co Progressiveness (Brill Academic Publishers: 2004) 34. 
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appropriate for some types of agreement but it is not in line with what this work has reasoned 
in relation to the nature of the ECHR as needing to evolve to remain relevant and not be held 
back in reflecting the common position by a small number of anomalous government 
practices.  
The member states have contracted to cooperate widely, though not as widely as an idealist 
motivation would infer, based on republican liberalism. In order to continually reinforce 
national faith in democracy and promote democracy elsewhere, there is a necessity to give 
the agents within a democracy the reassurance that progress is being made and that 
democracy is taking them in the right direction. The ECHR is a response to a recognition that 
democracies may progress only by measuring against each other and mutually reinforcing the 
correctness of new government developments. Whatever democracies reveal consistently as 
a norm must be prima facie correct, and those states diverging have presumably fallen 
“behind the curve” of the commonly understood principles and standards for application.  
While there is an implicit expectation of initial variation in interpretation of rights, given 
differences in historical, social and religious backgrounds, there is also anticipation and 
encouragement of the emergence of an ever more comprehensive shared set of principles – 
arguably moving towards a form of European constitution. This element of ambition means 
the project may look towards the aspirational norms adopted by some but not all of the 
member states in their practices.  
Requiring a simple majority is an alternative to complete consent, but given that in stage one 
of the ECtHR process, which is judges considering central questions relating to the very scope 
of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, this may go too far in striving to find a consensus. A 
middle ground is arguably more sensibly inferred. It is suggested that the first reasonable 
point at which national government practice could be used by the ECtHR to interpret a 
common justificatory principle falling under the scope of a right is when there is evidence that 
a quantitively and geopolitically relevant group of states have explored the issue, and a 
majority of the group have adopted practices that accord with the possible new principle. 
[The meaning of significant in this context is explored more in Chapter Six.] Prima facie, it is 
then an interpretation supported by the practices of a majority of the member states, thereby 
the normal outcome of democratic dialect and an ECHR principle to be upheld by the ECtHR. 
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However, it should be recognised that there could be danger in accepting according practices 
from even a clear majority of states as always being the “big bang” for interpreting a new 
common understanding that must be legitimately accepted by other states.   
Any apparent absence of recognition in the practice of other states may be put down to 
simple lack of consideration on their part. For the ECHR collective to work and the progressive 
vision for it be realised is, arguably, reasonable, to build positively with the materials that are 
available, to show a shared norm and not to lament about those which are not. Given the 
limitations of the existing machinery, the ECtHR being required to assume that a passive lack 
of recognition means disapproval, i.e. a lack of practice constitutes contrary evidence to the 
prima facie position, seems excessive.365  
More challenging are those cases raising new principles and applications recognised by the 
majority of states, but actively rejected by others having considered the issue in detail. 
Considering the idea of equal status, wherever there is a significant number of objecting 
states, actually evidenced through contradictory statements or contrary national law, this 
must be a factor that is taken into consideration in the ECtHR’s view whether the prima facie 
position revealed by the majority understanding is correct as a common one.   
Accepting that in determining consensus under the ECHR, a significant majority is only the 
starting point and makes it more likely that the decisions of the ECtHR are likely, on occasion, 
to be controversial. It could not be an exact process and there may even be some dispute 
among the judges in a particular case. When the objections of some states are sufficient to 
defeat the view of the majority it is not a question for which a precise formula is available to 
calculate the correct response.  
The ECtHR’s considerations are partly a matter of how strongly the objections are voiced in 
comparison to how robustly support for recognition of a norm is, how that reasoning accords 
with the range of norms already recognised via existing ECHR case law and persuasive 
                                                                
365 If the membership of the ECHR desire to reduce the necessity of such assumption, one possibility 
is to update the machinery to allow the “gaps” in state views to be filled e.g. an opportunity for any 
member state to give views while a case is progressing or to “red flag” some developments. Such 
possibilities are discussed in Chapter Eight of this work, which considers possible reforms.   
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evidence from democracies external to the ECHR system. They cannot, therefore, be reduced 
to a question of numbers. Where there is any real cause for doubt about a consensus, in spite 
of majority support, the argument of this work is that lack of recognition as a newly 
established commonly understood principle should be the default, with the onus on the party 
claiming one to prove it.  Once more, the examination returns to the notion that what is 
needed is that the response is explained so that its audience (citizens and the states) may 
understand it as demonstrating valid reasons for finding a consensus even in the midst of 
some objection by a minority of states. Chapter Six will explore the difficulties of such 
evidence in creating an approach for the ECtHR. 
This more limited approach to consensus may mean that the normative growth of rights is to 
some extent curtailed and that some individuals miss out on ECHR understandings of norms 
that become common across the Convention community too late for them.366 But if it is the 
case that democracy leads to progress and enlightenment then such outcomes are 
unavoidable and preferable to miss-steps or lack of trust in rulings. 367  The ECHR is not 
                                                                
366 It is worth noting the membership of a large proportion of contracting states to the European 
Union, which takes into consideration the ECHR when passing new laws. The authority of the EU to 
create new objects itself is driving greater consensus, meaning that change may not be as curtailed as 
first thought. A notable case on that potential is DH and Others v the Czech Republic which recognise 
the principle of indirect discrimination by using EU authority. DH and Others v the Czech Republic, 
Application no. 57325/00, Judgment of 13 November 2007. However, too much reliance upon EU 
states only may impact upon the “significance” of the consensus – a point explored in the Chapter Six. 
Additionally, in modern Europe it is now the case that most states unavoidably accept that they are 
no longer isolated and able to make domestic choices without external influence. Quite simply, what 
the rest of Europe does has an effect on citizens beyond the particular nation. People move with 
relative freedom between other countries and the ease of sharing information means that domestic 
values are informed by the wider view. 
367 Lady Justice Arden provides a helpful illustration of the role of state consensus: 
The use of consensus is somewhat like the use of state law by the US Supreme Court – 
Brandeis J famously referred [New State Ice v Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 38] to the 
States’ laws as “laboratories of democracy”.  He said “A state may, if it chooses, serve as a 
laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of society.”  
They could experiment with new ideas, giving new rights to their citizens, and in due course 
the Supreme Court would consider whether those ideas were in fact also reflected in rights in 
the US Constitution. 
Lady Justice Arden, ‘An English Judge in Europe: An article based on the Neill Lecture given in Oxford 
at the invitation of All Souls College, Oxford, on 28 February 2014 in celebration of the past 
Wardenship of Lord Neill of Bladen’, 25-26, available at <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
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primarily concerned with individual justice and its Preamble protects only “certain” rights 
based on “common understandings”. In any event, the current legal order is already facing a 
uniquely challenging time, with the “perfect storm” of an economic crisis, refugee crisis and 
a rise in terrorism and armed conflict, so a more “stable” understanding of the responsibilities 
of states may be helpful in practice.368 It would allow greater reflection by states, turning a 
mirror on the delivery of accepted principles, and also free the ECHR machinery to 
concentrate on their application.369 From a legitimacy perspective, it would also avoid forcing 
new principles and duties ahead of agents (or rather their democratic representatives) 
commonly reasoning them through dialectic reasoning in line with the PGC. 
                                                                
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lj-arden-an-english-judge-in-europe.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2016. 
368 A point recognised by Linos-Alexandre Sicilanos, a judge at the European Court of Human Rights, in 
a recent speech:  
There is no doubt that Europe is currently experiencing a serious crisis. Until recently it was 
thought that this crisis was primarily an economic one. The movement of refugees, 
unprecedented since the Second World War, has added a new dimension to the situation. 
Moreover, as has been clearly shown by the events in Paris in January, in the Isère, in Tunisia 
and in Kuwait in June 2015, and again in Turkey last Saturday, the rise in extremism and 
terrorism, with its barbaric violence, has taken on increasingly worrying proportions. In 
parallel, new armed conflicts have broken out, together with ongoing older conflicts, on our 
continent and in neighbouring regions. 
L. Sicilanos, ‘The European Court of Human Rights at a Time of Crisis in Europe’, SEDI/ESH Lecture, 
ECHR, 16 October 2015, page 1. 
369 Examples of important applications of existing law are provided in the speech by Sicilanos. For 
example, the detention conditions required by Article 3 have been undermined by the economic crisis:  
One only needs to consult the most recent penal statistics of the Council of Europe to see that 
the economic crisis has negatively affected those conditions in European prisons, including in 
stronger States such as Italy or France. The large number of individual applications on the 
subject of detention conditions in Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia or 
Ukraine, clearly reflects the extent of the problem.  
Another example regards the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers:  
In the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, the Grand Chamber expressly emphasised the 
dimension of the problem when it observed, back in 2012, that "[t]he economic crisis [had] 
throw[n] up new challenges for European States in terms of immigration control". I would go 
even further by saying that the economic crisis, together with the migration crisis, has led to 
a sudden rise in xenophobic and extremist reactions; reactions which, in their turn, threaten 
the very pillars which underpin the Convention. 
ibid page 2 
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5.3 Stage Two – Application 
Once a norm is settled as falling under the interpretation of a right, the ever-increasing range 
of now autonomous ECHR legally defined principles of general application must be applied in 
concreto to particular circumstances. The ECtHR must apply standards – rules, factors or 
criteria – relevant to protection, so that these may be applied against national decisions. Once 
established, these criteria also become an autonomous part of the extensive body of ECHR 
jurisprudence.370 As Allan explains, the rights are better understood as reasons informing the 
“specific content” and “application” of criteria to assess the exercise of national decision-
making powers.371  
An ECtHR ruling on disputes to settle the criteria to show appropriate protection of a norm in 
both the decision-making process of the states and the substantive decision is necessary. 
Without some standardisation of the implementation factors there could not be practical, 
effective and cohesive protection. As the work has already argued, settling these is not a task 
for which all agents are equally suited once the question moves to application considerations 
in concreto.  
Expert opinion is necessary but also expertise in the capacity to apply that expert knowledge 
appropriately and to combine it with wider evidence relating to the facts of the case and social 
background and shared moral values and social principles. While it is primarily the role of the 
organs of national democracy to apply that knowledge, oversight of that process is the type 
of task for which judges have particular aptitude, training and experience, making them 
                                                                
370 As Sedley notes: 
‘[I]f you are serious about the universality of human rights the Convention cannot mean one 
thing in Britain and another thing, on indistinguishable facts, in Denmark or Russia.’ 
S. Sedley, “Human Rights and the Whirligig of Time”, Edinburgh Law Review (2016) 1,6. 
371 T.R.S. Allan, “Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) Law 
Quarterly Review 96, 96. 
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uniquely well-suited. The removal from the constraints of elections also puts the ECtHR judges 
in a strong position of independence in such a reflective task.372  
It is therefore to be expected that the ECtHR would enjoy stronger autonomy at this second 
stage of the judicial process. It is performing its most central function, safeguarding against 
the underlying risks of democracy which, at times, may give way to factors such as 
misinformation, stagnation, majoritarianism, utilitarianism, cost, or panic. An effective 
judiciary must keep in check the danger of larger classes within a population unfairly 
overriding the rights of others through convenience, fear, intolerance or out-dated 
understandings, or of the governing bodies failing to act reasonably in ensuring proper 
consideration, accountability and consistency.  
Despite its stronger autonomy from the member states, similar concerns do still arise, as for 
stage one, if the autonomy of the ECtHR is argued too strongly. The risks of a prematurely 
decisive ECtHR imposing relatively uniform decisions, are highlighted by Lord Hoffmann:        
In practice the Court has not taken the doctrine of the margin of appreciation nearly 
far enough. It has been unable to resist the temptation to aggrandize its jurisdiction 
and to impose uniform rules on Member States. It considers itself the equivalent of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, laying down a federal law of Europe.373  
To challenge the authority of the democratic states in relation to application, the ECtHR needs 
to show that: (1) the overarching common standard for democratic due process was not 
complied with by the state in making a decision; (2) there is evidence that was not factored 
into the decision-making process relating to facts (of the case and social background) or to 
opinion from relevant experts; or (3) the ultimate substantive decision of the respondent 
state was not that of a reasonable person. The procedural element (an informed democratic 
decision-making process, including a review of relevant evidence) and the substantive 
                                                                
372 Regarding the advantages of political independence see J. Alvarez, International Organizations as 
Law-Makers (Oxford University Press: 2005). 
 373 Lord Hoffmann, The Universality of Human Rights, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, 19 March 
2009 available at <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Universality_of_Human_Rights.pdf
> accessed 16 December 2017. 
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element form two different points of the margin of appreciation open to states when applying 
ECHR community principles. 
In settling the criteria relevant to the procedural margin of appreciation, the ECtHR is 
empowered to perform the judicial role of determining whether overarching standards of 
democratic principles were upheld, facts and evidence properly identified and considered, 
and relevant national and international expert opinion factored.   
In selecting expert opinion for this purpose, questions are raised about the propensity of the 
ECtHR to rely on a wide variety of international sources to show new standards. Given the 
nature of the ECHR as progressive and the strong autonomy of the ECtHR in this second stage, 
identification of relevant international evidence is to be welcomed as the Court being diligent 
and ensuring that the Convention keeps pace with wider legal developments. However, unlike 
nationally placed expert bodies or professions, assuming that a democracy must recognise 
the authority of international bodies without proof of democratic acceptance raises 
challenges of institutional legitimacy in relation to the ECtHR. As such, it is arguable that a 
consensus of the member states in their recognition of the expertise of an international 
institution on the subject area is necessary, in order for any common duty to take it into 
consideration. This is a point explored in more detail in Chapter Six. 
Provided the procedural review requirements were complied with, given the trust in the 
democratic process under republican liberalism, there must be a prima facie presumption 
that the substantive response could be reached by a reasonable person, thereby requiring a 
less intensive review. Whereas, conversely, where due democratic process is not followed, 
the substantive decision must be unsupported and so a breach of the ECHR probably requiring 
remedial action by a fresh correctly conducted government review.374 
                                                                
374In Animal Defenders v United Kingdom, the ECtHR established a clear connection between the 
parliamentary process and the margin of appreciation. The majority opinion was that: 
[T]he quality of the parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of the measure is of 
particular importance in this respect [assessing the proportionality of the legislator’s choices], 
including to the operation of the relevant margin of appreciation.  
Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom, Application No.  48876/08, Judgment of 22 April 
2013, para 108. 
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It is helpful at this point to reiterate the point that the principle of subsidiarity means that the 
ECHR does not require an answer to all human rights concerns. The role of the ECtHR is to 
identify only: (1) whether ECHR community standards for democratic due process in decision-
making were satisfied; and (2) to challenge a substantive decision of a state that is not one 
that a reasoned person would reach. The national legal system otherwise provides the 
answer, as guided by national constitutional values and national democratic representatives. 
The role of the ECtHR is not necessarily to create completely uniform law on delivering a 
generic moral norm in particular circumstances, but rather a uniform basis for assessment.  
The ECtHR’s task is to check that the factors applied in the procedural review would have 
allowed a reasonable person to reach the same conclusion as the state and to look for any 
deviation from responses to delivery that are commonly emerging. Therefore, the decision of 
whether there has been an interference with a norm and if so, for a non-absolute right, 
amounts to an unjustifiable interference by a member state in a particular instance, cannot 
be reduced to a binary question of yes or no and is rather a matter of degree. While the ECtHR 
must be trusted to perform its ultimate function of determining upon reasoning by 
governments, there always remains this allowance of choice, creating a margin of 
appreciation afforded to member states.375  
The view taken by this work, that there is margin open to states in the determination of 
whether a norm has been interfered with is somewhat controversial, as the work has noted 
that legal definitions of the norms once recognised are autonomous. This may suggest that a 
state has no choice in determining whether there is an interference, there either is or there 
is not, with a margin left regarding only the question whether that interference was 
                                                                
375 Described by Gross and Ni Aolain: 
Generally speaking, the doctrine stands for the notion that the authorities of each state party 
to the European Convention ought to be allowed a certain measure of discretion in 
implementing the standards enshrined in the Convention. Using the margin of appreciation, 
the Court gives the state coming before it a certain leeway in choosing the appropriate 
regulatory response to matters affecting rights protection within the state’s territorial 
boundaries. 
O. Gross and F. Ni Aolain, “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 625, 626. 
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necessary. This view can, however, be challenged by taking the most extreme example of a 
right, the norms of which the state is never permitted to interfere with and where the ECtHR 
has worked hard to provide an autonomous definition – the absolute protection accorded 
under Article 3. In spite of the ECtHR never referring to a margin of appreciation in its dealings 
with this Article, a review of its case law reveals that: 
The Commission and the Court have always operated on the basis that whilst the 
prohibitions in Article 3 are absolute and in principle not negotiable, assessment of 
the specific conduct under consideration can only be subjective [emphasis added].376 
Overall, with regard to Article 3 the ECtHR has established that “effective protection is not 
synonymous with total protection”.377 To suggest that the subjective element in determining 
whether, for example, particular conduct amounts to torture or that the risk of torture is too 
high for an individual to be exposed to it, is anything other than the provision of a margin is 
arguably failing to recognise a practical and necessary truth. 
Moving to consider the substantive margin of appreciation, the degree of choice left to the 
state must depend upon factors including: (1) the importance of the principle(s) raised; (2) 
consensus in national and recognised international expert opinion required to have been 
considered as part of the procedural review; and (3) the extent that there are 
comparable/equivalent issues and the presence or absence of consensus in decisions on 
delivery by similarly affected member states. This last consideration means that the weighting 
of consistent expert opinion, may be undermined when challenged by the presence of 
divergent positions taken in response to it by states. This makes evidence of the membership 
declining to commit to an expert opinion (even that of a body they normally respect) or 
adopting contrary practices highly relevant. Where the operation of democracy reveals a 
flexible approach, that must be recognised. Under republican liberalism, the basis for 
cooperation was not an idealist stance that the decisions of all member states in observing 
the principles should be routinely challenged by judicial review but rather that the worth of 
                                                                
376 M. Addo and N. Grief, “Does Article 3 of The European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine 
Absolute Rights?” (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 510, 517. 
377 ibid 519. 
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democratic bodies should be reinforced in the conclusions they reach being normally 
reinforced as correct.  
The ECtHR's relative insulation from everyday pressures and removal from the varied local 
cultural, economic, political and religious structures of member states is problematic. In 
assessing whether the decision is one that a reasonable person would reach, the ECtHR must 
be aware that it does not have an equal appreciation of the situation on the ground. Without 
appropriate evidence of judicial restraint, as the work has argued for the interpretive stage 
one of the ECtHR process, the concerns expressed by the contracting states of unlimited 
growth beyond mission and the undermining of democracy appear supported. While 
consensus is not determinative on the issue378, the ECtHR should be cautious in challenging 
the democratic process in the absence of state consensus on standards regarding application 
and it must be the key influencer of the substantive margin of appreciation.379 In the absence 
of lack of due democratic process, a manifestly wrong or excessive response, or weighty and 
consistent contrary expert opinion, the ECtHR is in difficult territory justifying its reasoning as 
superior on the issue to that of democratic government. 
Even where there is consensus on substantive application, Dzehtsiarou suggests that:  
European consensus is a rebuttable presumption, which means that the contracting 
parties are presumed to be in violation of the Convention if their solution diverges 
                                                                
378 Wildhaber, Hjartarson and Donnelly note following a review of its case law that, ‘the [C]ourt has 
never indicated that it considers consensus as binding’.  
L. Wildhaber, A. Hjartarson, S. Donnelly "No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights" (2013) 33 Human Rights Law Journal 248, 262. 
379 In Animal Defenders v United Kingdom, the majority of the ECtHR, in addition to the UK adherence 
to a due democratic process, attached weight also to the lack of a European consensus between the 
member States on how to regulate paid political advertising in broadcasting and that a lack of relevant 
consensus among could favour a somewhat wider margin of appreciation. 
Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom, Application No.  48876/08, Judgment of 22 April 
2013, para 123. 
For a review of the ECtHR’s combined use of European consensus and the new procedural approach 
to the margin of appreciation, which has now been seen in several judgments, see T. Kleinlein, 
"Consensus and Contestability: The ECtHR and the Combined Potential of European Consensus and 
Procedural Rationality Control" (2017) European Journal of International Law 871. 
Page 249 of 391 
 
from the solution adopted by the majority, unless they can provide sufficient and 
weighty reasons for such divergence.380   
Recognising this degree of choice afforded to member states is not to accept that the margin 
should be vaguely defined. Given the very essence or spirit of the ECHR is that shared 
community principles are better protected through centralised monitoring of democratic 
government compliance with standards, it is arguable that the margin allowable in each case 
should be as clearly set out as is supportable.381 If the work of the ECtHR is carried out 
robustly, with reliance on appropriate evidence, it is difficult to challenge the legitimacy of 
what the Court then demands a member state must demonstrate as having being duly 
considered in its decision-making procedure and its conclusions relating to the effectiveness 
and proportionality of the outcome. 
The element of choice left to states is not then to be seen as a concession to a respondent 
state, which may be simply increased or decreased “across the board”, as a simplistic reading 
of the demands in the Brighton declaration relating to the margin of appreciation may 
suggest. Rather it is something which must be, as far as possible, based on an objective view 
of the evidence available to support a conclusion on what member states must do to satisfy 
their responsibilities for a particular norm raised in that case. States require the best possible 
guidance on the factors they are required to, demonstrably, consider and balance. Without 
this, there are difficulties in terms of certainty, both for individuals making claims and for 
contracting states proactively seeking to fulfil their obligations.  
5.4 Prioritisation of Serious Breaches 
The concern of member states that remains (having considered the role of consensus and the 
margin of appreciation in relation to unlimited growth beyond mission and undermining 
democracy), is a lack of prioritisation of serious breaches.  
                                                                
380 K. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Cambridge University Press: 2015) 2. 
381 See J. Brauch, ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004) 11 Columbia Journal of Law 113.  
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The ECtHR has the advantage of removal from political pressure and potentially the benefit 
of seeing the bigger and longer-term picture. This puts it in the better position for deciding 
whether particular cases, while not seen as a national priority, may be considered as 
important for the community as a whole. As a founding ECHR figure, Teitgen, explained, lesser 
transgressions must be stopped to prevent escalation. The Second World War had shown 
that:  
Democracies do not become Nazi countries in one day. Evil progresses cunningly … 
one by one freedoms are suppressed. Public opinion and the entire national 
conscience are asphyxiated […] It is necessary to intervene before it is too late. A 
conscience must exist somewhere which will sound the alarm to the minds of a 
nation.382 
Overall, in its role as the interpreter of requirements, the ECtHR must enjoy strong autonomy 
determining when judicial review is needed to support a practical and coordinated response. 
It cannot be expected that contracting states could easily challenge decisions of the ECtHR on 
its view on the degree of seriousness of an alleged violation, provided reasonable supporting 
evidence and reasoning is provided. 383  However, accepting that it is for the ECtHR to 
determine the level of seriousness, does not remove the Court from a responsibly to provide 
reasoning on why the threshold has been met.  
Noting republican liberalism as the basis for cooperation, it may be argued that frequent 
questioning does not best reinforce democracy and that shifting too much focus from national 
to international systems may risk impeding change and development within states and 
undermine faith and engagement with the democratic process. The democratic state is 
authorised and entrusted to represent the reasoning and meet the needs of citizens in 
allocating limited resources effectively and in prioritising intervention and support. Where a 
                                                                
382 Consultative Assembly, Official Reports (August 1949) 1158. 
383 The introduction of the right to individual petition supports the autonomous principles as applied 
by the ECtHR being the driver for action, rather than States choosing when action is needed. 
Although, as will be considered in Chapter Eight of this work exploring possible agreed reforms to the 
system, states could have a role in agreeing areas they accept are in urgent need of review. Then, 
independent of a particular case as required to trigger the ECtHR, awareness and debate could be 
encouraged and greater consolidated action possible.   
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breach is not serious, it may be that the member state is currently prioritising more pressing 
points.384  
Increasingly, by settling all matters internationally, it may also result in people becoming less 
inclined to develop their own norms and routes for dispute resolution. While made in relation 
to the European Union, the point is well made by Everson and Joerges:  
Europeanisation and globalisation determine that contemporary societies are 
experiencing an ever greater gulf between decision makers and those who are 
impacted upon by decision making. This schism is a normative challenge to democratic 
orders. Constitutional States can no longer guarantee voice for all persons impacted 
upon by their internal decision-making processes. The democratic notion of self-
legislation, which postulated that the addressees of a law are also its authors, 
nonetheless demands the inclusion of the other. The conflicts-law approach builds 
upon this eternal observation; Member States are no longer in a position to guarantee 
the democratic legitimacy of their policies. However, at the outset of the 21st century, 
a democracy that pays no heed to the excluded other is no democracy at all. At the 
same time, "universalist organisation", the aspiration for unbounded social justice - at 
least as it is expressed in legal institutions - is at worst a chimera, at best, a still elusive 
goal [emphasis added].385 
This, in turn, limits their usefulness as agents acting as the moral compass in accordance with 
the PGC, from a practical view and also reduces the sense of social responsibility to abide by 
our own reasoning of duties outside of any risk of legal sanction. To rely upon an international 
body to assist where it does not have the resources, may arguably be harmful, creating false 
hope of support in groups who may act to their detriment (or fail to act assuming international 
scrutiny will come to their aid). It may therefore be reasonable to limit the ECtHR to acting 
where it is satisfied of either: (1) a significant impact on the given individual; or (2) a question 
with the potential to significantly impact upon the respondent state or the ECHR community. 
The decision of this work to suggest a “significant” impact rather than a “serious” impact upon 
the claimant is reached only after further considering the nature of the ECHR. Under a 
                                                                
384 Even what begins a less serious issues could, in time, develop into a serious breach if it continues 
for a prolonged period with the state falling further behind the standard and showing little indication 
of a serious commitment to change. 
385 M. Everson and C. Joerges, "Reconfiguring the Politics-Law Relationship in the Integration Project 
through Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism" (2012) 18(5) European Law Journal 644,663. 
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republican liberalism view, the primary mission of the ECtHR is not to provide individual relief 
but rather more of a “constitutional” safeguarding and supporting of the overall operation of 
democracy. This does not suggest that every complaint must be heard, no matter its 
severity;386 there is no impetus to act where, for example, small sums of money are involved 
or a formal step missed that has no impact in practice. However, arguably, constitutional 
justice can be delivered only through the adjudication of individual complaints and there is 
no justice at all without an effective remedy.387 Following the introduction of the individual 
right to petition under ECHR Protocol 11 in 1994, this need was recognised. A reliance upon 
member states filing complaints against each other as contracting states was insufficient. 
Where there is a significant impact on the claimant, then the right of individual petition must 
provide access the ECtHR to settle the dispute.  
Where, however, the impact is not significant on the individual, then the approach under a 
republic liberalism theory is to avoid unnecessary interference with the democratic process. 
Again, a test of whether the potential breach was sufficiently serious388  was considered. 
However, the ECHR process is not concerned with whether a state is to be held culpable. It is 
aimed rather at strengthening the process of democracy and the illumination/dissemination 
of its work to meet shared expectations. This means that the ECtHR should have the ability to 
intervene wherever the case in question could have a significant impact upon the respondent 
state or the wider ECHR community. 
5.5 Chapter Conclusions 
In summary the judicial model for a legitimate ECtHR process must be built upon a number of 
central tenets informing its structure: 
                                                                
386 C. Hioureas, “Behind the Scenes of Protocol No. 14: Politics in Reforming the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2006) 24:2 Berkeley Journal of International Law 718, 732. 
387  S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 165. 
388 The EU approach to state liability is useful here. In Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany (1996) C-46/93 
[56]-[59], the Court of Justice advised a breach is to be regarded as 'sufficiently serious' by weighing a 
range of factors, such as whether it was voluntary, or persistent.  
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The authority and the autonomy of the ECtHR as a resolver of human rights stems from 
its recognition by the contracting member states.  
The original government object and purpose of the founding states of ECHR sets the 
ECtHR’s mandate and limits of its authority and autonomy, in the absence of clear consent 
subsequently by the contracting member states to a change. 
That original understating relates not to how the founding states would have understood 
the normative scope and application of rights at the time but rather how they understood 
the object and purpose of the ECHR and, therefore, the means for its development, a type 
of “living originalism”.  
The object and purpose of the ECHR supports a “republican liberalism” objective, 
reinforcing democratic procedure and decisions and not primarily delivering individual 
justice. 
The operation of democracy is accepted as the legitimate means to identify the normative 
scope of the ECHR rights and to deliver them in practice. 
The role of the ECtHR is to interpret the normative scope of the rights, in accordance with 
the common practices of the member states, and to oversee the application of norms in 
accordance with standards for democratic due process, including consideration of expert 
evidence, and for reasonable substantive decisions in light of the findings from that 
process. 
As an institution tasked with oversight of the operation of democracy and not itself a 
democratically representative body, the ECtHR is not expected to routinely question 
governments and thereby risk undermining faith in and engagement by citizens with the 
state. Therefore: 
The ECtHR should find a case admissible where there is a significant impact upon the 
applicant or the potential for a significant impact upon the respondent state or the wider 
ECHR community.  
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Given that it is not possible to fully extrapolate all necessary meanings regarding the 
interpretation and application of the rights from the text of the ECHR, a reasonable route 
must be found. Democracy is the route for constructing societal norms. This allows for 
development of the rights by the ECtHR, in accordance with the role given to the democratic 
process as legitimising authority based on a Democratic Justification Thesis: 
While questions are in abstracto principles are of general application and do not require 
expertise to reason upon, it is for agents in a society via a social contract based upon 
democracy to reason and to construct justified moral norms. The practices of 
governments evidence the democratic understandings of the underlying societal 
principles. Interpretation of government practices across the membership, to find 
common ECHR community understanding, is the role of the ECtHR.  
Interpreting the moral principles which could justify common governments practices and 
translating them into substantive legal definitions, is a role to which ECtHR is uniquely suited. 
It is the body designed to provide an oversight of the big picture, to recognise commonality, 
and act as the expert legal thinker.  
In keeping with living originalism, “consensus” in the practices of the governments of member 
states was the route for first recognising the norms constructed as human rights in the ECHR 
and is thereby recognised as a basis for consensual growth in international law in general. It 
provides the route forward in the absence of any other uncontested method. 
The ECHR object and purpose of republican liberalism means that it is reasonable not to 
require the level of consensus called for elsewhere in international law. A significant majority 
consensus of member states reveals a clear democratic trend towards prima facie recognition 
of a new norm. Although, express contrary evidence from any member States must be 
factored in by the ECtHR against such acknowledgement.  
Democracy is also the route for applying the generic ECHR principles of general application in 
particular circumstances, but this is subject to ECtHR oversight safeguards: 
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In the in concreto application, the ECtHR enjoys wider autonomy to identify and apply the 
factors for a compliant state decision. Here, the ECtHR prevents states from erring 
because of pressure, misinformation or bias.  
In the in concreto stage, the reasoning of all agents is appropriately enhanced by the use 
of reasoning by experts and by oversight ensuring that the overarching common 
standards for democratic due process were followed and that a reasonable decision was 
reached based on that evidence and process. 
In the procedural review, the deployment of a democratic process informed by 
appropriate factual evidence (of the case and social background) and expert opinion are 
used to assess state compliance. 
Provided the state complies with the procedural requirements, there is a strong prima 
facie presumption that the substantive decision made is legitimate. If it does not, then the 
substantive decision is unsupportable as "democratic" and so unsustainable. 
The reasonableness of the substantive decision reached by the democratic process may 
still be challenged as not corresponding with a decision a reasonable person would make.  
The degree of choice, or margin, left to the state varies, with consensus between states 
on the correct response to similar issues being a key factor. 
The tenets underlying the structure for any legitimate judicial model for the ECtHR, to be 
developed into a full proposed improved model in Chapter Six, can be summarised as: 
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Fig. 5.2 Tenets Underlying the Structure for a Legitimate Judicial Model for the ECtHR
An admissibility criteria limiting the ECtHR's intervention to 
cases in which the outcome will potentially have a significant 
impact.
For a new norm under the parameteres of the right at issue 
to be recognised as democratically constructed in the first in
abstracto stage of the ECtHR’s decision making, consensus in 
confirmatory practices from a substantial majority of the 
member states is necessary. 
This creates prima facie recognition as a community wide 
norm to be translated into a ECHR legal norm by the ECtHR.
The assessment of application of that  norm in concreto by a 
state must be based primailry upon a judicial review of the  
adequacy of the democratic evaluation and use of relevant 
factual evidence (of the case and social background) and 
expert opinion. 
Where a state complied with the procedural requirements, 
there must be  a default to the substantive decisions reached 
creating a strong prima facie assumption they are reasonable.
Where it did not, that must be a breach in its own right and a 
review, that follows due-process, would normally be 
required. 
The margin left to the state in the judicial review of whether 
its subtantive decisions were those of a reasonable person 
must be signficantly influenced by the degree of consensus 
on delivery in similar member states, to the extent that 
comparable/equivalent issues are raised.
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6 Chapter Six 
 
Development of a Proposed Corrective 
Judicial Model and Review of the Present 
European Court of Human Rights Approach 
 
An improved judicial model in line with the 
analytical framework for assessment of the Court 
procedure 
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6.1 Introduction 
Phase six of the project is the formulation and explanation, using illustrative case law, of a 
proposed improved model for judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
This task is preceded by identification of the suggested shortfalls of the current approach.   
The corrective model is built upon the analytical framework for assessing the legitimacy of 
ECtHR procedure under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presented in 
Chapter Four (identified in Fig. 4.3) and the conclusions with respect to the tenets underlying 
the structure for a legitimate judicial model presented in Chapter Five (identified in Fig. 5.2). 
6.2 Stage One - Interpretation 
6.2.1 Questions that Fall Under Stage One 
This stage itself incorporates two questions: 
a) The normative parameters of the right at issue.  
 
ECtHR case law already accepts that candidate norms that may fall under the scope of a 
right do not necessarily do so. There are “inherent” accepted limits on the scope of 
principles of general application. Such limits are, according to this work, those constructed 
by the societal moral reasoning of communicative and dialogical agents (represented via 
democratic representatives) in evaluating solutions to the generic issues faced by all 
agents and the expectations that form the minimum underlying common expectations. 
For example, Shindler v the United Kingdom389 concerned election laws preventing people 
resident outside of the UK for more than 15 years from voting (Article 3 of the First 
Protocol: Right to free elections). The ECtHR accepted the need for such a limitation. In 
terms of interpretation of the meaning of the right to vote, the case suggests that the 
normative scope of the general right is limited to citizens actively involved in the given 
state. This was not reasoning only particular circumstances or people, it is a norm of 
                                                                
389 Shindler v the United Kingdom, Application No. 19840/09, Judgment of 7 May 2013. 
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general application. Nor was it guided by reasoning that required special expertise or 
experience. It was, in accordance with the reasoning of this work, an in abstracto analysis 
under stage one of a consideration by the ECtHR. (Conversely, the limitation to 15 years 
would have fallen under what this work terms the application stage). 
b)  The conditions that permit interference with that principle of general application 
(restrictions/limitations) in particular circumstances. 
For example: the norms generally recognised under the right to privacy may be limited in 
particular circumstances where there is a danger to the public if details are not shared; 
freedom of speech may be restricted for reasons of public morality or security; and a life 
may be taken where there is a danger to the public or another individual. Returning to the 
right to vote, examples allowing legitimate interreference in particular circumstances 
include criminality, mental incapacity, and non-residency.   
These questions, while in abstracto, are those that this work has argued may be decided only 
by the ECtHR interpreting the practices of the democratic governments and finding 
understandings that could be reasoned to show support for moral principles.  These are then 
the shared commonly understood points under the normative scope of the rights. A 
significant majority consensus means it can be reasonably presumed that it is an ECHR 
community norm. This does raise the issue of what is meant by a majority and what is meant 
by significant. 
Some international law systems do provide a definition, for example the UN General 
Assembly calls for a two-third majority (66.7%) for important decisions390 and the EU requires 
55% of countries and 65% of the EU population.391 Even with a consensus that is quantitatively 
                                                                
390 The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations comprising all of its 193 
Member States. Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of 
new members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority.  
391 The Treaty of Lisbon established a dual majority system for adopting decisions. A qualified majority 
is achieved if it covers at least 55% of Member States representing at least 65% of the population of 
the EU. This system therefore assigns a vote to each Member State while taking account of their 
demographic weight. The Treaty of Lisbon also provides for a blocking minority composed of at least 
four Member States representing over 35% of the EU population. For more information see 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:ai0008> accessed 24 March 2017. 
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relevant, as Draghici notes, care is also needed to ensure that the consensus is geopolitically 
representative: 
‘[I]f consensus operates by analogy with customary law, there cannot be entire sub 
regional blocs outside of the alleged normative trend.’392  
The selection of the sample for the survey is important if it is to be significant. Ideally, all 
member states of an agreement would be included but it may be questioned whether this is 
feasible. On this point, the work of Draghici is again useful: 
The doctrine could be reorganised around several cumulative criteria: a comparative 
survey encompassing all States or a sample representative of all major geopolitical 
blocs, as historically defined (e.g. Western Europe, Eastern Europe); […] this rule must 
be observed by a highly qualified majority (with a higher ratio for correction if 
assessment is based on a sample); no contrary practice from an geopolitical bloc 
(conversely, the departure of a minority of States from the rule should not bar its 
formation) […]393 
Two points can be drawn from this. First, that it may be acceptable to use what evidence of 
practice is available from a sample. Evidence might not be available from all of the 
membership. For example, not all member states may have yet considered the issue (some 
might not even be faced with it). This work would suggest that the position taken by some 
states is significant, provided they are quantitively and geopolitically relevant. Where a 
majority within a significant sample made up the states who have debated an issue have 
reached a similar view, this must be prima facie a new norm.  
Second, member states may form a blocking minority. If member states form a blocking 
minority, the points they raise must be clearly considered and factored into the decision of 
the ECtHR to recognise a new principle. 394    
                                                                
392 C. Draghici, “The Strasbourg Court Between European and Local Consensus: Anti-Democratic or 
Guardian of Democratic Process?” Public Law (2017) 11, 19. 
393 ibid 21. 
394  Alter, in relation to international courts generally, makes a strong point about the danger of 
reliance upon the view of some but not all states: 
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The requirement for methodological transparency in the ECtHR consensus analysis is 
demanding. But this at the point of in abstracto review of what the common understanding 
of the normative scope of the rights is i.e. the very duties to which the membership has 
agreed. Once an ECHR principle is interpreted from the common practices of the 
governments, it is then the role of the ECtHR to translate it into a henceforth autonomous 
substantive legal norm. For most cases that come before the ECtHR, the relevant norm and 
its general restrictions are already well established. It is the in concreto application (under 
stage two of the proposed judicial model) that is in question and it will be proposed by this 
work that consensus is less onerous as a requirement under that phase.  
6.2.2 Questions that Cannot Fall Under Stage One 
6.2.2.1 Norms that do not Apply Generally 
Stage one concerns only generic norms that “all” agents could express as rights and duties 
acceptable to “all”. Any such the norm must be expressed generally, so that anyone “could” 
accept it, whatever the particular features or ends pertaining to an individual. 
This means a norm is not generic if it applies unfairly against a group with inherent 
characteristics (i.e. is discriminatory). For example, a principle that, “Everyone who is white 
has the right to vote” could not be a generic principle. A generic principle could however 
include a general restriction, “Everyone of sound character and with capacity has the right to 
vote”.  
                                                                
States are concerned about slippage, meaning they are concerned about international judges 
interpreting the rules of the collective principal [States] in ways that were not intended and 
that the collective principal does not want and would not have agreed to. But here the 
problem of collective principals [...] manifests itself. The ICs [international court] 
interpretation may not be what the collective would agree to, but it likely does represent what 
a sub-set of States actually prefer. Thus IC slippage is really about ICs awarding victories in 
politically contested cases that state-litigants could not win in negotiations, and thus 
essentially rewriting through interpretation the law that States have agreed to. Even if a State-
litigant chooses to ignore the IC ruling, the legal ruling itself can shift the political context by 
changing the status quo of what the law means in the eyes of others; by labelling a state’s 
extant policy “illegal” popular support for the policy can be undermined. 
K. Alter, “Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Re-Contracting Political Power” in D. 
Hawkins, D, Lake, D. Nielson and M. Tierney (eds.) Delegation and Agency in International 
Organizations (Cambridge University Press: 2008) 316. 
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The limitation to white persons would, then, fall under stage two of the proposed ECtHR 
model i.e. the point of applying the generic norm to specific circumstance or people. It would 
clearly fail the test as acceptable to a reasonable person, given clear victimisation based on 
objectively incorrect knowledge or self-interest.  
Taking a modern example, gender self-identity is now recognised under ECHR case law as a 
protected aspect of a person’s inherent self-identity. To now deny that right to those who are 
gender neutral could not be generic under stage one. Such a limitation would again fall under 
stage two and require justification beyond it being “different” minority condition of gender 
dysphoria.  
That the norm must be general also means that different treatment of identified individuals 
could not fall under stage one. For example, “Everyone has the right to a fair trial, except for 
Mr X of whom the public have formed a strong dislike”. Again, the question of the different 
treatment of Mr X would fall under stage two of the proposed judicial model. 
6.2.2.2 Particular Circumstances 
Stage one relates to the generic general norms of any society and not their application to a 
specific situation or localised national setting. For example, “There is a right to privacy, even 
in public spaces, but that is currently suspended in the UK because of a high terror alert 
status”, this would fall under stage two of the process, as a particular non-general application 
due to a specific threat. 
6.2.2.3 Requisite Expert and Technical Knowledge 
The interpretation stage cannot raise points upon which an informed view could not be 
developed by all. Any point requiring expert knowledge falls under stage two. For example, 
“Abortion is allowed, but up to 24 weeks only” would fall under stage two, as an application 
of expert knowledge. “Abortion is allowed, until the foetus is viable” would fall under stage 
one. “Everyone aged over 18 years old has the right to vote” would fall under stage two, but 
“Everyone with the maturity to make an informed choice has the right to vote” could fall 
under stage one. 
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6.2.3 Distinguishing Between Stages One and Two 
It is accepted that it may sometimes be difficult to determine whether a case requires (1) the 
adoption of an established existing principle to be applied in concreto to a new situation; or 
(2) an extension of the normative scope of a right to include a new principle.   
A legal norm is autonomous once recognised, and that definition may thereafter be applied 
to any circumstances under stage two provided there is no reasonable alternative view on 
whether the right is raised/has been triggered. For example, to: (1) identify the real character 
of member state behaviour395; (2) be adapted to determine the impact of changes in modern 
living arrangements and relationships396, changes brought about by advent of new technology 
such as the internet or in vitro fertilisation 397 , the emergence of new organisational 
                                                                
395 For example, in Tyrer v the United Kingdom, the question of whether corporal punishment was 
degrading treatment under Article 3 was not determined by public opinion on whether it did so but 
upon the real nature or character of the punishment. Tyrer v the United Kingdom, Application No. 
5856/72, Judgment of 25 April 1978. 
In Engel and Others v the Netherlands the ECtHR was asked whether proceedings in a military court 
against soldiers for disciplinary offences involved criminal charges within the meaning of Article 6. 
Regarding the classification of offences as disciplinary thereby avoiding the right to a fair trial, the 
ECtHR recognised that the true nature of the offence and the severity of the penalty actually 
determine whether an applicant is the subject of a ‘criminal charge’. Engel and Others v the 
Netherlands, Application No. 5100/71, Judgment of 8 June 1976. 
There can be no degree of relativity in the constructed definition interpreting a principle (only in its 
application). To allow that would be at variance with spirit of the ECHR providing for universal rights 
and freedoms. 
396 For example, in Nazarenko v Russia it was held there may be family ties, with the legal test based 
around the development of a close emotional bond, between individual who are not biologically 
related. Irrespective of whether this is how people traditionally define family. Nazarenko v Russia, 
Application No. 39438/13, Judgment of 16 July 2015. 
In Zaunegger v Germany, the position of a father in claiming custody post separation was considered 
and the Court found that:  
[I]n this context that although there exists no European consensus as to whether fathers of 
children born out of wedlock have a right to request joint custody even without the consent 
of the mother, the common part of departure in the majority of member States appears to be 
that decisions regarding the attribution of custody are to be based on the child’s best interest 
[...] [emphasis added]. 
Zaunegger v Germany, Application No. 22028/04, Judgment of 3 December 2009, at para. 60. 
397  For example, in Parrillo v Italy, in considering whether embryos obtained from an in vitro 
fertilisation were part of the donor’s private life under Article 8, the autonomous background 
understanding of genetic material being part of a person’s identity could be applied. Protection was 
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structures398, or new threats such as human trafficking399; or (3) to respond to questions 
about the inclusion of particular activities within those rules.400  
In such situations, the ECtHR decision as to whether the same normative principle is raised 
must be authoritative but it is suggested by this work that the Court proceed with caution, in 
order to claim legitimacy. The earlier analysis of this work in relation to formalism and to 
extrapolation demonstrates the dangers of expansive reasoning which constructs widely 
encompassing legal categories from existing text and rulings in response to a dispute.401 Olsen 
and Toddington note: 
What is wrong with constructing more general, more widely encompassing 
categories? The answer is, nothing – unless the attempt to find relevant and significant 
common characteristics among various disputes is in some way fallacious or 
erroneous or antithetical to what might be seen as the proper conception of valid or 
proper legal reasoning. For legal disputes arise in virtue of disagreement or confusion 
concerning various interests perceived in terms of entitlements or permissions and 
the duties and liabilities correlate to them. These real normative concerns are 
categorised and coded by the law and thereby transformed from social disputes into 
legal disputes [...] Formalist developments in legal reasoning ignores important 
differences in this regard in an attempt to develop a “one size fits all” model of legal 
rules. A blanket imposition of a maximally general rule appears as an “efficient” way 
of terminating growing numbers of disputes, but again […] the rule, like a badly made 
suit, “fits” a particular dispute only where it happens, contingently, to “touch” it. In 
other words, the carefully reasoned, particular, tailor-made principles deemed to be 
substantively legitimate responses to prior conflicts of rights and interests are used 
fraudulently. They are used as collateral to lever up the dynamic range of authority to 
                                                                
therefore afforded (although ultimately the claim failed once it was decided that the limits imposed 
were legitimate). Parrillo v Italy, Application No. 46470/11, Judgment of 27 August 2015.  
398  For example, in Matthews v UK the evolution of the EU European Parliament fell under the 
autonomous meaning of having an ability to vote in relation to a maker of domestic laws. The 
Parliament had the characteristics of a “legislature” in Gibraltar.  Matthews v the United Kingdom, 
Application No. 24833/94, Judgment of 18 Feb 1999, at para 39. 
399 See again, Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, Application No. 25965/04, Judgment of 7 January 2010. 
400 For example, in X and Y v the Netherlands in reasoning that respect for private life includes the right 
to establish and to develop emotional relationships with other human beings, of which sexual life must 
be an important part. X and Y v the Netherlands, Application No. 8978/80), Judgment of 26 March 
1985. 
401 See Chapter Five extrapolation and Chapter Two on formalism (and the issues with a realist stance 
as a full resolution to those problems). 
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invent more general rules which […] are mere fictions and thus, at least in some cases, 
are inappropriate or invalid responses to at least some disputes.402 
The ECtHR must show that it is responsive to the communicative reasoning of agents via 
democracy as the means for constructing new moral norms under the rights. Where there is 
any doubt about whether or how an existing principle “touches” the case, a stage one review 
for consensus should be carried out. To do otherwise risks the ECtHR appearing to impose the 
subjective norms preferred by its judges and their worldview in settling the scope of the right 
at issue, without the relative legitimacy of the norms justified by operation of democratic 
process. Democracy is the agreed route for societal construction of compromised 
dialectically-contingent norms between agents in accordance with ethical reasoning under 
the PGC. 
6.3 Stage Two – Implementation Requirements and Assessing 
Application 
Following stage one, certain justified moral norms now have an autonomous substantive legal 
definition, as principles of general application they must now be executed in concreto in 
particular circumstances by the member states. Stage two of the proposed judicial model 
reviews the compliance with standards for that application. 
That ECtHR process of review must be subject to an appropriate degree of choice left open to 
the respondent member state. A margin is necessary if democracy is to be allowed to operate 
and reinforced as the optimal context adopted for a moral societal reasoning on the law in 
accordance with the PGC. The intensity of questioning of a state decision must be heavily 
influenced by standards from: (1) the operation of due democratic process in decision making 
(procedural compliance); and (2) the degree of consensus between democracies in the 
substantive delivery (a reasonable substantive choice). While legal reasoning and expert 
opinion may challenge the outcomes of due democratic deliberations on an issue, the 
evidence would need to be particularly robust. 
                                                                
402 H. Olsen and S. Toddington, “Legal Realism: In Search of a Science of Law” (2016) 4 Retfærd 22, 28-
29. 
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The review of the choices made relating to application under the corrective model must 
therefore address two aspects. A procedural requirement and a distinct review of the merits 
of the substantive decision reached. The aspects may, however, as reasoned in Chapter Five, 
be usefully linked. Popelier and Van de Heyning explain: 
Procedural rationality review, then, enters as a type of review that respects the 
primordial balancing role of national authorities while safeguarding the ECtHR from 
forsaking its supervisory role. Procedural rationality review implies that the Court 
takes the quality of the decision-making procedure at the legislative, the 
administrative as well as the judicial stage, as a decisive factor for assessing whether 
government interference in human rights was proportional, thereby avoiding intense 
substantive review. This type of review is also known as "semi-procedural review' or, 
in administrative law, as "process-review'. It differs from pure procedural review in 
that it does not merely examine whether a decision was taken in compliance with 
specific procedural requirements laid down in some statute or regulation. Instead, 
when conducting substantive review of an act, the court refers to procedural 
elements. 
Where an administrative act is challenged, elements of the decision-making process 
such as evidence from studies, statistics, impact assessments or consultations are 
taken into account to assess whether the contested measure is justified. Where a 
legislative act is concerned, the same elements play a part, as well as the intensity of 
the parliamentary debate. 
Procedural rationality should, therefore, alter the impact on the intensity of the substantive 
review by the ECtHR. Hence, the suggestion of a strong prima facie presumption that 
compliance with the procedural requirements means a valid, substantive decision. Popelier 
and Van de Heyning continue: 
Procedural rationality review is thus part of the substantive proportionality test, 
where scrutiny of the legislative or administrative record and the judicial reasoning 
process serves to underpin the conclusion of whether or not a measure is the result 
of an informed balancing exercise. If national authorities assess the proportionality of 
a measure on the basis of a careful and informed weighing of interests, the ECtHR will 
more easily be convinced that the measure is, indeed, proportional. In contrast to a 
strong substantive proportionality review, the Court will thus not weigh the interests 
or rights itself, but rely on the balancing in so far it is shown that the outcome follows 
from a duly informed and deliberated procedure. Where national courts may link this 
scrutiny with more detailed better regulation programs, the Court, overviewing a 
variety of legal orders, merely looks for evidence in parliamentary debates, 
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consultation papers and scientific reports that the government's interference is based 
on evidence and informed debate.403 
The outcome of the judicial review of procedure thus significantly influences the substantive 
review. Furthermore, given that due procedure is a key aspect of showing a respondent state 
is responding to its duties, a lack of correct procedure means that its substantive decision is 
unsustainable as a correctly reasoned response and presumptively wrong. This means that 
the procedural review is the starting point for stage two of the proposed corrective judicial 
model. 
6.3.1 The Procedural Requirements 
The procedural review always involves the respondent state demonstrating that in reviewing 
its protection of the principle of general application in particular circumstances, it duly 
followed democratic standards and considered relevant evidence. Such evidence includes 
factual (of the case and social background) and expert evidence.  
A member state found not to have complied with the procedural requirements of a 
democratic consideration would have failed in its duty to effectively protect a norm and be 
thereby in breach of the ECHR.404 To comply with the ruling, and thereby validate the same 
(or a revised) substantive decision on the issue, would require a state re-evaluation of the law 
in light of the shortfalls identified by the ECtHR with its first decision-making process.  
In terms of the elements required in any democratic consideration the process must be: 
                                                                
403 P. Popelier and C. Van de Heyning, “Subsidiarity post-Brighton: procedural rationality as answer?” 
(2017) Leiden Journal of International Law 5,10 
404 For example, see Dickson v UK, Application No. 44362/04, Judgment of 4 December 2007. The 
ECtHR found no evidence that in setting the policy on requests for artiﬁcial insemination by prisoners 
the UK had weighed the competing individual and public interests or assessed the proportionality of 
the restriction. A proper procedural review was, therefore, not administered by the Secretary of State 
or, because the policy was not embodied in primary legislation, by Parliament. 
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Fig. 6.1 Elements of Due Democratic Process 
Building upon this, an informed choice would always be required to take into consideration 
relevant evidence: 
 
Fig. 6.2 Evidence for an Informed Decision 
In relation to international expert opinion, it was noted in Chapter Five that there are 
potential challenges regarding the legitimacy of requiring international expert opinion to be 
factored in to the decisions of a respondent state. This is a real issue, given its routine use by 
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the ECtHR.405 Letsas, in a review of the ECtHR’s interpretive approach, sets out a selection of 
the range of different sources identified as having been utilised in cases:  
[T]he new Court has taken into account an impressive number of materials – most of 
which were non-binding on the respondent State – such as: recommendations and 
resolutions of Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly, reports of the 
Venice Commission, reports of European Commission Against Racism, the European 
Social Charter, the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on 
State Immunity, the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, the Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, the ILO Forced Labour Convention, and many 
others.406 
The International Law Commission (ILC) has confirmed this potential, that ‘[i]n certain cases, 
the practice of international organizations also [as well as states] contributes to the 
expression, or creation, of rules of customary international law’.407 There are, arguably, two 
views that must be balanced in assessing when and how international organisations should 
contribute to the formation of customary law. Odermatt notes: 
[A]n underlying tension between the view of international organizations as 
independent actors in international law, capable of contributing to its formation and 
development in an autonomous fashion, and the view of international organizations 
as little more than the collective will of the member States, whose contribution to 
international law “as such” is negligible at most [emphasis added].408 
To suggest that only the collective will of ECHR contracting states as evidenced by their 
national practices is relevant, is to deny the legal autonomy that this work accepts has been 
given to such institutions by the membership. Provided those other international institutions 
                                                                
405 Rachovitsa in a review of the ECtHR’s approach notes that: 
‘The Court, in fact, proclaims that not only it is entitled but that it also has a duty to read the 
ECHR by taking other PIL [public international law] norms into account.’ 
A. Rachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of International Law Revisited: Insights, Good Practices, and Lessons to 
be learned from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights’ Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2015) 863, 864. 
406 G. Letsas, “Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer” (2010) European 
Journal of International Law 509. 
407 ILC, Fourth Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, Special 
Rapporteur, ILC 68th Session (2016), para 20, available at < 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/695> accessed 22 October 2017.   
408 J. Odermatt, “The Development of Customary International Law by International Organizations” 
(2017) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 491,492. 
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act within their own given mandate, they are part of the evidence of the practices of member 
states from which the ECtHR must be able to infer standards. However, as the ILC has stated: 
International organizations are quite different from States, and in addition present 
great diversity among themselves. In contrast with States, they do not possess a 
general competence and have been established in order to exercise specific functions 
(“principle of speciality”). There are very significant differences among international 
organizations with regard to their powers and functions, size of membership, relations 
between the organization and its members, procedures for deliberation, structure and 
facilities, as well as the primary rules including treaty obligations by which they are 
bound.409 
The use of all expertise is invaluable to the true operation of democracy and, when the ECtHR 
consideration of application moves from its procedural review onto the substantive review of 
the state’s ultimate decision, is also key to the judicial review of the reasonableness of that 
choice.410  However, it is not in line with the primacy of democracy for the ECtHR to find 
international expertise influential, and certainly not determinative on an issue, if the member 
states do not commonly recognise the authority of the given institution. 411  In accordance 
                                                                
409 Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, General commentary, para. 7 
(Report of the International Law Commission 2011, A/66/10, para. 88), reproduced in M. Ragazzi (ed.), 
The Responsibility of International Organizations: Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie (Martinus 
Nijhoff: 2013), at p. 449-451. 
410 For example: Glass v United Kingdom 75 ECHR (2004) where the ECtHR took account, in deciding 
about the requirements for doctors justifying an interference with Article 8 by providing medical 
treatment to a child without parental consent, of the standards enshrined in the Oviedo Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 4 April 1997.  
Öneryıldız v Turkey where in determining the criteria for state responsibility under Article 2 in respect 
of dangerous activities the ECtHR referred to the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting 
from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (ETS no. 150 – Lugano, 21 June 1993) and the 
Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (ETS no. 172 – Strasbourg, 4 
November 1998).  
Taşkın and Others v Turkey (2003) in which the ECtHR built on its case law concerning Article 8 of the 
Convention in matters of environmental protection (an aspect regarded as forming part of the 
individual's private life) using principles enshrined in the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (ECE/CEP/43).  
411 It is also worth noting here that in its third report, the ILC emphasised that states remain the 
primary markers of international law:  
States remain the primary subjects of international law and […] it is primarily their practice 
that contributes to the formation, and expression, of rules of international law. It is also States 
that (for the most part) create and control international organizations, and empower them to 
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with consent, and the relationship between principals and agency, authority to settle an issue 
cannot be drawn from/recognised in any body unless first vested by the principals. Authority, 
under the PGC, cannot be taken. In international law, the principals are the states. Unless 
express or implied consent by a majority of the member states to recognise the authority of 
any given organisation can be found, its views are not commonly understood and thereby 
incorporated into the ECHR legal system. States must either give the given organisation 
independent autonomy to act within a remit or else willingly recognise elements of its output.  
The ways identified by the ILC by which international organisations may contribute to 
international law are helpfully summarised by Odermatt as: (1) states acting through 
international organisations (for example, through resolutions of organisations composed of 
states); (2) international organisations acting as “catalysts” of state practice (for example, 
calling on states to respond to draft texts, activities or statements); and (3) the contribution 
of international organisations “as such”. 412   In the last method, the ILC takes care to 
emphasise that such contributions are limited to state assigned competencies, which: 
[R]elates to “operational activities” of the organizations that are akin to the activities 
undertaken by States, defined by one author as “the programmatic work of 
international organizations carried out as part of their overall mission or in fulfilment 
of a specific mandate”.413 Such activities are extremely varied, and depending on the 
functions and powers attributed to international organizations, may range from 
enforcement measures by the United Nations to the Secretariat’s treaty depositary 
functions. Except in such fields, the acts and views of the Secretariat are unlikely to 
amount to practice.414 
                                                                
perform, as separate international legal persons, a variety of functions on the international 
plane in pursuit of certain goals common to their members. 
ILC, Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, Special 
Rapporteur, ILC 67th Session (2015), para 70, available at < 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/682> accessed 22 October 2017. 
412 J. Odermatt, “The Development of Customary International Law by International Organizations” 
(2017) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 491, 499-502. 
413  I. Johnstone, “Law-Making Through the Operational Activities of International Organizations”, 
George Washington International Law Review, 40 (2008) 87, 94. 
414  ILC, Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, Special 
Rapporteur, ILC 67th Session (2015), para 71, available at < 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/682> accessed 22 October 2017. 
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Returning to due democratic process as a whole, provided the respondent member state has 
followed due democratic process it then enjoys a strong prima facie presumption that the 
actual decision taken is substantively legitimate. This wider margin for substantive decisions 
where due process is followed, is not to undermine the importance of the ECtHR’s role. It is 
still vital in checking that democracy operated correctly in terms of the method and evidence 
deployed and, as the work will explore shortly, was ultimately reasonable in its decisions. As 
Judge Dean Spielmann, former President of the European Court of Human Rights, explains, 
the meaning of subsidiarity in regards to the margin of appreciation is:  
Not, as some would have it, [subsidiarity] to State authorities in a broad or general 
way on traditional sovereignty grounds. Rather, the Convention mechanism is 
subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights [emphasis added].415  
This means that there is what:  
[O]ne might call the procedural aspect of the margin of appreciation. It is implicit in 
the very term used, “appreciation”. The competent domestic authority, which may be 
a court, or parliament, or the administration, must engage in a process of 
appreciation, or assessment, of the rights and interests at stake.416  
This process of deliberation should normally have occurred at the national level, or to put the 
point more eloquently:   
The Convention system has been hailed as a ground-breaking and uniquely influential 
international mechanism for protecting the individual. The emphasis is on the word 
“system”, of which the European Court is a part. But what is a flagship without a fleet 
[emphasis added]?417 
                                                                
415 Judge Dean Spielmann, ‘Wither the Margin of Appreciation’, UCL – Current Legal Problems Lecture, 
20 March 2014, Page 4. 
416 Judge Dean Spielmann, ‘Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and the 
National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?’, Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 13 December 2013, Page 4. 
417 Judge Dean Spielmann (n 415) Page 12. 
This is a point that Chapter Eight of this work, considering possible ECHR reforms in line with proposals 
for the European union, will emphasise. As with the EU, national governments (including the national 
courts and tribunals) must be both empowered and normally trusted to make decisions in compliance 
with the ECHR. Otherwise, the ECtHR will continue to be overwhelmed and delayed in responses. 
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The centrality of due democratic process to the ECHR project is why a failure to comply with 
due process forms, according to the argument of this work, a breach in its own right of the 
duties of the member state. 418 Taking the point further, it is submitted also that such a breach 
must mean that any substantive decision made could not stand.  
Placing greater emphasis on the procedural requirements as the primary determiner of the 
outcome of a case requires democracies to show their functionality. This supports the 
operation of democracy in line with the ideals of republican liberalism. Furthermore, a focus 
on showing due democratic process should enable the development of better democratic 
practices which will support the ECHR system’s legitimate growth and enhance the agency of 
subjects in accordance with the PGC. 
6.3.2 The Substantive Review 
Where a respondent state complied with the procedural requirements, there will be a strong 
prima facie presumption of compliance meaning the intensity of the ECtHR’s substantive 
review will be less. However, the ECtHR may still find either that a decision was not one a 
reasonable person would reach, this could be because: (1) a decision about the existence of 
                                                                
418 Popelier and Van de Heyning argue the ECtHR should develop the quality of national decision-
making processes as an independent standard of review under the proportionality principle, instead 
of as a factor that influences strictness of review under the margin of appreciation doctrine.  Particia 
Popelier and Catherine Van de Heyning, “Procedural Rationality: Giving Teeth to the Proportionality 
Analysis” (2013) 9 EuConst 230, 248 and 261.  Also, see Gerards, “The Prism of Fundamental Rights” 
(2012) 8 EuConst 173, 200.   
The views held on the correct use of the margin of appreciation vary as to whether attention to the 
quality of national decision-making processes in complying with expected practice is as an 
independent standard of review or only a factor influencing the strictness or leniency of review under 
the margin of appreciation doctrine as applied to the particular state.  
The difficulties are explored in depth by Arnardóttir, who also reviews case law and suggests that the 
ECtHR favours an approach of State practice informing the margin afforded to that particular State.  
Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, ‘Organised Retreat? The Move from ‘Substantive’ to ‘Procedural’ Review in 
the ECtHR’s Case Law on the Margin of Appreciation’, Conference Paper No. 4/2015  ESIL Conference 
Paper Series, Vol 5, No 4 available at  
<https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=437004004092116103121090002117091100113004
07101503905808800702311900011606510212702510101011612712603612402210512106400301
90310160150220930330760020200210821200800690170910961030121200031251220941151180
26115009073072102093015109118105091120018104027&EXT=pdf> accessed 20 November 2016. 
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any interference failed to provide effective protection of the norm419; or more commonly (2) 
that a discretion exercised in response to a legitimate reason for an interference was 
disproportionate and failed to provide effective protection. 
Effective protection will not be present where a reasonable person would think the right not 
effectively safeguarded, which is not synonymous with total protection. Regarding the 
proportionality of denying that effective protection, Kumm explains how the principle of 
proportionality represents a rational exercise by courts, comprising four steps: (1) whether 
there was a legitimate aim for the interference; (2) the suitability of the means employed; (3) 
whether a less restrictive means was available; and (4) whether the determination based on 
those factors was disproportionate, resulting in a negative outcome that no reasonable 
person would think justified by the overall aim.420 
The lack of reason may be apparent from disharmony in the law of the respondent state, an 
arbitrary decision or one which is inconsistent with other applications within that state.421 In 
other cases, the question of reasonably necessarily involves the ECtHR in an assessment based 
                                                                
419 For example, whether behaviour amounted to torture. A debate in relation to whether there as 
any interference (as opposed to an unjustified interreference) is most likely to focus on the absolute 
where the finding of any interference must be an ECHR breach. 
420 M. Kumm, “Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional 
Justice” (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 595. 
421 The point relating to consistency is best demonstrated by an example. In A and Others v the United 
Kingdom the indefinite detention non-nationals suspected of involvement with terrorism was held 
unfair based, at least in part, on the same measures not being applied to nationals under the same 
suspicion. A and Others v the United Kingdom, Application No. 3455/05, Judgment of 19 February 
2009. In B and L v the United Kingdom, a bar on a marriage between a former father-in-law and 
daughter-in-law was found inconsistent given that in some cases it had been lifted:  
It [the ECtHR] observes that this bar on marriage is aimed at protecting the integrity of 
the family (preventing sexual rivalry between parents and children) and preventing harm 
to children who may be affected by the changing relationships of adults around them. 
These are, without doubt, legitimate aims [...] [However,] [f]rom the information before 
the Court, it transpires that individuals in a similar situation to these applicants have been 
permitted to marry [...] where there were also children in the household, it was declared 
that the impediment placed on the marriage served no useful purpose of public policy. 
The inconsistency between the stated aims of the incapacity and the waiver applied in 
some cases undermines the rationality and logic of the measure [emphasis added]. 
B and L v the United Kingdom, Application No. 36536/02, Judgment of 13 September 2005, at para. 
36. 
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upon the evidence, as set out as relevant factors under the procedural review (facts of the 
case, social background, national expert opinion, and recognised international expert 
opinion). In cases where the decision is manifestly wrong or excessive, being clearly 
incompatible with the norm or evidence or being based upon flawed information, the ECtHR 
is bound to act. But, in most cases, the work has considered that there is likely to be room for 
debate on the right decision even when considering well defined principles and sound 
evidence. As such, it is determined that the state has a substantive margin of appreciation. In 
setting that margin, given the prima facie presumption that the democratic states are 
entrusted with substantive delivery on the ground, the degree of consensus (or lack thereof) 
between member state consensus on application regrading comparable issues must play a 
central role alongside legal reasoning in establishing a benchmark standard. 
The degree of consensus on substantive application will be particularly important in the types 
of cases that raise:  difficult moral balances422, complex competing interests423, choices about 
the distribution of resources, responding to local needs and conditions424, and revising legal 
policy to “catch up” with dynamic social, economic or scientific developments. The last 
category raises its own questions about how long states should benefit from a lack of 
agreement on how to change the law. Time must be allowed for states to consider the best 
approach, and ideally a consensus will then emerge. But once sufficient time has passed, the 
ECtHR must then mandate that some action is taken. Otherwise, states may be allowed to 
simply “drag their feet”. How much time is allowed depends on the impact upon individuals 
and the trend towards protection.  
For example, years passed between the ECtHR first recommending only that the UK 
reconsider its stance in regard to transsexuals having their adopted gender (as opposed to 
                                                                
422 For example, see Evans v the United Kingdom, Application No. 6339/05, Judgment of 7 March 2006 
regarding the relevance of the absence of a consensus on frozen embryos and the requirements for 
both parties to consent to in vitro fertilisation. 
423 For example, see Chapman v the United Kingdom, Application No. 27238/95, Judgment of 18 
January 2001 regarding a lack of consensus around the issue of denying permission for a gypsy family 
to live in a caravan on land that they had purchased. 
424 For example, see Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom, Application No. 48876/08, 
Judgment of 22 April 2013 regarding a lack of consensus around the issue of refusal to broadcast an 
advert that had political elements. 
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their sex at birth) recognised as their legal sex (on birth certificates and their National 
Insurance records) to ultimately requiring it. This is best explored by working through the 
development of ECHR case law on the point. 
In Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom425 the ECtHR reasoned that the legal recognition of 
new identity was necessary for transsexuals to have their choice of a sex change recognised 
effectively.  While there was a common understanding on the right to protection as principle 
of general application, shown by the practices of government, the application of that norm to 
the particular challenge of a workable records system was not consistent. There was, as the 
ECtHR accepted, still no consensus on the legal recognition of a new gender identity. In spite 
of this, the ECtHR found the UK to be in breach. The ECtHR explained: 
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it is indeed primarily for the 
contracting States to decide on the measures necessary to secure Convention rights 
within their jurisdiction and, in resolving within their domestic legal systems the 
practical problems created by the legal recognition of post-operative gender status, 
the contracting States must enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. The Court 
accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European 
approach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the clear 
and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of 
increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual 
identity of post-operative transsexuals [emphasis added]. 
This may appear out of line with the proposed model. However, the ECtHR does not deny the 
importance of the impact of consensus and recognises that there must be a wide margin 
because of the lack thereof. All that the ECtHR has required here is that there is action, which 
seems appropriate given the trend towards protection and that the UK had already been 
given a number of opportunities by the ECtHR to reconsider its position.426  
                                                                
425 Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom, Application No. 28957/95, Judgment of July 11 2002. 
426 See earlier cases:  
Rees v the United Kingdom, Application No. 9532/81, Judgment of October 17 1986.  
The applicant was a female-to-male transsexual. After changing his name to a male name, he 
requested an altered passport and birth certificate. The authorities refused. The ECtHR found that 
there was not yet any consensus on a duty to recognise changes in gender identity. However, the 
ECtHR was conscious “of the seriousness of the problems affecting transsexuals and of their distress” 
and recommended “keeping the need for appropriate measures under review, having regard 
particularly to scientific and societal developments” (para 47 of the judgment). 
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An issue with consensus is the use of international law. This raises the question of when it is 
acceptable for the ECtHR to rely upon international consensus outside of the membership of 
the ECHR. For example, in Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom in finding a trend the ECtHR 
relied upon evidence from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US, Singapore, South Africa 
and Israel. The use of practices from beyond the ECHR member states is common in the 
ECtHR’s case law but raises a number of possible concerns. 
Consensus may relate to the actual practices adopted by member states427, but also through 
their recognition of relevant international public law. This is accordance with the earlier 
                                                                
Cossey v the United Kingdom, Application No. 10843/84, Judgment of September 27 1990. 
The ECtHR confirmed the approach in Rees. The applicant had undergone gender re-assignment and 
wished to marry. Authorities had informed her that she was legally still considered a man. The ECtHR 
stated that there were no reasons to depart from its judgment in the Rees case, since there were no 
scientific or social developments which would justify or require a different evaluation. It reiterated 
that “gender reassignment surgery did not result in the acquisition of all the biological characteristics 
of the other sex” (para 40 of the judgment). 
X, Y and Z v The United Kingdom, Application No. 75/1995/581/667, Judgment of April 22 1997. 
The ECtHR noted evidence of a “clear trend within the contracting states towards the legal recognition 
of gender reassignment” (para 40 of the judgment). 
Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom, Application No. 22985/93, Judgment of 30 July 1998. 
The ECtHR was not persuaded that it should depart from Rees and Cossey, ‘transsexualism continues 
to raise complex scientific, legal, moral and social issues in respect of which there is no generally 
shared approach among the Contracting States’ (para 58 of the judgment). However, it reaffirmed 
‘that the area needs to be kept under permanent review by the Contracting States (para 60 of the 
judgment), in the context of ‘increased social acceptance of the phenomenon and increased 
recognition of the problems which post-operative transsexuals encounter’.  
427  For example, in relation to Article 14 and discrimination, whether the practice in question is 
regarded as non-discriminatory in other member States has been held as of ‘major relevance’. See J. 
Schokkenbroek, “The Prohibition of Discrimination in Article 14 of the Convention and the Margin of 
Appreciation” (1999) 19 Human Rights Law Journal 20, 21. 
In Konstantin Markin v Russia it was held that attitudes towards care for children by father had 
changed and so requirements relating to parental leave:  
[T]he legal situation as regards parental leave entitlement in the contracting States had 
evolved. In an absolute majority of European countries, the legislation now provided that 
parental leave might be taken by both mothers and fathers [...] This showed that society had 
moved towards a more equal sharing between men and women of the responsibility for the 
upbringing of their children [...] [T]here was no objective or reasonable justification for the 
difference in treatment between men and women as regards entitlement to parental leave. 
Konstantin Markin v Russia, Application No. 30078/06, Judgment of 22 March 2012, at para.99. 
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reasoning of this work that state practice is not limited to actual practice, given the 
aspirational elements of the ECHR project. It may also be shown by opinio juris generalis. 
Where agreement on desired practice is clear from reputable and recognised sources, it is 
clearly relevant that a number of states actually do (or do not) follow that advice, but it is only 
one factor. However, this work would suggest that an agreement on the part of a state “to 
try” must at least be present.428  This is not to say that, particularly in borderline decisions 
where other evidence is balanced, international law could not be persuasive in tipping the 
ECtHR but rather that it cannot be substituted for consensus in the member states.429  The 
                                                                
For a case confirming the relevance of consensus, see Belgian Linguistic Case, Application Nos. 
1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64, Judgment of July 23 1968. 
However, the ECtHR needs to show care in finding consensus where the evidence is not clear on the 
point. Returning once more to the case of Zaunegger v Germanyin, in which a requirement to subject 
custody arrangement between unmarried parent to scrutiny by national courts was confirmed based 
on the common principle that decisions be made in “the child’s best interests”. The lack of consistency 
in the actual approaches taken by member states was commented upon. Judge Schmitt delivered a 
dissenting opinion in which he voiced concerns:  
Where there is no uniform approach it has to be accepted in my opinion that there are a 
number of possible ways of solving the conflict between the different interests at stake [...] 
Zaunegger v Germany, Application No. 22028/04, Judgment of 3 December 2009, dissenting opinion 
of Judge Schmitt, at para. 5. 
428 For example, in Marckx v Belgium, regarding the justification of a distinction in the treatment of 
legitimate and illegitimate children based on the protection of morals and public order, an emerging 
consensus in modern societies (reflected in two international treaties to which only four of the ECHR 
member states had signed) was sufficient to show a change in common attitudes and beliefs. The 
ECtHR reasoned at para. 41 that:  
[T]he domestic law of the great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe has 
evolved and is continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant international instruments, 
towards full juridical recognition of the maxim mater semper certa est. 
Marckx v Belgium, Application No. 6833/74, Judgment of 13 Jun 1979, at para. 41. 
In Brauer v Germany the ECtHR again based a finding of consensus upon the ratification of an 
international convention by a minority of ECHR member states. 
Brauer v Germany, Application No. 3545/04, Judgment of 28 May 2009. 
429 For example, in M C v Bulgaria the question was posed whether requiring physical force was 
legitimate in rape cases [at para. 156]:  
The Court observes that historically, proof of physical force and physical resistance was 
required under domestic law and practice in rape cases in a number of countries. The last 
decades, however, have seen a clear and steady trend in Europe and some other parts of the 
world towards abandoning formalistic definitions and narrow interpretations of the law in this 
area [emphasis added]. 
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use of international law forms an issue in the current approach of the ECtHR, as Rachovitsa 
explains: 
It is not atypical for the Court to rely on PIL norms in the absence of common legal 
standards in national practice; or, all the more, when member States present contrary 
national practices. The Court, by virtue of interpreting the ECHR in light of PIL, also 
pervades areas in which States traditionally enjoyed a great margin of appreciation – 
the sphere of imposing criminal sanctions; the protection of the environment; or the 
immigration context. Hence, PIL norms have been dissociated and are independent 
from national practice. The external norms do not serve a role supplementary to the 
comparative interpretation, in establishing or strengthening the existence of national 
practice, but yet their impact to the interpretation process is decisive. 
It is also clear that, despite the absence of discernible consensus, the Court still uses 
external PIL norms. The Court employs treaties in its judgments to demonstrate the 
existence of commonly accepted standards, even if said treaties are not ratified and 
accepted by the majority of States or are not yet in force. It seems that the ordinary 
requirement [in international law] of being accepted by the vast majority of States is 
not strictly followed430 
Rachovitsa continues with an example: 
The Court also disregards the absence of consensus among States, as clearly reflected 
in certain treaties. In the D.H.431  and Oršuš432  cases, even though the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) prescribed programme-
type provisions evidencing the explicit lack of agreement among States, the Court 
                                                                
This trend alone may have been enough to narrow the margin, but the reasoning that follows is also 
of great interest. The decision continues [at para. 162]:  
The Court also notes that the member States of the Council of Europe, through the Committee 
of Ministers, have agreed that penalising non-consensual sexual acts, “[including] in cases 
where the victim does not show signs of resistance”, is necessary for the effective protection 
of women against violence [...] and have urged the implementation of further reforms in this 
area [emphasis added]. 
So, statements made may be as relevant in finding consensus as the actual acts. Also [at para 164] 
there was an indication of expert opinion:  
As submitted by the intervener, the evolving understanding of the manner in which rape is 
experienced by the victim has shown that victims of sexual abuse – in particular, girls below 
the age of majority – often provide no physical resistance because of a variety of psychological 
factors or because they fear violence on the part of the perpetrator.  
430 A. Rachovitsa (n 405) 868-869. 
431 D.H. and Others v Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, Judgment of 7 February 2006. 
432 Oršuš and Others v Croatia Application no. 15766/03, Judgment of 26 March 2010. 
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interpreted the ECHR in light of the provisions of the FCNM and the progressive view 
of its Advisory Committee.433 
This practice of over-reliance upon PILs affects the width of the substantive margin of 
appreciation making it too prescriptive, despite lacking actual endorsement as such by the 
democratic process.   
The consensus required in this stage would come from exploring the standards and approach 
of other member states. In stage one, interpreting the rights, we have suggested a 
quantitative and geopolitically significant majority consensus across all member states is 
arguably required to show the scope of the human right claimed as one “any” human must 
hold as a principle of general application. But in this stage two regarding executing those 
principles in particular circumstances, a different basis is required. It is no longer a question 
of how rights would be interpreted by any agent, but rather one of how to guarantee them 
in particular circumstances. Such evidence may be, unavoidably, more limited. As Draghici 
comments: 
A […] problem is the correct basis for comparison, as the aspects in contention are not 
always socially significant or subject to legislative debate in all States.434 
This, according to the corrective model put forward by this work, means that in the second 
stage the comparison and search for consensus may be reduced to a smaller number of 
similarly affected states. This is permissible, however, only provided the sample is 
geopolitically relevant and the socio-political circumstances comparable to those of the 
respondent state. In accepting this, one of the difficulties with the current, apparently 
“inconsistent”, use of consensus is lessened.435 The number of member states compared may 
                                                                
433 A. Rachovitsa (n 405) 869. 
434 C. Draghici, “The Strasbourg Court Between European and Local Consensus: Anti-Democratic or 
Guardian of Democratic Process?” Public Law (2017) 11, 18. 
For example, in SAS v France, it was noted that: “[T]he question of the wearing of the full-face veil in 
public is simply not an issue at all in a certain number of member States, where the practice is 
uncommon.” 
S.A.S. v France, Application No. 43835/11), Judgment of 1 July 2014, at para. 156. 
435 For example, Draghici notes the following issues as examples: 
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permissibly vary, provided the ECtHR explains its choices and the selected population is 
neither random nor overlooking of inconsistent practices. 
Where there is a lack of agreement, a much wider substantive margin is to be expected, often 
with cases involving matters that raise controversial issues of morality.436 There are some 
areas where a lack of clear direction or trend in standards among member states is 
particularly notable in resulting in a wide margin. For example, in relation to Article 15 and 
                                                                
Assessments based on a mere sample are doubtful when the population is randomly selected. 
For instance, the comparative study conducted in Markin v Russia [Application No. 30078/06, 
Judgment of 22 March 2012] was based solely on 33 States, with no discussion of the selection 
criteria (e.g. geopolitical representativeness) or impact on statistical relevance. 
In Vallianatos v Greece [Applications Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, judgment of 7 November 
2013 – exclusion of same-sex couples from civil unions], by reducing the comparison to the 19 
States having introduced registered partnerships, the Court distorted the real question, i.e. 
the availability of legal recognition for same-sex couples, in whatever form. Similarly, in X v 
Austria [Application No. 19010/07, Judgment of 19 February 2013], regarding second-parent 
adoption for same-sex partners, the GC limited the analysis to the ten States allowing second-
parent adoption in unmarried couples. By overlooking the fact that 35 States contemplated 
no access to either joint or second-parent adoption for same-sex couples, the Court 
circumvented the crux of the dispute, namely the existence of consensus on giving a child two 
legal mothers (or fathers). 
C. Draghici (n 434) 18. 
This is not to say that the ECtHR could not have come to the conclusions it did on the merits of the 
state choices (if no objective evidence could be put forward beyond discriminatory “perceptions” of 
same-sex relations not forming stable and nurturing partnerships), but rather that is should not have 
done so by suggesting such a degree of consensus on the point. A transparent and consistent ECtHR 
must use the correct basis. The lack of consensus on the issue as it similarly affected all states should 
have meant a wider margin of appreciation.  
436 In Evans v the United Kingdom the ECtHR summarised:  
Where [...] there is no consensus within the member States of the Council of Europe, either 
as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, 
particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider. 
Evans v the United Kingdom, Application No. 6339/05, Judgment of 7 March 2006.  
The facts of the case involved questions regarding the use of embryos post the breakdown of a 
relationship. In accordance with the stages for an ECtHR ruling, suggested by this work, stage one 
could find a consensus on a recognised a value that could be understood by all and apply to all – a 
duty to provide infertility treatment. However, the questions raised in this case went well beyond 
what “all” could morally reason upon by raising considerations needing expert knowledge and (for 
example, the requirements of consent) and skills to respond to particular circumstances (for example, 
how to balance demand against realistic supply) and so were part of stage two. In the absence of 
expert agreement and consensus, the requirements for the state were flexible in how they might be 
interpreted and therefore the margin should have been wide. 
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the ability for member states to suspend rights in time of or war or threat to the life of the 
nation, there is a generous margin in the state’s determination of whether that condition is 
met.437  Or Articles 8 to 11, safeguarding the right to private and family life, freedom of 
thought conscience and religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly and 
association. All of these have allowed for a wide margin in respect of decisions made about 
the protection of public health and morals. 438  Even with European consensus present, 
                                                                
437 See M. O’Boyle, “The Margin of Appreciation and Derogation under Article 15: Ritual Incantation 
or Principle” [1989] 19 Human Rights Law Journal 23.  
For an example case, see Lawless v Ireland, Application No. 332/57, Judgment of July 1 1961. 
438 For example, Handyside v United Kingdom in which the UK was permitted to ban the printing of an 
allegedly pornographic book as there was no European consensus on the issue of pornography. The 
ECtHR could not find a uniform conception of morals between the states because, “the requirements 
of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterised 
by far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject”. State authorities were, therefore, in a better 
position to assess the “necessity” of a particular measure because of their “direct and continuous 
contact” with the “vital forces of their countries” [para 48]. Handyside v United Kingdom, Application 
No. 5493/72, Judgment of 7 Dec 1976.  
In Stubbing v Germany, the ECtHR considered provisions of criminal law prohibiting incestuous sexual 
relationships under Article 8 and private life. There was no consensus regarding criminal liability for 
sexual intercourse between siblings in Europe. In many member states, sexual intercourse between 
siblings was still considered a criminal offence. Additionally, the reasons which had guided the state 
authorities (e.g. protection of family, public health) were not unreasonable. Therefore, the ECtHR 
found that Germany had acted within its margin of appreciation. Consequently, the ECtHR did not find 
a violation of the right to private life. Stubbing v Germany, Application No. 4357/08, Judgment of 12 
April 2012. 
In Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom, lack of consensus allowed for a wide margin for 
laws relating to consensual adult sexual activity in public and sado-masochism. Laskey, Jaggard and 
Brown v the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 21826/93, 21627/93, 21974/93, Judgment of February 
19 1997. 
But contrast this with Dudgeon v the United Kingdom. The case related to criminalisation of 
homosexual activities. The ECtHR reasoned that in a case such as this involving, “a most intimate 
aspect of private life […] there must exist particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part 
of the public authorities can be legitimate […]” [para. 52]. Such justifications are there were for 
criminalisation, principally moral conservatism in Northern Ireland, were outweighed by the effects 
on private sex life. In addition, better understanding and increased tolerance has resulted in 
decriminalisation elsewhere. Dudgeon v the United Kingdom, Application No. 35765/97, Judgment of 
31 July 2000. 
For these cases, it is tempting to assume that such issues are for stage one of the proposed ECtHR 
model i.e. with such a divided view on the limitations that apply is there not as yet a consensus on any 
principle to protect? However, note that for the exclusion of a principle enjoyed by some for others, 
the reason must not be based upon inherent personal characteristics. The reasons must be such that 
all agents “could” accept them. It is difficult to conceive of anything more inherently personal than 
sexual desires or what types of information will be engaging and stimulating. Sexual preference is 
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particularly sensitive issues may still be allowed a wide margin when it comes to 
application.439 The weighting given to a norm and the limitations to it determined in stage 
one, may also mean that a wider discretion is given to member states.440  
Giving member states a wide discretion in making decisions on application until a consensus 
in practices on substantive protection forms will, over time, lead to a consensus on more 
standards emerging. Helfer and Slaughter explain that consensus:  
[A]llows the Court to narrow the margin of discretion allotted to national governments 
in an incremental fashion [...] In the meantime, a state government lagging behind in 
the protection of a certain right is allowed to maintain its national policy but is forced 
to bear a heavier burden of proof before the ECHR, whose future opinions will in part 
turn on its own conception of how far the “trends” in European domestic law have 
evolved. The conjunction of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the consensus 
inquiry thus permits the ECHR to link its decisions to the pace of change of domestic 
law, acknowledging the political sovereignty of respondent states while legitimizing 
its own decisions against them.441  
                                                                
considered particularly important and any interference will require reasoning beyond personal 
distaste to withstand particularly robust scrutiny. 
439 For example, the emotiveness of expectations surrounding abortion. Despite its recognition as a 
protected meaning for women in the majority of states, a wide margin in delivery by individual states 
was recently confirmed because of the moral difficulties it raises. See A, B and C v Ireland, Application 
no. 25579/05, Judgment of 16 December 2010. Or matters upon which diametrically opposing views 
can be formed for equally valid reasons, for example, in Leyla Sahin v Turkey, Application No. 
44774/98, Judgment of 10 November 2005, as Judge Tulken’s opinion points out that: “the 
comparative law materials […] show that Turkey was in a tiny minority in prohibiting university 
students wearing the headscarf.” The ECtHR, however, came to the diametrically opposed conclusion 
that there was a lack of consensus on the headscarf issue which supported a much weaker analysis of 
the ban. 
440 It has already been mentioned that some limitations are weighted particularly heavily, allowing for 
greater interference with expectations. This will clearly affect the appropriate margin. A serious threat 
to a national economy appears to be recognised as such. In Koufaki and Adedy v Greece, Application 
No. 57665/12 and 57657/12, Judgment of 7 May 2013. In contrast, some of the meanings attributed 
to limitations means no margin is available. Sticking with economic considerations, lack of resources 
cannot justify prison conditions which do not comply with Article 3, or failure to secure the right to a 
fair trial, or discriminating against vulnerable groups in relation to "essential" expectations such as 
education. 
441 L. Helfer and A. Slaughter, ‘The Effectiveness of the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Regime’ in 
B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek (eds.) Autonomous Policy Making by International Organisations 
(Routledge: 2005), 151. 
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In addition to a review of ECHR member state consensus in the application practices of states, 
the proposed model includes a more “local consensus”. Draghici explains this idea: 
A different recourse to “local consensus” allows the ECtHR, when unable to rely on 
European consensus to effect change, to shift the attention to attitudes within the 
national community and expand rights solely within the respondent State.442 
While an extended review of local consensus to every case would have advantages in a system 
tasked with individual justice443, this work argues that a republican liberalist focus means such 
intense questioning of the outcome of an ostensibly democratic process should be more 
circumspect. Its influence on the substantive margin should, thus, be reserved. Care is 
required, given the principle of subsidiarity, to suggest that the ECtHR was better placed to 
decide on the best interests and the internal values of a particular jurisdiction (state) in the 
absence of an overall ECHR member state consensus:   
[T]he Strasbourg Court is less well-positioned than domestic authorities to measure 
public opinion and ought not, as a rule, substitute its assessment of what society 
requires. Whilst an international court does not have autonomous means of gauging 
domestic public opinion, it may nevertheless accept evidence from reliable sources, 
national statistics officers, reputable NGOs; this has already been the Court’s practice 
for the purpose of comparative law reviews. Moreover, since the presumption in 
democratic societies is that parliamentary acts are the expression of popular will, a 
survey of public opinion should not systematically feature in every single Strasbourg 
judgment.444 
In the absence of the factual evidence relating to the national social background revealing a 
stark contrast of the state’s decision with the public view, a challenge of unreason based only 
upon local consensus would be problematic. For example, challenge may be made where the 
                                                                
442 Draghici argues: 
State-specific assessments of compliance are a positive trade-off between controversial pan-
European standards and localised but effective supranational control. A temporary “variable 
geometry” of rights is also preferable to reining in evolutive interpretation altogether whilst 
waiting for European consensus to crystallise [...] 
C. Draghici (n 434) 25. 
443 ibid 12. 
444 ibid 26. 
Page 285 of 391 
 
national judiciary has been clear that public values are not in keeping with the decision or that 
national experts are universally opposed. 
The elements that interact to influence the substantive margin of appreciation can thus be 
illustrated as: 
 
Fig. 6.3 Elements Affecting the Substantive Margin of Appreciation 
6.4 Prioritisation of Serious Breaches 
The analytical framework suggests that the ECtHR should act only where satisfied of either: 
(1) a significant impact on the given individual; or (2) a potentially significant impact upon the 
respondent state or the ECHR community.  
This could fit with the ECtHR’s already reformed admissibility criteria, following the entry into 
force of Protocol No. 14 on 1 June 2010. Article 35(3)(b)445  allows the ECtHR to declare 
                                                                
445  3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article             
34 if it considers that: […] 
(b)  the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights 
as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the 
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inadmissible any case where the applicant has suffered no “significant disadvantage”. This is 
subject to safeguards: (1) the ECtHR might not declare such an application inadmissible where 
respect for human rights requires an examination of the application on the merits; and (2) no 
case may be rejected under this new criterion which has not been duly considered by a 
domestic authority. 
The requirement of a significant impact upon the applicant is in keeping with the reasoning 
of this work. The case law of the ECtHR reveals that the severity may be significant either 
because of an objective impact upon the person’s life, for example a financial cost or a non-
pecuniary cost446. The subjective importance of the case to the applicant is a relevant factor, 
but only if the subjective perception is justified on objective grounds. 
In Korolev v Russia the ECtHR explained: 
[A] violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain a 
minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court. The 
assessment of this minimum level is […] relative and depends on all the circumstances 
of the case […], taking account of both the applicant’s subjective perceptions and what 
is objectively at stake.447 
                                                                
application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has 
not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal. 
446 For example, in Giuran v Romania, Application No. 24360/04, Judgment of 21 June 2011 the ECtHR 
found a significant disadvantage because the proceedings concerned the applicant’s right to respect 
for his possessions and for his home. This was despite the fact that the complaint related to goods 
worth just 350 euros. 
447 Korolev v Russia, Application no. 25551/05, Decision on admissibility, judgment of 1 July 2010, Part 
A. The ECtHR determined that the tiny and indeed almost negligible size of the pecuniary loss which 
prompted the applicant to bring his case was of minimal significance to the applicant.  
See also See Ladygin v Russia: 
The Court reiterates that the main element contained in the new admissibility criterion is the 
question of whether the applicant has suffered a “significant disadvantage”. Inspired by the 
above-mentioned general principle de minimis non curat praetor, the new criterion hinges on 
the idea that a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain 
a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court. The 
assessment of this minimum level is, in the nature of things, relative and depends on all the 
circumstances of the case. The severity of a violation should be assessed, taking account of 
both the applicant’s subjective perceptions and what is objectively at stake in a particular 
case.  
Ladygin v Russia, Application no. 35365/05, Judgment of 30 August 2011.  
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Recognising the role of subjectivity is in accordance with republican liberalism as the basis 
argued by this work for cooperation under the ECHR, recognising that not only the substantive 
impact on a person but also perceptions are important to the wider trust and faith in 
democracy.  
The first safeguard of an “important issue of principle” requiring an ECtHR examination is in 
accordance with the suggested approach of this work. Cases that the ECtHR has found raise 
questions of a general character affecting the observance of the ECHR in spite of not having 
a significant impact on the individual, are those that suggest a serious structural deficiency in 
the respondent state, affecting other persons in the same position as the applicant.448  
For example, Finger v Bulgaria449concerned a possible systemic problem of unreasonable 
length of civil proceedings and lack of an effective remedy. The ECtHR found it unnecessary 
to determine whether the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage because respect 
for human rights required an examination of the case. Nicoleta Gheorghe v Romania 450 
concerned a question of presumption of innocence and equality of arms in criminal 
proceedings following a change in national law. The ECtHR considered the question was 
necessary for the national jurisdiction. In Juhas Đurić v Serbia451, a police-appointed defence 
counsel complained of problems with the payment of fees in the course of a preliminary 
                                                                
448 See Korolev v Russia: 
The second element contained in the new criterion is intended as a safeguard clause […] 
compelling the Court to continue the examination of the application, even in the absence of 
any significant damage caused to the applicant, if respect for human rights as defined in the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires. […] [In accordance with similar ECHR 
provisions] A further examination of a case was thus found to be necessary when it raised 
questions of a general character affecting the observance of the Convention (see Tyrer v. the 
United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, Commission’s report of 14 December 1976, Series B no. 24, p. 
2, § 2). 
Such questions of a general character would arise, for example, where there is a need to clarify 
the States’ obligations under the Convention or to induce the respondent State to resolve a 
structural deficiency affecting other persons in the same position as the applicant. 
Korolev v Russia, Application No. 25551/05, Judgment of 1 July 2010.  
449 Finger v Bulgaria, Application No. 37346/05, Judgment of 10 May 2011. 
450 Nicoleta Gheorghe v Romania, Application No. 23470/05, Judgment of 3 April 2012. 
451 Juhas Đurić v Serbia, Application No. 48155/06, Judgment of 10 April 2012. 
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criminal investigation. The ECtHR found that this matter could not be considered trivial since 
it related to the functioning of the criminal justice system.  
More recently, in M.N and Others v San Marino452 the ECtHR explained: 
“Furthermore, the nature of the issues raised is not trivial, and may have an impact 
both at the domestic level as well as at the Conventional one [emphasis added].”453 
This safeguard is in accordance with republican liberalism, with the focus on ensuring a 
functional system. Systematic flaws are revealed by significant failures against individuals, or 
by what might be trivial for an individual but show a disregard for rights that must be 
investigated, confirmed and publicly pronounced. The adherence to republican liberalism is 
also demonstrated by the ECtHR declining to act against possible systematic breaches where 
an examination of a particular case by the Court would not bring any new elements.454 The 
ECHR is not primarily concerned with individual justice. 
The second safeguard, “not duly considered by a domestic tribunal” is not in keeping with this 
work’s suggested framework of analysis for assessing the legitimacy of the ECtHR procedure 
or the tenets concluded as underlying the structure for a legitimate judicial model. The theory 
of republican liberalism revealed more of a constitutional undertaking on the part of the 
ECtHR rather than individual justice. If a matter is not significant for either the individual or 
                                                                
452 M.N and Others v San Marino, Application no. 28005/12, judgment of 7 July 2015 
453 ibid para. 39. 
454 Cases in which the ECtHR declined to continue the examination include: those where the relevant 
law has changed (Léger v France, Application No. 19324/02, Judgment 30 March 2009 and Adrian 
Mihai Ionescu v Romania, Application No. 36659/04, Judgment of 1 June 2010); where the ECtHR has 
already addressed the issue as a systemic problem e.g. non-enforcement of domestic judgments 
(Vasilchenko v Russia, Application No. 34784/02, Judgment of 23 September 2010, Gaftoniuc v 
Romania, Application No. 30934/05, Judgment of 22 February 2011, Savu v Romania, Application No. 
29218/05, Judgment of 11 October 2011; Burov v Moldova, Application No. 38875/03, Judgment of 
14 June 2011, Gururyan v Armenia, Application No. 11456/05, Judgment of 24 January 2012).  
These cases are a selection of those used in a Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights 
Research Report, and other cases are also explored in the document. Council of Europe/European 
Court of Human Rights, ‘The New Admissibility Criterion under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention: 
Case-law Principles Two Years On’ (Research Report, 2012) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_admissibility_criterion_ENG.pdf> accessed 
21 December 2016. 
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for the respondent state or wider ECHR community, it is suggested that it is not part of the 
ECtHR’s mandate. However, under Article 5 of Protocol No. 15, this element will be removed. 
6.5 The Proposed Corrective Model 
What follows is the structuring of the analytical framework introduced in Chapter Four (Fig. 
4.3) and the tenets underlying the structure for a legitimate judicial model in Chapter Five (Fig 
5.2) into a coherent and credible proposed improved model to support legitimate and 
effective operation and evolution of the ECHR through the ECtHR. A staged approach is 
suggested as the most appropriate:   
A. The preliminary or initial question is whether a case meets the threshold for sufficient 
seriousness to be explored by the ECtHR. The ECtHR must consider that there is: (1) a 
significant impact for the given individual; or (2) a potentially significant impact upon the 
respondent state or the ECHR community.  
B. Stage one asks in abstracto whether there is: (1) a relevant norm falling under the scope of 
an ECHR right, interpreted by ECtHR as a moral justification for the practices of a quantitively 
and geopolitically relevant majority of member states who have debated the issue, with no 
“significant” resistance; and (2) the conditions that permit interference with that principle of 
general application in particular circumstances (restrictions/limitations). The ECtHR has the 
authority to determine what the opinio juris generalis is, and there is strong prima facie 
presumption that a majority consensus means the norm falls under the protection of the 
ECHR system. If the ECtHR identifies a new principle, it then produces a substantive legal 
definition. This means that, in many cases, stage one will be satisfied by reference to an earlier 
decision recognising the given norm claimed by an applicant along with acceptable reasons 
for its limitation. 
C. Stage two, is an assessment of the actual application in concreto of the principle of general 
application in particular circumstances through judicial review of the state decision, subject 
to an appropriate margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent state. 
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The (1) procedural margin requires the respondent state to show that in reviewing its delivery, 
it followed overarching standards of due democratic process, including considering facts (of 
the case and social background), expert opinion from sources that are nationally recognized 
and from international bodies that are commonly recognized by member states. Provided the 
state carried out a satisfactory review process, it enjoys a strong prima facie presumption that 
the actual decision taken is legitimate. Failure to adhere to process will be a breach in its own 
right. 
The (2) substantive margin allows the state discretion in how it protects the right and 
responds to any legitimate reasons to restrict it, but it must still act in accordance with what 
a reasonable person would conclude and act consistently. This requires effective protection 
of the right and a proportionate response where interference is justified. In assessing 
proportionality, the ECtHR will ask the following questions: (1) was there a legitimate aim for 
the interference with a norm; (2) were the means employed suitable; (3) were less restrictive 
means available; and (4) was the response disproportionate resulting in a negative outcome 
that no reasonable person would think justified by the overall aim? In assessing these 
different aspects, the margin allowed at this point may be wide or narrow. The determination 
of width of the margin places particular emphasis placed upon the standards for delivery 
revealed by a degree of consensus for comparable issues in practices for delivery by similarly 
affected member states.  
6.5.1 Similar Issues 
It is accepted that, once settled by the ECtHR in accordance with the above model, the 
determinations of the Court on the definitions of the norms and standards for application 
become autonomous. This means that a previous ECtHR ruling on a similar issue makes 
reconsideration on that point unnecessary. In cases of repetitive applications where no new 
legal norms or questions on correct application are raised, revaluation would be wasted 
effort.455 It is suggested that these cases, where a full consideration has already been given 
and (ideally) a clearly reasoned and explained judgment made, fall into a category where a 
                                                                
455 As Dzehtsiarou stresses at the start of his consideration of consensus [at page 1], ‘the Court cannot 
endlessly justify each and every judgment [...]’. K. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the 
Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press: 2015) page 1 
Page 291 of 391 
 
reconsideration would mean unnecessary delay. While the ECtHR is not bound to its own 
previous decisions, it must be able to rely on them to secure the unity and common 
understanding it is striving for. There is, to some extent, a de facto system of precedent. This 
is a view supported by the member states.456 It also means that the proposed corrective 
model does not require retrospective application. Established judgments that have been 
adopted and are now integrated into the practices of member states must not now be 
routinely unpicked. There is otherwise unacceptable and unnecessary risk to the wider web 
of decisions flowing from them, undermining the ECHR system, and altering the position of 
people who have relied upon them. 
6.5.2 The Assessment of the ECtHR is Final 
 
The proposed improved judicial model still involves significant assessment by the ECtHR when 
interpreting the practices of member states and when reviewing standards for application. 
The model for decision making proposed by this work would ensure that assessment is 
structured and that there is a checklist of relevant points to consider at each stage. But the 
ECtHR must have the freedom to make ultimate decisions on issues such as democratic due 
process, reasonableness, proportionality, consensus and inferences from state practices. 
Consensus, in particular, has been given a prominent role in the proposed new model. As 
Helfer argues, if the ECtHR, ‘hope[s] to maintain institutional authority’ 457  and ‘expect[s] 
                                                                
456 See declaration 25 of the Brighton Declaration: 
The Conference therefore […] welcomes the Court’s long-standing recognition that it is in the 
interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart 
without cogent reason from precedents laid down in previous cases; and in particular, invites 
the Court to have regard to the importance of consistency where judgments relate to aspects 
of the same issue, so as to ensure their cumulative effect continues to afford States Parties an 
appropriate margin of appreciation […] 
‘High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration’ 
(19-20 April 2012) available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2016. 
457 L. Helfer, ‘Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights’, 26 Cornell Int LJ 
(1993) 133, 154. 
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states to comply with [its] increasingly rights protective judgments, [it] must provide a more 
precise explanation’458 of consensus. 
This presents a major difficulty if the basis is not set out as clearly as possible, leaving 
questions such as those posed by Helfer: 
Does it mean what all or most citizens accept? Or does it rather mean what reasonable 
and fully informed citizens would accept? Moreover, how is the court to say when this 
common ground has been achieved? By consulting opinion polls? By relying on judges’ 
limited personal experience?459 
The proposed improved judicial model goes as far as it can in settling these points. Consensus 
relates to: (1) the norms that most, not necessarily all, of the national governments can be 
interpreted as accepting following an ECtHR review of their practices; and (2) standards for 
application that most similarly affected states adopt. It is the national governments, including 
political representatives and the national judiciary, whose practises the ECtHR reviews and 
not the citizens directly. In the absence of very clear contradictory evidence, the democratic 
and empirical validity of the practices of the national government must be prima facie 
presumed. This makes the task more intelligible for the ECtHR, not normally being required 
to look behind government practice to the citizens directly or to explore sources such as 
opinion polls. When it comes to searching for the common moral threads, the principles, that 
could justify those government practices, the ECtHR is well placed for that task. It is searching 
for any moral justificatory norms that could be generic for all agents, having the distance to 
see those underlying patterns may be helpful. In relation to delivery, again it is not necessary 
for the ECtHR it to appreciate fully the situation on the ground to be able to step-back and 
look for any general standards. Provided the ECtHR adopts a reasonable process in its search 
for significant consensus, its determinations must be respected as the body tasked with legal 
settlement.  
In upholding norms of interpretation and application emerging from the practices of only 
some of the member states, the ECtHR is in effect raising the bar for others and must be aware 
                                                                
458 ibid 141. 
459 ibid 138. 
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of the danger of forcing democratic evolution.  As such, the ECtHR should err on the side of 
restraint and act only where there is clear evidence.460 However, provided evidence is cited, 
criticisms made about those developments being “judge made law” are minimised and 
allegations of activism reduced by limiting the pace of change to developments in 
democracies.   
Individual decisions may still be subject to allegations that the ECtHR got it wrong, given the 
difficulties in the use of consensus but that is not a reason to abandon it. The legitimacy of 
the ECtHR procedure should include safety measures producing the most rigorous and 
disciplined approach to consensus practically possible.
                                                                
460 Carozza cautions that:  
The Court’s haphazard and overly casual assertions of similarities or divergences in national 
laws constitute a serious weakness that undermines the legitimacy of the Court by 
rationalizing its crucial turns in justification on little more than hunches about European 
commonality and patterns of legal, social, and moral development.  
P. Carozza, “Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: Some Reflections 
on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” Notre Dame Law Review 73 (1997-98) 
1217, 1225. 
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Procedural margin of appreciation: 
As above. 
 
Substantive margin of appreciation: 
Was the decision of the respondent State to 
interfere disproportionate: (i) was there a 
legitimate aim for the interference, (ii) were 
the means employed suitable, (iii) were less 
restrictive means available, (iv) was the 
response disproportionate resulting in a 
negative outcome that no reasonable person 
would think justified by the overall aim?   
 
The preliminary 
question: Is the case 
admissible? 
 
Stage one: Does the 
claim fall under the 
normative scope of 
the right at issue in 
abstracto? 
 
Stage two: Has the 
State correctly applied 
the norm in concreto? 
 
 
The margin 
available for 
substantive 
decisions is 
affected by the 
following: 
(i) The 
importance of the 
norm. 
(ii) Consensus in 
recognized expert 
opinion. 
 (iv) To the extent 
that there are 
comparable 
issues, consensus 
in decisions on 
delivery by a 
significant sample 
of similarly 
affected member 
States* 
(v) Local social 
consensus. 
(vi) Sensitivity of 
the issue. 
 
* Consensus on the 
desire to deliver in 
a particular manner 
AND actual delivery 
separately relevant. 
For non-absolute rights. 
If due process followed, strong prima facie 
presumption for substantive decision. 
 
 
Fig. 6.4 Proposed Corrective Judicial Model for the ECtHR 
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6.6 The Ruling 
 
The manner of rulings made by the ECtHR may better reflect the different stages set out by 
the proposed judicial model by including as routine judgments: (1) a rejection of any current 
breach but encouraging all contracting states to actively consider the point raised relating to 
interpretation or to application461; and (2) providing a clear division between mandatory steps 
and recommendations of the ECtHR. 
Where there is a breach then it is in accordance with subsidiarity and respect for due 
democratic process that the respondent state has the choice of how to comply, with an 
avoidance of overly prescriptive requirements.462  
                                                                
461 Points which may, in turn, be taken up by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
462The ECtHR has held, on a number of occasions that its judgments generally leave to states the means 
to discharge obligations under Article 41, which requires them to abide by judgments. See Aleksanyan 
v Russia, Application for an explanation:  
The Court notes that the applicant did not request any pecuniary compensation under Article 
41 of the Convention. As to the specific measures requested by the applicant, the Court 
reiterates that its judgments are essentially declaratory in nature and that, in general, it is 
primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of 
Ministers, the means to be used in its domestic legal order in order to discharge its obligation 
under Article 46 of the Convention […] 
Only where it is, exceptionally, deemed necessary for just the types of situations that the proposed 
model envisages will the ECtHR go further: 
However, exceptionally, with a view to helping the respondent State to fulfil its obligations 
under Article 46, the Court will seek to indicate the type of measure that might be taken in 
order to put an end to a systemic situation it has found to exist […] In other exceptional cases, 
the nature of the violation found may be such as to leave no real choice as to the measures 
required to remedy it and the Court may decide to indicate only one such measure […] 
Aleksanyan v Russia, Application No. 46468/06, Judgment of December 22 2008, at paras. 238 and 
239. 
See also Assanidze v Georgia, Application No. 71503/01, Judgment of 8 April 2004; Scozzari and Giunta 
v Italy, Application Nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, Judgment of 13 July 2000; and Brumărescu v 
Romania, Application No. 28342/95, judgment of 28 October 1999. 
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6.7 Illustrating the Issues 
As the element of the proposed judicial model on the preliminary point regarding admissibility 
of cases is in keeping with the existing approach (that the questions it raises are “significant 
issues”), that aspect of the model will not be further evaluated in this work. It is once a case 
is admitted that the suggested corrective judicial model and current one appears to diverge.  
As a starting point, there is currently no particular judicial strategy of the ECtHR once the case 
is accepted for its judgment. This means the approach to questions such as consensus and 
the margin of appreciation is unpredictable. In particular, this work has noted already that 
consensus is found with varying numerical and geopolitical significance in the evidence 
presented and, sometimes, very little evidence of member state practices at all. There 
appears to be significant reliance on international law, that might not always be recognised 
in the practices of the states. And, the impact of due democratic review appears to be more 
forceful in some cases compared to others, when it should be consistent in creating a strong 
presumption of compliance. 
The work will now return to the speech made by Lord Hoffmann, considered in Chapters Four 
and Five.463 Three cases his lordship uses to illustrate his concerns relating to the current use 
of the margin of appreciation by the ECtHR, provide a useful means for this work to introduce 
the implications of the suggested corrective model and possible shortcomings of the current 
approach.  
The first case reference concerns interpretation of a norm as falling under the scope of a right, 
it is particularly notable as the judgment arguably gave this norm the status of being absolute. 
The ECtHR appears to have done so without any consideration of whether member state 
practices could be reasonably interpreted as a showing consensus on the point. 
The second case reference relates to the application of an accepted norm. The ECtHR appears 
to have set a narrow substantive margin of appreciation without considering the impact of 
consensus between member states or in expert opinion (or more accurately dissent in that 
                                                                
463 Lord Hoffmann, The Universality of Human Rights, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, 19 March 
2009. Chapter 4 (n 250) and Chapter 5 (n 373). 
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case). The substantive margin of appreciation was, therefore, arguably more restricted than 
the evidence on any shared standards for delivery supported. 
The third case reference relates to both interpretation and application. This time it is the 
procedural margin of appreciation that is raised. The ECtHR’s lack of explanation as to why it 
considered that the state procedures (which appeared to have met the requirements of 
democracy) inadequate is at issue. 
Case One relates to a refusal by the ECtHR to allow any exceptions to the rule that evidence 
provided under compulsion could not be used in criminal proceedings.464 The UK had argued 
that while a defendant in a criminal trial cannot be compelled to appear as a witness at his 
own trial, the privilege against self-incrimination was not absolute.465 As such, it would be 
necessary to have regard to all the facts of the case, including the many procedural safeguards 
inherent in the system.466 The UK further emphasised, in respect of that balance, that 'whilst 
the interests of the individual should not be overlooked, there was also a public interest in 
the honest conduct of companies and in the effective prosecution of those involved in 
complex corporate fraud'.467  
In response, the ECtHR did not, “find it necessary [...] to decide whether the right not to 
incriminate oneself is absolute or whether infringements of it may be justified in particular 
circumstances”. 468 It instead held, without consideration of any additional evidence on the 
point and certainly not the majority consensus in practices for which the corrective model 
calls, that it could not accept that the complexity of corporate fraud and the public interest in 
the investigation and punishment of such fraud could justify such a marked departure from 
one of the basic principles of a fair procedure. It considered that: 
[T]he general requirements of fairness contained in Article 6, including the right not 
to incriminate oneself, applies to criminal proceedings in respect of all types of criminal 
                                                                
464 Saunders v the United Kingdom, Application No. 19187/91, Judgment of December 17 1996. 
465 ibid at para. 62. 
466 ibid at para. 63. 
467 ibid at para. 64. 
468 ibid at para. 74. 
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offences without distinction from the most simple to the most complex [emphasis 
added].469 
Applying the reasoning of this work, this type of statement falls under stage one. It is part of 
the in abstracto reasoning interpreting a principle as it applied generally. Interpretation 
relates to what the norm is and in what particular circumstances it can be restricted. The 
question of the acceptability or not of self-incrimination in any criminal case is a generic one, 
raised in a generic situation and not requiring expertise. Asserting that there was no need to 
consider whether limitation was ever possible, making the right absolute, was an 
interpretation of a principle of general application and when it can be restricted. Without 
exploring state practices for a consensus supporting such an interpretation, the ECtHR gave 
the appearance of itself constructing the normative scope of the right based on its own values 
rather than democratically reached compromised constructions.  
The result was a rather underdeveloped final outcome, later criticised as not showing 
sufficient deference to the detailed work of the national authorities, including national courts, 
in weighing up the competing considerations to establish safeguards for defendants. This 
national work would be, according to the corrective model, part of stage two, requiring 
democratic due process and a reasonable response by the national government. If the ECtHR 
had not effectively found the norm to be absolute despite the lack of evidence for such 
understanding, then under stage two the process adopted by the state may well have been 
sufficient to show a prima facie assumption that the actual decision made was legitimate with 
a resultantly widened margin of appreciation open to the state. 
Case Two was a refusal by the ECtHR to allow the admission, in exceptional circumstances, of 
hearsay evidence in criminal trials. If allowed, such evidence could lead to a conviction based 
solely (or to a decisive degree) upon depositions made by a person of whom the accused has 
had no opportunity to examine or have examined.470   
                                                                
469 ibid at para. 74. 
470 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 26766/05 and 2228/06, Judgment 
of 15 December 2011. 
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Again, crucial to such a judgment is first a consideration in stage one interpreting normative 
scope. The Chamber accepted that the norm did not amount to an absolute right of challenge, 
but instead to the ability to challenge unreliable evidence or evidence rendered unreliable by 
virtue of the lack of an ability to cross-examine. The work will assume that there was evidence 
of consensus in state practices to support this as a commonly understood construction, 
focused on a public general understanding that an ability to challenge evidence is part of its 
reliability. Yet, in settling the margin of appreciation for securing that expectation in practice 
within the complexity of legal processes beyond the understanding of the public as a whole, 
the ECtHR gave the appearance of doing so without considering that delivery of non-absolute 
protection against unreliable evidence allows a member state to review differing options to 
secure that aim. The ECtHR’s decision effectively determined that all “important” hearsay 
evidence be treated as unreliable. As the UK submitted, when the case was later referred to 
the Grand Chamber: 
[T]he sole or decisive rule, as applied by the Chamber in its judgment, was predicated 
on the false assumption that all hearsay evidence which was critical to a case was 
either unreliable or, in the absence of cross-examination of the witness, incapable of 
proper assessment [...] The rule could produce arbitrary results; it could operate to 
exclude evidence simply because it was important, irrespective of its reliability or 
cogency. The Chamber had not explained whether or how the issue of reliability was 
relevant to the application of the rule [emphasis added].471 
In essence, the case removed any practical margin of appreciation for a norm that the ECtHR 
had accepted as not currently understood as being absolute. Under the procedural margin of 
appreciation, the ECtHR overlooked the detailed considerations of the national bodies and 
courts relating to the types of requirements that may safeguard that expectation in practice. 
If it had done so then it is likely that the following of due democratic process would have 
resulted in a prima facie presumption that the substantive UK decision was legitimate. While, 
under the substantive margin it would still have been open to ECtHR to make the same 
ultimate finding, that margin would have been wider and further influenced by absence of 
consensus in expert opinion and the standards established by the practices of other similarly 
affected states.  
                                                                
471 ibid at para. 96. 
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Interestingly, the lack of reasoning provided also made the decision of the ECtHR set out 
unworkable. This appeared again in the UK’s submission when the case was referred to the 
Grand Chamber:  
It [the Chamber] had not conducted a full analysis of the safeguards available in 
England and Wales, nor had it appreciated the important difference between 
common-law trial procedures and those of other contracting member States. It had 
not explained when evidence would be decisive with sufficient precision to enable a 
trial court to apply the sole or decisive rule in practice or given adequate consideration 
to the practical problems which would arise by application of the rule in England and 
Wales.472 
It is notable that in the Grand Chamber, the ECtHR came to a different conclusion. Here, it did 
consider the reasoning of the respondent state and a range of relevant comparative law from 
other similar jurisdictions to determine the type of balancing and safeguards utilised. On that 
point, under what the proposed model terms the substantive margin, it determined that for 
one of the challengers in this case, the protection had been fair.  
Case Three relates to a decision to extend the hours of permitted flights at Heathrow, which 
was held by the ECtHR Chamber as a breach of the right to private and family life.473 The UK 
submitted that in deciding to introduce the scheme governing the airport it struck an 
appropriate and justified balance between the various interests involved and so any 
interference with Article 8 was justified. 474  If the UK could show that it had used due 
democratic process under the procedural margin of appreciation, then it should have been 
afforded a prima facie presumption that the decision made was legitimate. 
In support of its processes, the UK referred to the series of noise mitigation and abatement 
measures implemented at Heathrow airport 475  and industry responses to a consultation 
project, all of which emphasised the economic importance of night flights and provided 
detailed information and figures to support their responses476. The UK claimed that active and 
                                                                
472 ibid para. 96. 
473 Hatton and Others v the United Kingdom, Application no. 36022/97, Judgment of July 8 2003. 
474 ibid at para. 85. 
475 ibid at para. 87. 
476 ibid at para. 88. 
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detailed consideration had been and continued to be given to the issue of sleep disturbance 
and to whether the research undertaken to date needed to be supplemented and, if so, in 
what areas and on what scientific basis.477 Overall, the UK contended that, before deciding 
upon the scheme, they had considered extensive and detailed information. Given the range 
of interests involved, striking a balance is not straightforward, but was, 'something which the 
national authorities are particularly well placed to do'. As such, the balance struck should be 
found as fair and reasonable.478  
The Chamber concluded that insufficient research was conducted by the UK Government. It 
accepted that it was, at the very least, likely that night flights contribute to  the national 
economy as a whole but, critically, that the importance of that contribution had never been 
assessed, whether by the UK Government directly or by independent research on their 
behalf.479 It noted also that only limited research had been carried out into the nature of sleep 
disturbance and prevention.480 Overall, the Chamber did not accept that what it determined 
as "modest steps" at improving the night noise climate were capable of constituting “the 
measures necessary” to protect the applicants’ position. It stated that: 
In particular, in the absence of any serious attempt to evaluate the extent or impact 
of the interferences with the applicants’ sleep patterns, and generally in the absence 
of a prior specific and complete study with the aim of finding the least onerous 
solution as regards human rights, it is not possible to agree that in weighing the 
interferences against the economic interest of the country – which itself had not been 
quantified – the Government struck the right balance in setting up the 1993 
Scheme.481 
In terms of the application stage of the proposed improved judicial model, this ruling found a 
procedural breach given an insufficient review and it followed that this meant the substantive 
decision was unjustified. This ruling would, therefore, hold under the proposed corrective 
model but only provided the norm itself was correctly defined under the in abstracto 
                                                                
477 ibid at para. 89. 
478 ibid at para. 90. 
479 ibid at para. 102. 
480 ibid at para. 103. 
481 ibid at para. 106. 
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interpretation stage regarding the general balance between a quiet home and the economic 
interest of the public as a whole.  
Notably, when the case was referred to the Grand Chamber it reversed the Chamber's 
decision.482  The UK strongly objected to the “minimum interference” approach which had 
been adopted by the Chamber as the guiding principle of general application. The UK 
submitted that the test reduced to “vanishing-point” the margin of appreciation afforded to 
states in an area involving difficult and complex balancing of a variety of competing interests 
and factors.483 While such a requirement “may” have been a reasonable interpretation of the 
duty in relation to sound pollution, it was not a way in which it “must” be interpreted. As such, 
only a common government understanding between the states on the generic protection 
expected by all citizens could establish that as a binding commitment. If the ECtHR had been 
required to show consensus in support of its interpretation of the normative scope and had 
not found such a strict understood obligation, then its determination of procedural 
compliance may well have reached a different outcome. It, in essence, started off down the 
wrong path. 
The UK further argued that there was no single correct policy to be applied regarding 
regulation of night flights. So, assuming that it was found to have followed due democratic 
process, it would have claimed a wide substantive margin. states could and did adopt a variety 
of different approaches, with a clear absence of consensus on delivery. Because of their 
'direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries', national authorities 
were better placed to evaluate local conditions and needs. 484  The role of ECtHR was 
supervisory only, to ensure that the state did not follow a process which would result in the 
making of an arbitrary decision i.e. had it made itself sufficiently informed of the relevant 
                                                                
482The Grand Chamber noted that: 
[R]egard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing 
interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State 
enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure 
compliance with the Convention.  
ibid at para. 98. 
483 ibid at para. 87. 
484 ibid at para. 88. 
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issues by carrying out an adequate investigation and had it adopted procedures to strike a 
fair balance.485 Provided the state procedurally complied then that following of due process, 
coupled with variation in the practices of similarly affected states, would mean that it enjoyed 
a very wide margin of appreciation, making it less likely for the ECtHR to find a breach. 
The ECtHR Grand Chamber noted that: 
Whilst the State is required to give due consideration to the particular interests, the 
respect for which it is obliged to secure by virtue of Article 8, it must in principle be 
left a choice between different ways and means of meeting this obligation. The Court's 
supervisory function being of a subsidiary nature, it is limited to reviewing whether or 
not the particular solution adopted can be regarded as striking a fair balance.486 
It therefore determined, emphasizing the importance of the procedural review, that a 
reasonable decision had been made based on the data available. If the proposed corrective 
model had been utilised, the need for this reversal could well have been avoided.  
6.8 Chapter Conclusions 
A comparison between the elements in the framework of analysis for assessing the legitimacy 
of the ECtHR procedure from Chapter Four (Fig. 4.3) and the proposed improved judicial 
model for the Court (Fig. 6.4) is now possible from the analysis in this chapter:
                                                                
485 ibid at para. 89. 
486 ibid at para, 123. 
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Element Explanation Risk Response 
Transparency and consistency Clearly explained reasoning for 
judgments. 
 
Decision-making process with clearly 
defined stages for interpretation and 
application, always applied. 
Difficulty applying a decision outside 
of the specific facts of the case. 
 
Inconsistent development of law. 
 
Lack of clarity on what is required for 
a state to comply with its duty. 
 
Undermining of ECtHR accountability. 
 
Undermining of trust in the legitimacy 
of judgments. 
Sequential stages for the judicial 
process, suitable for all types of 
case. 
 
Nature/requirements of judicial 
reasoning process explained in 
relation to each. 
 
Relevant factors identified, 
creating a checklist. 
Directed/contained authority Acts as agent to secure the objects of 
its principals (the member states as 
representatives of citizens). 
Expansion beyond the mission, 
slippage from securing the principals’ 
shared government object and 
purpose. 
Stage one requires the 
interpretation of the normative 
parameters of a right to reflect 
common understandings 
constructed by social interactions 
between agents (interpreted via 
the practices of democratic 
governments). 
Current/informed Judgments need to keep pace with 
evolving understandings of the 
government purpose of the principals 
and to be informed by/harmonious 
with wider international law. 
The ECHR ceases to be effective and 
relevant internationally. 
Use of consensus to develop the 
stage one interpretation of the 
rights and to help settle 
standards for stage two 
substantive application. 
 
Recognized expert opinion, both 
national and international, forms 
part of the procedural review 
under stage two and helps to 
settle the substantive margin of 
appreciation.  
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Acknowledgement of subsidiarity 
and a margin of appreciation 
Local variation means that national 
democratic government choices are 
presumed to be correct. 
Unrealistic judgments. 
 
Judgments not in accordance with 
societal values and empirical reality. 
 
Unimplemented judgments and loss 
of public investment – meaning the 
ECHR ceases to be effective. 
 
 
Interpretation under stage one 
requires consensus from a 
numerically but also 
geopolitically relevant majority. 
 
A procedural and substantive 
margin of appreciation is 
provided for, under stage two. 
 
Compliance with the procedural 
review requirements means a 
strong prima facie presumption 
that the substantive decision is 
correct, resulting in a less 
intensive review. 
 
Only unreasonable or 
disproportionate substantive 
decisions challenged. 
 
Consensus influential in 
determining how much variation 
is required, reviewing the 
absence or presence thereof only 
in similarly affected states. 
 
Sensitive issues given a wider 
substantive margin. 
Limited to oversight  Not tasked with securing individual 
justice i.e. not an appeal court. 
Excessive caseload, undermining local 
systems and overwhelming the 
ECtHR. 
 
Admissibility criteria met only in 
cases with a significant impact on 
individuals or indicating a 
systemic issue. 
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Overly intensive review of local and 
democratic decisions. 
Compliance with the procedural 
review requirements under stage 
two means a strong prima facie 
presumption that the substantive 
decision is correct, resulting in a 
less intensive review. 
 
Evidence/changed circumstances 
from after the challenged 
national decision was made is not 
admissible when reviewing state 
compliance. 
Acknowledgement of the democratic 
process 
The ECtHR is tasked with upholding 
and reinforcing democracy. 
 
Democratic decisions on 
interpretation of right are correct is 
they could accord with the PGC. 
 
Provided the democratic process is 
followed national decision-making on 
application should, prima facie, be 
upheld with a wide margin of 
appreciation. 
Undermining of the operation, 
relevance and faith in democracy as 
the best route to securing “human 
rights” and organising society. 
 
Undermining the very basis of the 
ECHR and the rights as listed in its text 
(themselves having been interpreted 
by the original states based upon the 
understandings commonly developed 
via democracy). 
The moral balancing on the 
generic moral norms that fall 
under rights occurs in stage one, 
within democracies and overseen 
by national democratic 
government. 
 
In the stage two application of 
the principles of general 
application to particular 
circumstances, where a 
democratic process of review is 
followed, it is presumed that the 
decision is correct. In challenging 
that substantive decision, 
consensus in democratic state 
practices is a major influence. 
Effectiveness Are judgments upheld and are the 
decisions of the ECtHR influential in 
driving forward wider reform? 
Individuals do not secure an 
appropriate remedy and no 
systematic change. 
 
The model, in securing the other 
elements of the framework, is 
more legitimate. 
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Decisions do not inform future law-
making and public debate. 
The evidence of a consensus in 
other states will add to pressure 
to comply. 
 
The actual implementation of a 
judgment is normally left to the 
state, making it more likely that 
any response will be sufficient to 
comply. 
 
Where there is not yet consensus 
on issues, the ECtHR is 
encouraged by the model to ask 
states to consider particular 
points and to make 
recommendations. This will 
engage states in a process for 
realistic and empirically valid 
development of principles and 
standards. 
Fig. 6.5 Response of the Proposed Improved Judicial Model to the Framework of Analysis for Assessing the Legitimacy of ECtHR Procedure 
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Additionally, consideration of the cases highlighted by Lord Hoffmann demonstrates the 
potential usefulness of the proposed model for the ECtHR and shows the impact of some of 
the flaws identified in relation to the Court’s current approach. 
Notably, the ECtHR does not have a particular judicial strategy. Furthermore, its approach to 
settling points such as consensus and the margin of appreciation is unpredictable.  Consensus 
is found with varying numerical and geopolitical significance in the evidence presented and, 
sometimes, very little evidence of member state practices at all. Arguably this results in 
expanding interpretations of the rights that are not recognised by the states as forming part 
of the agreement.  
This represents an expansion of the ECHR project beyond its mission that undermines the 
democratic process. It also results in an artificially reduced margin for state application of the 
rights, narrowed by reliance upon expert opinion that is not recognised by states and 
consensus that has not been properly established.  In the application stage, democratic due 
process is not always sufficiently factored into the margin left to the state.  Another 
consequence is a move towards the ECtHR delivering individual justice, as opposed to 
oversight of democratic processes.487 
However, the research question of this work, set out in Chapter One, requires us to consider 
whether cases such as these are an anomaly or are evidence of a more systematic problem: 
                                                                
487 See the work of Greer and Wylde, which notes that: 
[R]ecent developments have tended to confirm the ascendancy of the “individual justice 
model” over the “jurisprudence of principles”/”standards for dialogue” alternative, the latter 
of which, in its various forms, has, nevertheless, become a particularly powerful and widely 
held view among scholars [...] 
S. Greer and F. Wylde, “Has the European Court of Human Rights become a “Small Claims Tribunal” 
and Why, If at All, does it Matter?” (2017) European Human Rights Law Review 145. 
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Chapter Seven will apply the corrective model to a wider range of case law. It selects 
controversial case law which represents some of the most challenging issues the ECtHR has 
responded to, in order to robustly test the ability of the proposed improved judicial model to 
provide a more legitimate and effective solution. 
  
Since its inception, the European Court of Human Rights has been charged with 
demonstrating an increased willingness to find member states in violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. While some evolution in the interpretation of rights is 
necessary and the requirements for application to secure rights are to be expected to 
become less fluid as the Court develops its acquis, some participants allege that the nature 
of these ongoing developments cannot be reconciled with the Court’s mandate.  
(1) To what extent is the mandate of the Court identifiable and relevant to the scope 
and limits of its authority? 
(2) Based on that authority, what are the elements of a corresponding exercise of 
judicial autonomy (a framework) and has an expansive interpretation of rights and 
a reduced margin made available to member states in applying them, exceeded 
that authority?  
(3) If discrepancies are identified could a corrective model for decision making by the 
Court be proposed, to support more legitimate and effective operation and future 
evolution of the system? 
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7 Chapter Seven 
 
Evaluation of the Proposed Corrective 
Model 
 
Application and evaluation of the staged model 
against key ECtHR rulings and hypothetical 
consequences  
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7.1 Introduction 
Phase seven of the project provides a comparison of the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR), based on appropriate case history, with the improved corrective 
judicial model proposed in Chapter Six (identified in Fig. 6.4). Key rulings from the ECtHR are 
analysed, in particular those that have resulted in controversy.  
Noting that Chapter Six considered that the initial assessment for admissibility of a case 
currently in use by the ECtHR is in keeping already with the proposed judicial model (questions 
raised that are “significant” and “current” 488 ), this chapter reviews only the two-stage 
approach to evaluating whether there has been a breach after a case has been accepted by 
the Court for judicial review.
                                                                
488 Note that, under ECHR Protocol 15, the current time limit of six months from the national judgment 
would be reduced further to four months. 
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Exhaustion of 
domestic remedies. 
 
Four-month deadline 
for applying to the 
Court. 
 
Complaint 
compatible with the 
Convention and not 
manifestly ill-
founded. 
 
Translation into an 
autonomous legal 
norm. 
 
Existence of 
interference: 
Has the respondent 
State reasonably 
met the minimum 
requirements for 
the norm being 
transposed / 
effectively 
protected?  
 
Complaint 
sufficiently serious: 
Significant impact 
for the given 
individual; or 
Significant impact 
upon the system of 
the respondent 
State or at a 
European level. 
 
(1) Existing legal 
norm that 
"touches" the case 
and addresses all 
the significant 
questions 
(2) The majority of  
a significant 
(quantitatively and 
geopolitically 
relevant) sample of 
member States 
commonly 
recognizes the 
extension of a right 
to include the new 
norm:  
A consensus on the 
desire to protect 
(opinio juris 
generalis) or on 
actual protection. 
relevant 
 
Note the possibility 
of a blocking 
minority. 
 
 
Necessity of an 
interference with 
the norm in line 
with an available 
legitimate 
justification for 
restriction: 
Could the decision 
of the respondent 
State be 
proportionate? 
 
Procedural margin of appreciation: 
In reviewing the application of the norm has 
the respondent State (i) used due 
democratic process, (ii) applied relevant 
facts (of the case and social background), (iii) 
considered nationally recognized expert 
opinion, and (iv) considered international 
opinion from expert authorities commonly 
recognised. 
If not, this is a breach in its own right and the 
substantive decision is unsupported. 
 
Substantive margin of appreciation: 
Was a conclusion of the respondent State, in 
light of the factors identified in the procedural 
margin, one a reasonable person would find 
justified and is it consistent with other 
applications? 
Procedural margin of appreciation: 
As above. 
 
Substantive margin of appreciation: 
Was the decision of the respondent State to 
interfere disproportionate: (i) was there a 
legitimate aim for the interference, (ii) were 
the means employed suitable, (iii) were less 
restrictive means available, (iv) was the 
response disproportionate resulting in a 
negative outcome that no reasonable person 
would think justified by the overall aim?   
 
The preliminary 
question: Is the case 
admissible? 
 
Stage one: Does the 
claim fall under the 
normative scope of 
the right at issue in 
abstracto? 
 
Stage two: Has the 
State correctly applied 
the norm in concreto? 
 
 
The margin 
available for 
substantive 
decisions is 
affected by the 
following: 
(i) The 
importance of the 
norm. 
(ii) Consensus in 
recognized expert 
opinion. 
 (iv) To the extent 
that there are 
comparable 
issues, consensus 
in decisions on 
delivery by a 
significant sample 
of similarly 
affected member 
States* 
(v) Local social 
consensus. 
(vi) Sensitivity of 
the issue. 
 
* Consensus on the 
desire to deliver in 
a particular manner 
AND actual delivery 
separately relevant. 
For non-absolute rights. 
If due process followed, strong prima facie 
presumption for substantive decision. 
 
Fig. 6.4 Proposed Improved Judicial Model for the ECtHR 
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7.2 Terrorism Laws and Deportation        
7.2.1 Torture and “Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" 
Absolute rights raise particular challenges for the balance of authority between the ECtHR 
and member states, given that a government can never restrict or take away any norms that 
fall under their parameters. There are only four rights in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) which are absolute: (1) not to be tortured or to be inhumanly or degradingly 
treated or punished489; (2) not to be held in slavery or servitude490; (3) not to be convicted for 
conduct which was not an offence at the time it occurred491; and (4) not to have a heavier 
penalty imposed for an offence than the one applicable at the time the offence was 
committed492.  
Decisions of the ECtHR based upon Article 3, normative principles under which relate to 
stopping deportation and the right not to be tortured or inhumanly or degradingly treated or 
punished, illustrate the importance of careful formation of the understood normative scope 
of an absolute right. It has been selected as an area for review as one that poses the greatest 
challenge for the proposed corrective model and demonstrates the potential impact of 
separating the proposed ECtHR judicial model into stage one for interpretation and stage two 
for application. Two cases illustrate clearly the impact of considering the normative scope of 
a right under stage one on Article 3: Soering493 in exploring the normative parameters of 
Article 3 beyond national borders and Chahal494 in considering the relevance, if any, of risks 
to national security allowing any restrictions to an absolute principle of general application in 
particular circumstances. 
                                                                
489 Article 3 ECHR. 
490 Article 4 (1) ECHR. 
491 Article 7 (1) ECHR. 
492 Article 7 (1) ECHR. 
493 Soering v the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989. 
494 Chahal v the United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996.  
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7.2.1.1 Stage One (Interpretation) 
Article 3 EHCR states: 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment [emphasis added].’ 
There is a clear absolute guarantee of the normative scope of Article 3, meaning there can be 
no acceptable restrictions of the generally expected norms that fall within its parameters. 
There is no allowing of member states to limit the generally expected protection under stage 
two in concreto application to particular circumstances. This make the first stage of the 
corrective model suggested by this work particularly critical, starting with the ECtHR 
interpreting the right’s normative parameters in abstracto.  
Article 3 leaves a number of aspects open to interpretation. The wording “torture or inhuman 
treatment” requires further reasoning on its meaning. What is meant by “subjecting” a person 
to such treatment is also unclear. While the wording of the Article clearly means that a state 
may not itself engage in the banned activity in any circumstances, it is not clear on any positive 
duty to actively safeguard against others practicing it. A further question is raised about the 
government’s responsibility to safeguard people outside of its borders. 
The in abstracto settlement of these points is, in accordance with the proposed model, via 
evidence of a majority consensus between the member states. Only if an already recognised 
norm can be adopted to necessarily cover the circumstances of a case, is a full stage one 
evaluation not required. 
Soering required a determination of whether the normative scope of Article 3 reaches beyond 
prohibiting the state from causing torture or inhuman or degrading treatment within their 
own jurisdiction or to cover also exposing people to extraterritorial punishment conducted 
by other states.  
Within a state's territory, the understood expectations extend demonstrably to the state not 
engaging in such treatment and also to a positive duty to prevent others from doing so. That 
position is well accepted, the consensus is clear and longstanding and forms an accepted legal 
norm between the states of the ECHR (and more widely). However, that principle does not 
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resolve whether removal to outside a state’s territory still requires that duty of protection. As 
such, a new stage one evaluation was necessary, to find a new universally constructed norm. 
The ECtHR is able to adopt an existing norm to cover a different in concreto situation, but 
should not itself extend in abstracto principles to recognise a new claim. In terms of 
extraterritorial duties, the criteria of reason could be properly met with varying 
interpretations of the existing norms recognised as falling under Article 3 as defined in 
relation to domestic duties; from imposing no duty to not encouraging, not endorsing, or not 
knowingly putting an individual at risk (even here, there could be varying levels of acceptable 
risk).  
Settling which of these interpretations forms the dialectically necessary construction is a 
matter upon which all agents may be expected to reason, as represented by their democratic 
representatives. Without a consensus on the right norm i.e. a consistent moral justification 
inferable from the practices of the governments of a majority of the member states, there is 
no ECHR principle to be applied by the member states and overseen by the ECtHR.  
In the case, the applicant submitted that under Article 3: 
[A]n individual may not be surrendered out of the protective zone of the Convention 
without the certainty that the safeguards which he would enjoy are as effective as the 
Convention standard.495  
The UK contended that Article 3 should not be interpreted so as to impose responsibility on 
a member state for acts that occur outside its jurisdiction. It maintained that: 
[I]t would be straining the language of Article 3 intolerably to hold that by surrendering 
a fugitive criminal, the extraditing State has "subjected" him to any treatment or 
punishment that he will receive following conviction and sentence in the receiving 
State.496  
Note here the points made in Chapter Four about the risks of overzealous extrapolation. 
While the position of the applicant “could” be reasoned and could be coherent with existing 
understood norms, so could other interpretations. It “may” rather than “must” represent the 
                                                                
495 Soering v the United Kingdom (n 493) at para. 82. 
496 ibid at para. 83. 
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moral normative understanding. With that in mind, the UK’s position seems supportable 
given the ECHR guarantees only minimum common understandings. There is the potential to 
reason a distinction between committing or sanctioning violence within an area under one’s 
control, and exposing a person to it in an area outside of one’s control. This was not a 
necessary adoption of an existing moral norm to a new situation, but rather a significant 
extension of the right to include a new category. 
In the alternative, if it had any duty, the UK submitted that the application of Article 3 in 
extradition cases involving criminals should be limited to those occasions in which the 
treatment or punishment abroad is “likely”. Arguing that: 
[T]he fact that by definition the matters complained of are only anticipated, together 
with the common and legitimate interest of all States in bringing fugitive criminals to 
justice, it requires a very high degree of risk, proved beyond reasonable doubt, that ill-
treatment will actually occur [emphasis added].497 
The elements of the arguments made by the state fit with that of this work. First, whether the 
practices within states reveal moral constructions by agents of any norms extending a duty 
beyond national boundaries. Second, whether the scope of any generally understood duty to 
protect criminals covered only cases with a particular degree of risk. The latter argument is 
not the same as recognising that, when it comes to application, effective protection can be 
limited in some particular circumstances, but rather that the generic level of protection 
claimed was never a protected normative duty in the first place. 
The next consideration is how the ECtHR itself approached the claim. The ECtHR accepted 
that under Article 3:  
The question remains whether the extradition of a fugitive to another State, where he 
would be subjected or be likely to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, would itself engage the responsibility of a Contracting State 
under Article 3 [emphasis added].498  
                                                                
497 ibid at para 83. 
498 ibid at para. 88. 
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It then adopted reasoning, that seems to be in accordance with requiring evidence of a 
common normative understanding across member states of the expectation. The ECtHR 
explained: 
That the abhorrence of torture has such implications is recognised in Article 3 of the 
United Nations [1984] Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which provides that ‘no State Party shall [...] 
extradite a person where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture’ [emphasis added].499 
As wording agreed by the United Nations General Assembly, to which all member states of 
the Council of Europe are member, there was evidence of consensus among the ECHR’s 
member states that the scope Article 3 extended beyond borders, to cover any case where 
there are substantial grounds for believing there is a risk. But what of the second claim of the 
UK, that in criminal cases there must be a likelihood of torture occurring? “Substantial” 
grounds certainly require evidence that the risk is real, i.e. beyond imagination, theory or 
speculation. It could, however, also be reasoned to require that the evidence is weighty. This 
uncertainty about the meaning of a common principle on the lower threshold inferable from 
the practices of the member states should have resulted in the more minimal understanding 
of the UK, as requiring likelihood, to have been applied. The ECtHR requirement of only a real 
risk being needed would have required further evidence beyond that utilized by the Court to 
show any consensus. 
The ECtHR continued by suggesting that it may have made a finding of extraterritorial 
protection even in the absence of such agreement. It considered that the expectation of 
protection under the ECHR extends beyond the UN agreement, which relates to only 
                                                                
499 ibid at para. 88. 
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torture500, to incorporate the wider category of inhuman treatment501 and that substantial 
grounds means any real risk. The ECtHR concluded that:   
The fact that a specialised treaty should spell out in detail a specific obligation 
attaching to the prohibition of torture does not mean that an essentially similar 
obligation is not already inherent in the general terms of Article 3 of the European 
Convention. It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the 
Convention, that "common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the 
rule of law" to which the Preamble refers, were a contracting State knowingly to 
surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous 
the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly 
referred to in the brief and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to 
the spirit and intendment of the Article, and in the Court’s view this inherent 
obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced 
in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment proscribed by that Article [emphasis added].502 
The statement that the expectations relating to torture and inhuman treatment in other 
countries is “inherent” shows a problematic tendency. The ECtHR cannot legitimately claim 
the authority, in the absence of consensus, to know what is “inherently” required if another 
alternative candidate normative understanding could be properly reasoned as the outcome 
by a moral agent. That consensus had been shown to be present in relation to torture where 
there was weighty evidence making it likely, but it was not shown in relation to inhuman 
treatment or to a real risk of its occurrence being sufficient. The ECtHR reached its decision 
despite a note of caution that:  
                                                                
500 Defined in Article 1 of the UN agreement as: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions. 
501 Protection against inhuman treatment is required under Article 16 of the UN agreement only within 
territory under a state’s jurisdiction. 
502 Soering v the United Kingdom (n 493) at para. 88. 
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[I]nherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As movement about the world 
become easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly 
in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be 
brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would 
not only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but 
also tend to undermine the foundations of extradition. These considerations must also 
be included among the factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and 
application of the notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in 
extradition cases.503 
In Chahal, given the establishment in Soering that Article 3 covers expulsions exposing an 
individual to a “real risk”, the focus now shifted to whether it is possible to revoke that 
protection or require a higher threshold of risk in cases involving a danger to national security.  
The UK argued its obligations under Article 3 in relation to ill-treatment could be revoked if 
the applicant might represent a danger to national security.  The UK argued that the 
guarantees were not absolute, where the applicant posed a threat to national security: 
[T]he guarantees afforded by Article 3 were not absolute in cases where a Contracting 
State proposed to remove an individual from its territory.  Instead, in such cases, 
which required a difficult prediction of future events in the receiving State, various 
factors should be taken into account, including the danger posed by the person in 
question to the security of the host nation. Thus, there was an implied limitation to 
Article 3, entitling a Contracting State to expel an individual to a receiving State even 
where a real risk of ill-treatment existed, if such removal was required on national 
security grounds [...] [emphasis added].504 
Once the ECtHR took the view of Soering that the scope of principles under Article 3 extend 
beyond national borders and that a “real risk” sufficed, that now autonomous definition must 
apply to another case that also raises the same generic question of extraterritorial availability. 
That being so, the ECtHR was bound to reject the UK’s argument. As the ECtHR explained: 
The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally absolute in 
expulsion cases.  Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing 
that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
                                                                
503 ibid at para. 89. 
504 Chahal v the United Kingdom (n 494) at para. 76. 
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Article 3, if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to 
safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged [...]505 
In the absence of the substantive legal norm absolutely prohibiting any “real risk” of torture 
and inhuman treatment by another state established in Soering, the UK’s argument would 
have merited consideration.506  
The second argument made by the UK once more raised the question of the threshold of risk. 
The second submission was that: 
In the alternative, the threat posed by an individual to the national security of the 
Contracting State was a factor to be weighed in the balance when considering the 
issues under Article 3. This approach took into account that in these cases there are 
varying degrees of risk of ill-treatment.  The greater the risk of ill-treatment, the less 
weight should be accorded to the threat to national security.  But where there existed 
a substantial doubt with regard to the risk of ill-treatment, the threat to national 
security could weigh heavily in the balance to be struck between protecting the rights 
of the individual and the general interests of the community [...]507 [emphasis added] 
This would require a higher degree of risk to be shown where national security was a concern, 
requiring that ill-treatment be likely. However, given the similarity of the arguments to those 
raised in Soering, that now autonomous definition preventing any real risk must apply to 
another case that also raises the same question of a state exposing an expelled individual to 
real risk extraterritorially. The particular circumstances of an individual, such as being a 
security risk, simply cannot be a consideration under an absolute right to the same protection 
against inhuman treatment that is expected by all. The ECtHR concluded that: 
                                                                
505 ibid at para. 80. 
506 Support for the potential have been able to reason differently comes from a treaty raised in the 
Chahal case. Article 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees provides:    
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.    
2.  The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there 
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, 
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes 
a danger to the community of that country [emphasis added]. 
507 ibid at para. 76. 
Page 321 of 391 
 
It should not be inferred from the Court's remarks [in Soering] concerning the risk of 
undermining the foundations of extradition […] that there is any room for balancing 
the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for expulsion in determining whether a 
State's responsibility under Article 3 […] is engaged.508  
The implications of Soering shows the impact of norms that become autonomous after 
translating to a legal norm by the ECtHR. The clarity created by these legal norms is to be 
welcomed as providing the unity and certainty that the ECHR system is striving towards. 
Without this, the task of applying those principles to the array of situations in which they arise 
would be intelligible. But the very nature of those norms as being binding and inflexible means 
it is important that they are clearly democratically recognised by the membership as a general 
duty in the first place. There is, in accordance with the proposed judicial model, doubt about 
that status in relation to the position taken by the ECtHR with inhuman treatment and the 
sufficiency of real risk in all extraterritorial cases. 
Having lost two cases and with the Soering approach firmly rooted, the UK may normally have 
accepted the position under ECHR law. However, such is the impact of the decision and the 
nature of the perceived threat to the state that it raised the questions again. When the UK 
intervened as a third party in the subsequent case of Saadi v Italy509  (with the support of the 
Italian government) to argue the points again.   
The UK submitted that:  
It was true that the protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment provided by Article 3 of the Convention was absolute. However, in the 
event of expulsion, the treatment in question would be inflicted not by the signatory 
State but by the authorities of another State. The signatory State was then bound by 
a positive obligation of protection against torture implicitly derived from Article 3. Yet 
in the field of implied positive obligations, the Court had accepted that the applicant’s 
rights must be weighed against the interests of the community as a whole [emphasis 
added].510 
                                                                
508 ibid at para. 81. 
509 Saadi v Italy, application no. 37201/06, judgment of 28 February 2008. 
510 ibid at para. 120. 
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This does raise an interesting point. Given that the extraterritorial protection was based upon 
a new common understanding, developed well after the signing of the ECHR, could that norm 
not now be limited to the extent of its common recognition included generic limits? The 
ECtHR’s own settled case-law shows that deciding the normative scope of a right (stage one) 
does not have absolute answers. For example, the ECtHR accepts that ill-treatment must 
attain a minimum level of severity and the likelihood of mistreatment must attain a minimum 
level before a criminal can demand not to be returned. It is arguable that generic reasoning 
could support a restriction where there is a threat to national security.  
The problem is that Article 3, the right under which expansion into positive duties has been 
recognised, is absolute. Even if new norms commonly recognised under its parameters are 
also commonly understood to be limited in some particular circumstances, the express 
wording of the Article does not allow it. This does demonstrate the need, when drafting living 
instruments, to ensure that the wording is not too prescriptive. The modern practices of 
states may now favour an absolute negative duty on states not to violate Article 3 and an 
absolute right on their positive duty to provide reasonable protection within their borders, 
but it would appear that a different more limited duty may be preferred for the 
extraterritorial norm. 
In regard to the nature of the offence being relevant to having rights under Article 3, the 
ECtHR reaffirmed its absolute position on extraterritorial ill-treatment: 
[T]he Court cannot accept the argument of the United Kingdom Government, 
supported by the [Italian] Government, that a distinction must be drawn under Article 
3 between treatment inflicted directly by a signatory State and treatment that might 
be inflicted by the authorities of another State, and that protection against this latter 
form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the interests of the community as a 
whole […] Since protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, 
that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the 
receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment. As the 
Court has repeatedly held, there can be no derogation from that rule […] It must 
therefore reaffirm the principle stated in Chahal […] that it is not possible to weigh the 
risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion in order to 
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determine whether the responsibility of a State is engaged under Article 3, even where 
such treatment is inflicted by another State.511 
The ECtHR did not refer back to the UN 1951 Convention, which we have noted showed a 
consensus in relation only to torture.512  However, the ECtHR did go on to refer to 2002 
guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism adopted (post Soering and 
Chahal)513 by the Council of Europe, Point XII the guidelines reads as follows: 
It is the duty of a State that has received a request for asylum to ensure that the 
possible return (‘refoulement’) of the applicant to his/her country of origin or to 
another country will not expose him/her to the death penalty, to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. The same applies to expulsion [emphasis 
added]. 
This would have been sufficient to show that there is now a consensus on the right to 
protection against extraterritorial torture and also inhuman treatment. But, this work would 
note that 2002 Guidelines do not reveal a consensus that a real risk is always sufficient, talking 
only of a duty to “ensure” rather than prevent against ill-treatment. While that wording 
clearly means a robust response is required, it leaves the specifics vague and open to different 
interpretations.  
Having reaffirmed its position on the relevant norm, the ability for the threshold of risk to 
vary in particular circumstances was responded to by the ECtHR as follows: 
With regard to the second branch of the United Kingdom Government’s arguments, 
to the effect that where an applicant presents a threat to national security stronger 
evidence must be adduced to prove that there is a risk of ill-treatment […] the Court 
                                                                
511 Ibid at para. 138. 
512 The UK made a sound argument why torture and inhuman treatment do not raise the same value 
considerations: 
In expulsion cases the degree of risk in the receiving country depended on a speculative 
assessment. The level required to accept the existence of the risk was relatively low and 
difficult to apply consistently. Moreover, Article 3 of the Convention prohibited not only 
extremely serious forms of treatment, such as torture, but also conduct covered by the 
relatively general concept of “degrading treatment”. And the nature of the threat presented 
by an individual to the signatory State also varied significantly. 
ibid at para. 121. 
513 On 11 July 2002, at the 804th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe. 
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observes that such an approach is not compatible with the absolute nature of the 
protection afforded by Article 3 either. It amounts to asserting that, in the absence of 
evidence meeting a higher standard, protection of national security justifies accepting 
more readily a risk of ill-treatment for the individual. The Court therefore sees no 
reason to modify the relevant standard of proof, as suggested by the third-party 
intervener, by requiring in cases like the present one that it be proved that subjection 
to ill-treatment is ‘more likely than not’.514 
7.2.1.2 Stage Two (Application) 
This still leaves the ECtHR to apply the second stage of its process; to determine against 
standards the adequacy of the actual delivery in the UK. The proposed corrective model 
would split this into the procedural margin of appreciation and the substantive margin of 
appreciation. 
Some have argued that there is no margin of appreciation for absolute rights, given the norms 
recognised as falling under them cannot ever be interfered with. The margin of appreciation 
has never been expressly invoked in respect of Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (the right 
not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), or 
Article 4 (the right not to be held in slavery or servitude)515 and it has had a very limited role 
in relation to Articles 5 and 6.516 The margin of appreciation is not, however, found in the text 
of the ECHR itself and so any limit to the Articles of the Convention to which it can be applied 
would have to also be justified by the ECtHR. Notably, the ECtHR has never expressly imposed 
such a limit.  
The reasoning of this work is that the principle of subsidiarity requires the democratic national 
governments to assess the evidence available when determining whether a norm is engaged 
and how to effectively meet the duty to protect it. As such, the lack of express consideration 
of the margin of appreciation remaining to the state in that task would not be in accordance 
                                                                
514 Saadi v Italy (n 509) at para. 140. 
515 J. Callewaert, “Is there a Margin of Appreciation in the Application of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the 
Convention?” (1998) 19 Human Rights Law Journal 6. 
516 J. Schokkenbroek, “The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights” (1998) 19 Human Rights Law Journal 30, 34. 
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with the proposed model and its ambitions of openness, transparency and consistency from 
a structured approach.  
In Soering, applying the “real risk” norm, the UK appears to have followed a democratic 
process, informed by relevant evidence, and to have provided reasoning for its decision. The 
reasons were fourfold: 
The United Kingdom Government […] did not accept that the risk of a death sentence 
attains a sufficient level of likelihood to bring Article 3 into play. Their reasons were 
fourfold. 
Firstly, […] the applicant has not acknowledged his guilt of capital murder as such. 
Secondly, only a prima facie case has so far been made out against him. In particular, 
in the United Kingdom Government’s view the psychiatric evidence … is equivocal as 
to whether Mr Soering was suffering from a disease of the mind sufficient to amount 
to a defence of insanity under Virginia law […] 
Thirdly, even if Mr Soering is convicted of capital murder, it cannot be assumed that 
in the general exercise of their discretion the jury will recommend, the judge will 
confirm and the Supreme Court of Virginia will uphold the imposition of the death 
penalty … The United Kingdom Government referred to the presence of important 
mitigating factors, such as the applicant’s age and mental condition at the time of 
commission of the offence and his lack of previous criminal activity, which would have 
to be taken into account by the jury and then by the judge in the separate sentencing 
proceedings [...] 
Fourthly, the assurance received from the United States must at the very least 
significantly reduce the risk of a capital sentence either being imposed or carried out 
[…]  
At the public hearing the Attorney General nevertheless made clear his Government’s 
understanding that if Mr Soering were extradited to the United States there was 
"some risk", which was "more than merely negligible", that the death penalty would 
be imposed [emphasis added].517 
The ECtHR troubled to note, when ruling in favour of the applicant: 
This finding in no way puts in question the good faith of the United Kingdom 
Government, who have from the outset of the present proceedings demonstrated 
their desire to abide by their Convention obligations, firstly by staying the applicant’s 
surrender to the United States authorities in accord with the interim measures 
                                                                
517 Soering v the United Kingdom (n 493) at para. 93. 
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indicated by the Convention institutions and secondly by themselves referring the 
case to the Court for a judicial ruling […]518 
The UK has considered sufficient relevant evidence and there was no breach of process 
requirements in terms of the review of the risk. The level of risk identified is, therefore, prima 
facie presumed to be correct. The difficulty is that, whether legitimately or not, under stage 
one the ECtHR had determined that the norm not to a “likelihood” of ill-treatment but only a 
“real risk”.  The problem with this emerges in relation to the substantive margin.  
The substantive margin is narrower in this case because of the importance of the right, 
justifying a full review. The ECtHR explained: 
It is not normally for the Convention institutions to pronounce on the existence or 
otherwise of potential violations of the Convention. However, where an applicant 
claims that a decision to extradite him would, if implemented, be contrary to Article 3 
by reason of its foreseeable consequences in the requesting country, a departure from 
this principle is necessary, in view of the serious and irreparable nature of the alleged 
suffering risked and in order to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguard provided by 
that Article.519 
A reasonable person would not think that the factual findings of the UK could justify a 
conclusion that there was no real risk. The UK had itself actually admitted that there was 
“some risk” beyond the merely “negligible”.  
In Chahal, despite raising the arguments relating to interpretation explored earlier, the UK's 
primary contention was in relation to application. It had identified in its review that no “real 
risk” of ill-treatment was established. According to the proposed model, provided it complied 
with the procedural requirements of considering the appropriate evidence, it should then 
have enjoyed a prima facie presumption that the decision it took on risk was appropriate. The 
substantive margin of appreciation, while narrower for absolute rights, could intervene with 
the UK’s finding on the facts only if there was an error regarding the facts or if a reasonable 
person could not think they justified the conclusion. Was the decision such that it was 
improbable or contrary to the evidence and how did it equate with the decisions of other 
                                                                
518 ibid at para. 111. 
519 ibid at para. 90. 
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member states on comparable points e.g. their assessment of risks in that country and the 
veracity of undertakings? 
It would have proved interesting to see how far the ECtHR was willing to question the findings 
of fact that the UK had made. But, ultimately, that point was not in effect considered, as the 
ECtHR did not limit itself to considering only those facts that were available to the UK at the 
time when the decision was made. 
In accordance with the principle that the ECtHR is not an appeal court delivering individual 
justice but rather constitutional justice by checking the delivery of justice by the states, the 
applicant argued that the ECtHR should consider the position in June 1992, at the time when 
the decision to deport him was made final.520 The applicant reasoned that purpose of the stay 
on removal pending the case was ‘not to afford the High Contracting Party [the UK] with an 
opportunity to improve its case’. Moreover, it was ‘not appropriate that the Strasbourg 
organs should be involved in a continual fact-finding operation’. 521  In other words, the 
lawfulness of the UK’s decision was to be assessed on that date when that decision became 
final. 
However, the argument was rejected by the ECtHR: 
In determining whether it has been substantiated that there is a real risk that the 
applicant, if expelled to India, would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3, 
the Court will assess all the material placed before it and, if necessary, material 
obtained of its own motion [...] Furthermore, since the material point in time for the 
assessment of risk is the date of the Court's consideration of the case [...], it will be 
necessary to take account of evidence which has come to light since the […] review.522 
Under the proposed model, this is not in keeping with the role of the ECtHR. Its function under 
stage two is only to assess the delivery of the respondent state, not to consider the case 
                                                                
520 The applicant raised the argument as the evidence now suggested that the level of risk to him has 
lessened since the UK decision. The situation in India and in Punjab had significantly stabilised since 
that date. 
521 Chahal v the United Kingdom (n 494) at para. 84. 
522 ibid at para. 97. 
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anew.523 The position was, however, affirmed in Saddi despite the express acknowledgement 
by the ECtHR that this is an unusual position to have taken under the ECHR: 
With regard to the material date, the existence of the risk must be assessed primarily 
with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the 
contracting State at the time of expulsion. However, if the applicant has not yet been 
extradited or deported when the Court examines the case, the relevant time will be 
that of the proceedings before the Court […] This situation typically arises when, as in 
the present case, deportation or extradition is delayed as a result of an indication by 
the Court of an interim measure […] Accordingly, while it is true that historical facts 
are of interest in so far as they shed light on the current situation and the way it is 
likely to develop, the present circumstances are decisive.524 
Suspending the decision of a member state, in the absence of concerns about how it was 
made, may undermine faith in democracy and the authority still vested in the state to have 
made the final determination and trust in their decisions in future cases. That is not to say 
that the state may not be required to start new national proceedings in light of new evidence, 
which is different from criticising an existing judgment. 
7.2.2 The Right to a Fair Trial 
The next case selected is Abu Qatada v UK525, again relating to deportation but considering 
something other than an absolute right, specifically Article 6 and the right to a fair trial.  The 
case concerned the risk of use of evidence obtained by torture, again there was debate about 
the normative scope of the right under stage one. 
7.2.2.1 Stage One (Interpretation) 
Article 6 states: 
                                                                
523 This is not to say that urgent appeals should not be available in the member state where conditions 
worsen in the destination country or that the member state could not reconsider deportation where 
conditions improve. 
524 Saadi v Italy (n 509) at para. 133. 
525 Abu Qatada v the United Kingdom, Application No.  8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012. 
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In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Clearly the state is responsible under the wording to ensure that its justice system meets 
those requirements. What is not immediately clear is whether evidence obtained by torture 
may not be used in a fair trial and, if so, what level of risk of torture having occurred places a 
state under a duty not to utilise it. Furthermore, under the positive responsibility of states 
not to enable others to use torture evidence, it is uncertain: (1) whether the acceptable risk 
for torture having taken place varies in an extra-territorial context; and (2) how to respond to 
a risk that the foreign system would actually use that evidence in spite of any assurances to 
the contrary. 
It was accepted by the UK that the “flagrant denial of justice” 526  test was a relevant 
understood norm here. In the ECtHR’s case-law, the term has been synonymous with a trial 
that is manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6. The ECtHR noted that case-law serves 
to underline the view that flagrant denial of justice is a “stringent test” of unfairness and goes 
beyond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the trial procedures such as might result 
in a breach of Article 6 if occurring within the respondent state itself. It determined that what 
is required is a breach “so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or destruction of the 
very essence” of Article 6.527 This forms the starting point from which further interpretation 
of the norm and then application must start. 
The ECtHR considered first whether the use at trial of evidence obtained by torture amounted 
to a flagrant denial of justice. It determined that it would: even if it resulted in real and reliable 
evidence. Given the positioning of the protection against torture as an absolute right, this was 
arguably a response that was inherent in any reading of Article 6. As the ECtHR explained: 
                                                                
526  It establishes that an issue might exceptionally be raised under Article 6 by an expulsion or 
extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive had suffered or risked suffering a flagrant 
denial of justice in the requesting country (Soering v the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, 
Judgment of 7 July 1989; Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, Applications nos. 46827/99 and 
46951/99, Judgment of 4 February 2005; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, Application 
No. 61498/08, Judgment of 2 March 2010). 
527 Abu Qatada v the United Kingdom (n 525) at paras. 258-260.  
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The trial process is a cornerstone of the rule of law. Torture evidence damages 
irreparably that process; it substitutes force for the rule of law and taints the 
reputation of any court that admits it. Torture evidence is excluded to protect the 
integrity of the trial process and, ultimately, the rule of law itself.528 
In any event, the ECtHR concluded that international law, like the common law before it, has 
declared its unequivocal opposition to the admission of torture evidence. The ECtHR cited the 
United Nations [1984] Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. The ECtHR noted that the UN Convention: 
[R]eflects the clear will of the international community to further entrench the ius 
cogens prohibition on torture by taking a series of measures to eradicate torture and 
remove all incentive for its practice. Foremost among UNCAT’s provisions is Article 15, 
which prohibits, in near absolute terms, the admission of torture evidence. It imposes 
a clear obligation on States. As the United Nations Committee Against Torture has 
made clear, Article 15 is broad in scope.529 
This conclusion meant there was only one remaining issue for the ECtHR to consider under 
stage one; whether a real risk of the admission of torture evidence is sufficient for the State 
to have a duty not to expel. 
The UK submitted that a “high standard of proof” should apply when, in the extra-territorial 
context, the applicant alleged that evidence obtained by torture or ill-treatment would be 
used at a trial in the receiving state.  
In relation to proof that the evidence had been obtained by torture, the UK argued that no 
special test should apply to evidence obtained by torture or other ill-treatment than to any 
other factor which may render a trial unfair. Even if it did, when there was nothing more than 
a real risk that evidence had been obtained by ill‑treatment, the admission of that evidence 
at trial would not amount to a complete nullification of the right to a fair trial. 
The UK Government observed that the UK courts would themselves admit evidence where 
there is a real risk that it has been obtained by torture, provided that it was not established 
on the balance of probabilities that it has been so obtained. A flagrant denial of justice could 
                                                                
528 ibid at para. 264. 
529 ibid at para. 266. 
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not arise unless it was established on a balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt. 
The applicant had not, in the UK’s assessment, so established that risk.530 
The ECtHR determined that the flagrant denial of justice assessment required the same 
burden of proof as applicable for Article 3 in expulsion cases, i.e. a “real risk”.531 It did not rely 
on consensus to do so, but used its own judicial reasoning. The ECtHR considered that it would 
be unfair to impose any higher burden of proof because the same due regard must be had to 
the special difficulties in proving allegations of torture: 
Torture is uniquely evil both for its barbarity and its corrupting effect on the criminal 
process. It is practiced in secret, often by experienced interrogators who are skilled at 
ensuring that it leaves no visible signs on the victim. All too frequently, those who are 
charged with ensuring that torture does not occur – courts, prosecutors and medical 
personnel – are complicit in its concealment. In a criminal justice system where the 
courts are independent of the executive, where cases are prosecuted impartially, and 
where allegations of torture are conscientiously investigated, one might conceivably 
require a defendant to prove to a high standard that the evidence against him had 
been obtained by torture. However, in a criminal justice system which is complicit in 
the very practices which it exists to prevent, such a standard of proof is wholly 
inappropriate.532 
This is a decision that could be argued as being in line with the corrective judicial model 
proposed by the work. Effective protection against torture “must” include protection against 
the tainted fruits of its use by a government, there is no room for reasonable dispute on that 
issue with no sustainable opposing argument. The so called “evidence” collected being in 
violation of an agent’s rights cannot then be used against them without further contributing 
to that same violation. Having once equated the moral dangers of the use of torture evidence 
with those of torture being conducted, it is also part of effective protection that any accepted 
understanding of when there is exposure to risk “must” be consistently deployed.  No new 
considerations are raised concerning when the level of risk it is unacceptable just because of 
a different context for the same principle. The ECtHR went on to apply the same norm that 
applied to conduct of torture to the risk of such evidence being used. That norm is, itself, 
                                                                
530 ibid at paras. 242-245. 
531 ibid at para. 261. 
532 ibid at para. 276. 
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however, one that we have suggested is itself possibly beyond the common understanding of 
the member states. This illustrates why decisions of the ECtHR, which may at first seem 
constrained in their impact, can have wider consequences and importance in ensuring the 
legitimacy of “building blocks” in the expansion of rights into new contexts. 
7.2.2.2 Stage Two (Application) 
Under the procedural margin of appreciation, the UK did follow democratic due process in 
considering the relevant evidence and did come to reasoned conclusion on the level of risk. 
This is, therefore, presumed under the proposed model to be substantively correct. Given 
that the UK did determine that he was at real risk, just not one of a high degree, it must have 
been found to be in breach of its substantive duty, given how the norm is defined. 
Even if a real risk was not admitted to by the UK, the presumption that its decision is correct 
may well not have withstood the substantive margin. The importance of the right, coupled 
with the availability of recognised expert opinion on the point, would have revealed an 
incongruity between expert consensus and the UK position: 
Not only is torture widespread in Jordan, so too is the use of torture evidence by its 
courts. In its conclusions on Article 15 of UNCAT, the Committee Against Torture 
expressed its concern at reports that the use of forced confessions in courts was 
widespread […] The reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
support this view. Amnesty International has considered the State Security Court to 
be “largely supine” in the face of torture allegations, despite, in the ten years prior to 
2005, one hundred defendants alleging before the State Security Court that they had 
been tortured into making confessions and similar allegations being made in fourteen 
such cases in 2005 alone […] Human Rights Watch’s 2006 Report depicts a system in 
which detainees are shuttled back and forth between GID officials and the Public 
Prosecutor until confessions are obtained in an acceptable form […] Finally, the NCHR 
has, in successive reports, expressed its own concerns about the manner in which 
statements obtained by coercion become evidence in Jordanian courts […] 
The Court recognises that Jordanian law provides a number of guarantees to 
defendants in State Security Court cases. The use of evidence obtained by torture is 
prohibited. The burden is on the prosecution to establish that confessions made to 
the GID have not been procured by the use of torture and it is only in relation to 
confessions made before the Public Prosecutor that the burden of proof of torture is 
imposed on the defendant. However, in the light of the evidence summarised in the 
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preceding paragraph, the Court is unconvinced that these legal guarantees have any 
real practical value.533 
7.3 Prisoner Voting 
Hirst v UK (No 2)534 involved the question of whether the right to vote under Article 3 of the 
First Protocol extends to protecting the ability of convicted prisoners to do so, during their 
incarceration. The ECtHR ruled that a blanket ban on British prisoners exercising the right to 
vote is contrary to Article 3 of the First Protocol. The case has caused much controversy535, 
arguably stemming from the uncertainties around a stage one question regarding normative 
interpretation. 536   
7.3.1 Stage One (Interpretation) 
Article 3 of the ECHR First Protocol reads:  
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals 
by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion 
of the people in the choice of the legislature. 
That wording does not, on its face, confer rights on all individuals to vote or stand for election 
and may be generally limited in terms of expectations and restrictions in particular 
                                                                
533 ibid at paras. 277-278. 
534 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2), Application No. 74025/01, Judgment of 6 October 2005. 
535 Note the lecture of Sir Nicolas Bratza, the then President of the European Court of Human Rights, 
regarding the attack made on the ECtHR judges:  
The vitriolic - and I am afraid to say xenophobic - fury directed against the judges of my Court 
is unprecedented in my experience, as someone who has been involved with the Convention 
system for over 40 years. We are, as a Court, not unused to criticism by Government who 
think we have gone too far, by unsuccessful applicants and by NGOs, who think we have not 
gone far enough, and by certain sections of the media that miss no opportunity to attack the 
Court [...] But the scale and tone of the current hostility directed towards the Court, and the 
Convention system as a whole, by the press, by members of the Westminster Parliament and 
by senior members of the Westminster Parliament and by senior members of the Government 
has created understandable dismay and resentment among the judges in Strasbourg. 
Sir Nicholas Bratza, “The Relationship between the UK Courts and Strasbourg” (2011) European 
Human Rights Law Review 505. 
536 See the resolution on 10 February 2011 the House of Commons by 234 votes to only 22 that, 
'legislative decisions of this nature should be a matter for democratically-elected law makers.' 
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circumstances. In its judgment in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium537, in considering the 
rights enshrined in Article 3, stated: 
The rights in question are not absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting 
them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for implied 
limitations. In their internal legal orders the contracting States make the rights to vote 
and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded 
under Article 3.538 
A norm allowing citizens to vote does not, therefore, definitely provide an answer that can be 
adopted to many significant remaining questions about the scope of the right. There are a 
number of recognised general reservations on who has the right that could form part of the 
in abstracto interpretation. For example, limiting the right to those residing in the State as 
engaged citizens. 539   Or, perhaps more obviously, to those with the mental capacity to 
understand and engage in the voting process.  
                                                                
537 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, application no. 9267/81, judgment of 2 March 1987, at 
para. 51. 
538 ibid at para. 52. 
539 In Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece, citizens of another state claimed the right to vote in 
the state in which they now lived. The ECtHR found that neither the relevant international and regional 
law nor the varying practices of the member states revealed any consensus which would require States 
to arrange for the exercise of voting rights by citizens living abroad. Under stage one of the ECtHR 
process, the point was not within the scope of the duty that states are even under a duty to justify 
why it was not possible for resident non-nationals to vote. Only a consensus could demonstrate that 
as a universally held expectation. Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece, Application No. 
2202/07, Judgment of 15 March 2012. 
Shindler v the United Kingdom concerned state election laws preventing people resident outside of 
the United Kingdom for more than 15 years from voting. The ECtHR accepted the relevance of the 
limit to the expectation. In terms of meaning, the case again suggests that the scope of the right is 
limited to citizens actively involved in the state. [The question of whether 15 years is an appropriate 
boundary for making that distinction in reality relates to a practical application or a justifiable response 
to that concern and within the margin of appreciation afforded to states. In considering the ‘margin 
of appreciation’, the ECtHR found that the election law in question had not gone too far.] Shindler v 
the United Kingdom, Application No. 19840/09, Judgment of 7 May 2013. 
The Commission has considered it acceptable to remove political rights from persons convicted of “un-
citizen-like conduct”. For example, from a person sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment for 
refusing to report for military service (X v the Netherlands, Application No. 6573/74, Commission 
decision of 19 December 1974, and H v the Netherlands, Application No. 9914/82, Commission 
decision of 4 July 1983). Or in Patrick Holland v Ireland, Application No. 24827/94, Commission 
decision of 14 April 1998, where the applicant was sentenced to seven years for possessing explosives. 
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Arguments, as raised in Hirst, of further possible exclusions based upon principles such as 
punishment and the need for a decent and moral electorate raise significant generic questions 
for any society. Such questions must be evaluated under stage one as generic problems 
requiring a societally compromised balanced solution.  
The UK reasoning supporting a possible complete reservation was set out by Lord Justice 
Kennedy in the Division Court as follows: 
So I return to what was said by the European Court in paragraph 52 of its judgment in 
Mathieu-Mohin. Of course, as far as an individual prisoner is concerned 
disenfranchisement does impair the very essence of his right to vote, but that is too 
simplistic an approach, because what Article 3 of the First Protocol is really concerned 
with is the wider question of universal franchise, and "the free expression of the 
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature". If an individual is to be 
disenfranchised that must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim. In the case of a convicted 
prisoner serving his sentence the aim may not be easy to articulate. Clearly there is an 
element of punishment, and also an element of electoral law. As the Home Secretary 
said, Parliament has taken the view that for the period during which they are in 
custody convicted prisoners have forfeited their right to have a say in the way the 
country is governed. The Working Group said that such prisoners had lost the moral 
authority to vote. Perhaps the best course is that suggested by Linden JA, namely to 
leave to philosophers the true nature of this disenfranchisement whilst recognising 
that the legislation does different things [emphasis added].540  
The UK argument has the potential to fall within the PGC criteria for reason541, the reasons 
are not, for example, arbitrary, incoherent, irrelevant or incapable of being the will of 
everyone. Punishment and forfeiture of the right to vote are not incoherent reasons and the 
identification of prisoners, as opposed to anyone convicted of a crime, is not arbitrary as 
imprisonment is a particular type of sanction (reserved for significant violations of societal 
rules) relevant to those reasons.542  
                                                                
540 R (Pearson Martinez and Hirst) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Hirst v Attorney-
General [2001] EWHC Admin 239, at para. 40. 
541  As cited by the UK, the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Californian 
Constitution’s disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners (see Richardson v Ramirez [1974] 418 United 
States: Supreme Court Reports 24). 
542 In contrast to Alajos Kiss v Hungary in which the applicant lost his right to vote because he had 
been placed under protection on psychiatric grounds. The law of Hungary provided for an automatic 
and general restriction on the right to vote of persons placed under protection. After accepting that 
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As regards the UK’s first argued purpose of promoting civic responsibility and respect for the 
law, denying prisoners the right to vote was in the ECtHR’s opinion more likely to undermine 
respect for the law and democracy than enhance those values. The legitimacy of the law and 
the obligation to obey the law flow from the right of every citizen to vote. This certainly is a 
reasonable view to take, it “may” be reasoned but it may be questioned if it “must” be 
necessarily more reasonable than that reached by a democratic body. 
With regard to the second UK argument of imposing appropriate punishment, the ECtHR 
considered that there was no credible basis for denial of a fundamental democratic right as a 
form of state punishment. The ECtHR reasoned that neither the record nor common sense 
supported the claim that disenfranchisement deterred crime or rehabilitated criminals. Again, 
this “may” be a reasonable view but a counter view could be taken looking at punishment 
from the perspective of those affected by a crime and the rest of society. The ECtHR position 
was not one that “must” form part of the existing normative understanding. 
That there was debate in relation to a complete ban being acceptable is suggested by a strong 
minority opinion from four of the ECtHR judges, who found that there was a reasonable and 
rational social or political philosophy.  
The first objective recognised by the ECtHR minority related to the promotion of good 
citizenship. The minority judges considered social rejection of crime reflected a moral line 
which safeguarded the social contract and the rule of law and bolstered the nexus between 
individuals and community. The “promotion of civic responsibility” might be abstract or 
symbolic, but symbolic or abstract purposes could be valid of their own accord.  
As regards the second objective, that of enhancing the criminal sanction, the minority ECtHR 
judges viewed that the measure clearly had a punitive aspect with a retributive function. The 
disenfranchisement was a civil disability arising from the criminal conviction. It was also 
proportionate, as the measure was rationally connected to the objectives and tailored to 
                                                                
the withdrawal of the right to vote pursued a legitimate aim, the ECtHR emphasised that it could not 
accept a blanket ban on the right to vote affecting all persons under protection regardless of their 
actual mental faculties. The response to the stated aim was clearly excessive in its arbitrariness, not 
all those placed in protection lack the capacity to understand and engage in the voting process. Alajos 
Kiss v Hungary, Application No. 38832/06, Judgment of May 2010. 
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apply only to perpetrators of serious crimes. The disenfranchisement of serious criminal 
offenders delivered a message to both the community and the offenders that serious criminal 
activity would not be tolerated by society. The minority noted the fact that there may be 
many possible reasonable and rational balances.  
Disagreement between the highest Canadian courts, cited as evidence in the case by the UK, 
further demonstrates that showing that a decision to ban by a state could never be reached 
by a reasonable person is difficult.  
The ECtHR majority view does make sound points about the issues with disenfranchisement 
of prisoners, similar points could also be made in relation to deprivation of liberty. Yet, 
imprisonment is still allowed in range of cases and loss of the right to vote is allowed (even 
following this ruling) for most prisoners. This suggests that the beliefs of the majority of the 
ECtHR judges about the illogic of loss of voting rights were not beyond dispute. Democratic 
consensus should, therefore, have played an important role in the interpretation of the 
minimum common understanding of the norm.  
Consensus could be found on a norm: (1) that prisoners have a right to vote i.e. rejecting the 
possibility of disenfranchisement simply because of imprisonment as part of the sanction; 
and, if so, of (2) a level of criminality at which a state is released from its duty to recognise a 
right to vote. 
In relation to consensus on the issue, practices of the member states were summarised by 
the ECtHR: 
According to the [UK] Government’s survey based on information obtained from its 
diplomatic representation, eighteen countries allowed prisoners to vote without 
restriction […]  while twelve countries prisoners’ right to vote could be limited in some 
other way [...] 
Other material before the Court indicates that in Romania prisoners may be debarred 
from voting if the principal sentence exceeds two years, while in Latvia prisoners 
serving a sentence in penitentiaries are not entitled to vote; nor are prisoners in 
Liechtenstein.543 
                                                                
543 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) (n 534) at paras. 33-34.  
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The practices could be interpreted by the ECtHR as showing a majority understanding of a 
norm that prisoners are not excluded from a right to vote by simple virtue of the sanction of 
imprisonment. There was, however, also significant evidence of direct opposition to that 
trend. Under the proposed model, the ECtHR would be required to consider whether this 
resistance was sufficient to possibly represent a blocking minority. The ECtHR was, however, 
quick to dismiss the relevance of that information.   
The UK argued that:  
[W]here the legislature and domestic courts have considered the matter and there is 
no clear consensus among contracting States, it must be within the range of possible 
approaches to remove the right to vote from any person whose conduct was so 
serious as to merit imprisonment [emphasis added].544 
The ECtHR responded: 
As regards the existence or not of any consensus among contracting States [...] it is 
undisputed that the United Kingdom is not alone among Convention countries in 
depriving all convicted prisoners of the right to vote [...] However, the fact remains 
that it is a minority of contracting States in which a blanket restriction on the right of 
convicted prisoners to vote is imposed or in which there is no provision allowing 
prisoners to vote. Even according to the [UK] Government’s own figures, the number 
of such States does not exceed thirteen. Moreover, and even if no common European 
approach to the problem can be discerned, this cannot in itself be determinative of the 
issue [emphasis added].545 
Under the proposed model, such strong evidence of a significant blocking minority in direct 
dissent from the trend is difficult to ignore. This is particularly so given that the UK position 
could accord with the criteria for reason and that, where there was consensus, the ECtHR 
accepted that the practices were somewhat unsettled for interpreting a common moral 
justificatory norm behind them. There was no consensus, between those states that did allow 
some prisoners to vote, with regard to which prisoners were to be excluded from that right 
(e.g. only a “serious offender”546). Given such a position, perhaps the minority view that there 
                                                                
544 ibid at para. 78. 
545 ibid at paras. 81. 
546 This was the test suggested in a later case by the EU in Thierry Delvigne v Commune de Lesparre-
Médoc and Préfet de la Gironde, Case C‑650/13, judgment of 6 October 2015. The ruling of the Court 
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was of yet no common recognition in practices suggesting that prisoners fall under the 
understood principle of having a right to vote should have received a more open evaluation. 
If the ECtHR had fully explored the strength of the minority view from the states, and still 
found there to be a common norm of recognising prisoners as having the right to vote, this 
would have been within the remit of the Court and by showing it duly considered all of the 
evidence that would be legitimate. There would then be the second issue of what common 
minimum norm could be interpreted with regard to when that right may be lost based on the 
level of criminality. 
What emerges from a review of member state practices is evidence of a consensus on criminal 
activity as a potential excluder from the right to vote, but only for the more “significant” 
offences rather than any anyone convicted of a crime. This appears to be the understanding 
that the ECtHR could interpret as the common position. However, in terms of the weighting 
between criminal activity versus the right to vote, a consensus is far from clear on what 
amounts to a significant crime. The was clear variation in the application of member States, 
including a minority in which a complete restriction was recognised. There would, therefore, 
be a wide margin for the state on what could represent such a crime with regard to the 
concrete application, under stage two of the corrective model.  
7.3.2 Stage Two (Application) 
On the assumption that the ECtHR was correct to discount a limitation allowing exclusion 
from voting as part of the sanction of imprisonment, because of practices showing a counter 
common position, there would be a procedural breach if the UK could not show it had acted 
reasonably in applying the alternative limitation that exclusion is possible for significant 
crimes.  
Under the procedural margin of appreciation, the UK did consider the evidence, such as 
judgments, put forward by the applicant, from Canadian precedents. In particular, that of the 
                                                                
of Justice of the EU is not, however, sufficient to show a consensus on the point now given that it 
relates to voting for the EU Parliament only. 
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Canadian Supreme Court in Sauvé v Canada (no. 1)547and that of the Federal Court of Appeal 
in Sauvé v Canada (no. 2)548. There was also no suggestion that the UK did not explore and 
then carefully weigh and apply evidence in reaching its decision.  
The difficulty identified by the ECtHR was that in doing so the process used appeared not to 
have considered the different circumstances of prisoners but rather grouped them all 
together.549  There had been no decision-making process by the UK to differentiating why 
prisoners as individuals fall into the non-protected category. A complete ban could not 
demonstrate any tailoring to the actions and circumstances of the individual offender. The 
ECtHR explained: 
Therefore, while the Court reiterates that the margin of appreciation is wide, it is not 
all-embracing [...] It [the UK Act] strips of their Convention right to vote, a significant 
category of persons and it does so in a way which is indiscriminate. The provision 
imposes a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison [...] Such a general, 
automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right must 
be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that 
margin might be [...] [emphasis added]550 
If the ECtHR were correct in assuming that a complete ban must be disproportionate and 
arbitrary there was, then, a breach in procedural requirements under the proposed model. 
Given that the UK would not have complied with an important part of the procedural 
requirements, this would mean under the corrective model that the substantive decision 
would not have stood. The substantive review asks whether the process used and grounds 
and evidence applied reached a conclusion that a reasonable person would think justified and 
proportionate. 
                                                                
547 Sauvé v Canada (no. 1) [1992] 2 Supreme Court Reports 438. 
548 Sauvé v Canada (no. 2) [2000] 2 Federal Court Reports 117. 
549 The ECtHR was heavily influenced in its ultimate decision by the Canadian Supreme Court decision 
in Sauvé v Canada (no. 2) ibid. The Canadian judges held, by five votes to four, that denying the right 
to vote to every person imprisoned in a correctional institution serving a sentence of two years or 
more was unconstitutional. The majority found that the Canadian Government had failed to identify 
the particular problems that required denying the right to vote and that the measure did not satisfy 
the proportionality test.  
550 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) (n 534) at para. 82. 
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However, it is unclear why individual positions must have been taken into consideration in 
order for the UK to show that it had properly considered the right of prisoners. In Chapter Six, 
the application of a right to have one’s gender identity recognised was explored. The ECtHR 
in its initial case law allowed the UK for a number of years not to allow for any recognition of 
changes to gender self-identity in relation to gender legal-identify. This was because of the 
degree of variation in societal development and standards between member states.551 There 
was no individualised consideration in that case, but rather a justifiable blanket decision. 
Ireland, because of its religious history and public morals was able to continue with a blanket 
ban on abortion rather than only if there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the 
expectant mother. 552  Later in this chapter, we will explore the position in relation to 
secondary strike action in which a blanket denial because of the particular situation of the UK 
was also allowed. This work would suggest that, provided the position is not unreasonable, 
disproportionate or arbitrary, there is no reason to assume that blanket bans cannot be 
justified. The particular circumstances in the UK, including how it as society morally viewed 
criminality or when crimes are significant, may permit a blanket approach. Although, the 
evidence supporting it would need to be strong. 553  As Kennedy LJ explained in the UK 
Supreme Court, the margin within which a decision may be proportionate is wide on this 
issue: 
The European Court also requires that the means employed to restrict the implied 
Convention rights to vote are not disproportionate, and that is the point at which, as 
it seems to me, it is appropriate for this Court to defer to the legislature. It is easy to 
be critical of a law which operates against a wide spectrum (e.g. in relation to its effect 
on post-tariff discretionary life prisoners, and those detained under some provision of 
                                                                
551 See Rees v the United Kingdom, Application No. 9532/81, Judgment of October 17 1986; Cossey v 
the United Kingdom, Application No. 10843/84, Judgment of September 27 1990; X, Y and Z v The 
United Kingdom, Application No. 75/1995/581/667, Judgment of April 22 1997; and Sheffield and 
Horsham v The United Kingdom, Application No. 22985/93, Judgment of 30 July 1998.  
552 A, B and C v Ireland, Application no. 25579/05, Judgment of 16 December 2010. 
553 For principles that may vary in their application to individual people and circumstances, such 
blanket bans will always be problematic and require strong justification. For example, in protecting 
the individual welfare of a child, despite the acceptance of a wide margin of appreciation left to the 
states on these issues, a total ban on people over a certain age could be an arbitrary response in the 
application. Or a complete refusal of law to recognise a relationship between children born as a result 
of surrogacy treatment and their biological father (Mennesson and Others v France, Application No. 
65192/11, Judgment of 26 June 2014 and Labasse v France, Application No. 65941/11, Judgment of 
26 June 2014). 
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the Mental Health Act 1983), but, as is clear from the authorities, those States which 
disenfranchise following conviction do not all limit the period of disenfranchisement 
to the period in custody. Parliament in this country could have provided differently in 
order to meet the objectives which it discerned, and like McLachlin J in Canada, I 
would accept that the tailoring process seldom admits of perfection, so the courts 
must afford some leeway to the legislator. As [counsel for the Secretary of State] 
submits, there is a broad spectrum of approaches among democratic societies, and 
the United Kingdom falls into the middle of the spectrum. In course of time this 
position may move, either by way of further fine tuning, as was recently done in 
relation to remand prisoners and others, or more radically, but its position in the 
spectrum is plainly a matter for Parliament not for the courts.554 
The result of the case, despite the controversy it has generated, also reveals how borderline 
the dismissal of a complete ban has proved to be. The minimum duty following the case could 
be defined as: the right to vote cannot be restricted only because a person is a prisoner, i.e. 
different circumstances must be considered. This is a duty allowing a great deal of flexibility 
in its actual delivery. That a wide range of decisions outside of a complete ban could be 
acceptable is suggested by the ECtHR’s conclusion that: 
Turning to the Government’s comments concerning the lack of guidance from the 
Chamber as to what, if any, restrictions on the right of convicted prisoners to vote 
would be compatible with the Convention, the Court notes that its function is in 
principle to rule on the compatibility with the Convention of the existing measures. It 
is primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the 
Committee of Ministers, the means to be used in its domestic legal order in order to 
discharge its obligation [...]555 
While the UK raises a valid point about the need for definitions from the ECtHR being as 
detailed as possible, under the proposed model it is actually to be welcomed that the ECtHR 
declined to define principles beyond the position upon which it found a consensus. The 
matter has been resolved recently by a compromise, accepted by the Council of Europe, that 
will see only around 100 prisoners gain the right to vote (who are on temporary release and 
at home under curfew).556 That a compromise has proved possible is to be welcomed, given 
                                                                
554 R (Pearson Martinez and Hirst) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Hirst v Attorney-
General [2001] EWHC Admin 239, at para. 41. 
555 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) (n 534) at para. 83. 
556 D. Lidington, Rt Hon, MP, The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, ‘Secretary of State's 
Oral Statement on Sentencing’ (Oral Statement to Parliament, 2 November 2017) 
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concerns during the 12 years which elapsed between the ruling and the UK response about 
the implications for the ECHR’s enforcement. Concerns, which echo those of this work about 
questions about the legitimacy of ECtHR rulings, could result in an undermining of the whole 
system.557 It is, however, notable that far from requiring a consideration of the position of 
individuals, the result is rather a shift from a blanket ban on prisoners from voting to a blanket 
ban on those prisoners still incarcerated in a prison. Such a total rather than nuanced result 
is arguably reflective that the reasoning of some states so strongly held against prisoner 
voting is not because of particular national circumstances, but a stage one strongly held moral 
conviction. To have allowed what comes close to a complete ban as a possible solution, not 
because of any particular national considerations, arguably makes the right for prisoners to 
vote illusory and raises the question whether there was in place a suitably strong common 
construction of that right in the first place.  
As a separate point, before moving to the next case, it is interesting to note that the ECtHR 
was asked to consider as evidence, developments arising after the UK made the decision Hirst 
was challenging. With respect to the proposed corrective model; the use of evidence 
subsequent to the national decision under review, could not be relevant to assessing the 
state’s delivery. The ECtHR may, however, note that some concerns causing a state to be in 
breach of its obligations have since been remedied.     
                                                                
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/secretary-of-states-oral-statement-on-sentencing> 
accessed 21 December 2017. 
557 For example, see the memorandum from Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights: 
In my view, the UK’s non-compliance with the Hirst (No. 2) and Greens and M.T. judgments 
has thus far not caused irreparable damage to the Court, the Council of Europe, or the UK’s 
international reputation. However, I believe continued noncompliance would have far-
reaching deleterious consequences; it would send a strong signal to other member states, 
some of which would probably follow the UK’s lead and also claim that compliance with 
certain judgments is not possible, necessary or expedient. That would probably be the 
beginning of the end of the ECHR system, which is at the core of the Council of Europe. 
N. Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Observations for the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill’ (Strasbourg, 10 October 2013) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetI
mage=2933800&SecMode=1&DocId=2062696&Usage=2> accessed 21 December 2017. 
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7.4 Secondary Strike Action 
In National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
issued a judgment recognising secondary strikes558 as falling under the normative scope of 
Article 11.559 However, in then applying the margin of appreciation to implementation by the 
UK it took the unusual step of allowing a blanket ban. Once more, the crucial question was 
the existence of a commonly understood norm under the stage one interpretation of the 
right. 
7.4.1 Stage One (Interpretation) 
Article 11 provides that: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests [emphasis added]. 
The UK submitted that the complaint regarding secondary strike action should be rejected as 
manifestly ill-founded, relying on an argument in line with this work’s argument that 
interpreting the commonly understood normative parameters of a right is the first 
consideration: 
They [the UK] considered that there had been no violation of, or even interference 
with, the applicant’s right of freedom of association since Article 11 did not confer any 
right to take secondary action. Instead, it was plain from the very wording of that 
provision that it contemplated collective action by workers to protect their own 
interests. Sympathy strikes, which were no more than a show of solidarity with 
another group of workers, lacked the requisite nexus between collective action and 
the direct interests of the persons taking part in it [...] [emphasis added]560 
The applicant’s counter argument was in line with the idea of a “deep structure” of the right 
that could be inferred: 
                                                                
558 Sympathy action by workers in support of those employed by a separate enterprise. 
559 The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v the United Kingdom, Application No. 
31045/10, Judgment of 08 April 2014. 
560 ibid at para. 49. 
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[H]aving identified collective bargaining as an essential element of trade union rights, 
it must logically follow that the right to strike was equally essential, since without the 
threat of industrial action, collective bargaining would be deprived of any 
effectiveness and be little more than “collective begging”. The ban on secondary 
action thus impaired the essence of freedom of association [emphasis added].561 
The first point regarding the right to strike is arguably a simple adoption of the existing norm 
necessary for its effective protection, akin to the right to protection life requiring investigation 
of possible problem deaths in order to be effective. But, for the reasons set out by the UK 
relating to whether it is the striker’s interests that are being protected, the extension of this 
to secondary strike action is not a direct link that “must” rather than “may” be reasoned.  
Furthermore, the right to strike is not an absolute right as the UK noted: 
[I]n light of the recent case-law of this Court, the right under Article 11 to join a trade 
union normally implied the ability to strike. But this was by no means an absolute right 
- it could be subject to conditions and restrictions in accordance with Article 11 § 2 
[emphasis added] […]562 
Under stage one, there may therefore be limits upon when a society recognises any protected 
right to strike. Some of these may impose inherent limits on the norms recognised under a 
right, rather than limitations for application by experts to particular circumstances and 
individual cases under stage two of the model. It could be in accordance with the criteria for 
reason to determine that secondary striking simply always goes too far because of its 
potential to cause largescale disruption.  
The question therefore required, according to the suggested corrective model, an evaluation 
under stage one. A majority consensus on the understood normative position must be 
inferred from the practices of the member states in order to establish any common duty 
towards secondary striking. The ECtHR’s assessment began by considering the applicability of 
Article 11. It determined: 
What the [UK] Government propose is a literal reading of the second clause of the first 
paragraph of Article 11. Although it is possible to derive such a meaning from the 
language of the text taken on its own, the Court would recall that, as provided in 
                                                                
561 ibid at para. 55. 
562 ibid at para. 62. 
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Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the provisions of a 
treaty are to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning, in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose. Furthermore, it has often stated that 
the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted in 
harmony with the general principles of international law. Account should be taken, as 
indicated in Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention of “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in relations between the parties” [...]  
In this regard, it is clear from the passages set out above [...] that secondary action is 
recognised and protected as part of trade union freedom under ILO Convention No. 
87 and the European Social Charter. Although the Government have put a narrower 
construction on the positions adopted by the supervisory bodies that operate under 
these two instruments, these bodies have criticised the United Kingdom’s ban on 
secondary action [...] The Government further queried the authority, for the purposes 
of the Convention, to be attributed to the interpretative pronouncements of the 
expert bodies tasked with supervising compliance with these specialised international 
standards [...] For now, it suffices to refer to the following passage from the Demir and 
Baykara judgment (§85): “The Court, in defining the meaning of terms and notions in 
the text of the Convention, can and must take into account elements of international 
law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent 
organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common values.” [...] 
[emphasis added]563 
When compared to the approach proposed in this work, such an argument appears 
dangerous. As the UK notes, the interpretations of expert bodies alone may be of 
questionable authority. For stage one in abstracto considerations, before the matter becomes 
too specialist for all agents to reasonably comprehend, it is only if the majority of member 
states accept (whether expressly, through statements in support, or practices that are in 
compliance) the expert interpretation, that it gains status as a common democratically 
recognised principle.564 For some type PIL agreements, for example the EU, member state 
acceptance is mandated for matters that fall under the competency of the expert body. But 
under many PIL agreements there may be questions surrounding the authority of an 
institution to automatically declare its decisions binding. Furthermore, even if an 
international body has the power to require compliance, should that decision not be adopted 
in practice, then for the purposes of the ECHR the authority may be doubted. 
                                                                
563 ibid at para. 76. 
564  Notably, in the Demir case referenced, the ECtHR stated that PIL norms are based upon the 
existence of a European consensus.  
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 Note here the arguments made by the UK: 
The [UK] Government further observed that the ECSR was not a judicial or quasi-
judicial organ, but simply an independent body that submitted its conclusions to the 
Committee of Ministers annually. It was the latter that had the power to adopt 
recommendations to States in relation to any instance of non-compliance with the 
Charter […] In any event, that Committee was not a judicial or quasi-judicial body 
either, and its interpretation of ILO Conventions was not definitive. Rather, its role 
was to provide impartial and technical evaluation of the state of application of 
international labour standards. In fact, the question of a right to strike was currently 
the cause of sharp controversy within the ILO, as part of which the status of the 
interpretations given by the Committee of Experts had been called into question. In 
addition, the Government perceived a divergence of view between the Committee of 
Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association, the latter regarding the right 
to strike as applying only to the defence of one’s economic interests. It was 
noteworthy that the ILO Governing Body had refrained from taking any position on 
the situation. The Government thus did not accept that the United Kingdom was in 
breach of its obligations under Convention No. 87.565 
Unless there is a majority consensus clearly shown in the member states accepting these 
“interpretive pronouncements” though their practices there is not as yet an accepted 
normative principle requiring protection of secondary strike action by the ECHR signatories. 
The UK argued: 
[T]he United Kingdom was not alone in banning or significantly restricting secondary 
action. Given the great diversity of the different industrial relations systems in Europe, 
any superficial comparison on this precise point would be of limited assistance. 
Contrary to what the applicants asserted, that diversity pleaded in favour of a wide 
margin of appreciation.566 
Similar concerns to those in relation to prisoner voting are again raised, with some states 
opposed to the recognition of secondary action in an area where the consensus that does 
exist is rather variable in its possible justificatory principles. 
                                                                
565 The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v the United Kingdom (n 559) at para. 
69. 
566 ibid 70. 
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7.4.2 Stage Two (Application) 
If the ECtHR still interpreted a majority consensus of a general principle protecting secondary 
strike action, this would then move the decision taken by the UK not to provide that 
protection because of its particular circumstances to stage two. A wide margin would be 
expected, given that there is no consensus on standards, for example, is it always to be 
available or only to individuals in defence of one’s own economic interest, or only where such 
an interest is “significant” etc. 
Under the procedural margin of appreciation, the UK had reviewed its position.  However, 
one may have expected, in a similar vein to prisoner voting, for the ECtHR to have found there 
to be a breach. The UK could not demonstrate it had taken into consideration the ability for 
individual circumstances to alter the availability of secondary strikes. If the ECtHR were to be 
consistent then whatever limitations there could be, a total ban would fall outside of any 
margin of appreciation for the interference: 
The Court concludes therefore that the applicant’s wish to organise secondary action in 
support of the Hydrex employees must be seen as a wish to exercise, free of a restriction 
imposed by national law, its right to freedom of association within the meaning of 
Article 11 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that the statutory ban on secondary action, 
as it operated in the example relied on by the applicant, constitutes an interference 
with the applicant’s rights under this provision. To be compatible with paragraph 2 of 
Article 11, such interference must be shown to be ‘prescribed by law’, to pursue a 
legitimate aim, and to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve those aims.567 
The ECtHR held, however, that a ban was permitted: 
The [UK] Government have argued that the “pressing social need” for maintaining the 
statutory ban on secondary strikes is to shield the domestic economy from the 
disruptive effects of such industrial action, which, if permitted, would pose a risk to 
the country’s economic recovery. In the sphere of social and economic policy, which 
must be taken to include a country’s industrial relations policy, the Court will generally 
respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is “manifestly without reasonable 
foundation” (Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 42184/05, §61, ECHR 
2010). Moreover, the Court has recognised the “special weight” to be accorded to the 
role of the domestic policy-maker in matters of general policy on which opinions 
within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely (see in the context of Article 
                                                                
567 ibid at para. 78. 
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10 of the Convention the case MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, § 
200, 18 January 2011, referring in turn to Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom 
[GC], no. 36022/97, §97, ECHR 2003-VIII, where the Court adverted to the “direct 
democratic legitimation” that the legislature enjoys). The ban on secondary action has 
remained intact for over twenty years, notwithstanding two changes of government 
during that time. This denotes a democratic consensus in support of it, and an 
acceptance of the reasons for it, which span a broad spectrum of political opinion in 
the United Kingdom. These considerations lead the Court to conclude that in their 
assessment of how the broader public interest is best served in their country in the 
often charged political, social and economic context of industrial relations, the 
domestic legislative authorities relied on reasons that were both relevant and 
sufficient for the purposes of Article 11. 
The Court must also examine whether or not the contested restriction offended the 
principle of proportionality. The applicant argued that it did, given its absolute 
character, which completely excluded any balancing of the competing rights and 
interests at stake and prohibited any differentiation between situations. The 
Government defended the legislature’s decision to eschew case-by-case 
consideration in favour of a uniform rule, and contended that any less restrictive 
approach would be impracticable and ineffective [...] 
The Court observes that the general character of a law justifying an interference is not 
inherently offensive to the principle of proportionality. As it has recently recalled, a 
State may, consistently with the Convention, adopt general legislative measures 
applying to pre-defined situations without providing for individualised assessments 
with regard to the individual, necessarily differing and perhaps complex circumstances 
of each single case governed by the legislation (see Animal Defenders International v. 
the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, §107, 22 April 2013, with many further 
references concerning different provisions of the Convention and Protocol No. 1).568 
The potential issue with the decision, as with prisoner voting, is the creation of a margin so 
wide that it may make the right to secondary action illusory. It is arguably difficult to view 
that the particular circumstances of the UK are so variable to those of other states that a 
complete ban was a solution because of its unique position, rather the point again seems that 
there was no morally constructed view that secondary strike action formed a right to be 
actively protected so far as possible. 
                                                                
568 ibid at paras 99-101. 
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7.5 Jurisdiction and Extra-territoriality 
The territorial scope of the ECHR is governed by its Article 1, under which: 
The High Contracting Parties [States] shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention. 
It is not clear from the text of the Article what is meant by the term “jurisdiction”. In an 
evaluation of a range of case law on the point, Milanovic identifies two main strands of 
jurisprudence from the ECtHR on the interpretation.569 First, a narrower spatial model of 
jurisdiction (or “territorial”) based on effective overall control of an area. Secondly, a wider 
personal model of jurisdiction (or “state agent authority”) based on the exercise of authority 
or control over an individual or individuals.  
According to the proposed judicial model, while the wider approach may fit within the 
normative scope of the right as a candidate principle, it can only be interpreted as an ECHR 
commonly understood minimum duty if inferable from the practices of a majority of the 
member states.   
In Bankovic v Belgium and Others570, a case concerning deaths resulting from air strikes, this 
idea was reflected in reasoning by the ECtHR, in finding that the concept of jurisdiction under 
the ECHR is primarily territorial because of the ordinary or accepted meaning of the term: 
As to the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the relevant term in Article 1 of the Convention, the 
Court is satisfied that, from the standpoint of public international law, the 
jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial.   While international law 
does not exclude a State’s exercise of jurisdiction extra-territorially, the suggested 
bases of such jurisdiction (including nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular 
relations, effect, protection, passive personality and universality) are, as a general 
rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant States 
[…] [emphasis added]571 
                                                                
569 M. Milanovic, “Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg” (2012) 23(1) European Journal of International 
Law 121. 
570 Bankovic v Belgium and Others, Application No. 52207/99, Judgment of 12 December 2001.  
571 ibid at para. 59. 
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The relevance of any understanding taking into consideration the nature of the ECHR as a 
project and the limits that places on the authority of the ECtHR was also referred to: 
In short, the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating [...] in an essentially regional 
context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the contracting States […] 
The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect 
of the conduct of contracting States.572 
However, in the case of Al-Skeini v UK573 the tide appears to have turned. The case had six 
applicants. Five of them were allegedly killed by UK British troops on patrol in Basra. The sixth 
applicant was taken to a UK detention facility and killed there. The applicants’ families asked 
for an investigation of the deaths in compliance with Article 2.  
The UK House of Lords dismissed the cases of the five applicants killed but found the sixth 
applicant to have been within the UK’s jurisdiction. It considered that Bankovic precluded the 
application of the personal model and opted for the spatial model. As a matter of fact, the 
House of Lords determined that the UK did not have effective overall control over Basra. 
Therefore, the first five applicants were not within its jurisdiction. However, a military prison 
was held to have a special status akin to that of an embassy and so the sixth applicant was 
within the UK’s jurisdiction.  
It is the decision in relation to the five applicants killed by the patrol that is of interest for our 
purpose, given the difference in outcome compared to that of the House of Lords when the 
matter reached the ECtHR. The ECtHR reasoned: 
It can be seen [...] that following the removal from power of the Ba’ath regime and 
until the accession of the Interim Government, the United Kingdom (together with the 
United States) assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to 
be exercised by a sovereign government. In particular, the United Kingdom assumed 
authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in South East Iraq. In these 
exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that the United Kingdom, through its 
soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in question, 
exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security 
                                                                
572 ibid at para. 80. 
573 Al-Skeini v the United Kingdom, Application No. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011. 
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operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the 
United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention [emphasis added].574 
This applies the personal model of jurisdiction, in spite of, as was the reasoning of the House 
of Lords, previous case law having discounted a consensus having being reached on the 
availability of such arguments. Such a change in understanding, would have required 
adducing of new evidence of democratic recognition in support. While citing a range of 
previous case law under the ECHR, new information regarding State support was not adduced 
by the ECtHR.  
With the territorial model already manifesting an expectation where the state has a high-
degree of authority and responsibility575, one could argue it is a small step to recognising 
responsibility in situations where a state has a lesser degree of authority. However, that raises 
somewhat familiar “slippery slope” concerns. It is for the democratic process to lead the way 
in developments, however gradual they may be, in any direction. 
7.6 Life Imprisonment 
In Vinter and Others v the United Kingdom576 the ECtHR reviewed the ability for member 
states to impose whole life orders. The applicants complained that imprisonment for life 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3, as they had no hope of 
release.  
                                                                
574 ibid at para. 149. 
575 This is helpfully explained in the submissions of the respondent Governments in Bankovic v Belgium 
and Others:  
As to the precise meaning of ‘jurisdiction’, they suggest that it should be interpreted in 
accordance with the ordinary and well-established meaning of that term in public 
international law. The exercise of ‘jurisdiction’ therefore involves the assertion or exercise of 
legal authority, actual or purported, over persons owing some form of allegiance to that State 
or who have been brought within that State’s control. They also suggest that the term 
‘jurisdiction’ generally entails some form of structured relationship normally existing over a 
period of time. 
Bankovic v Belgium and Others, Application No. 52207/99, Judgment of 12 December 2001, at para.36. 
576  Vinter and Others v the United Kingdom, Application Nos.  66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 
Judgment of 9 July 2013. See also Harakchiev and Tolumov v Bulgaria, Application Nos. 15018/11 and 
61199/12, judgment of 8 July 2014. 
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A Chamber of the ECtHR had held that there was no violation as the applicants’ sentences did 
not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. In particular, it was not evident that 
continued detention served no legitimate penological purpose. When the case reached the 
Grand Chamber, it endorsed the Chamber’s finding that only a “grossly disproportionate” 
sentence would violate Article 3. That test would be met only on rare and unique occasions.  
However, in the instant case, the applicants had not sought to argue that their whole life 
orders were grossly disproportionate; instead, they submitted that the absence of an in-built 
procedural requirement for a review constituted ill-treatment from the moment the order 
was made. Under the proposed model, this raises a generic interpretation question under 
stage one. Did the practices of member states reveal a commonly understood norm that that 
all prisoners must have the ability to atone and thereby reduce prison terms. Alternatively, 
was consensus limited to a right to review for some levels of offence i.e. excluding the most 
serious in which a whole life sentence was not grossly disproportionate.  
One reasoned interpretation would be that the justifications for life-sentences must include 
the ability for a prisoner to demonstrate that they no longer apply. As the ECtHR argued: 
There are a number of reasons why, for a life sentence to remain compatible with 
Article 3, there must be both a prospect of release and a possibility of review. 
It is axiomatic that a prisoner cannot be detained unless there are legitimate 
penological grounds for that detention. As was recognised by the [UK] Court of Appeal 
in Bieber and the Chamber in its judgment in the present case, these grounds will 
include punishment, deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation. Many of these 
grounds will be present at the time when a life sentence is imposed. However, the 
balance between these justifications for detention is not necessarily static and may 
shift in the course of the sentence. What may be the primary justification for detention 
at the start of the sentence may not be so after a lengthy period into the service of 
the sentence. It is only by carrying out a review of the justification for continued 
detention at an appropriate point in the sentence that these factors or shifts can be 
properly evaluated. 
Moreover, if such a prisoner is incarcerated without any prospect of release and 
without the possibility of having his life sentence reviewed, there is the risk that he 
can never atone for his offence: whatever the prisoner does in prison, however 
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exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation, his punishment remains fixed and 
unreviewable [emphasis added].577 
However, this is not the only possible reasoned interpretation of the principles that apply. As 
the UK House of Lords reasoned in the Hindley578 there was  
[N]o reason, in principle, why a crime or crimes, if sufficiently heinous should not be 
regarded as deserving lifelong incarceration for purposes of pure punishment […] 
[T]here is nothing logically inconsistent with the concept of a tariff by saying that there 
are cases where the crimes are so wicked that even if the prisoner is detained until he 
or she dies it will not exhaust the requirements of retribution and deterrence […] 
[emphasis added]579 
Reasons of punishment and deterrence are not necessarily affected by the behaviour of the 
prisoner, and so may not require the mandatory life-sentence to be subject to review on that 
basis. 
Once more, a review of the practices of the member states was needed to interpret any 
common generic principle. The ECtHR did consider a range of evidence on practices. This 
included a review of the actual practices of member states to life sentences580, international 
law commitments as evidence of aspiration practice581, and wider international practice.582 
The ECtHR found: 
First, there are currently nine countries where life imprisonment does not exist […] 
Second, in the majority of countries where a sentence of life imprisonment may be 
imposed, there exists a dedicated mechanism for reviewing the sentence after the 
prisoner has served a certain minimum period fixed by law. Such a mechanism, 
integrated within the law and practice on sentencing, is foreseen in the law of thirty-
two countries: Albania (25 years), Armenia (20), Austria (15), Azerbaijan (25), Belgium 
                                                                
577 ibid at paras 110-112. 
578 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [2001] 1 AC 410 and see also R v 
Anderson [2003] 1 AC 837. 
579 ibid at 416-417. 
580 Vinter and Others v the United Kingdom (n 576) from para 68. 
581 ibid from para 76. 
582 ibid from para 73. While international practice is not a replacement for European practice it is, 
under the proposed model, persuasive where there is doubt about the veracity of a numerically 
significant majority (e.g. to determine the significance of a possible blocking by a minority of States). 
Page 355 of 391 
 
(15 with an extension to 19 or 23 years for recidivists), Bulgaria (20), Cyprus (12), Czech 
Republic (20), Denmark (12), Estonia (30), Finland (12), France (normally 18 but 30 
years for certain murders), Georgia (25), Germany (15), Greece (20), Hungary (20 
unless the court orders otherwise), Ireland (an initial review by the Parole Board after 
7 years except for certain types of murders), Italy (26), Latvia (25), Liechtenstein (15), 
Luxembourg (15), Moldova (30), Monaco (15), Poland (25), Romania (20), Russia (25), 
Slovakia (25), Slovenia (25), Sweden (10), Switzerland (15 years reducible to 10 years), 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (15), and Turkey (24 years, 30 for 
aggravated life imprisonment and 36 for aggregate sentences of aggravated life 
imprisonment) […] 
Third, there are five countries which make no provision for parole for life prisoners: 
Iceland, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands and Ukraine. These countries do, however, 
allow life prisoners to apply for commutation of life sentences by means of ministerial, 
presidential or royal pardon. In Iceland, although it is still available as a sentence, life 
imprisonment has never been imposed. 
Fourth, in addition to England and Wales, there are six countries which have systems 
of parole but which nevertheless make special provision for certain offences or 
sentences in respect of which parole is not available. These countries are: Bulgaria, 
Hungary, France, Slovakia, Switzerland (for sex or violent offenders who are regarded 
as dangerous and untreatable […]) and Turkey. 583 
Strong evidence of minority dissent once more raises the question, under the model proposed 
by the work, whether that should have been sufficient to block any common norm that review 
must always (rather than normally) be required. The UK was joined by six other member 
states in prohibiting parole, and five that allow an application to be made but have no routine 
process for review. The ECtHR may still have reached the same outcome, given that the 
practices of the majority states were very consistent and wider PIL could tip the balance in 
favour of the principle, but the relevance of the dissent would have been expressly explored.  
The existence of an element of doubt is introduced by the partly dissenting opinion of Judge 
Villiger in the ECtHR: 
I respectfully disagree with the majority of judges in this case. 
As a lawyer I can of course agree that an irreducible sentence raises different and at 
times highly problematic issues. But as a judge bound by the Convention, I am obliged 
to analyse this issue solely through the prism of Article 3. 
                                                                
583 ibid at para 68. 
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My disagreement stems from the method which this judgment chooses to examine 
the alleged breach of Article 3 of the Convention, namely that the irreducible sentence 
imposed on the applicants runs counter to this provision as such. 
The Court has a time-honoured case-law as to the standards and conditions of 
applying Article 3, starting with its 1978 judgment in Ireland v. the United Kingdom (18 
January 1978, § 162, Series A no. 25). In that case and in literally countless subsequent 
cases it has affirmed that whether or not an issue arises under Article 3 will depend 
on all circumstances of the individual case; that this provision contains different 
thresholds (namely “inhuman”, “degrading” and “torture”); that a minimum of 
severity has to be reached to attain the first threshold; and that the assessment of this 
minimum will be relative (see for a more recent case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
[GC], no. 30696/09, § 219, ECHR 2011). 
In the present judgment, the Court essentially finds a violation of Article 3 as there is 
currently no prospect of release and no possibility of review of the three applicants’ 
sentences. It adduces, inter alia, the arguments that the balance of the justification 
for detention may shift over time (at § 111 of the judgment); that whatever the 
prisoner does in prison, however exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation, his 
punishment remains fixed and unreviewable (at § 112); and implicitly that an 
irreducible sentence runs counter to human dignity (at § 113). The crucial point is that 
the judgment takes the position that the question of an irreducible sentence’s 
compatibility with Article 3 must be analysed from the perspective of the moment 
when a prisoner begins serving that sentence. Thus, at § 122 of the judgment it is 
stated: 
“[A] whole life prisoner should not be obliged to wait and serve an 
indeterminate number of years of his sentence before he can raise the 
complaint that the legal conditions attaching to his sentence fail to comply 
with the requirements of Article 3.” 
In my opinion, this manner of analysing the complaints does not comply with the 
standards and conditions of Article 3 of the Convention as developed in the Court’s 
case-law for the following reasons. 
To begin with, I note that in the judgment (for example, at §§ 121 et seq.) reference is 
made to the “standards” and “requirements” of Article 3. However, nowhere in the 
judgment are these standards and requirements explained, analysed and applied. 
Second, the judgment assesses the situation for all prisoners serving whole life orders, 
thus in fact providing for a generalised interpretation of Article 3. However, Article 3 
would normally require an individualised assessment of each applicant’s situation. 
Third, by taking a prospective view of the prisoners’ situation ‑ extending to many 
decades ahead in the prisoners’ lives (and also after the Court’s examination of the 
present case) – the judgment provides for an abstract assessment and fails to 
undertake a concrete examination of each applicant’s situation at the time when it is 
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examining the case. How can the Court know what will happen in ten, twenty or thirty 
years? 
Fourth, this general and abstract application of Article 3 to the present case does not, 
in my view, square easily with the principle of subsidiarity underlying the Convention, 
not least when, as the judgment itself recognises, issues relating to just and 
proportionate punishment are the subject of rational debate and civilised 
disagreement (§ 105 of the judgment). 
Finally, and not least, this manner of proceeding overlooks the different thresholds in 
Article 3. The judgment makes no reference as to whether the minimum severity of 
treatment has been attained in respect of the applicants in order to bring about the 
application of Article 3. Neither is there a qualification as to whether the irreducible 
prison sentence amounts to inhuman or degrading punishment, or indeed to torture. 
Reference is made solely to “Article 3” (see, for example, at § 122 of the judgment). 
This manner of analysing Article 3 cannot, in my view, do justice to the cardinal 
importance of this provision within the Convention, as interpreted by the Court in its 
case-law. 
Taking the second and third concerns of Judge Villiger, the proposed model would reduce the 
impact of them. The second concern is that the ECtHR should take a more individual, and less 
general approach to interpreting the ECHR. This is not in keeping with the model, which 
suggests that the role of the ECtHR is more constitutional in nature. The ECtHR’s first task 
should be establishing general principles, and then reviewing how the states apply them in 
practice. It has already been suggested that the application may include some blanket 
positions and not require every single individual’s position to be considered separately.  
The third concern is connected with requiring that there be a significant impact on the 
individual brining the case i.e. that some of the applicants were not yet in a position where it 
was realistic to expect that a review could in any event go in their favour (one had only been 
serving his sentence for just over five years). However, under the model, the the ECtHR should 
find a case admissible where there is a significant impact upon the applicant or the potential 
for a significant impact upon the respondent state or the wider ECHR community. Here, it was 
systematic failings being alleged against the UK process however trivial/theoretical the impact 
was for now on some of the applicants. 
It is the fourth and fifth concerns of Judge Villiger that are the most notable for suggesting a 
different outcome under the proposed model. The fourth suggests that the majority view was 
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a “general and abstract application of Article 3”. It was not in keeping with subsidiarity, 
particularly given that the judgment itself recognises that the principles relating to just and 
proportionate punishment are the “subject of rational debate and civilised disagreement”. 
Until a consensus is clear on such difficult issues, interpreting there to be a general normative 
principle must be undertaken with care. The fifth concern raises similar issues, that the 
definition of what amounts to inhuman treatment is another issue upon which there remains 
a significant variation in interpretation. 
7.7 Same-Sex Marriage 
In Schalk And Kopf v Austria584, the applicants alleged that the legal impossibility for them to 
get married constituted a violation of their right under Article 8 to respect for private and 
family life and of the principle of non-discrimination. The central element of the debate would 
fall under stage one of the proposed judicial model; the general interpretation of what 
marriage is.  
The applicants’ argument was that: 
[T]he notion of marriage had evolved [...] In particular, the procreation and education 
of children no longer formed an integral part of marriage. In present day perception, 
marriage was rather a permanent union encompassing all aspects of life.585 
If this held true as the commonly held norm as defined, then the respondent state was then 
very unlikely to be able to support exclusion for gay couples as being substantively 
reasonable, given it would not be an objective ground. As the applicants contended: 
There was no objective justification for excluding same-sex couples from concluding 
marriage, all the more so since the European Court of Human Rights had 
acknowledged that differences based on sexual orientation required particularly 
weighty reasons. Other European countries either allowed homosexual marriages or 
                                                                
584 Schalk And Kopf v Austria, Application No.30141/04, judgment of 22 Nov 2010. See also Parry v UK, 
Application No. 42971/05, Judgment of 28 November 2006 in which it as determined that the choice 
of several states (insufficient to show a consensus) to allow same-sex marriage reflected their own 
vision of marriage, not ECHR obligations.  
585 ibid at para 1. 
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had otherwise amended their legislation in order to give equal status to same-sex 
partnerships.586 
The respondent state had been unconvinced by the argument. The Austrian Constitutional 
Court dismissed the applicants' case on 12 December 2003, reasoning: 
Neither the principle of equality set forth in the Austrian Federal Constitution nor the 
European Convention on Human Rights (as evidenced by “men and women” in Article 
12) require that the concept of marriage as being geared to the fundamental 
possibility of parenthood should be extended to relationships of a different kind.... 
The European Court of Human Rights found in its Cossey judgment of 27. September 
1990 (no. 10843/84, concerning the particular position of transsexual persons) that 
the restriction of marriage to this “traditional” concept was objectively justified, 
observing: 
'[...] that attachment to the traditional concept of marriage provides sufficient 
reason for the continued adoption of biological criteria for determining a 
person's sex for the purposes of marriage.' 
[...] The fact that same-sex relationships fall within the concept of private life and as 
such enjoy the protection of Article 8 of the ECHR – which also prohibits discrimination 
on non-objective grounds (Article 14 of the ECHR) – does not give rise to an obligation 
to change the law of marriage.587 
The ECtHR agreed, and the application failed. While same-sex couples are in a relatively 
similar situation to different-sex couples as regards their need for legal recognition and 
protection of their relationship, since practice in this regard is still evolving across Europe the 
contracting states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation as to the way in which this is achieved 
within the domestic legal order.  
This is the correct outcome in accordance with the corrective model, until a general consensus 
emerged that the potential for parenthood was of no relevance to categorising the formal 
recognition of a partnership the member states were able to continue making such 
distinctions in practice.  
                                                                
586 ibid at para 1. 
587 Verfassungsgerichtshof (VfGH), B777/03, 13.12.2003. 
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7.8 Civil Rights and Obligations 
The final case for consideration shows the UK Supreme Court, very recently, questioning the 
legitimacy of an ECtHR judgment, and openly debating the correctness of following it. 
The case of Poshteh v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2017]588 concerned ECHR 
Article 6.1, which provides:  
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations […] everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law […] [emphasis added] 
The UK Supreme Court held that the duty of a local housing authority589  to secure provision 
of “suitable” accommodation for a person who is homeless and in priority need, and has not 
become homeless intentionally, did not fall under Article 6.1. A civil right required the 
substance to be defined precisely, rather than be dependent upon the exercise of judgement 
by a local authority. This UK position was established in Ali v Birmingham City Council 
[2010]590, following a full review of UK law and ECtHR jurisprudence. 
However, once the matter reached the ECtHR in Ali v United Kingdom (2015)591, the Court 
held that article 6.1 did apply to the duty to provide accommodation. 
 In so doing, the ECtHR accepted that: 
Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee any particular content for civil “rights and obligations” 
in the substantive law of the Contracting States: the Court may not create by way of 
interpretation of Article 6 § 1 a substantive right which has no legal basis in the State 
concerned (see, for example, Fayed v. the United Kingdom, 21 September 1994, § 65, 
Series A no. 294-B, and Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, § 119, ECHR 
2005-X). The starting-point must be the provisions of the relevant domestic law and 
their interpretation by the domestic courts (see Masson and Van Zon v. the 
Netherlands, 28 September 1995, § 49, Series A no. 327-A, and Roche, cited above, § 
120). This Court would need strong reasons to differ from the conclusions reached by 
                                                                
588 Poshteh v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2017] UKSC 36. 
589 Housing Act 1996 Part VII. 
590 Ali v Birmingham City Council [2010] 2 AC 39. 
591 Ali v United Kingdom, Application No. 40378/10, Judgment of 20 October 2015. 
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the superior national courts by finding, contrary to their view, that there was arguably 
a right recognised by domestic law [...]592 
Furthermore, previous case law from the ECtHR provided support for the UK position that 
accommodation fell outside the scope: 
It is now well-established that disputes over entitlement to social security or welfare 
benefits generally fall within the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, for 
example, Tsfayo v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 40, Feldbrugge v. the 
Netherlands, 29 May 1986, Series A no. 99, Deumeland v. Germany, 29 May 1986, 
Series A no. 100 and Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263). 
The Court has even recognised a right to a non-contributory welfare benefit as a civil 
right (see, for example, Salesi v. Italy, cited above, § 19, and Tsfayo v. the United 
Kingdom, cited above, § 40). However, the present case differs from previous cases 
concerning welfare assistance, as the assistance to be provided under section 193 of 
the 1996 Act not only was conditional but could not be precisely defined (compare, 
for example, Tsfayo, in which the dispute concerned a fixed financial amount of 
housing benefit). It concerns, as the Government noted, a “benefit in kind” and the 
Court must therefore consider whether a statutory entitlement to such a benefit may 
be a “civil right” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 [...]593 
However, ultimately the ECtHR went on to find that Article 6.1. did apply: 
It is true that accommodation is a “benefit in kind” and that both the applicant’s 
entitlement to it and the subsequent implementation in practice of that entitlement 
by the Council were subject to an exercise of discretion. Nonetheless, the Court is not 
persuaded that all or any of these factors necessarily militate against recognition of 
such an entitlement as a “civil right”. For example, in Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 
24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, in which the applicant’s entitlement to an invalidity 
pension depended upon a finding that she was at least 66.66% incapacitated, the 
Court accepted that Article 6 § 1 applied. In any case, the “discretion” in the present 
case had clearly defined limits: once the initial qualifying conditions under section 
193(1) had been met, pursuant to section 206(1) the Council was required to secure 
that accommodation was provided by one of three means, namely by providing 
accommodation itself; by ensuring that the applicant was provided with 
accommodation by a third party; or by giving the applicant such advice and assistance 
to ensure that suitable accommodation was available from a third party […] 
In light of the above, as far as the applicability of Article 6 § 1 is concerned, the Court 
sees no convincing reason to distinguish between the applicant’s right to be provided 
with accommodation […] and the right to housing benefit asserted by the applicant in 
                                                                
592 ibid at para 54. 
593 ibid at para 58. 
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Tsfayo. Article 6 § 1 therefore applies and, as such, the applicant had a right to a fair 
hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal.594 
The UK Supreme Court in Poshteh, did not follow the ECtHR ruling in Ali and openly 
questioned the validity of the ruling. The first concern of the Supreme Court was that: 
The Chamber acknowledged (in line with the Grand Chamber decision in Boulois) the 
weight to be given to the interpretation of the relevant provisions by the domestic 
courts. It is disappointing therefore that it failed to address in any detail either the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court, or indeed its concerns over “judicialisation” of the 
welfare services, and the implications for local authority resources […]595 
Furthermore: 
Questionable also, with respect, is the Chamber’s reliance on the decision in Schuler-
Zgraggen v Switzerland as an example of entitlement subject to “discretion”. As Lord 
Collins pointed out in Ali (at para 61), it was treated by the 1993 court as a claim to an 
“individual economic right” flowing from “specific rules” laid down in the statute. The 
case report shows that the statute in question gave a right to a full invalidity pension 
where incapacity of at least 66.66% was established (para 35). Once that level of 
incapacity was established, the financial entitlement followed as a matter of right, not 
discretion. It is hard to see any fair comparison with the range of factors, including 
allocation of scare resources, to which authorities are entitled to have regard in 
fulfilling their obligations under the housing legislation.596 
The concerns of the UK Supreme Court are in keeping with the proposed judicial model. The 
interpretation of scope of the right had not previously extended to cover claims where there 
was any real discretion. Furthermore, even if it did so, under the application stage the UK 
courts would have been, presumably, better positioned to determine whether substantial 
discretion remained to the UK local authorities. The ECtHR did not explore the existence of 
consensus to support an expansion of the scope of the right, or conduct a significant review 
of the UK decision-making process to challenge its application. 
The position of the UK Supreme Court in Poshteh reveals the significance a lack of clear 
process may have upon trust in an ECtHR decision: 
                                                                
594 ibid at paras 58-60. 
595 Poshteh v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2017] UKSC 36, at para 33. 
596 ibid at para 35. 
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Our duty under the Human Rights Act 1998 section 2 is “take account of” the decision 
of the court. There appears to be no relevant Grand Chamber decision on the issue, but 
we would normally follow a “clear and constant line” of chamber decisions (see 
Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2011] 2 AC 104, para 48). This might perhaps be said 
of some of the previous decisions referred to in the judgment, including most recently 
Tsfayo v United Kingdom (2006) in which the application of article 6 was conceded by 
the government. However, it is apparent from the Chamber’s reasoning (see para 58 
cited above) that it was consciously going beyond the scope of previous cases. In answer 
to Lord Hope’s concern that there was “no clearly defined stopping point” to the 
process of expansion, its answer seems to have been that none was needed. That is a 
possible view, but one which should not readily be adopted without full consideration 
of its practical implications for the working of the domestic regime.  
The scope and limits of the concept of a “civil right”, as applied to entitlements in the 
field of public welfare, raise important issues as to the interpretation of article 6, on 
which the views of the Chamber are unlikely to be the last word. In my view, this is a 
case in which, without disrespect to the Chamber, we should not regard its decision as 
a sufficient reason to depart from the fully considered and unanimous conclusion of the 
court in Ali. It is appropriate that we should await a full consideration by a Grand 
Chamber before considering whether (and if so how) to modify our own position 
[emphasis added].597 
7.9  Chapter Conclusions 
The proposed corrective judicial model provided a structured and effective procedure for 
approaching analysis of the challenging cases selected. 
In keeping with legitimacy, the focus on democratic consensus means there is consent to new 
interpretations of the rights. Consensus enables recognition of new normative principles that, 
while not reasoned by some member states or strictly derivable from the higher rights, 
nonetheless form binding duties.   
Deference to democracy is also recognized by a more visible and consistent basis for the 
margin of appreciation in relation to application of recognised norms; with the margin always 
influenced by the presence of overarching standards for democratic due process and the 
extent of wider democratic consensus on substantive application to particular circumstances. 
                                                                
597 Poshteh v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2017] UKSC 36, at paras 36-37. 
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ECtHR intervention for unreasoned choices requires clear evidence or judicial reasoning to 
rebut a strong presumption in favour of democratically reached outcomes. 
In terms of impact, it is notable that the model could in some of the above cases have 
supported a change in the outcome (and thereby avoided some unfortunate reversals of 
decisions by a Chamber of the ECtHR, by the Grand Chamber598).  In other cases, it would have 
provided for a more transparent and consistent approach to justifying the ruling and hence 
the level of acceptance.  
It is concluded therefore that the model represents, at the least, a useful tool for analysis of 
ECtHR decisions, and has the potential to be considered as a more formal element in the 
continued operation and evolution of the ECHR. While the model is not claimed to provide 
the one definitive outcome for a case, it does provide a structure and process for the ECtHR 
to work with and thus provides the potential for greater transparency, legitimacy, consistency 
and sustainability in its decisions. This may help to promote more widespread acceptance of 
initial decisions of the ECtHR and reduce the incidence of disagreement and appeal against 
the judgments of the Chamber.  
  
                                                                
598 It has already agreed that in future all cases involving departures from ECtHR existing case law 
should be relinquished to the Grand Chamber.  
‘The Interlaken Process and the Court’ (28 August 2013), page 11, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2013_Interlaken_Process_ENG.pdf> accessed 20 May 2017. 
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8 Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Critical review and evaluation of the work 
completed and identification of the need and 
potential for further work and development 
 
  
Page 366 of 391 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide an evaluation of the work completed and identify the extent to which 
the objectives set out in Chapter One have been satisfied. The need for further work and 
development will be discussed. 
8.2 Satisfaction of Research Objectives 
The research question set for the work was: 
 
A response to the question was identified as requiring achievement of four objectives: 
Since its inception, the European Court of Human Rights has been charged with 
demonstrating an increased willingness to find member states in violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. While some evolution in the interpretation of 
rights is necessary and the requirements for application to secure rights are to be 
expected to become less fluid as the Court develops its acquis, some participants allege 
that the nature of these ongoing developments cannot be reconciled with the Court’s 
mandate.    
(1) To what extent is the mandate of the Court identifiable and relevant to the 
scope and limits of its authority? 
(2) Based on that authority, what are the elements of a corresponding exercise of 
judicial autonomy (a framework) and has an expansive interpretation of rights 
and a reduced margin made available to member states in applying them, 
exceeded that authority?  
(3) If discrepancies are identified could a corrective model for decision making by 
the Court be proposed, to support more legitimate and effective operation and 
future evolution of the system? 
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8.2.1 Objective 1 – To establish a basis for evaluating human rights systems and 
the relevance of consent to legitimate institutional oversight  
The work accepts, in Chapter Two, Gewirth’s principle of generic consistency (PGC) as the 
substantive justification for the recognition of justified moral rights under the ECHR.  This 
follows: (1) a review and rejection of other potential footings, such as religion or natural law, 
as acceptable because they fail in the requirement of being acceptable to all as a basis for 
voluntary societal cooperation; and (2) dismissal of a purely positivist stance given that the 
purpose of ECHR is clearly idealistic in recognising natural rights.  
The most concise synopsis of the PGC argument is that if an agent accepts that other agents 
hold certain rights, then they also accept that those agents are entitled to whatever generic 
conditions are required to exercise those rights. This foundational principle provides a starting 
point for a concept of legitimacy. Interpretations and applications of the ECHR rights must be 
capable of being framed as justified moral norms in general accordance with the PGC.  The 
legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) expectation that its decisions will 
be followed was thus based upon the PGC as its substantive justification. 
The difficulty is that the PGC does not purport to provide a complete answer but rather 
provides a reasonable basis for one being reached. The PGC gives only a basis for moral 
internal reasoning by agents. It is not, in itself a means of identifying what these general 
human rights principles are and practically require in action. It does, however, provide for a 
criterion of reason. 
The criterion for reason may be deployed by a court such as the ECtHR to negatively 
determine clearly unreasoned responses. But these criterion for reason may also support the 
creation of a system for the positive construction by a society of morally justified responses. 
Moral agents interacting while going about their own ends in a mutually dependent society 
must consider and respect the rights of others, certain basic or general principles should 
emerge consistently as those understood as necessary to the freedom for the self to develop. 
These moral principles are at least dialectically contingent (as opposed to necessary) justified 
moral understandings of the rights and duties that underly that society as the basis for justice 
Page 368 of 391 
 
and fairness. Such principles have legitimacy by being objective in the sense that they are 
reasoned for all, and in being effective in holding that society together.  
The PGC was seen to require a reasonable process or procedural justification for making 
positive determinations on the interpretation and application of human rights to bind agents 
as a society. There is a moral need for social contract, that accords with reasoning that would 
emerge from the hypothetical original position of Rawls. As there may be more than one 
decision-making process that could accord with the criteria for reason, the question moved 
to which procedure has been consented to by agents and furthermore what authority they as 
principals vested in any regime’s institutions. It was argued that such a system would need to 
ensure freedom and equal respect for citizens. 
Once there is an acceptance of public goods that are objectively justified and morally valid, 
then any system must show itself to comply with that underlying conception of justice by 
building upon the PGC with a system that is effective in terms of people complying with it 
AND having the potential to support the dialectic methodology of the PGC.  This compliance 
cannot ever be presumed merely because decisions are habitually followed. Instead, 
legitimate exercise of authority depends upon: (1) interpretations of the common moral 
principles having the potential to accord with objective reasonableness under the PGC (not 
manifestly unjust); and (2) a process for the settlement of interpretations and standards for 
application that respects agent participation and empirical validity.  
Chapter Three considers in more detail the development of the concept of institutional 
authority under a procedural justification (procedural legitimacy) of legal systems via states 
and an assessment of the extent to which, over time, institutional authority has in part shifted 
from states to international bodies under an internationalised social contract with their own 
need for procedural justification.  
State authority was considered to emanate from agreement under a type of social contract 
that has evolved over time to form a system of democratic government within nations. Social 
contracts are required to respond to the reality of limited resources, conflict and 
disagreement between agents. The normative dimension of social contract theory provides a 
basis for settling: (1) the principles of justice that bind citizens in a society (dialectically 
Page 369 of 391 
 
contingent constructed norms under the PGC); and (2) the conditions under which a state 
may settle any dispute. The social contract response to both of these questions is built upon 
consent, reconciling the authority of government with the freedom and equality of all agents. 
The relevance of consent of agents means that a true government purpose behind legislation 
must be one that appeals to the public, rather than private values, and has empirical validity. 
It also means that the procedural requirements of the system consented to are crucial, for 
example those of a liberal democracy. 
Traditionally, there has been an acceptance that nation sovereign states are to be seen as 
completely autonomous. In turn, international law was viewed as being built entirely upon 
state consent. However, given the recognition by this project of certain moral norms or 
objectively true forms of rationality, such a position is untenable in relation to the 
underpinning argument. More modern reasoning accepts that states are no longer viewed as 
the foundation for international law. Their very legitimacy is in fact grounded in their 
recognition as being in accordance with the conditions set by global law and acting within the 
areas of competency that fall within the national domain. It is possible to develop an 
internationalised democratic social contract theory, which values the sovereignty of states 
under the rule of law and which, in turn, sees the existence, protection and promulgation of 
human rights as intrinsic to this politico-legal model of internationalised civil society.  
States are subject to the PGC and to the justified moral normative construction of global 
principles, but building upon the notion of consent to a national social contract, states as the 
representatives of their citizens may also consent to work together beyond the most basic 
principles. This type of cooperation for a particular object and purpose is called for to resolve 
the issues that arise between coexisting states because of limited resources and conflicting 
claims, but also to work towards a more internationalised cosmopolitan community able to 
promote: peace; economic wellbeing; social and cultural enrichment; resolution of shared 
threats; and, most relevant for our purposes, human rights.  The ECHR represents such an 
express contract between states, and so its object and purpose may reveal consent to move 
beyond clear violations of the most basic human rights principles to a more ambitious 
protection of understandings between its membership. Any shared government object and 
purpose that can be reasonably attributed to the membership of ECHR both empowers the 
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ECtHR to legitimately pass judgment on the protection of human rights in member states and 
limits the extent of that authority. This sets, referring back to the normative dimension of a 
social contract, the conditions under which the ECtHR may settle any dispute.   
What is clear is that, given an established cosmopolitan international society is still a distant 
aspiration (with recent events revealing disparities with regard to fundamental basic values) 
we are not yet at a stage where individual states cease to play the central role. For now, it 
remains the case that this collective of cooperating agents is primarily located at state level, 
the level at which most normative construction of at least contingently justified moral rights 
occurs. 
International law continues to be state-centred, because it is assumed that the state system 
is the legitimate exercise of sovereignty in accordance with the consent of citizens. States 
continue to have a strong institutional order, demonstrably able to create, interpret and 
enforce laws followed by the majority of a population. States may not be a perfect social and 
legal systems, but they are well-established and effective in managing populations. As such, 
states retain a powerful role and state consent remains a central consideration in 
understanding any agreement. 
Any international system that tries to move too fast, and does not incorporate the 
understandings relevant to the object and purpose of an agreement emerging from national 
systems of government, is liable to have legitimacy questioned. It is to be expected that the 
government object and purpose of the membership of the ECHR was not to provide the ECtHR 
with the ability to interpret and apply the rights guaranteed by the Convention without some 
degree of control and influence over those developments coming from the states.  
8.2.2 Objective 2 – To establish the object and purpose of the ECHR and the 
consequences for a framework of analysis for assessing the legitimacy of ECtHR 
procedure in line with its authority 
Chapter Three explores how consent to authority is present within nation states and how that 
has shifted to international bodies, such as the ECtHR. The chapter identifies how the rules 
governing international bodies have developed, including the key agreement of the Vienna 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties. This establishes the relevance of: (1) the text of an 
agreement; (2) the object and purpose; and (3) consensus as the key means for resolving 
uncertainties.  
Given the nature of the PGC and the difficulties of its pursuit, the work concludes that such 
uncertainties are unavoidable despite the text of the ECHR setting out the rights protected 
and defining each broadly. Deriving justified moral norms from those already recognised is 
accepted by academics, including Gewirth, as far from a straightforward process. There are 
often multiple “candidate” norms that could fall under the parameters of an existing 
definition, there is not one that “must” be better than the others.  It is suggested that the 
decision to originally draft the rights in the ECHR so widely may have been to allow the 
understandings of those rights to develop. If a new interpretation of the normative scope of 
a right is not to be conflated with recognising rights and duties beyond those to which the 
member states gave consent, what is needed is a route, or referring back to the normative 
dimension of the social contract the conditions, for settling dispute. That route must be in 
accordance with the consent of the states.  
The ECHR Preamble refers to a “common understanding”, this suggests that it is not the ECtHR 
alone that must influence the development of normative understanding of the principles 
under rights. It also references “liberal democracy” as the accepted system for safeguarding 
the rights, which suggests it is the system for: (1) developing a moral understanding of their 
normative content; and for then (2) applying those principles of general application to 
particular circumstances. This view is reinforced by the work of Chapter Four.  
Following a review of the origins of the ECHR, in Chapter Four, the work argues that the object 
and purpose of the ECHR is one of republican liberalism, to promote and support the national 
liberal democracies as the means of securing human rights in accordance with the PGC. In 
response to the research question, the mandate is therefore reasonably identifiable. As such, 
the primary route for settling the issues interpretation and application of the rights is by the 
operation of national democracy.   
This conclusion of the primacy of democratic due process is supported by the wording of the 
ECHR, and is also in keeping with the PGC as the basis for the rights, by putting the internal 
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reasoning of agents and the compromises they must make with one another at the centre of 
a fair and equal society. This also supports subsidiarity as a key principle for the ECHR and the 
ECtHR acting not as a direct provider of individual justice but in a more constitutional role.  
The consequences of a republican liberalism mandate for the conditions under which the 
ECtHR may operate legitimately is argued to be distinguishable in regard to the: (1) 
interpretation of the in abstracto normative scope of the rights; and (2) the in concreto 
application of those principles of general application to particular circumstances.  
Interpretation must come from democracy operating within the states, where all citizens have 
an equal part in constructing understandings of the underlying rights and duties that are the 
foundation for justice and freedom. Unless the outcome of democracy is incapable of 
complying with the criterion for reason under the PGC, its choices must stand as opposed to 
the reasoning of unelected judges. The ECtHR may have an important role in interpreting the 
practices of member states to determine whether there is a “common” democratic 
understanding.  
Application is also the function of democratic government, but the ECtHR has an important 
oversight function in ensuring that the standards for due democratic process were followed 
and ensuring that the ultimate government decision is one that a reasoned person would 
reach. Provided the democratic procedural requirements were followed, it would be 
expected that a state would enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in relation to its substantive 
choice. 
The analysis in Chapter Four goes on to reason that the framework of analysis for assessing 
the legitimacy of ECtHR procedure, in keeping with the mandate of the Court, must therefore 
comprise principles that act as an affirmation of the democratic process, subsidiarity and 
oversight, as well as standard elements for international courts such as transparency, 
consistency, relevance, effectiveness and self-limitation to the role allocated to it by the 
signatories.  
The framework for analysis of legitimacy is set out in Fig. 4.3. 
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Element Explanation Risk 
Transparency and consistency Clearly explained reasoning for judgments. 
 
Decision-making process with clearly defined 
stages for interpretation and application, always 
applied. 
Difficulty applying a decision outside of the 
specific facts of the case. 
 
Inconsistent development of law. 
 
Lack of clarity on what is required for a state to 
comply with its duty. 
 
Undermining of ECtHR accountability. 
 
Undermining of trust in the legitimacy of 
judgments. 
Directed/contained authority Acts as agent to secure the objects of its principals 
(the member states as representatives of 
citizens). 
Expansion beyond the goals/mission, slippage 
from securing government object and purpose, as 
represented by the signatory states. 
Current/informed Judgments need to keep pace with evolving 
understandings of the government purpose of the 
principals and to be informed by/harmonious 
with, wider international law. 
The ECHR ceases to be effective for agents and 
relevant internationally. 
Acknowledgement of subsidiarity and a margin 
of appreciation 
Local variation means that national democratic 
government choices are presumed to be correct. 
Unrealistic judgments. 
 
Judgments not in accordance with public values. 
 
Unimplemented judgments and loss of public 
investment – meaning the ECHR ceases to be 
effective. 
Limited to oversight  Not tasked with securing individual justice i.e. an 
appeal court. 
Excessive caseload, undermining local systems 
and overwhelming the ECtHR. 
 
Overly intensive review of state democratic 
decisions. 
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Acknowledgement of the democratic process The ECtHR is tasked with upholding and 
reinforcing democracy. 
 
Democratic decisions on interpretation of right 
are correct is they could accord with the PGC. 
 
Provided the democratic process is followed 
national decision-making on application should, 
prima facie, be upheld with a wide margin of 
appreciation. 
Undermining of the operation, relevance and 
faith in democracy as the best route to securing 
“human rights” and organising society. 
 
Undermining the very basis of the ECHR and the 
rights as listed in its text. 
Effectiveness Judgments upheld and decisions of the ECtHR 
influential in driving forward wider reform. 
Individuals do not secure an appropriate remedy 
and no systematic change. 
 
Decisions do not inform future law-making and 
public debate. 
 
Fig. 4.3 Analytical Framework for Assessing the Legitimacy of ECtHR Procedure 
Page 375 of 391 
 
The framework is used, in relation to Objectives 3 and 4, to respond to the research question, 
by proposing a corrective judicial model (Objective 3) and hence provide support for analysis 
of ECtHR judicial procedure with respect to its institutional authority. 
8.2.3 Objective 3 - To propose a corrective judicial model 
In Chapter Five, possible routes to ensuring that the understandings of the normative scope 
of the rights and standards for the application are limited to those reached by the operation 
of democracy are explored.  
The use of extrapolation, using the text of the ECHR and existing case law to reason further 
norms, is rejected as a sufficient response. While the ECtHR should be able to rely on earlier 
judgments to ensure consistency and a coherent legal system, there are many cases in which 
a candidate interpretation “may” represent a reasoned one but does not necessarily mean it 
“must” be. In those cases, expanding a norm to situations it does not clearly cover may 
represent judicial expansion beyond the ECHR Preamble commitment to “common” 
understood norms. 
Strict originalism is also rejected. While restricting understandings to those understood by 
governments at the time of signing the ECHR would certainly respond to concerns about 
mission slippage, it would be too restrictive given the shared government object and purpose. 
The ECHR must be a living instrument if it is to be effective, and the signatory states must be 
taken to have accepted that as society continues to evolve so will the public principles 
understood as underlying that cooperation.  
A better approach is reasoned to be commitment to an original purpose i.e. the mission to 
promote republican liberalism. This would allow for developments in line with that mandate. 
This would, as has already been noted, allow for interpretations of the normative parameters 
of the rights that now form the common understandings of the states. A common 
understanding is not the same as total agreement, and it is suggested that a significant 
consensus would suffice. This is in accordance with wider principles of international law, and 
also in keeping with how the rights included in the ECHR were originally negotiated based 
upon the common government understandings of the time. In terms of the application, the 
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overarching standards for democratic due process would always apply but in terms of 
assessing the reasonableness of the ultimate substantive government decision, the degree of 
consensus between states would again be relevant. 
The tenets that must inform any legitimate judicial model are identified (Fig. 5.2) in 
accordance with the framework of legitimacy:
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Fig. 5.2 Tenets Underlying the Structure for a Legitimate Judicial Model for the ECtHR
An admissibility criteria limiting the ECtHR's intervention to cases 
in which the outcome will potentially have a significant impact.
For a new norm under the parameteres of the right at issue to be 
recognised as democratically constructed in the first in abstracto
stage of the ECtHR’s decision making, consensus in confirmatory 
practices from a substantial majority of the member states is 
necessary. 
This creates prima facie recognition as a community wide norm to 
be translated into a ECHR legal norm by the ECtHR.
The assessment of application of that norm in concreto by a state 
must be based primailry upon a judicial review of the  adequacy 
of the democratic evaluation and use of relevant factual evidence 
(of the case and social background) and expert opinion. 
Where a state complied with the procedural requirements, there 
must be  a default to the substantive decisions reached creating a 
strong prima facie assumption they are reasonable.
Where it did not, that must be a breach in its own right and a 
review, that follows due-process, would normally be required. 
The margin left to the state in the judicial review of whether its 
subtantive decisions were those of a reasonable person must be 
signficantly influenced by the degree of consensus on delivery in 
similar member states, to the extent that comparable/equivalent 
issues are raised.
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The tenets for a legitimate judicial model are then developed into a proposed judicial model 
in Chapter Six. The elements included within that corrective model are identified follows: 
Respect for democracy as identifying the normative extent of human rights in their 
abstraction and respect for national democracies as having the best local appreciation of how 
to secure them in practice within a particular society.   
This means that, provided all agents could have reasoned on a point, the consistently reached 
government understandings across democratic systems (provided it could accord with the 
criteria for reason) must be upheld as correct. In relation to the interpretation of the 
normative scope of rights as “all” must hold them, the work notes that there is no reason to 
accept that the reasoning of “experts” on such principles of general application is any more 
valid than that of other agents. At least for so long as the level of reasoning remains in 
abstracto i.e. in applying to everyone generally and raising questions that anyone can 
understand, the reasoning of every human is potentially as valid as that of any other. As such, 
a consensus within a significant majority of the democratic systems under the ECHR 
represents the collective or common understanding of what principles are included within a 
right. 
Once the matter moves to the in concreto application, executing those principles in individual 
cases and within specific circumstance and societies, democracy still retains the ultimate 
authority to settle the matter at the local level. It is reasoned, however, to be subject to 
review by the ECtHR under a procedural and a substantive “margin of appreciation”.  
In this application stage, during the hypothetical meeting of all of agents, they could not 
possibly comply with the criteria for reason without factual evidence and the support of 
experts. The criteria require that the reasons for a decision are coherent and informed, and 
agents could not possibly satisfy this without reliance on special knowledge. By extension, 
their democratic representatives must also appeal to and apply, expert opinion in reaching 
decisions on application. The margin must then include a procedural element, demonstrating 
that due democratic process was used and that relevant evidence was properly considered.  
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This application stage also introduces the risk, in moving beyond questions of interpretation 
that apply to all agents, that the reasoning will be affected by factors such as prejudice, self-
interest or fear of the majority of agents overriding the rights of the minority. This means the 
margin must also include a substantive element. Even if the procedural margin was complied 
with, the substantive decision ultimately reached via that process may be questioned 
regarding its reasonableness and its proportionality. 
Provided the state has followed the due democratic process, considering relevant evidence, 
its substantive determination should be prima facie presumed acceptable. While the 
substantive correctness may still be found invalid because of an unreasonable or 
disproportionate response, the intensity of review would be less. Failure to carry out a 
democratic review would result in the substantive decision being unsupportable. 
In cases where the procedural review was complied with, the work has already noted that 
there is a presumption that the substantive decision reached should stand, unless it was not 
one a reasonable person would reach. While the ECtHR must be free to use judicial reasoning 
to decide of the point, the margin of appreciation left open to the State must be heavily 
influenced by the absence of consensus on application in similarly affected member states 
and consistency in recognized expert opinion. 
The outcome of the analysis is a proposed staged judicial model (Fig. 6.4):
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Exhaustion of 
domestic remedies. 
 
Four-month deadline 
for applying to the 
Court. 
 
Complaint 
compatible with the 
Convention and not 
manifestly ill-
founded. 
 
Translation into an 
autonomous legal 
norm. 
 
Existence of 
interference: 
Has the respondent 
State reasonably 
met the minimum 
requirements for 
the norm being 
transposed / 
effectively 
protected?  
 
Complaint 
sufficiently serious: 
Significant impact 
for the given 
individual; or 
Significant impact 
upon the system of 
the respondent 
State or at a 
European level. 
 
(1) Existing legal 
norm that 
"touches" the case 
and addresses all 
the significant 
questions 
(2) The majority of  
a significant 
(quantitatively and 
geopolitically 
relevant) sample of 
member States 
commonly 
recognizes the 
extension of a right 
to include the new 
norm:  
A consensus on the 
desire to protect 
(opinio juris 
generalis) or on 
actual protection. 
relevant 
 
Note the possibility 
of a blocking 
minority. 
 
 
Necessity of an 
interference with 
the norm in line 
with an available 
legitimate 
justification for 
restriction: 
Could the decision 
of the respondent 
State be 
proportionate? 
 
Procedural margin of appreciation: 
In reviewing the application of the norm has 
the respondent State (i) used due 
democratic process, (ii) applied relevant 
facts (of the case and social background), (iii) 
considered nationally recognized expert 
opinion, and (iv) considered international 
opinion from expert authorities commonly 
recognised. 
If not, this is a breach in its own right and the 
substantive decision is unsupported. 
 
Substantive margin of appreciation: 
Was a conclusion of the respondent State, in 
light of the factors identified in the procedural 
margin, one a reasonable person would find 
justified and is it consistent with other 
applications? 
Procedural margin of appreciation: 
As above. 
 
Substantive margin of appreciation: 
Was the decision of the respondent State to 
interfere disproportionate: (i) was there a 
legitimate aim for the interference, (ii) were 
the means employed suitable, (iii) were less 
restrictive means available, (iv) was the 
response disproportionate resulting in a 
negative outcome that no reasonable person 
would think justified by the overall aim?   
 
The preliminary 
question: Is the case 
admissible? 
 
Stage one: Does the 
claim fall under the 
normative scope of 
the right at issue in 
abstracto? 
 
Stage two: Has the 
State correctly applied 
the norm in concreto? 
 
 
The margin 
available for 
substantive 
decisions is 
affected by the 
following: 
(i) The 
importance of the 
norm. 
(ii) Consensus in 
recognized expert 
opinion. 
 (iv) To the extent 
that there are 
comparable 
issues, consensus 
in decisions on 
delivery by a 
significant sample 
of similarly 
affected member 
States* 
(v) Local social 
consensus. 
(vi) Sensitivity of 
the issue. 
 
* Consensus on the 
desire to deliver in 
a particular manner 
AND actual delivery 
separately relevant. 
For non-absolute rights. 
If due process followed, strong prima facie 
presumption for substantive decision. 
 
Fig. 6.4 Proposed Corrective Judicial Model for the ECtHR 
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8.2.4 Objective 4 – Evaluation of the proposed model using case law 
The framework and proposed judicial model developed allows an evaluation in Chapter Seven 
of the validity of the ECtHR’s current approach, based upon relevant case histories. The work 
determines from its review of case law that the ECtHR is mindful of the principles set out in 
the framework and proposed judicial model. The ECtHR does undertake to respect the 
national democratic process and includes self-limiting, initially, judge-made tools in its rulings. 
These procedural safeguards include the well-known doctrines of the margin of appreciation 
and proportionality, and the principles of subsidiary and consensus.  
The work does, however, find that the manner of use of these tools and the point in a 
judgment at which they are applied is, arguably, inconsistent with the framework. Notably, 
the ECtHR does not have a particular judicial strategy. Furthermore, its approach to settling 
points such as consensus and the margin of appreciation is unpredictable.   
When interpreting the normative scope of right, the ECtHR finds consensus between the 
member states with varying numerical and geopolitical significance in the evidence 
presented. Sometimes, very little actual evidence of member state practices is provided or 
there is over reliance on principles under wider international agreements to which states have 
not committed. Insufficient account may be taken of a significant minority dissent from the 
common position. Arguably this results in expanding interpretations of the rights that are not 
recognised by the states as forming part of the agreement. This may be seen as unlimited 
growth beyond the project mission, and as undermining trust in the democratic process as a 
fair and effective system to construct dialectically contingently justified moral norms under 
the PGC. The concerns of member states arguably have some objective basis. 
In the application stage, democratic due process is not always sufficiently factored into the 
margin left to the state. Where democratic procedure is followed, the state should enjoy a 
wide discretion in its substantive choice. The procedural margin must form a separate 
consideration, with clear reference by the ECtHR to whether it is satisfied. For the substantive 
margin, there is sometimes an artificial or arbitrary reduction, narrowed in part by reliance 
upon expert opinion that is not recognized by states and reference to a consensus on 
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standards between states that has not been properly established. The ECtHR does not always 
recognise where there is disagreement or provide reasons for preferring some sources over 
others and may, as a result, be too ready to find consensus where it is lacking.  
In response to the research question, the issues identified with the current approach of the 
ECtHR regarding: (1) interpretation of rights beyond evidence of a common democratic 
consensus on understanding; and (2) the reduced margin of appreciation for application in 
light of democratic due-process and level of consensus on application has, arguably, resulted 
in the ECtHR not appearing to clearly work within its remit to promote the PGC via democracy. 
These conclusions are in keeping with some of the concerns raised by member states at the 
2012 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights in Brighton, 
identified in Chapter One: 
 
Fig. 1.4 Member State Concerns taken from the Brighton Declaration 
Declaration 25 sets out the overall call from the member states: 
3. Lack of prioritisation of 
the more serious breaches. 
2. Undermining of the 
democratic process. 
1. Unlimited growth of the 
ECHR system, beyond its 
mission.
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The Conference therefore […] Welcomes the steps that the Court is taking to maintain 
and enhance the high quality of its judgments and in particular to ensure that the 
clarity and consistency of judgments are increased even further [emphasis added] …599 
The key outcome of that Conference, ECHR Protocol 15, requires an express change to the 
ECHR so that it makes express reference to subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation.600 
The relevance of a new model that responds to these calls, which correspond to the 
framework, is clear. The ECtHR should be under no pressure to push for uniformity faster than 
the evidence allows, and the checklist of different factors to consider when settling the 
normative interpretation of a right and the margin for states in the application of the general 
principles to particular circumstances would provide for more transparent reasoning. The 
inclusion of principles that the ECtHR already recognized in the model also means that aspects 
of it are, to some extent, road tested as forming the basis for a workable partnership between 
the national and ECHR legal systems. 
                                                                
599 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Brighton Declaration’ 
(19-20 April 2012), available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2016. 
600 Declaration 12 is that, at the end of the ECHR Preamble, a new recital shall be added, which shall 
read as follows:   
Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention 
and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject 
to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this 
Convention. 
The principle of subsidiarity was also emphasised at the Interlaken and Izmir conferences. High Level 
Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Interlaken Declaration’ (19 
February 2010), available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2016. 
High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Izmir Declaration’ (26-
27 April 2011), available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2011_Izmir_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2016.  
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8.3 Future Areas of Work 
While outside the scope of the current project, the framework of analysis reveals some 
concerns that a judicial model in keeping with the current ECHR regime cannot resolve. There 
are proposed reforms to the regime, and lessons from other systems, such as the European 
Union, which may need to be the subject of future consideration. 
8.3.1 Yellow and Orange Cards 
Under the proposed improved model, in keeping with the framework of analysis, consensus 
plays a central role in settling normative interpretations of ECHR rights and decisions on their 
application. However, even if the ECtHR is cautious in declaring new common understandings 
and standards for delivery, there are likely to be occasions where, despite a lack of objections 
before the case, serious objections are made afterwards.601 Should there be a means of taking 
this into consideration and, within a prescribed and limited period of time, challenging the 
outcome of an ECtHR judgment?  
The European Union introduced additional safeguards for subsidiarity and proportionality in 
the 2009 Lisbon treaty. The “yellow card” system allows a third or more of EU Member States 
to jointly, temporarily block draft laws within eight-weeks of the proposals. They submit a 
reasoned objection to the draft, outlining why the proposal does not fit with the principle of 
subsidiarity. The draft law must then be reviewed by the EU, which may decide to maintain, 
amend or withdraw it but only after giving reasons for that decision. The Commission can get 
around a yellow card by giving clearer justifications for its actions and proposing the law again. 
If more than half the EU Member States submit reasoned opinions and the institution decides 
to maintain the proposal, it must submit a reasoned opinion in support of this decision to the 
                                                                
601 The procedure currently gives ECHR contracting states a right to intervene in any case but with so 
many judgments each year, it is often not feasible for states to do so before the impact of a decision 
by the ECtHR becomes clear and the membership is then effectively asking for revision to existing case 
law. 
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Council and European Parliament, each of which can defeat the proposal outright if national 
parliaments agree (the “orange card”).602  
In the EU, this system only applies to “new” law, not to the interpretation and application of 
the requirements of law by the Court of Justice of the EU. However, the ECHR system develops 
its law in absence of an organised political system like that of the EU and is reliant upon the 
ECtHR to interpret state practices to find common understandings developed in the political 
systems of the contracting states. It must be accepted that, at times, the reasonable 
interpretation by the ECtHR of the government purpose behind those practices will not accord 
with the actual one. Unlike the interpretations of national courts in relation to national 
legislation, there is at present no way of “fixing” such an error by the legislature intervening 
and clarifying its purpose. As such, the EU card system has some appeal as a clear brake on 
the prima facie presumption of a majority consensus on an issue.  The problem is at what 
point in or after proceedings could such a card be deployed to avoid delays and uncertainty.  
8.3.2 Formal Input into Remedies 
A relatively simple suggestion to increase the effectiveness of ECtHR judgments, and in 
keeping with the principle of subsidiary, is to allow those most closely affected by the 
outcome of a case to comment on the issue of remedies. While subsidiarity means it is 
accepted that the state is best placed to ultimately determine an appropriate response, more 
certainty on what elements that response must address would help with compliance and 
monitoring. As suggested by Keller and Marti:  
[P]ossible negative effects on compliance or for the situation of the applicant could, 
to a certain extent, be anticipated by allowing both the applicant and the Responding 
State to comment on the issue of remedies.603 
                                                                
602  See R. Raffaeilli, ‘European Parliament Fact Sheet’, (March 2017), available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.2.pdf> accessed 20 May 2017. 
603 H. Keller and C. Marti, “Reconceptualising Implementation: The Judicialization of the Execution of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments” (2015) European Journal of International Law 829, 
841. 
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A time limit for compliance is also suggested, increasing pressure upon states to comply while 
a judgment still captures the attention of citizens and other member states.  
8.3.3 Advisory Judgments Only 
The UK Government has suggested that the judgments of the ECtHR should be only advisory 
(as opposed to mandatory). The work notes that for states with a well-embedded system of 
democracy and a history of compliance with international law, such an approach would be 
worthy of full consideration. However, given that Europe is facing a period of significant 
volatility and heightened challenge, combined with many of the contracting states of the 
ECHR having a problematic record even with widely accepted moral norms, it is suggested 
that it is not the time for such a radical change.  
In spite of some states not always complying, the reputational costs and political 
embarrassment that comes from being in clear breach means this is not the norm. The 
acceptance of decisions as mandatory is a symbolic commitment by the states to a common 
understanding. The direct influence of the ECtHR’s rulings on national legal systems also 
means that agents are aware of the rights under it, and to remove that link would weaken its 
incorporation into the thoughts and actions of agents in Europe and potentially stunt the on-
going development of the rights and the desired unity.  
8.3.4 Advisory Opinions 
Protocol 16 would introduce a system allowing the highest courts and tribunals of a 
contracting state to request directly from the ECtHR an advisory opinion on ‘questions of 
principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in 
the Convention or the Protocols thereto’, in addition to clarifying the ECtHR’s case-law.604 
The given reasons for the change are very much in line with the framework used in this work; 
to provide further guidance to states by assisting them in avoiding future violations, enhance 
                                                                
604 Committee of Ministers, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, CM(2013)31, 2 April 2013, paras. 1, 9. 
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the constitutional role of the ECtHR, and strengthen interactions between the Court and 
national authorities.605 
While a significant and important step forward, it is clear that when compared to the 
preliminary reference procedure of the European Union this process is less integrative. The 
EU allows all courts and tribunals to make references, references are mandatory when there 
is no further national judicial remedy, and the preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the 
EU is binding. This is reflected by the fact that there is no individual right of appeal, EU citizens 
rely on the national courts to give effect to EU law. 
Given the current issues of compliance in some of the ECHR contracting states, the positioning 
of Protocol 16 is appropriate. Even if a more robust version of the advisory opinion could be 
introduced and accepted by the contracting states someday, it is unlikely that the right of 
individual petition would be removed, given it is now embedded in the concept of 
safeguarding human rights. It has been argued that a key character of the ECtHR is that, ‘it 
will hear any case, from anyone who claims to be a victim of the Convention’.606 
                                                                
605 Committee of Ministers, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, CM(2013)31, 2 April 2013, paras. 1-3. 
606  Marie-Benedicte Dembour, ‘"Finishing off" cases: the radical solution to the problem of the 
expanding ECtHR caseload’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 604, 621.  
While Protocol 14 ECHR has introduced a new admissibility criterion, meaning cases can be declared 
inadmissible if the applicant did not suffer a significant disadvantage, there was reluctance to be too 
restrictive in any qualifying criteria.  
In their contribution to the Interlaken Conference 2010, the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
stated that: 
We oppose proposals: that would undermine the accessibility of the Court such as charging 
applicants fees, or adding new, more restrictive admissibility criteria. Lack of funds should 
never be an obstacle for bringing an application before the Court; that would give the Court 
discretion to decide on which admissible cases it renders judgment […] 
‘Preparatory contributions: Interlaken Conference’, page 35, available at 
<http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/europa/euroc.Par.0108.File.tm
p/Brochure_cont ributions_preparatoires_en.pdf> accessed 20 November 2016.  
In the Brighton Declaration, it was confirmed that: 
The States Parties also reaffirm their attachment to the right of individual application to the 
European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) as a cornerstone of the system for protecting 
the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. 
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8.3.5 Provisional Judgments 
An interesting proposal for a new form of judgment was put forward by Lady Justice Arden 
prior to the Brighton process, the provisional judgment: 
There are various ways in which provisional judgments can be used.  Under one 
version, if the decision would significantly develop its jurisprudence, Strasbourg would 
not issue a binding decision but only a provisional decision […] In that provisional 
judgment it would indicate how, provisionally, it proposed to interpret the Convention 
but give national courts the opportunity, and a generous period of time, to express 
their view on the practicality of this development.    
Another situation is where a provisional judgment will simply indicate that 
Strasbourg’s current view, was that unless there was a change in circumstances, it 
would decide, in an appropriate case, in say three years’ time that a new 
interpretation would be given to a certain right.  Contracting states would be able to 
intervene in the proceedings when the point next arose for final decision and file 
submissions for Strasbourg’s consideration […]”607  
Subject to concerns about the administrative burden of this process608, this does appear a 
very worthwhile possibility to explore, not only for national courts to express views early in 
the development process but also national parliaments and other interested parties.   
                                                                
High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Brighton Declaration’ 
(19-20 April 2012), page 1, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2016. 
607 Lady Justice Arden, An English Judge in Europe, An article based on the Neill Lecture given in Oxford 
at the invitation of All Souls College, Oxford, on 28 February 2014 in celebration of the past 
Wardenship of Lord Neill of Bladen, available at <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lj-arden-an-english-judge-in-europe.pdf> accessed 10 
January 2017, pages 29-33. 
608 The Council of Europe report of the Steering Committee for Human Rights concluded: 
Another proposal suggested that the Court could have the possibility to issue provisional 
judgments. National courts would be given the opportunity to express their views on a 
Strasbourg decision that would significantly develop jurisprudence, and Contracting Parties 
would intervene in the proceedings involving a new interpretation of a particular right. It was 
argued that this would reflect the principle of subsidiarity, and help ensure acceptance by 
national actors of the development of the case law of the Court. The main arguments against 
this proposal included that it would lengthen proceedings before the Court, imply the creation 
of two different classes of judgments (the provisional and the final ones), and diminish the 
authority of the Court. The existing possibility of referral of cases to the Grand Chamber is a 
more appropriate legal tool in this context. In addition, the practice of the Court when finding 
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8.3.6 Redefining the Rights 
Finally, the UK has suggested that some of the rights in the ECHR should be redrafted to 
expressly alter the law that has developed. The corrective model proposed by this work would 
not have retrospective application, norms already recognised as forming autonomous law can 
be applied to cases raising no significant new questions. As such, express alteration could be 
an option. However, such a move would need to be carefully considered and the changes kept 
to a minimum. It may otherwise start a slippery slope towards the notion that the 
fundamental human rights developed by democracies in Europe and established as core 
building-blocks of legal systems are wrong, a dangerous trend for the ECHR if it is to survive 
and to thrive for another 66 years. 
8.4 Contribution of the Work 
While it accepted that the framework of analysis and proposed judicial model for the ECtHR 
may not be accepted as legitimate by all, it is argued that it represents a valuable and credible 
step forward given: (1) its response to the concerns raised by the contracting states; (2) its 
adherence to elements in the framework of analysis for the exercise of its legitimate 
authority, developed from a reasoned inference of the shared member states’ government 
object and purpose; (3) its links with the direction that the ECtHR has already taken to a more 
limited extent; and (4) its ability to alter the suggested outcome in key cases that generated 
dissatisfaction and even for reversals. To this extent, the framework and the model have value 
in making an original contribution to what is likely to be an ongoing debate in terms of 
                                                                
no violation, to signal, in light of the developments underway, that this is a matter/area where 
there might be a change in its future case law that “needs to be kept under review by 
Contracting States” was considered a serious counter-argument. 
Council of Europe, ‘The Longer-Term Future of the System of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (adopted December 2015, published June 2016) report of the Steering Committee for Human 
Rights, page 68, available at <https://rm.coe.int/the-longer-term-future-of-the-system-of-the-
european-convention-on-hum/1680695ad4> accessed 9 May 2018. 
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analysing ECtHR decisions and in supporting development of improvements in the 
processes/operation of the Court concerning legitimacy, consistency and hence authority.  
Development and validation of the analytical framework and judicial model represented a 
significant challenge, being based upon extensive and original analysis of existing published 
work and synthesis with relevant elements of: law process, morally justified legal reasoning 
and legal institutions. Hence it is proposed that the work represents an appropriate and 
original contribution to the body of knowledge. 
The work has argued that the ECtHR is subject to limitations on its legitimate authority to 
make rulings in accordance with the object and purpose it has been given by agents, via the 
member states. Its autonomy is set not only by the express provisions in the text of the ECHR, 
but also by what can be reasonably inferred about its mandate from the nature of the 
agreement. 
A review of the negotiation and wording of the original agreement indicates that republican 
liberalism is a reasonably inferable categorisation of the object and purpose and it, in keeping 
with the express terms, places the promotion and reinforcement of national democracy at 
the heart of the arrangement. 
This has been used to produce a framework of elements for the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s 
rulings which is applied to the current processes of the Court to assess any validity in the 
concerns raised by member states, the first original contribution of the work. 
It is concluded that the process could be appropriately strengthened and a proposed new 
model for ECtHR rulings has been developed, the second original contribution of the work. 
The most important changes are: (1) the recognition of two stages to the ECtHR process, 
interpretation and application, each raising different evidential requirements; (2) evidence of 
significant majority consensus between the member states is essential to interpreting the 
normative scope of a right; (3) a separate procedural and substantive margin of appreciation 
should always be expressly considered in relation to application; (4) correct application of 
procedural requirements by the member states means a strong prima facie presumption that 
the substantive determination is acceptable; and (5) evidence of the presence or absence of 
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consensus in the practices of similarly affected member states on an issue must be factored 
in to determining the reasonableness of the substantive decision. 
The two most promising possible future reforms identified by the work, which would be 
possible only via new express agreement, are identified as relating to formal input by 
respondent states and applicants in the choice of remedies by the ECtHR and the creation of 
provisional judgments, an idea put forward by Lady Justice Arden. These judgments would 
happen before a case even reached the ECtHR, where the Court views that it may soon 
significantly expand its jurisprudence. This would enable state understandings and practices 
to be communicated to the ECtHR, reducing the pressure on the Court base its interpretations 
and standards for delivery on potentially ambiguous government practice. It would also avoid 
debate taking place in a very public and potentially harmful context, only after a binding 
judgment has already been given.  
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